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2017 DIGILAW 754 (ORI)

Shashi Bhusan Tripathy v. Chief Information Commission, Odisha, Bhubaneswar

2017-07-19

D.P.CHOUDHURY

body2017
JUDGMENT : D.P. CHOUDHURY, J. Challenge has been made to the order dated 26.05.2014 passed by the State Information Commission (hereinafter called “the Commission”) in Second Appeal No. 1218 of 2013 with the prayer to set aside the same. FACTS: 2. The factual matrix leading to filing of the writ petition is that the petitioner made an application under the Right to Information Act, 2005 (hereinafter called “the Act”) to the Public Information Officer of the Office of the Sub-Collector, Kamakhyanagar, Dhenkanal to know about the names of the teachers along with their qualifications and the salary paid to them, Government grant and detailed audit report from the management. When the information sought for was not available within the statutory period, the petitioner sent a reminder. Being not successful to get the information, the First Appeal was filed before the First Appellate Authority. When the First Appellate Authority remained silent, the petitioner having no alternative filed Second Appeal No. 1218 of 2013 before the Commission. After hearing the Second Appeal, the Commission passed the order directing the petitioner to file fresh application under the Act, which according to him is illegal. It is also alleged by the petitioner that opposite party No.1 without imposing any punishment on opposite parties 2 and 3, directed the petitioner for filing fresh application although the petitioner had suffered a lot financially, physically and mentally for not obtaining information under the Act. Hence, the writ petition is filed. SUBMISSIONS 3. Mr. B.K. Mohanty, learned counsel for the petitioner challenged the impugned order stating that under the Act, the petitioner is entitled to the information sought for. The provisions of the Act are to supply the information within the statutory period and if the same is not supplied, the concerned authority must be punished by way of imposing penalty to pay so that the object of the Act can be well observed. He further submitted that the Public Information Officer of the Office of the Sub-Collector, Kamakhyanagar, Dhenkanal simply informed the P.I.O. of Sanda Mahavidyalaya to supply the information requested for. He further submitted that the petitioner has made several requests for supplying the information in time and accordingly has deposited the required cost. 4. Mr. He further submitted that the Public Information Officer of the Office of the Sub-Collector, Kamakhyanagar, Dhenkanal simply informed the P.I.O. of Sanda Mahavidyalaya to supply the information requested for. He further submitted that the petitioner has made several requests for supplying the information in time and accordingly has deposited the required cost. 4. Mr. Mohanty, learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that against the inaction of the First Appellate Authority, the petitioner has filed Second Appeal but the Second Appellate Authority, without considering the inaction of the P.I.O. and the First Appellate Authority, observed against the petitioner stating that he did not do due diligence before filing the application. On the other hand, the Commission illegally observed that the petitioner has made abuse of law. The observations of the Commission are not in accordance with law although the Commission directed the appellant to file fresh R.T.I. application. So, he submitted to set aside the order dated 26.05.2014 passed by the Commission and to direct the Commission to pass appropriate order for imposing punishment on opposite parties 2 and 3 for violation of the provisions of the Act. 5. Mr. S.R. Dash, learned counsel for opposite party No.1 submitted that there is no illegality in the impugned order. The informations sought for by the petitioner are voluminous and defective. It is also submitted that the Second Appellate Authority has allowed the petitioner to make fresh application because the information sought for was defective on the ground that the concerned institution has two separate educational institutions and the petitioner has not sought for from which institution, the said information has been sought for. When there is no any mistake on the part of the P.I.O. and the First Appellate Authority, the commission did not choose to impose any punishment. Moreover, it is a Second Appeal not a complaint by the petitioner before opposite party No.1. Thus, the Commission has got only prerogative to decide whether the information should be given or not. So, he supported the order of the Commission. 6. POINT FOR DETERMINATION (i) The main point for consideration in this case is whether the impugned order is liable to be set aside and opposite parties 2 and 3 are liable to be imposed with punishment. DISCUSSION 7. On going through Annexure-1, it appears that the petitioner has made application under Section 6(I) of the Act seeking required informations on 12.11.2012. DISCUSSION 7. On going through Annexure-1, it appears that the petitioner has made application under Section 6(I) of the Act seeking required informations on 12.11.2012. Annexure-1 series show that the P.I.O. of the Office of the Sub-Collector, Kamakhyanagar has informed on 16.11.2012 to the P.I.O. of Sanda Mahavidyalaya to supply information as required to the petitioner. Annexure-2 series show that on 24.12.2012 the P.I.O. of Sub-Collector, Kamakhyanagar asked the Principal, Sanda Mahavidyalay to supply information. Annexure-3 series shows that when no information was received, the petitioner filed first appeal on 07.01.2013 before the First Appellate Authority. Annexure-5 shows that when no action was taken by the First Appellate Authority, he filed Second Appeal before the Commission. The impugned order vide Annexure-6 shows that the Commission has given a speaking order and paragraphs 3 and 4 of the same are quoted below:- “xx xx xxxx xx 3. The Principal submitted that the Regional Higher Secondary School, Sanda, Dhenkanal district is an aided institution and +3 Sanda College, Sanda, Dhenkanal is a non-aided institution. The appellant has sought for information regarding Sanda Mahavidyalaya and its +2 wing and also wanted to inspect all the records of the office and thereafter take copies of some records as he would then decide. The Regional Higher Secondary School, Sanda and +3 Sanda Mahavidyalaya are two separate education institutions. The appellant has not correctly mentioned the names of the two institutions, therefore the information sought for has not been provided to him. He further submitted that the appellant previously was Secretary of Regional Higher Second School, Sanda. 4. The Commission heard both the parties and perused the records. The Commission observed that the appellant filed a defective application. He did not do due diligence before filing the application. The Commission further observed that the appellant made a sweeping demand to see all the records of the office and then choose records for supply of photo copies thereof. This, in the opinion of the Commission, is an abuse of the law. The appellant is advised to file a fresh RTI application seeking reasonable volume of information, serving any public interest. With these observations, the case is disposed of.” From the aforesaid order, it appears that the Commission found that the petitioner was not due diligence while filing application and the application was defective being not related to specific Educational Institution. The appellant is advised to file a fresh RTI application seeking reasonable volume of information, serving any public interest. With these observations, the case is disposed of.” From the aforesaid order, it appears that the Commission found that the petitioner was not due diligence while filing application and the application was defective being not related to specific Educational Institution. The Commission has also observed that the petitioner made a sweeping demand to see all the records of the office and then choose records for supply of photo copies thereof which is of course not the mode of seeking information. The information sought for as per the definition of Section 2(f) of the Act can be made available under the provisions of the Act. Similarly Section 2(j) of the Act defines “Right to Information” in the following manner:- “(j) “right to information” means the right to information accessible under this Act which is held by or under the control of any public authority and includes the right to— (i) inspection of work, documents, records; (ii) taking notes, extracts, or certified copies of documents or records; (iii) taking certified samples of material; (iv) obtaining information in the form of diskettes, floppies, tapes, video cassettes or in any other electronic mode or through printouts where such information is stored in a computer or in any other device;” From the aforesaid provisions, it is clear that Right to Information including the inspection of records and taking the copies of the same through any electronic mode. But the provisions of the Act never show the manner of taking information without specifying the document, copies of which, the petitioner wants. On the other hand, there is no provision in the Act that the petitioner who is the applicant can verify the documents and then take copy of the same at random. So, the view of the Commission cannot be said illegal to disallow the request of the petitioner to obtain information. However, the Commission has allowed the petitioner to make fresh application with specific information sought for. 8. The petitioner has alleged that the Commission has not imposed punishment upon opposite parties 2 and 3 for causing delay in supplying information. 9. However, the Commission has allowed the petitioner to make fresh application with specific information sought for. 8. The petitioner has alleged that the Commission has not imposed punishment upon opposite parties 2 and 3 for causing delay in supplying information. 9. It is reported in Manohar vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr.; (2012) 13 SCC 14 at para-29, where Their Lordships observed the following:- “From the above dissected language of the provision, it is clear that first of all an opinion has to be formed by the Commission. This opinion is to be formed at the time of deciding any complaint or appeal after hearing the person concerned. The opinion formed has to have basis or reasons and must be relatable to any of the defaults of the provision. It is a penal provision as it vests the delinquent with civil consequences of initiation of and/or even punishment in disciplinary proceedings. The grounds stated in the Section are exhaustive and it is not for the Commission to add other grounds which are not specifically stated in the language of Section 20(2). The section deals with two different proceedings. Firstly, the appeal or complaint filed before the Commission is to be decided and, secondly, if the Commission forms such opinion, as contemplated under the provisions, then it can recommend that disciplinary proceedings be taken against the said delinquent Central Public Information Officer or State Public Information Officer. The purpose of the legislation in requiring both these proceedings to be taken together is obvious not only from the language of the section but even by applying the mischief rule wherein the provision is examined from the very purpose for which the provision has been enacted. While deciding the complaint or the appeal, if the Commission finds that the appeal is without merit or the complaint is without substance, the information need not be furnished for reasons to be recorded. If such be the decision, the question of recommending disciplinary action under Section 20(2) may not arise. Still, there may be another situation that upon perusing the records of the appeal or the complaint, the Commission may be of the opinion that none of the defaults contemplated under Section 20(2) is satisfied and, therefore, no action is called for. If such be the decision, the question of recommending disciplinary action under Section 20(2) may not arise. Still, there may be another situation that upon perusing the records of the appeal or the complaint, the Commission may be of the opinion that none of the defaults contemplated under Section 20(2) is satisfied and, therefore, no action is called for. To put it simply, the Central or the State Commission have no jurisdiction to add to the exhaustive grounds of default mentioned in the provisions of Section 20(2). The case of default must strictly fall within the specified grounds of the provisions of Section 20(2). This provision has to be construed and applied strictly. Its ambit cannot be permitted to be enlarged at the whims of the Commission.” With due regard to the aforesaid decision read with Section 20 of the Act, it is clear that before imposing punishment, the Commission is to form opinion basing on the materials for imposing punishment. Moreover, provisions of Section 20 of the Act directs the Commission to form opinion from the available fact and circumstances of the case. In the instant case, since the Commission found the application was defective, for the reasons it has recorded above, it can be said that the Commission has no material to form opinion. Under Section 20 of the Act before taking opinion, the Commission has to garner the material and record the reasons. In the instant case, the Commission formed no opinion to impose punishment because he did not find any fault upon opposite parties 2 and 3. Hence, the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner sans merit. On the other hand, the impugned order of refraining itself to impose punishment is just and proper. The issue No.(i) is answered accordingly. CONCLUSION 10. It has been prayed in the writ petition to set aside Annexure 6 and direct opposite party No.1 to impose punishment on opposite parties 2 and 3 for their inaction. It has been already observed that the order of the Commission is correct and legal and the Commission has not formed opinion to impose punishment as per the discussion made hereinabove. As such, the prayer of the petitioner cannot be acceded to. In the result, the writ petition being devoid of merit, stands dismissed.