JUDGMENT : (Delivered by Hon'ble Alok Kumar Mukherjee, J.) 1. This appeal has been directed against the judgment and order dated 05.02.1983 passed by the VII Additional Sessions Judge, (Higher Criminal Court), Badaun in Sessions Trial No. 550 of 1980 (State v. Salig Ram and others) arising out of Crime No. 401 of 1980, P.S. Ujhani, district Budaun, convicting all the accused-appellants namely Salig Ram, Rajendra Pratap alias Rajendra Prasad, Ram Bilas, Jai Govind, Netra Pal, Munendra Kumar and Ram Vir for the offences under sections 302 read with section 149, 364 read with Section 149, and 201 I.P.C. and sentencing them each for life imprisonment, ten years rigorous imprisonment and five years rigorous imprisonment, respectively and further accused-appellants Salig Ram, Rajendra Pratap alias Rajendra Prasad and Netrapal for two years rigorous imprisonment each under section 148 IPC while accused-appellants Ram Bilas, Jai Govind, Munendra Kumar and Ram Vir for one year rigorous imprisonment each under section 147 I.P.C. which shall run concurrently. 2. It is relevant to mention here that during the pendency of this appeal, appellant nos. 3, 4 and 5 namely Rajendra Pratap alias Rajendra Prasad, Jai Govind and Netra Pal have already died; therefore, the appeal filed on their behalf was abated vide order dated 13.10.2014 passed by the coordinate Bench of this Court. As such the appeal on behalf of the remaining surviving appellant nos. 1, 2 , 6 and 7 namely Salig Ram, Ram Bilas, Munendra Kumar and Ram Vir, respectively are being heard and disposed off by this judgment. 3. The surviving appellants have filed the present appeal against the aforementioned judgment and order dated 05.02.1983 on the ground that the conviction of the aforesaid surviving appellants is against the weight of evidence available on record and against law. Further, the sentences awarded to them are too severe. 4. Brief facts of the prosecution are that in the morning of 16.07.1980 at about 7.00 a.m. one Chhote Lal of village Bheekhampur, P.S. Bilsi, District Budaun was murdered, who had close intimacy with all the police officers including S.H.O. of the P.S. Bilsi. Further, the sentences awarded to them are too severe. 4. Brief facts of the prosecution are that in the morning of 16.07.1980 at about 7.00 a.m. one Chhote Lal of village Bheekhampur, P.S. Bilsi, District Budaun was murdered, who had close intimacy with all the police officers including S.H.O. of the P.S. Bilsi. It is alleged by the prosecution that after the murder of Chhote Lal, his brother Saligram appellant, suspecting that 'Murao' and 'Muslim' community of the area were behind the murder of his brother, armed with guns walked in the village shortly after the said murder, openly threatening that all the Muraos and Muslims of the area would be killed one by one. The reason behind the said strained relationship was that the deceased Chhote Lal was alleged to have illicit relation with Smt. Ram Pyari wife of Bhawani Murao, who was in the employment of the said deceased. The said Bhawani was a close relative of the deceased of this case, Jauhari, Gopi and Ummedi, who, therefore, denounced all relations with Bhawani. Further, the daughter of the said Chhotey Lal eloped with one Ghani Khan (his own driver), who was framed in criminal cases by him using his clout. Also, in a marriage ceremony of the daughter of one Net Ram (murao), the said Ram Pyari was not invited. Infuriated by it he (Chhotey Lal) prevented the priest from performing the said marriage, which was then performed by a person of Murao community itself. In view of the aforesaid threat to their lives almost all the Muraos, particularly close relatives of the said Bhawani, i.e., deceased Jauhari, Gopi and Ummedi and some muslims as well, left the village in the morning of 16.07.1980 and took refusing in a nearby Jungle in the day time. But in the evening when it started raining heavily, they allegedly moved to nearby 'Madaiya' of deceased Zaki at sunset. 5. It is alleged by the prosecution that subsequently the deceased Jauhari had an urge of smoking (Biris). Consequently, he sent his son Ganga Singh to the shop of one Munshi in the village to fetch 'Biris'. But in the evening when it started raining heavily, they allegedly moved to nearby 'Madaiya' of deceased Zaki at sunset. 5. It is alleged by the prosecution that subsequently the deceased Jauhari had an urge of smoking (Biris). Consequently, he sent his son Ganga Singh to the shop of one Munshi in the village to fetch 'Biris'. Meanwhile, the aforesaid seven appellants, who are either close family members of the said Chhotey Lal or relatives and intimate common friends of the appellants, armed with fire arms and lathis, nabbed the said Ganga Singh, when he was coming out from his house after quenching his thirst. Thereafter on getting lead from him they forcibly took Ganga Singh to the said ''Madaiya'' of deceased Zaki and thereby they were able to catch hold of and abduct the above four deceased of this case namely Jauhari, Gopi, Ummedi and Zaki but Ganga Singh (PW-5) in torch light destroying the ''Madaiya'' and other articles of Zaki took them towards the jungle of village Kattaiya, Bhimsen (PW6) and Chandrapal managed to escape and save their lives. They went to nearby village Sirsaul, to the house of one of their relatives (fufa) and remained hidden there till 22.07.1980. Munshi was also hiding there before. Thereafter, they beheaded and castrated the bodies of all the four aforesaid abducted persons. Their bodies were later found lying in a nearby jungle of village Kattaiya, spotted as unknown bodies by the village Chowkidar (PW-1), who informed the P.S. Ujhani. An FIR (Ex.Ka-1) was lodged against unknown persons. Later on the deceased were identified by their family members when the case was first investigated by the local police and when they (P.W.5, P.W.6 etc.) received the information that investigation of the case had been taken over by the CID on 23.07.1980, they moved to their village. 6. Later on after the initial investigation by the local police, the matter was referred to the CID and on receipt of a wireless message dated 19.07.1980, Section Officer, Crime Branch, CID, Bareilly, vide his order dated 20.07.1980 entrusted the investigation of this case along with the case of Chhotey Lal to Inspector N.C. Nath (P.W. 28), who initiated his investigation from 21.07.1980. 7. 7. Subsequently, in the morning of 23.07.1980, Sub Inspector M.P. Singh (P.W.-13), who was on duty in village Bhikhampur, informed M.K. Kaushik, S.O. Bilsi about a conversation, which took place between the appellant Ram Bilas and his sister-in-law (Sali) during the night hours. M.K. Kaushik, S.O., immediately apprehended the appellant Salig Ram and after interrogation at Police Station, took him in police custody and a disclosure statement of Salig Ram was recorded in the Police Station before the said S.O., M.K. Kaushik, Sub Inspector N.C. Nath (P.W.-28), Section Officer C.B. Ray (P.W. 11) and some other police personnel present there. The said appellant assured all of them in his disclosure statement that he would get recovered the gunny bag, in which the heads of all the four deceased, weapon used in the commission of this crime and some clothes of the deceased persons, had been packed and dropped in a well. On his disclosure statement, the appellant Salig Ram was taken to the Mujaria Police post, where again before Sri G.L. Sharma, the then Superintendent of Police, Budaun (P.W. 46) and some other police officers, the said appellant reiterated his earlier disclosure statement. 8. Thereafter, R.P. Mishra, S.O., Sahaswan was sent to arrange for some public witnesses and also for rope and 'Kanta' by which the gunny bag could be taken out from the well. Then the appellant Salig Ram was taken in a jeep on the Kachchala Road in the direction suggested by the accused. After a distance of about 2 Kms. on the outskirts of village Nichola S.O. Sahaswan along with Puttu Singh (P.W. 9), Daya Ram (P.W.-10), Ram Charan, Sohan Pal and Than Singh met and the appellant Salig Ram repeated the same disclosure statement before the aforesaid public witnesses. Moving onward from that place, the police party along with all the aforesaid independent public witnesses and the appellant, reached a distance of one Km. towards the village Kachhala, from where on the suggestion of the appellant, the police party along with all the aforesaid persons and the said appellant marched a distance of about one furlong and there the appellant Salig Ram pointed out the well, wherein the aforesaid gunny bag was dropped by them (the appellant Salig Ram and his accomplices). 9. At about 1.30 P.M. the aforesaid gunny bag was pulled out from the well with the help of rope and two 'Kantas'. 9. At about 1.30 P.M. the aforesaid gunny bag was pulled out from the well with the help of rope and two 'Kantas'. The appellant Salig Ram opened the soaked gunny bag from-where all the four heads of the deceased, their bloodstained pieces of clothes, the 'Gandaasa', bloodstained wooden piece and wet earth along with other articles were recovered. Thereafter on the summoning of the police officials, widows/other relatives of the deceased persons reached the spot and identified heads of their respective husbands/relatives, namely Jauhari, Gopi, Zaki and Umedi. Memo of the aforesaid recoveries was prepared and signed by the Investigating Officer and also signed by G.L. Sharma, the then Superintendent of Police, Budaun (P.W. 46) along with all the Circle Officers, S.O. and S.I. of Police present at the place of the recovery and thumb impressions of the public witnesses present there, were taken on the aforesaid recovery memo (Ex.Ka-5). Recovered clothes of the four deceased were also identified by their respective widows/relatives. Thereafter, all the recovered materials were sealed on the spot and recovery memo along with Panchayatnama of the head of the deceased (Ex Ka 5) also signed by S.O. Puttu Singh (P.W. 9). 10. Subsequently, on 23.07.1980 accused Ram Vir and Ram Bilas were arrested after lots of effort put in by the then S.P. GL Sharma (P.W.46) and some other police officers. Appellant Munendra surrendered on 29.07.1980 before the court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Budaun. Similarly, appellant Netra Pal on 01.08.1980, appellant Rajendra on 27.09.1980 and appellant Jai Govind on 10.11.1980 surrendered before the court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Badaun. Thereafter, identification proceedings were conducted for some of them. In the said identification parade appellant Netrapal was identified by the witness Munshi, whereas appellants Netrapal, Munendra and Jai Gopal were identified by Bhimsen (PW-6) and Munshi. Both the identification memos (Ex. Ka 2, 3 and 4) were prepared as per rules. During the investigation recovery memos with regard to torches, pieces of clothes, materials found at ransacked ''Madaiya'', one 'angochha', blood stained earth and plain earth and site plans were prepared either by the Investigating Officers or other police officers on their directions (Ex. Ka 1A, 65, 46, 67 to 69, 25, 47, 66 and 42). Statements of the witnesses and appellants were recorded. Ka 1A, 65, 46, 67 to 69, 25, 47, 66 and 42). Statements of the witnesses and appellants were recorded. Postmortem of all the beheaded bodies as well as the four heads of the deceased were separately conducted by the respective doctors namely, Dr. R.P.Jauhari (PW-20) and Dr. V.P.Kulshreshtha (PW-12) and postmortem reports were prepared (Ex. Ka 21 to 24 and 11 to 14). Panchayatnamas of all the said bodies and of the four heads were also prepared during the investigation (Ex. Ka 26 to 29 and 6 to 9), challan nash, photo nash, reports R.I. and C.M.O. as well as sample seal (Ex. Ka 30-45) were prepared by the first I.O., Randhir Singh, S.I., P.S. Ujhani (P.W.21). Recovered materials were also sealed as per rules. After completion of the investigation, the charge sheet (Ex. Ka 74) against all the seven accused-appellants was submitted on 10.10.1980. 11. The case was committed to the court of Sessions by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Budaun on 08.12.1980. On 14.07.1981 the then VII Additional Sessions Judge, Budaun framed charges under sections 147, 148, 364/149, 302/149 and 201 IPC respectively, against all the accused-appellants on which they denied the charge, pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 12. In order to prove the charge, besides other papers, prosecution has filed as many as 79 documentary evidence, Ext. Ka-1 to Ext. Ka-79 and also examined in oral evidence as many as 47 witnesses, i.e. PW-1 to PW-47 and produced 22 materials, Ext.-1 to Ext.-22, before the trial court pertaining to this case, the details of which can be had from the impugned judgment. However, to maintain brevity and avoid repetition the material witnesses and relevant documents as well as material/exhibits are being cited/referred to during scanning and appreciation of the evidence at the time of careful examination, discussion of the material on record, consideration of rival contentions of the parties, and analysis of the circumstances relied on by the prosecution in this case, in the latter part of the body of the judgment. 13. During the statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. the appellants admitted their relationship and acquaintance with deceased Chhote Lal but denied the rest of the allegations, prosecution story as well as incriminating materials put forth, alleging false implication. 13. During the statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. the appellants admitted their relationship and acquaintance with deceased Chhote Lal but denied the rest of the allegations, prosecution story as well as incriminating materials put forth, alleging false implication. Appellant Saligram also stated that his brother deceased Chhote Lal was murdered on Wednesday and on the next following Wednesday at about 6 or 7 p.m. the appellants apprehended him from his house and got him falsely implicated in the present case under the influence of the Muslim community. Despite opportunity being given, no oral evidence was adduced by them in their defence. However, three documents were challenged by the appellants namely, copy of the postmortem report of deceased Chhote Lal (Ex. Kha 2), certified copy of the statement of Dr. O.P. Chinappa in Sessions Trial No. 467 of 1980 (State of U.P. Vs. Bhoorey) under Section 302 IPC pertaining to the murder of Chhote Lal deceased (Ex. Kha 3) and also a certified copy of the statement of S.O. Sri Surendra Kumar Kaushik, P.S. Bilsi in the aforesaid Sessions Trial (Ex. Kha 4). 14. After hearing the arguments of the parties the learned Sessions Judge by the impugned judgment and orders convicted the surviving appellants alongwith three other appellants (since deceased) and sentenced them as above. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and order of the trial court, this appeal has been preferred by all the appellants. 15. We have heard Sri Apul Mishra, learned counsel for the four surviving appellants namely Saligram, Ram Bilas, Munendra Kumar and Ram Vir and Sri R.K.Mishra, learned AGA for the State and carefully perused the evidence on record. 16. Sri Apul Mishra, learned counsel for the appellants has made his submission that the chain of circumstances and the links thereof were not complete. More so, all the public witnesses are not only relations of the deceased but also either inimical or 'chance witness'. He inter alia raised the following grounds that the entire prosecution evidence can be categorised under three broad headings; (i) firstly, one of the motive, but the prosecution has utterly failed to prove the alleged motive behind the murder of all the four deceased persons by any cogent evidence. The alleged motive appears to be concocted and an after-thought. He inter alia raised the following grounds that the entire prosecution evidence can be categorised under three broad headings; (i) firstly, one of the motive, but the prosecution has utterly failed to prove the alleged motive behind the murder of all the four deceased persons by any cogent evidence. The alleged motive appears to be concocted and an after-thought. (ii) Secondly, the 'theory of last seen', which was not proved beyond reasonable doubt because there were serious contradictions in the statements of the witnesses examined by the prosecution. More so, the evidence in this regard is not in consonance with the natural human conduct. (iii) Finally, the third heading is that of the recovery made under Section 27 of the Evidence Act on the insistence of the appellant Saligram alone. It was further submitted that the said recovery cannot be taken into consideration as it was the case of the prosecution itself that the appellant Saligram had been taken into formal police custody after his disclosure statement. Moreover, the recovery memo (Ex. Ka-5) lacks the signature of the appellant which indicates that it is a manufactured document and the theory of the said disclosure statement along with the alleged recovery of material objects are doubtful in nature. The entire case is based on circumstantial evidence but all the alleged circumstances, from which the conclusion of the guilt was drawn, could not be fully established by cogent evidence and the chain of alleged circumstances could not be so complete as to lead to any reasonable ground for concluding the guilt of the appellants only and not to any other hypothesis. The entire investigation proceeding is tainted and was conducted in a most casual, defective and perfunctory manner with a single aim to implicate the appellants in this case. 17. Attention was also drawn to the cross-examination of the witnesses PW2, PW5, PW6, namely Rampa, Ganga Singh and Bhim Sen who contradicted the prosecution version as well as their own examination in chief with regard to the material facts. Learned counsel for the appellants further submitted that the examination of inimical and relative witnesses or of the same caste as that of the deceased and their allegedly witnessing the different parts of the incident were wholly doubtful, unnatural and improbable, as such they are not worthy of reliance. Learned counsel for the appellants further submitted that the examination of inimical and relative witnesses or of the same caste as that of the deceased and their allegedly witnessing the different parts of the incident were wholly doubtful, unnatural and improbable, as such they are not worthy of reliance. The incident was informed to the police with an inordinate delay having no plausible explanation, whereas the FIR (Ex. Ka-1) was lodged by one Chowkidar of the village after the beheaded and castrated four corpses of unknown persons were seen by him. After the said recovery, the appellants of the village have falsely been implicated by the CID after due planning with their inimical groups as well as with the aid of the local police. 18. Learned counsel for the appellants further argued that it is surprising that some of the witnesses had identified the three appellants but others had named them, therefore, the said identification proceedings are of no significance. There is a huge gap between the dates of 'last seen evidence' and the 'recovery of the beheaded and castrated dead bodies of the deceased persons'. The entire prosecution story is concocted with a view to implicate the appellants. Neither any specific role had been assigned to each of the appellants nor proved by the prosecution, as such they appear to be falsely roped in, by the intervention of the CID, due to the alleged perceived enmity of the Muraos and the Muslims with the appellants. 19. These arguments have been strongly controverted by the learned AGA for the State. It has been submitted by him that the circumstances essential for conviction were completed, on the basis of evidence in as much abundance that there was cogent evidence to show that all the four deceased had been abducted by none other than the appellants, wielding fire arms and lathis, from the ''Madaiya'' of deceased Zaki and that while they were being whisked away, had been seen by two trustworthy witnesses. In addition to it, the ''Madaiya'', where the deceased persons hid themselves, was forcibly pointed out to the appellants, by the son of one of the deceased, on being threatened. The motive behind the murder of the deceased was consistently and cogently proved by the testimony of several trustworthy witnesses in this case and the said motive can be successfully attributed to the appellants. The motive behind the murder of the deceased was consistently and cogently proved by the testimony of several trustworthy witnesses in this case and the said motive can be successfully attributed to the appellants. The present case also rests on the 'last seen theory', which was also proved by the prosecution through the consistent testimony of two reliable witnesses. 20. The learned AGA for the State also rests his case on the recovery of the material objects on the voluntary disclosure of the appellant Saligram. This factum of recovery had further been fortified by the testimony of several police authorities/officers and independent witnesses, whose presence too, had been proved beyond doubt. Further, it is submitted by the learned AGA that Section 27 of the Evidence Act envisaged disclosure statement from a person "accused of any offence in the custody of the police officer" and not provided the 'formal arrest or custody', therefore, it would have no adverse effect on the disclosure made by the appellant before his formal arrest. The lack of signature/TI on the recovery memo (Ex. Ka-5) would also not adversely affect the factum of said recovery, in the wake of the testimony of number a of witnesses including the higher authorities/officers of police/CID. 21. It is further submitted by the learned AGA that all the circumstances concluding the chain have been proved by the cogent evidence and there is no break in the chain of said circumstances, which unerringly proved the guilt of the appellants. The motive behind the murder of all the four deceased was consistently and cogently proved mainly by the testimony of PW2, PW3 and PW6. Undisputedly, the four castrated and beheaded bodies were recovered by the Chowkidar from a nearby field of the village in a ravaged condition, in close proximity to the date of their abduction/last seen evidence. The present case rests on the 'last seen theory' also, which was proved by the consistent and unshaken testimony of the reliable prosecution witnesses. All the deceased were last seen alive when they were caught hold by the appellants; therefore, in the absence of any satisfactory explanation thereof from the side of the appellants, based on the concrete chain of the circumstantial evidence, the learned trial judge has rightly convicted and sentenced the appellants. Hence, the impugned judgment and order warrants no interference. All the deceased were last seen alive when they were caught hold by the appellants; therefore, in the absence of any satisfactory explanation thereof from the side of the appellants, based on the concrete chain of the circumstantial evidence, the learned trial judge has rightly convicted and sentenced the appellants. Hence, the impugned judgment and order warrants no interference. The witnesses examined by the prosecution are trustworthy, their presence at different spots were natural and probable. Having no material contradictions in their testimony, they cogently established each one of the circumstances specifically, as such, there is no substance in the argument of the learned counsel for the appellants. The alleged contradictions and exaggerations in the testimony of the public witnesses are very natural and appear to be either due to their own individual perceptions about the incident they witnessed and/or also because some of them are distressed, illiterate, rustic villagers, who have lost their dear and near ones in this ghastly crime. 22. Before entering into the merits of the appeal, we would like to remind ourselves the settled proposition of law, to be followed by the High court while exercising the appellate jurisdiction in criminal appeal, propounded by the Apex Court in the cases of Ishvarbhai Fuljibhai Patni Vs. State of Gujrat [1995 Supreme Court Cases (Crl) 222] and Lal Mandi Vs. State of West Bengal, [1995 Cr.LJ 2659 (Supreme Court), 2659] that the High Court, while exercising appellate jurisdiction in criminal appeal, is expected to appraise the credibility of evidence available on record and to draw the inference on the basis of material available on record and has not to be guided by the finding of acquittal or conviction recorded by the learned court below, in the light of the basic principle of criminal law regarding innocence of the accused. Bearing in mind the aforesaid proposition of law we have considered the rival contentions and carefully examined the impugned judgment and material on record. 23. We have considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the impugned judgment and material available on record. 24. It is not disputed that the conviction of the surviving appellants is based on the circumstantial evidence. In a case based on circumstantial evidence, the settled law is that the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is drawn should be fully proved and such circumstances must be conclusive in nature. 24. It is not disputed that the conviction of the surviving appellants is based on the circumstantial evidence. In a case based on circumstantial evidence, the settled law is that the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is drawn should be fully proved and such circumstances must be conclusive in nature. Moreover, all the circumstances should be complete, forming a chain and there should be no gap left in the chain of evidence. Further, the proved circumstances must be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and totally inconsistent with their innocence. Hence, we have to see how far the prosecution has fully and conclusively proved all the circumstances forming the chain without any gap and thereby able to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. 25. Circumstantial Evidence: It is pertinent to mention here that in Tulshiram Sahadu Suryawanshi and another Vs. State of Maharashtra (2012) 10 SCC 373 the Apex Court after referring to its earlier decisions in the cases based on circumstantial evidence has laid down as under: "In Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116 , this Court after referring to various earlier decisions, formulated the following conditions to be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established based on circumstantial evidence:- (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned "must or should" and not "may be" established. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned "must or should" and not "may be" established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between "may be proved" and "must be or should be proved" as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra where the observations were made: [SCC para 19, p. 807: SCC (Cri) p. 1047] Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental distance between ''may be' and ''must be' is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions." (2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty, (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency, (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. 154.These five golden principles, if we may say so, constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence." 26. Further, the Supreme Court, while dealing with a case of circumstantial evidence, in Nizam and others Vs. State of Rajasthan AIR 2015 SC 3430 has pointed out as follows: "The principles of circumstantial evidence have been reiterated by this Court in a plethora of cases. In Bodhraj @ Bodha and Ors. vs. State of Jammu & Kashmir, (2002) 8 SCC 45 ,wherein this court had quoted a number of judgments and held as under: "10. It has been consistently laid down by this Court that where a case rests squarely on circumstantial evidence, the inference of guilt can be justified only when all the incriminating facts and circumstances are found to be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or the guilt of any other person....... It has been consistently laid down by this Court that where a case rests squarely on circumstantial evidence, the inference of guilt can be justified only when all the incriminating facts and circumstances are found to be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or the guilt of any other person....... The circumstances from which an inference as to the guilt of the accused is drawn have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt and have to be shown to be closely connected with the principal fact sought to be inferred from those circumstances. In Bhagat Ram v. State of Punjab AIR 1954 SC 621 it was laid down that where the case depends upon the conclusion drawn from circumstances the cumulative effect of the circumstances must be such as to negative the innocence of the accused and bring home the offences beyond any reasonable doubt." 27. We may also make a reference to a decision of this Court in C. Chenga Reddy v. State of A.P. (1996) 10 SCC 193 , wherein it has been observed thus: (SCC pp. 206-07, para 21) "21. In a case based on circumstantial evidence, the settled law is that the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is drawn should be fully proved and such circumstances must be conclusive in nature. Moreover, all the circumstances should be complete and there should be no gap left in the chain of evidence. Further, the proved circumstances must be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and totally inconsistent with his innocence." 28. In Trimukh Maroti Kirkan vs. State of Maharashtra, (2006) 10 SCC 681 , this court held as under: "12. In the case in hand there is no eyewitness of the occurrence and the case of the prosecution rests on circumstantial evidence. In Trimukh Maroti Kirkan vs. State of Maharashtra, (2006) 10 SCC 681 , this court held as under: "12. In the case in hand there is no eyewitness of the occurrence and the case of the prosecution rests on circumstantial evidence. The normal principle in a case based on circumstantial evidence is that the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn must be cogently and firmly established; that those circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards the guilt of the accused; that the circumstances taken cumulatively should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and they should be incapable of explanation on any hypothesis other than that of the guilt of the accused and inconsistent with their innocence." The same principles were reiterated in Sunil Clifford Daniel vs. State of Punjab, (2012) 11 SCC 205 , Sampath Kumar vs. Inspector of Police, Krishnagiri (2012) 4 SCC 124 and Mohd. Arif @ Ashfaq vs. State (NCT of Delhi), (2011) 13 SCC 621 and a number of other decisions." 29. Keeping these principles in mind, we are now analyzing the circumstances relied on by the prosecution. On perusal of the record of the case it is manifest that the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution are as follows: I. All the appellants are either close relations of one Chhote Lal (deceased) of the village or on visiting terms with him. II. Motive: consisting of sequence of events: (a) There was illicit relationship of the said Chhote Lal with Smt. Ram Pyari wife of one Bhawani 'Murao' of his village, who was in his employment, (b) The three 'Murao' deceased in this case, namely Jauhari, Gopi and Ummedi, were closely related to the said Bhawani and the fourth deceased Zaki, was the person from whose 'madhaiya' the appellants had caught hold of all of them, while hiding and taking shelter. (c) It was suspected by the said deceased Chhote Lal when his daughter eloped with Chand Khan, his tractor driver, that the said Bhawani 'Murao' was instrumental in this incident as a the result thereof he gave beating to Bhawani and threat him out of his employment. (c) It was suspected by the said deceased Chhote Lal when his daughter eloped with Chand Khan, his tractor driver, that the said Bhawani 'Murao' was instrumental in this incident as a the result thereof he gave beating to Bhawani and threat him out of his employment. Consequently, Bhawani 'Murao' left the village but his wife Smt. Ram Pyari continued to live with the deceased Chhote Lal as his concubine. (d) There was also grave resentment within the relations of Bhawani 'Murao' on the issue of the said illicit relationship of Smt. Ram Pyari with Chhote Lal deceased as it brought bad name to their community which resulted in bad blood between the said Chhote Lal and the relations of Bhawani in particular and 'Muraos' in general. (e) Further, due to the said disgrace Smt. Ram Pyari was not invited to a family marriage of one of the relations of Bhawani 'Murao', as a protest, which infuriated the said Chhote Lal (deceased) and as a result thereof, he restrained the pandit (priest) while he was proceeding to solemnize the said marriage, therefore, the said marriage was solemnized by one of the members of 'Murao' community. III. The said Chhote Lal was murdered in the morning of 16.07.1980 resultantly FIR was lodged by his son appellant Ram Bilas, in which he named seven Muslims as assailants but did not name any relatives of the said Bhawani as accused despite strong enmity persisting against them also. IV. On 16.07.1980 appellant Saligram and Ram Bilas did not accompany the dead body of the deceased Chhote Lal to Budaun and they were present in the village Bheekampur, when in the early morning of 17.07.1980 at about 6.00 a.m., the Dy. S.P. Sri Yogendra Pal Singh (PW15) visited the village for spot inspection of the alleged scene of occurrence of the murder of deceased Chhote Lal. V. Appellant Saligram brother of the deceased Chhote Lal wielding firearm, soon thereafter, in the morning of the murder itself, openly abused and while roaming around in the village threatened all the 'Muraos' and the 'Muslims' of the locality that they would be killed after being picked up one by one individually. VI. V. Appellant Saligram brother of the deceased Chhote Lal wielding firearm, soon thereafter, in the morning of the murder itself, openly abused and while roaming around in the village threatened all the 'Muraos' and the 'Muslims' of the locality that they would be killed after being picked up one by one individually. VI. In the wake of the aforesaid threat, on the same day, deceased Jauhari, Gopi and Umedi along with Ganga Singh (PW5) Bhim Sen (PW6) and some other relatives of Bhawani 'Murao' fled away from their village to a nearby jungle and kept hidden themselves hidden for the whole day under the large bushes, but in the evening when it started raining heavily, they shifted to the nearby 'madhaiya' of the fourth deceased Zaki, brother of Ghulam Nabi, who was named as accused in the murder of the said Chhotey Lal. VII. Thereafter, Ganga Singh (PW-5) who was also hiding in the said 'madhaiya' was sent by his father, deceased Jauhari to bring 'bidis' from the shop of one Munshi of his village but to quench his thirst the said Ganga Singh (PW-5) visited his house first and when he was coming out of his house, all the appellants, wielding fire arms and 'lathis' caught hold of him and on the information elicited from the said Ganga Singh (PW5), they carried him to the said 'madhaiya' of the deceased Zaki. Then they abducted the said four deceased persons, while Ganga Singh (PW5) Bheem Sen (PW6) as well as some others, who were also hiding there, managed to run away. VIII. On 17.07.1980 when all the widows of the four deceased went to the said 'madhaiya' of Zaki they found the same to be completely destroyed and ransacked. IX. After the said incident all the four deceased named above were never seen alive and their castrated and beheaded bodies were found lying in a field, nearby a jungle of the village Kattaiya on 18.07.1980 by the Chowkidar Bihari Lal (PW-1). X. According to the postmortem report/medical evidence the four deceased namely Jauhari, Gopi, Umedi and Zaki, were all, most probably murdered at or about the same time and also probably in the night of 16/17.07.1980, itself. X. According to the postmortem report/medical evidence the four deceased namely Jauhari, Gopi, Umedi and Zaki, were all, most probably murdered at or about the same time and also probably in the night of 16/17.07.1980, itself. In all probability they were murdered between the evening of 16.07.1980 and 17.07.1980, i.e., in the mean time, they were abducted by the appellants and their beheaded bodies were found lying in the said field nearby a jungle of village Kattaiya, later identified by their widows and near ones. Therefore, the death of all the four deceased was not natural but homicidal. XI. On 23.07.1980 in the morning when appellant Saligram was interrogated by the police in the latter's custody, he made a disclosure statement. He repeated the same disclosure statement twice first, in the presence of senior police officers of the district Budaun and then, in the presence of the independent witnesses, such as PW-9 Puttu Singh and others. As a consequence thereof and on pointing out by the appellant Saligram, the gunny bag containing four heads of the deceased, a 'Gandasa' (weapon of assault), some pieces of clothes of the deceased persons and some other incriminating articles shown in the recovery memo (Ex. Ka-5) were recovered from a well situated in the jungle of village Kattaiya. Although, the said recovery under Section 27 of the Evidence Act was made on the disclosure statement and pointing out by the appellant Saligram alone, since all the four deceased were apprehended by the seven appellants jointly, in furtherance of their common object to kill the 'Muraos and Muslims' of the village selectively in revenge of the murder of the said Chhotey Lal, to whom all the appellants were either closely related or had intimate connection, therefore the said recovery will be treated as a circumstance against all the remaining appellants with the same force as against the appellant Saligram himself. 30. Before examining how far the prosecution has succeeded in proving the afore-mentioned circumstances against the surviving appellants, we would like to have a glance at the medical evidence in this case, which is in the form of statements of Dr. R.P.Jauhari (PW-20) and Dr. V.P.Kulshrestha (PW-12), postmortem reports of all the four beheaded bodies as well as four four heads of the deceased (Ex. Ka-21 to Ex.Ka-24 and Ex.Ka-11 to Ex. Ka-14) prepared by them respectively. R.P.Jauhari (PW-20) and Dr. V.P.Kulshrestha (PW-12), postmortem reports of all the four beheaded bodies as well as four four heads of the deceased (Ex. Ka-21 to Ex.Ka-24 and Ex.Ka-11 to Ex. Ka-14) prepared by them respectively. Although the appellants have not disputed the homicidal death and the recovery of their beheaded bodies and their heads separately, as alleged in the prosecution story, even then as an appellate court we are duty-bound to examine whether any offence was committed and if so, by whom. 31. Postmortem reports by the said Doctors (PW-20 and PW12) and their opinions: (A) Four beheaded bodies of the deceased: I. The Postmortem Examination of the beheaded body of the deceased Johari was conducted by Dr. R.P. Jauhari (P.W. 20) on 19.7.80 at 2.30 P.M. He then prepared the postmortem report (Ext. Ka-21) and made the following observations therein: 1. The deceased was middle aged, his body type was average. Rigor Mortis was absent. There was no head on the body. 2. There were maggots all over the body and the skin was peeled off from many parts of the body. Body hair was white and loose. 3. Nails were also loose. Intestines were protruding six inches out of anus. Body was decomposed. Following postmortem injuries were there on the person of the deceased: a.) Both axillae are eaten up by maggots or animals. b) Part of scrotum and major part of penis and whole testes are eaten up by maggots. c.) Dorsum of both hands eaten up by animals like vulture. Internal Examination of the body of the deceased revealed following findings: (a.) Scalp and skull not found with the body. Brain, base of skull not found (b.) In the thorax region, apart from skin and ribs all soft structure eaten up (c.) Only abdomen skin is left and the rest of the structure is eaten up by scavengers. (d.)In the postmortem report the doctor opined that the death occurred around three days prior to the postmortem and the cause of death is severing away of head from neck. II. The postmortem examination of the beheaded body of the deceased Gopi was also conducted by Dr. R.P. Jauhari P.W. 20 on the same date at 3.10 PM. He then prepared the postmortem report (Ext. Ka-22) and made the following observations therein: 1. The deceased was aged about 27 years and he was of average built. II. The postmortem examination of the beheaded body of the deceased Gopi was also conducted by Dr. R.P. Jauhari P.W. 20 on the same date at 3.10 PM. He then prepared the postmortem report (Ext. Ka-22) and made the following observations therein: 1. The deceased was aged about 27 years and he was of average built. Rigor mortis was absent. 2. Head and neck were not there on the body. Skin was peeling off from most parts of the body. 3. Big sized maggots were eating up the body, nails were loose and chest hair was black and loose. The doctor found following ante-mortem injuries on the person of the deceased: (a.) Head along with neck absent from the body. C-VI and C-VII Vertebrae are present in the cervical chain above the level of C-VI. (b.) The margins of the wound in neck along with underneath soft tissue are eaten up, hence the nature of wound is not clear. (c.) Contusion 6 cm x 4 cm on front of left elbow. (d.) Penis along with part of scrotum eaten up. (e.) Abdominal Wall eaten up. (f.) Left Buttock eaten up by animals. The internal examination of the person of the deceased revealed following information: (a.) Scalp and skull not found on the body. (b.) Brain not found. (c.) Leaving the skin around the chest and ribs all the soft structure eaten up. (d.) Entire abdomen area eaten up. The doctor opined that the death occurred due to severing away of head from neck. Also it appeared that death occurred three days prior to the postmortem examination. III. The postmortem examination of the beheaded body of the deceased Ummedi was also conducted by PW 20 Dr. R.P. Jauhari at 3.55 PM and he prepared the postmortem report (Ext. Ka-23) and made the following observations therein: (1.) The age of the deceased was about 40 years and he was of average built. (2.) Rigor mortis was absent. (3.) There was no head on the body, there were big sized maggots all over the body and skin was peeling off from various parts of the body (4.) The nails were wet and on the chest there was loose black hair. (5.) Head along with neck at the level of T 1 not found with the body. (3.) There was no head on the body, there were big sized maggots all over the body and skin was peeling off from various parts of the body (4.) The nails were wet and on the chest there was loose black hair. (5.) Head along with neck at the level of T 1 not found with the body. The following postmortem injuries were found on the body of the deceased: (a.)Margins and soft tissues of the wound are eaten up by maggots and birds. (b.) The sterno membrane also eaten up. (c.) Anus is eaten up. (d.) Both axillary are eaten up. (e.) Penis and scrotum eaten up except the left testicle. (f.) Anus eaten up at places. The internal examination of the body of the deceased produced following observations: (a.) Skull, neck, brain not found. (b.) Only wall of chest intact other soft tissues eaten up. (c.) Abdomen region completely eaten up. The doctor opined that the death occurred due to severing of head around three days prior to the postmortem. IV. The postmortem examination of the beheaded body of the deceased Zaki was also conducted by PW 20 Dr. R.P. Jauhari at 4.30 PM on the same date he has prepared the postmortem report (Ext Ka-24). Following observations were made in the postmortem report: (1.) The age of the deceased was about 50 years and he was of average built. (2.) Rigor Mortis was absent. Head along with neck absent from the level of C VII. There was peeling of skin at various parts. (3.) His nails were loose and big sized maggots were all over the body. Hair on chest was sparse and loose. The medical examination revealed following ante mortem injury: (a.) Head along with neck upto the level of C-VI absent. Following postmortem injuries were also revealed in the medical examination: (a.) Margins and underlying tissues of the wound are eaten up at places so nature of wound can't be ascertained. (b.) Both the axillae are eaten up by bugs. (c.) Both upper arms at different places eaten up. (d.) Penis along with testes and part of scrotum eaten up. (e.) Both illiac fossa are eaten up. The internal examination of the body of the deceased revealed following information: (a.) Skull, neck and brain were not found with the body. (b.) Both the axillae are eaten up by bugs. (c.) Both upper arms at different places eaten up. (d.) Penis along with testes and part of scrotum eaten up. (e.) Both illiac fossa are eaten up. The internal examination of the body of the deceased revealed following information: (a.) Skull, neck and brain were not found with the body. (b.) Chest wall at all places eaten up by bugs, soft structure underneath also eaten up. (c.) Abdomen wall of lower half abdomen eaten up. All soft structure of abdomen are eaten up. The doctor opined that death occurred due to severing of head from the body around three days before the postmortem examination. Dr. R.P. Jauhari (PW 20) stated on oath that all the four postmortem reports (Ext Ka-21 to Ext. Ka-24) were prepared and signed by him. He further stated that death of all the four deceased occurred in the midnight of 16.7.80-17.7.80. On being cross examined PW 20 stated that the duration of injuries may vary from 20 hours to 24 hours on either side. 32. (B) Four heads of the deceased: I. The medical examination of the head of the deceased Jauhari (Exhibit Ka-9) was conducted by Dr. V.P. Kulshreshth (P.W.-12) on 24.07.1980 at 3.30 P.M. wherein the characteristics of the external examination were noted as under: Received only Head including cervical VI vertebrae & in decomposed condition. The amputated wound is eaten up by insects, eye closed. His eyes shrunken, scalp hair is completely absent. Moustaches with some white hair can be seen. Ante mortem injuries: (i) Amputated wound at the level of C-IV on the cervical regions and neck having circumference of 24 cm and 11 c.m. diameter. Maggots present with decomposition at margins in side blood clots present. (ii) No injury seen on face region. Internal Examination : 1. Scalp hair absent. Neck is amputated at the level of C-VI 2. Only skull bone is visible. 3. Membranes decomposed. 4. Brain liquified Additional Specific details: The face skin shows faded and white colour with softened face as it was submerged in water. It was opined by the aforesaid doctor that the death of Johari might have been caused about eight days prior to the medical examination of the head due to shock and haemorrhage as a result of decapitation of body. II. It was opined by the aforesaid doctor that the death of Johari might have been caused about eight days prior to the medical examination of the head due to shock and haemorrhage as a result of decapitation of body. II. The medical examination of the head of the deceased Gopi (Exhibit Ka-14) was conducted by Dr. V.P. Kulshrshrestha (P.W.-12) on 24.07.1980 at 4.00 P.M., wherein the characteristics of the external examination were noted as under: During the external examination of the deceased, head and neck in advanced stage of decomposition. Eyes bulging out. Nose depressed. Tongue protruded. Maggots present. Ante mortem injuries: 1. Decapitated incised wound at the level of cervical VI vertebrae. Vertebra VI is cut. The wound circumference is 34 cms and diameter 11.5 cms. The margins are eaten by insect and they are clear out at some places and blood clots present in the cut places. Additional Specific details: Face skin is softened and has a faded white colour. No external injury seen on face. It was opined by the doctor that the death might have happened about eight days prior to the examination and further it might have happened due to shock and haemorrhage as a result of decapitation incised wound of head. III. The medical examination of the head of the deceased Ummedi (Exhibit Ka-13) was conducted by Dr. V. P. Kulshrshresth (P.W.-12) on 24.07.1980 at 4.30 P.M. wherein the characteristics of the external examination were noted as under: During the external examination of the deceased, head and neck were found in decomposed stage. Eyes bulging out. Mouth was found open. Tongue protruded out. Ante mortem Injuries: 1. Decapitated incised wound at the level of Thoracic T-1 (one) with diameter of 15 cms. and circumference of cut wound 361 cms. horizontal clean cut. Margins at places and blood clots but most of the places are eaten by insects. Additional Specific details: Face skin is softened and has a faded white colour. No external injury seen on face. It was opined by the doctor that the death might have happened about eight days prior to the examination and further it might have happened due to shock and haemorrhage as a result of decapitation from the neck. IV. The medical examination of the head of the deceased Zaki (Exhibit Ka-12) was conducted by Dr. It was opined by the doctor that the death might have happened about eight days prior to the examination and further it might have happened due to shock and haemorrhage as a result of decapitation from the neck. IV. The medical examination of the head of the deceased Zaki (Exhibit Ka-12) was conducted by Dr. V.P. Kulshreshth (P.W.-12) on 24.07.1980 at 5.00 P.M. wherein the characteristics of the external examination were noted as under: During the external examination of the deceased, head and neck were found in decomposed condition. Eyes protruded out. Mouth was found open. Scanty moustache, maggots present. Ante mortem Injuries: 1. Decapitated incised at the level of cervical VI of neck. The cut wound has clean margins at places while most of the places are eaten by insects and the circumference of the wound is 34 c.m. X 12 c.m. margins blood at places in the clot infected. Additional Specific details: Face skin softened and has a faded white colour. No extra injury seen on face. It was opined by the doctor that the death might have happened about eight days prior to the examination and further it might have happened due to shock and haemorrhage as a result of decapitated injury of neck. From the above medical evidence of unimpeachable character, we have no hesitation in concluding that all the four victims had died homicidal death around midnight of 16/17.07.1980 in the area of agricultural field nearby jungle of village Kattaiya within the jurisdiction of Police Station Ujhani of District Budaun (U.P.). The injuries on the dead bodies carefully revealed that they were mercilessly butchered and castrated with the intent to cause death due to sheer vengeance. The place where the dead body had been dumped leaves no room for doubt that perpetrators of the crime had intended to destroy the evidence. 33. Admittedly, this is not a case of direct ocular evidence but the case is entirely based on circumstantial evidence. Therefore, it needs to be examined as to how far the prosecution has succeeded in proving the aforementioned circumstances (I to XI) which cogently establish a definite consistently unerringly pointing only towards the guilt of the surviving appellants. 33. Admittedly, this is not a case of direct ocular evidence but the case is entirely based on circumstantial evidence. Therefore, it needs to be examined as to how far the prosecution has succeeded in proving the aforementioned circumstances (I to XI) which cogently establish a definite consistently unerringly pointing only towards the guilt of the surviving appellants. Further, there should be no escape from the above conclusion and they should be incapable of any explanation or hypothesis other than that of the guilt of the surviving appellants and are totally inconsistent with their innocence. 34. Therefore, first of all we carefully examine the first link of the aforementioned circumstances. It appears from the evidence of the prosecution as well as statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. of the appellants that this circumstance was not only proved by the prosecution witnesses but the same has also been admitted by all the appellants that appellants Saligram, Ram Bilas, Rajendra Pratap, Jai Govind and Ramvir were close relatives of deceased Chhote Lal while accused Munendra and Netrapal were on visiting terms with the family of said Chhote Lal (deceased). Now we examine the second circumstance which pertains to the motive of the incident as well as other circumstances III, IV, V, VIII AND IX. In a case of circumstantial evidence, motive assumes great significance and importance, for the reason that the absence of motive would put the court on its guard and cause it to scrutinize each piece of evidence very closely in order to ensure that suspicion, emotion or conjecture do not take the place of proof. In Subedar Tewari Vs. State of U.P. 1989 Supp (1) SCC 91, the Supreme Court observed as under: "20. The evidence regarding existence of motive which operates in the mind of an assassin is very often that (sic) not within the reach of others. The motive may not even be known to the victim of the crime. The motive may be known to the assassin and no one else may know that gave birth to the evil thought in the mind of the assassin." Similarly, in Suresh Chandra Bahri Vs. The motive may not even be known to the victim of the crime. The motive may be known to the assassin and no one else may know that gave birth to the evil thought in the mind of the assassin." Similarly, in Suresh Chandra Bahri Vs. State of Bihar 1995 Supp (1) SCC 80, the Apex Court held as under: "In a case of circumstantial evidence, the evidence bearing on the guilt of the accused nevertheless becomes untrustworthy and unreliable because most often it is only the perpetrator of the crime alone who knows as to what circumstances prompted him to adopt a certain course of action leading to the commission of the crime. Therefore, if the evidence on record suggest sufficient/necessary motive to commit a crime it may be conceived that the accused had committed it." 35. Thus, if the issue is examined in the light of the aforesaid settled legal proposition, we may concur with the courts below on the said aspect. 36. It appears from the record that the prosecution has examined PW2 Smt. Rampa, PW3 Smt. Kalawati, PW4 Smt. Bhagwati, widows of the above three deceased Jauhari, Gopi and Umedi, PW5 Ganga Singh and PW6 Bhimsen on this point. They have vividly described the motive behind this gruesome murder. Undoubtedly, Chhote Lal was murdered on 16.07.1980, the witnesses PW1 to PW 6 have narrated in their testimony that on the said date after the murder of Chhote Lal, his brother Saligram openly abused and threatened the 'muraos' and 'muslims' of that village with dire consequences and stated that now they would selectively kill them. There is no major inconsistency on this point in the inter se testimony of PW2 to PW6. This fact also finds place in their statement recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. Thus, their said statements proved the alleged motive for this crime. 37. All the three widows of the deceased (PW-2 to PW-4) have stated in their testimony that when their husbands/family members did not return to their homes till night of 16.07.1980, they went out in search of their husbands next day. During the said search when they reached near the 'madaiya' of Zaki, they found the same fully ransacked, various articles were lying scattered here and there. During the said search when they reached near the 'madaiya' of Zaki, they found the same fully ransacked, various articles were lying scattered here and there. It is also stated by PW4 Kalawati that thereafter, on 18.07.1980, she and one Shyama of her village went to P.S. Bilsi and informed the police officer that their family members were not traceable since the evening of 16.07.1980 and insisted on lodging of FIR, but the officer abusively rebuked them and did not lodge the report. PW-4 -Smt. Bhagwati, through her statement, has corroborated the factum of their (PW-4 and Shyama) first visiting the police station concerned. All the aforementioned witnesses (PW-2 to PW-5), PW-18, Samsuddin as well as widow of Zaki, Gariba also identified first, the beheaded bodies of the deceased and then their heads. 38. In addition to it, the witnesses PW2 Smt. Rampa, PW3 Smt. Kalawati, PW4 Smt. Bhagwati also narrated the background related to the facts behind the aforementioned threat although that facts were neither asked for by the Investigating Officers nor had they suo-moto narrated the same during investigation, being an illiterate rustic ladies of the village. In this case, based on circumstantial evidence, the cause behind the bad-blood prevailing in between the family of Chhote Lal on one hand and 'Muraos' and 'Muslims' on the other hand, cannot be brushed aside. The witnesses PW 2 to PW4 have categorically narrated the reasons for such threat before this incident. According to them, the said Chhote Lal had illicit relation with Smt. Ram Pyari, wife of Bhawani 'Murao', who was in his employment. Further, deceased Jauhari, Gopi and Umedi were closely related to the said Bhawani. The said furtive relationship was bringing bad name to the entire community of Muraos in general and their close relatives in particular. Hence, they socially boycotted the wife of Bhawani. Meanwhile, there was a marriage in one of the 'muraos' family in the village, in which Smt. Ram Pyari was not invited because of the said reason, which infuriated Chhote Lal, who in turn chased the pandit (priest) and did not allow him to perform the said marriage ceremony. Consequently, the 'Muraos' of the village performed the said ceremony by a person of their community. 39. Subsequently, in another incident daughter of the said Chhote Lal, Km. Dhanno, had eloped with one Chand Khan, his tractor driver. Consequently, the 'Muraos' of the village performed the said ceremony by a person of their community. 39. Subsequently, in another incident daughter of the said Chhote Lal, Km. Dhanno, had eloped with one Chand Khan, his tractor driver. In that incident Chhote Lal suspected that Bhawani 'Murao' was behind her elopement, as a result of which he terminated him from the employment and therefore, Bhawani left the village, but his wife Smt. Ram Pyari remained there living with Chhote Lal. According to the aforesaid witnesses these small incidents, which were happening in the village from time to time triggered a cumulative outlet on the date of the instant occurrence, after Chhote Lal was murdered. In consequence thereof, the brother of Chhote Lal, Saligram openly threatened the 'Muraos' and 'Muslims' roaming in the village with fire arm, as narrated above. 40. The learned counsel for the appellants vehemently argued that these statements regarding the background of the motive in question are nothing but an after-thought and a self-created cock and bull story of the prosecution witnesses that cannot be relied upon by the Court. But in our opinion, these statements/background facts of the alleged motive are an independent expression and perception of the above witnesses (PW2 to PW6), who are illiterate rustic villagers, which cannot be easily thrown away. All the said witnesses have stood to their lengthy cross examination and in their said cross-examination they also repeatedly corroborated the alleged motive and its background, narrated by them in their examination in chief. Therefore, in our opinion there is no force in this argument. 41. Further, in order to test the trustworthiness of the aforementioned witnesses (PW2 to PW6) that as to whether Saligram amd Ram Bilas, brother and son respectively, of the deceased Chhote Lal were present on 16.07.1980 in the village, as alleged by the witnesses, we examined the evidence on record and found that it is astonishing that the report of murder of the deceased Chhote Lal was lodged at police station by his son Ram Bilas in the morning of 16.07.1980 and in that report, he claimed himself to be an eyewitness and named seven Muslims as the assailants of his father and did not name any 'Muraos' of the village. From the evidence of PW-15 Yogendra Singh, Dy. From the evidence of PW-15 Yogendra Singh, Dy. S.P.Budaun it is proved that in the early morning of 16.07.1980 Saligram and Ram Bilas, brother and son of the deceased were present in the village but did not accompany the dead body of his brother/father Chhote Lal. This seems to be against normal human conduct and strengthens the evidence adduced by the PW2 to PW6 with regard to the motive and aforementioned other circumstances. 42. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that there was no enmity prevailing between Chhote Lal's family and 'Muraos' of the village, and this fact gains corroboration from the said FIR lodged by his son Ram Bilas not naming any of the 'Muraos' of the village but this contention of the learned counsel is not convincing. On the other hand it is surprising that despite staunch enmity with the family of the deceased Chhote Lal his son did not name any of the 'Muraos', especially those who were close relatives of Bhawani. 43. In our opinion the motive is aberration of the mind of the accused. It is probable that they thought that they themselves would teach them a lesson which resulted in this gruesome murder of three 'Muraos' and one person of Muslim 'community', in whose 'madaiya' they had taken shelter. Running away of terror-stricken 'Muraos' from the village perhaps further strengthens the suspicion of the appellants that family members of the deceased 'muraos' who were closely related with 'Bhawani', would also conspire for the murder of Chhote Lal. In consequence thereof, the appellants' frenzied mental date to take revenge resulted in this incident. The recovery of castrated and beheaded bodies by the police within two days after the abduction of all the four deceased from the field near jungle and recovery of their heads, 'Gandasa', weapon of assault as well as other incriminating articles on the pointing out of one of the appellant, proved in this case by the prosecution by enormous evidence, strengthens the alleged motive illustrated by the witnesses (PW2 to PW6) and points only towards the guilt of the appellants and none else. With the above discussion, we are of the opinion that the prosecution has succeeded in proving the alleged motive in this case. 44. With the above discussion, we are of the opinion that the prosecution has succeeded in proving the alleged motive in this case. 44. In the instant case, the prosecution story relies upon the 'last seen theory' and other circumstances (III to X of the circumstances collectively) also, as 'last seen theory' itself a pivotal evidence which is now being examined here in below. 45. The learned trial judge has also convicted the appellants based on the 'last seen theory' finding it an important link in the chain of the circumstances pointing only towards the guilt of the appellants and further that the appellants have not offered any cogent, reasonable and probable explanation under Section 106 of the Evidence Act. 46. To prove the aforementioned circumstances, in addition to the evidence discussed in earlier paragraphs, the prosecution has examined especially PW5 Ganga Singh, son of the deceased Jauhari and PW-6 Bhim Sen, son of Sukkhi. The learned trial judge has also found this fact proved in their testimony that on 16.07.1980, in the night all the deceased were last seen with the appellants, who caught hold of them from the 'madhiya' of deceased Zaki and took them to an unknown place. After that incident within two days on 18.07.1980 their castrated and beheaded bodies were recovered from the field nearby jungle of the village Kattaiya. 47. With regard to the 'last seen theory' the evidence of PW5 Ganga Singh and PW6 Bhim Sen are most important because both of them are alleged to be present when the appellants wielding fire arms and lathis over powered all the four deceased Jauhari, Gopi, Umedi and Zaki, while they were hiding in the 'madaiya' of Zaki in the night of 16.07.1980 and after that incident the deceased were never seen alive by anyone till their said beheaded bodies were recovered on 18.07.1980. Therefore, before relying on their testimonies it is necessary to examine as to whether evidence of both these material witnesses are trustworthy and whether they are worthy of credence. 48. Undisputedly, PW-5 Ganga Singh is the son of deceased Jauhari and PW6 Bhim Sen is his cousin. Both these prosecution witnesses, in their evidence had elaborately described their presence at the spot. In his statement PW-5 has stated that after the murder of Chhote Lal an open threat was issued by his brother Saligram. 48. Undisputedly, PW-5 Ganga Singh is the son of deceased Jauhari and PW6 Bhim Sen is his cousin. Both these prosecution witnesses, in their evidence had elaborately described their presence at the spot. In his statement PW-5 has stated that after the murder of Chhote Lal an open threat was issued by his brother Saligram. Consequently, he (PW-5) alongwith his father deceased Jauhari, his brother Chandra Pal and deceased Gopi and Umedi fled away from the village to a nearby jungle due to fear. He also stated that when they were coming out of the 'Madaiya', PW6 Bhim Sen met them in the jungle bearing torch. Munshi and Najir also met them when they told them about the threat of Saligram appellant. All of them went to the said jungle and kept hiding themselves in large bushes during the day. 49. He (PW-5) further stated that in the evening, one Anwar of his village also came with torch in search of his brother. When it started drizzling in the evening, they tried to cover themselves under the bushes but when it started raining heavily all of them shifted to the 'Madaiya' of Zaki. He also stated that when it was dark his father had a craving for smoking 'bidi' and so he asked the witness (PW-5) to bring some 'bidi' from the shop of Munshi situated in the village. On the way to the shop Ganga Singh (PW-5) felt thirsty and hence he went to his house to quench his thirst. When he came out of the house after taking water all the appellants holding firearms, Lathis and torch encountered him. He (PW-5) described the nature of weapons and torch in the possession of each of the appellants individually. He further stated that the appellants threatened him and inquired about his father and brother and by pressurizing him they elicited the information from him as to who all were hiding at the 'Madaiya' of Zaki. 50. According to him (PW-5), getting the said information the appellant Saligram, by catching hold of his hand forcibly dragged him to the said 'Madaiya' alongwith other six appellants. 50. According to him (PW-5), getting the said information the appellant Saligram, by catching hold of his hand forcibly dragged him to the said 'Madaiya' alongwith other six appellants. He (PW-5) also narrated how and from which direction they reached towards 'Madaiya' and after hearing the conversation between the persons hiding there, when the appellants were at a distance of about 10 paces from the said 'Madaiya', the appellant Saligram got infuriated and fired in the air after abusing the persons hiding there. Simultaneously, other appellants flashed their torches. Terrified by all this commotion the persons sitting in the 'Madaiya' came out and tried to run helter-skelter, on which the appellants pounced upon them with a view to catch them. 51. It is further stated by the witness Ganga Singh (PW-5) that as the appellant Saligram was involved in this process, he took advantage by managing to free himself and running away from the said place of 'madaiya'. While running, he also saw Chandrapal and Bhim Sen (PW-6) towards the north direction. On seeing this he, too, chose to run in the same direction and while doing so, from a distance he saw that the four deceased Jauhari, Gopi, Umedi and Zaki were being apprehended by the appellants. Hence in order to save his life he reached along with Bhim Sen and Chandrapal went to the nearby village Sirsaul, where his 'fufa' lived and where Munshi had already reached. 52. He (PW-5) further stated that all the persons who had been fleeing with him kept hiding in the house of his 'fufa'. After 4-5 days when they heard about the recovery of dead bodies of the four deceased they sent only Munshi to the village to find out the actual position and they, terrified by this incident, kept hiding there with a view to save their lives. Thereafter, on the next day, when Munshi left for getting information, his (PW-5's) brother Ratiram came there and told them that CID had taken up the investigation and now they had nothing to fear. When they returned to the village his statement was recorded by the CID authority/Investigating Officer. He also described the incident of recovery of four heads, pertaining to the deceased, from the well. When they returned to the village his statement was recorded by the CID authority/Investigating Officer. He also described the incident of recovery of four heads, pertaining to the deceased, from the well. According to him, he also went there along with his mother and many other persons and found that appellant Saligram was there in the custody of the police. 53. Similarly, PW-6 Bhim Sen has also corroborated the above evidence of PW-5 Ganga Singh, in almost all respect. He admitted that on the date, time and place, described by the PW5 Ganga Singh, he met with PW5 Ganga Singh, Chandrapal and all the deceased who were his relatives as well as other persons were hiding in the 'Madaiya' of Zaki. He also endorsed that PW5 Ganga Singh had told him about the alleged threat of the appellant Saligram and after hearing this he accompanied him along with other persons. He also narrated the entire incident minutely, as described above by the witness PW5 Ganga Singh. He further corroborated that when they were hiding in the 'Madaiya' of Zaki, with a view to protect themselves from heavy rain, after about half an hour, some persons came there flashing torches towards 'Madaiya' and he heard appellant Saligram abusing and shouting and asking them to come out. He also heard the gun shot. After hearing the gun shot they came out from the 'Madaiya'. He identified the appellants Ram Bilas, Ramvir, Rajendra and Saligram, who were previously known to him. He also identified the appellants Jai Govind, Munendra and Netrapal, who were recognized by him at the time of the incident only by their faces and not by their names. 54. He (PW-6) also narrated as to which appellant was holding which nature of weapon and torches at that time. He further stated that when they came out of the said 'Madaiya' all the appellants tried to apprehend them. Fortunately he and his brother Chandra Pal managed to escape and behind them, they saw Ganga Singh also running towards them to save his life. This witness also narrated that all the seven appellants were able to apprehend the four deceased. He also described how they reached from that place to the house of their relative in village Sirsaul, where Munshi was already present and kept hiding there. This witness also narrated that all the seven appellants were able to apprehend the four deceased. He also described how they reached from that place to the house of their relative in village Sirsaul, where Munshi was already present and kept hiding there. Corroborating the remaining evidence of PW5 Ganga Singh as stated above he told that he remained hidden in the house of his 'fufa' because relatives of the deceased Chhote Lal and the appellant Saligram created panic there and they apprehended threat to their lives. 55. According to PW-6 Bhimsen, after a few days, on the information of Ratiram his cousin brother that CID officials were present in the village and there was no fear, he along with others returned to the village, got his statement recorded to the Investigating Officer and also showed his torch to the police officials, who prepared the requisite memo. The witness also placed the said torch (Ex. 12) before the trial court and further stated that in the test identification parades held in the district jail, Budaun, he correctly identified the appellants Jai Govind, Munendra and Netrapal, whose names he did not know prior to the alleged incident. He also stated that he did not see any of them after the said incident at the 'Madaiya' of Zaki and between the time when he identified them in jail. 56. Both the witnesses stood to the lengthy cross-examination by the defence but in their cross-examination also both the witnesses again reiterated their evidence recorded during examination in chief. There is no material contradiction in the inter se evidence of the said witnesses (PW5 and PW6). Their testimony also gets fortified by the other oral and documentary evidence placed by the prosecution on record. Therefore, the evidence of these trustworthy witnesses are full of credence and it appears that the "last seen theory" shall be relied upon in this case. 57. In addition to this, to prove the test identification proceedings of the appellants Jai Govind, Munendra and Netrapal the prosecution has examined PW7 Virendra Pal Singh DRO, Budaun and PW8 S.S.Yadav, A.S.D.M., Budaun, who proved the identification memo of the appellant Jai Govind (Ex. Ka-2) and identification memo pertaining to Munendra and Netrapal (Ex. Ka-3), respectively. 57. In addition to this, to prove the test identification proceedings of the appellants Jai Govind, Munendra and Netrapal the prosecution has examined PW7 Virendra Pal Singh DRO, Budaun and PW8 S.S.Yadav, A.S.D.M., Budaun, who proved the identification memo of the appellant Jai Govind (Ex. Ka-2) and identification memo pertaining to Munendra and Netrapal (Ex. Ka-3), respectively. According to PW-7 on 26.02.1981 witnesses Bhim Sen (PW-6) and Munshi correctly identified accused Jai Govind while according to PW8, on 27.09.1980 Bhim Sen had correctly identified both the appellant Munendra and Netrapal but Munshi had correctly identified only Netrapal appellant in the district jail, Budaun. PW-8 Mr. Yadav has further proved that on 27.09.1980 he also conducted another test identification of the recovered clothes, relating to the incident, in question in which Smt. Rampa, Smt. Kalawati, Smt. Bhagawati and Chandrapal witnesses too correctly identified some of the clothes related to them and he proved the identification memo in this regard (Ex. Ka4). Although some of the appellants were known to the witnesses and are of the same village, those appellants, who were residing in Etah passed through the said test identification during investigation, which shows that the investigating officer wanted to be doubly sure before placing the charge-sheet against them. 58. The learned counsel for the appellants also pointed out that no proper safeguard were adopted by the concerned Magistrate during test identification of some of the appellants. But we do not find any substance in the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants because in the case of State of Maharashtra Vs. Suresh (2000)1 SCC 471 the Apex Court in this context has observed as under: "If potholes were to be ferreted out from the proceedings of the magistrates holding such parades possibly no test identification parade can escape from one or two lapses. If a scrutiny is made from that angle alone and the result of the parade is treated as vitiated every test identification parade would become unusable. We remind ourselves that identification parades are not primarily meant for the court. They are meant for investigation purposes. The object of conducting test identification parade is two fold. First is to enable the witnesses to satisfy themselves that the prisoner whom they suspect is really the one who was seen by them in connection with the commission of the crime. They are meant for investigation purposes. The object of conducting test identification parade is two fold. First is to enable the witnesses to satisfy themselves that the prisoner whom they suspect is really the one who was seen by them in connection with the commission of the crime. Second is to satisfy the investigating authorities that the suspect is the real person whom the witnesses had seen in connection with the said occurrence..... " 59. Therefore, on the analysis of the evidence of the aforementioned witnesses it is amply clear that the prosecution has proved that in view of the facts and circumstances stated above and the panic prevailing in the village by the family members of the deceased Chhote Lal, the deceased were 'last seen' near the 'madaiya' of Zaki, in the clutches of all the seven appellants named above, by the above mentioned witnesses (PW-5 and PW6) in the night of 16.09.1980 and they were either known or identified by the witnesses correctly. Thereafter, on 18.09.1980, the beheaded and castrated bodies of all the four deceased were found lying in one of the fields of village Kattaiya, nearby the said 'Madaiya' of the deceased Zaki by the chowkidar (PW1) of the same village; who thereupon informed the police of Police Station Bilsi on 18.07.1980 about 1.45 p.m. by registering the FIR against unknown persons, which resulted in the investigation of this case and the Investigating Officer found that all the seven appellants alone had committed the crime in this case. 60. Hence, on the detailed scrutiny of the relevant documents on record and the material witnesses in this respect, we find that 'theory of last seen' put forth by the prosecution gets fortified in this case. It also appears that against this cogent evidence with regard to the 'last seen theory', the appellants/defence were/was unable to give any plausible explanation. 61. Learned counsel for the appellants tried to dislodge the evidence adduced by the witnesses, PW5 and PW6, with regard to the 'last seen theory', by submitting that the instant case is a case of blind murder and is based entirely on circumstantial evidence, as there is no eye witness to the material part of the said incident of murder and that their statements are an afterthought, having major contradictions and are based on mere suspicion. 62. 62. It is further contended by him that if they had actually seen the said part of the incident, they should have contacted the police. It is also astonishing as to how they had escaped from the clutches of all the seven appellants, armed with weapons, which leads to the only inference that actually all the witnesses of fact including these witnesses (PW5 and PW6) are of the same caste, admittedly inimical and relatives as well. Further, they are also most interested/partisan witnesses as well as "chance and got up witnesses", planted with a view to implicate the appellants, due to suspected enmity with 'Muraos' of the village and have tried to manufacture a concocted story of the prosecution with the help of the CID personnel. It is also submitted that neither any 'Muraos' of the village nor any relatives of the said Bhawani have been named in the murder of Chhotey Lal, therefore, the perception of the alleged strong enmity of 'Muraos' against the family members and friends of Chhotey Lal does not stand to the conscience. The conduct of the witnesses (PW5 and PW6) is also against natural human conduct. 63. We do not find any substance in the argument of the learned counsel for the appellants that all the witnesses of the fact including PW5 Ganga Singh and PW6 Bhim Sen are of the same caste and are inimical to the appellants. Further, they are relatives as well as most interested/partisan witnesses and also PW5 and PW6 are got up and chance witnesses. The law is settled on this point that even if a witness is a 'chance witness', related, inimical, partisan witness or of same faction or caste, even then his evidence cannot be discarded solely on the ground that he was a chance or a related witness. In a recent decision in the case of Nagappan Vs. State (by Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu) 2013 CriLJ 3878, the Apex Court has observed on the question of related/interested/partisan witnesses as follows: "As regards the first contention about the admissibility of the evidence of PW1 and PW3 being closely related to each other and the deceased, first of all, there is no bar in considering the evidence of relatives. It is true that in the case on hand, other witnesses turned hostile and have not supported the case of the prosecution. It is true that in the case on hand, other witnesses turned hostile and have not supported the case of the prosecution. The prosecution heavily relied on the evidence of PW1, PW3 and PW10. The trial court and the High Court, in view of their relationship, closely analyzed their statements and ultimately found that their evidence is clear, cogent and without considerable contradiction as claimed by their counsel. This Court, in a series of decisions, has held that whether the evidence of "interested witnesses" is consistent and duly corroborated by medical evidence, it is not possible to discard the same merely on the ground that they were interested witnesses. In other words relationship is not a factor to affect the credibility of a witness." 64. In the case of Rana Pratap and others Vs. State of Haryana 1983 (3) SCC 327 , the Supreme Court has held on the point of 'chance witnesses' as under: "Murder are not committed with previous notice to witnesses; soliciting their presence. If murder is committed in a dwelling house, the inmates of the house are natural witnesses. If murder is committed in a brothel, prostitutes and paramours are natural witnesses. If murder is committed in a street, only passersby will be witnesses. Their evidence cannot be brushed aside or viewed with suspicion on the ground that they are mere chance witnesses'. The expression 'chance witnesses' is borrowed from countries where every man's home is considered his castle and every one must have an explanation for his presence elsewhere or in another man's castle. It is a most unsuitable expression in a country whose people are less formal and more casual. To discard the evidence of street hawkers and street vendors on the ground that they are 'chance witnesses' even where murder is committed in a street is to abandon good sense and take too shallow a view of the evidence." 65. The Apex Court in the decision of State of U.P. Vs. Ram Swarup and others AIR 1988 SC 1028 , while deciding this aspect of same faction or caste or inimical witnesses has concluded as under: "There is no rule of law to the effect that the evidence of partisan witnesses cannot be accepted. The fact that the witnesses are associated with the faction opposed to that of the accused by itself does not render their evidence false. The fact that the witnesses are associated with the faction opposed to that of the accused by itself does not render their evidence false. Partisanship by itself is no ground for discarding sworn testimony. Interested evidence is not necessarily false evidence. In a small village like the one under consideration where people are divided on caste basis, the prosecution may not be able to get any neutral witness. Even if there is any such neutral witness, he will be reluctant to come forward to give testimony to support one or the other side. Therefore, merely because the eye-witnesses are associated with one faction or the other, their evidence should not be discarded. It should, no doubt, be subjected to careful scrutiny and accepted with caution. We may also point out that law does not lay down different standard of appreciation of evidence when the prosecution witnesses and the accused are of different caste. The principles are the same as in other cases." 66. This Court cannot be oblivious to the reluctance of general public to help the police or victims of crime. The Court also cannot shut its eyes to the hard reality that citizens are averse to depose due to a couple of reasons. Firstly, involvement of risk from criminals, as it is apparent in the case in hand in which the villagers, especially 'Muraos' and 'Muslims', were gripped with panic. Secondly, in the mind of the public it is a thankless job. Therefore, we cannot ignore this handicap of the investigating agency in discharging their duty. The public in general are insensitive to come forward to give any statement in respect of any criminal offence. Unless inevitable people normally keep away from the Court as they feel it to be distressing. Thus, this kind of human behaviour although unfortunate, is a natural phenomenon. Therefore, we are of the view that the entire case in hand cannot be derailed merely on the ground of absence of independent witness as long as the evidence of eye witnesses who are related and interested/partition is trustworthy. The presence of PW5 Ganga Singh and PW6 Bhimsen at the spot of 'last seen' is very well proved by them and corroborated by other evidence on record. 67. The presence of PW5 Ganga Singh and PW6 Bhimsen at the spot of 'last seen' is very well proved by them and corroborated by other evidence on record. 67. It is a settled proposition of law that in such a case where witnesses are relatives or inimical or partisan, the Court has to adopt a careful approach in analysing the evidence of such witnesses and if their testimony is otherwise found credible the accused can be convicted on the basis of their testimony. The above ratio of law has been laid down by the Apex Court in the cases of Dahari and others Vs. State of UP AIR 2013 SC 308 , Shyam Babu Vs. State of UP AIR 2012 SC 3311 , Shyamal Ghosh Vs. State of West Bengal AIR 2012 SC 3539 . In view of the above, we find no force in the argument of the learned counsel for the appellants. 68. We do not subscribe to the above arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants also because in this case the entire evidence on record should be scrutinized on the then prevailing atmosphere in the village, which was gripped with panic, created solely by the relatives of the deceased Chhotey Lal. The fear loomed so heavily on the family members of the 'Muraos' community, especially the close relatives of the said Bhawani 'Murao' that as per prosecution evidence (PW2 to PW6), their ladies assembled together in one house and the male members fled the village. Some of them took shelter in the house of their nearby relatives and the deceased as well as some witnesses including PW5 Ganga Singh and PW6 Bhim Sen took shelter in the nearby dense forest along with other 'Muraos' and later due to rain, in the 'madaiya' of said Zaki. Therefore, their (PW-2 to PW-6) evidence in this case should be looked into with this angle also. Hence, it is amply clear that the witnesses PW5 and PW6 did not inform the police about the said part of the incident and remained hidden along with some others in another village and also did not report the matter to the police promptly so as to at least save their skins first. 69. Further, the evidence on record shows that the local police was hand in glove with the deceased Chhotey Lal and his family members. 69. Further, the evidence on record shows that the local police was hand in glove with the deceased Chhotey Lal and his family members. This fact also gets fortified by the evidence of the widows of Jauhari and Gopi, PW2 Smt. Rampa and PW3 Smt. Kalawati, who tried to inform the police about their missing husbands and others but the local police did not pay any heed to the information instead abused both of them. Later the case was transferred to the CID and the PAC was called for in this village who then camped in the village. All this leads to the interference that the family members of the deceased and 'Muraos' of the locality were so terrified that they were neither in a position to trace their missing relatives nor were in a position to inform the police till the case was handed over to the CID. 70. In view of the above facts and circumstances, the evidence of 'last seen' advanced by the aforementioned two trustworthy witnesses (PW5 and PW6) cannot be brushed aside. Their unshaken testimony fully corroborates the said factums/circumstances. Their presence at the spot seems natural and is proved by cogent evidence. Their conduct is totally in consonance with natural human conduct. At the time of the incident the witness Ganga Singh (PW5) was aged about 14 years, he and his cousin PW6 Bhimsen categorically and vividly described the said circumstances. 71. There is no hard and fast rule that any delay in lodging the FIR or informing the police would simply render the prosecution case doubtful. It necessarily depend upon the facts and circumstances of the each case and there is no mathematical formula by which an inference may be drawn either way. Merely on account of delay in lodging of the FIR or omission to inform the police by the panic-stricken persons/witnesses, the case of the prosecution can't be brushed aside. The Court has to take judicial notice of the evidence placed on the record of the case. Knowing the conditions as they are, one cannot expect these rustic villagers to rush to the police immediately after the said occurrence. 72. The Court has to take judicial notice of the evidence placed on the record of the case. Knowing the conditions as they are, one cannot expect these rustic villagers to rush to the police immediately after the said occurrence. 72. Human nature is such that it is not prudent to expect from the person who has witnessed the occurrence to mechanically reproduce, the incident with all the promptitude, while in recording the evidence, especially in this case when all of them are completely terrified by the sequence of the events in the village. However, unless there is an indication of fabrication the court cannot reject the prosecution version as borne out from the record and also later substantiated by the evidence, merely on the ground of omission or delay to inform the police or some minor contradiction. This is all a matter for proposition which depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. 73. Further, why the appellants had left the said two witnesses (PW5 and PW6), how they had escaped and why they could not have been killed then and there on the spot, all these questions are raised by the side of the appellants based on surmises and conjectures. The witnesses (PW5 and PW6) in their testimony, have categorically described how they escaped and their witnessing the said part of the incident/circumstances. A crime is an aberration of the mind of the accused persons. Aforementioned questions/facts, put forth by the learned counsel for the appellants, cannot be logically established or proved, because it is a subjective thing, which lies in the brain and heart of the accused persons. With regard to the natural human conduct of the witnesses we can simply show that each person reacts in a different way, after going through the trauma of any horrific criminal incident. The aforesaid view gets fortified by the observation made by the Supreme Court in the case of Appabhai and another Vs. State of Gujrat, AIR 1988 SC 696 . The relevant portions of paragraphs 10 and 11 of the decision are quoted herein: -- "10......The Court, however, must bear in mind that witnesses to a serious crime may not react in a normal manner. Nor do they react uniformly. The horror stricken witnesses at a dastardly crime or an act of egregious nature may react differently. The relevant portions of paragraphs 10 and 11 of the decision are quoted herein: -- "10......The Court, however, must bear in mind that witnesses to a serious crime may not react in a normal manner. Nor do they react uniformly. The horror stricken witnesses at a dastardly crime or an act of egregious nature may react differently. Their, course of conduct may not be of ordinary type in the normal circumstances. The Court, therefore, cannot reject their evidence merely because they have behaved or reacted in an unusual manner. In Rana Pratap and others Vs. State of Haryana 1988 (3) S.C.C. 327. Chinnappa Reddy J. speaking for this Court succinctly set out what might be the behaviour of different persons witnessing the same incident. The learned Judge observed; (at p. 330). Every person who witnesses a murder reacts in his own way. Some are stunned, become speechless and stand rooted to the spot. Some become hysteric and start wailing. Some start shouting for help. Others run away to keep themselves as far removed from the spot as possible. Yet others rush to the rescue of the victim, even going to the extent of counter-attacking the assailants. Every one reacts in his own special way. There is no set rule of natural reaction. To discard the evidence of a witness on the ground that he did not react in any particular manner is to appreciate evidence in a wholly unrealistic and unimaginative way. 11. These may be some of the reactions. There may be still more. Even a man of prowess may become pusillanimous by witnessing a serious crime...." 74. Therefore, from the above unimpeachable evidence of PW5 and PW6, we have no hesitation in concluding that both the witnesses had seen all the appellants. With arms and torches, on the said date, time and place, apprehending, dragging and taking away with them all the four deceased. Their presence at the spot and fleeing away after witnessing the said part of the incident is proved by cogent evidence and also gets corroborated by other evidence on record. Evidence of both the witnesses are natural, their presence is probable and they appear to be trustworthy. In view thereof their (PW5 and PW6) evidence on the point of 'last seen theory' must be relied upon. The arguments of the learned counsel for the appellants contrary to it, have no force. 75. Evidence of both the witnesses are natural, their presence is probable and they appear to be trustworthy. In view thereof their (PW5 and PW6) evidence on the point of 'last seen theory' must be relied upon. The arguments of the learned counsel for the appellants contrary to it, have no force. 75. Learned counsel for the appellants has also stated that Munshi one of the material witnesses of the incident, has been withheld by the prosecution for reasons best known to them. This argument of the learned counsel for the appellants cannot be accepted for the simple reason that the prosecution by relying heavily on number of material, cogent and reliable witnesses have proved the 'last seen theory', the involvement of none other than all the appellants in the incident, their motive as well as the disclosure and recovery part of the incident (last circumstance) in a very trustworthy manner. There appears to be no major omission, commission, illegality or fault in the process of the investigation which would prejudice the defence. Therefore, mere non-examination of the alleged material witness does not affect the prosecution case. 76. Further, the law on this point is quite clear that non-examination of a material witness is not a mathematical formula for discarding the weight of the testimony available on record, howsoever natural, trustworthy and convincing it may be. It is a settled law that non-examination of an eye-witness cannot be pressed into service like the ritualistic formula for discarding the prosecution case with a stroke of pen. Court can convict the accused on the statement of a sole eye witness even if he is relative of the deceased and non-examination of an independent witness would not be fatal to the case of the prosecution. The above ratio of law has been laid down by the Apex Court in the cases of Kripal Singh Vs. State of Haryana, AIR 2013 SC 286 , Sandeep Vs. State of U.P., (2012) 6 SCC 107 and Mano Dutt and another Vs. State of U.P. 2012 (77) ACC 209 (SC). Hence, there is no force in the said argument of the learned counsel for the appellants. 77. State of Haryana, AIR 2013 SC 286 , Sandeep Vs. State of U.P., (2012) 6 SCC 107 and Mano Dutt and another Vs. State of U.P. 2012 (77) ACC 209 (SC). Hence, there is no force in the said argument of the learned counsel for the appellants. 77. As narrated above, the recovery of four beheaded and castrated bodies of all the deceased, Jauhari, Gopi, Umedi and Zaki which were found lying in one of the fields of the village Kattaiya, situated nearby the 'madaiya' of deceased Zaki, by the Chowkidar of the village Bihari Lal (PW1) on 18.09.1980 at about 11-12.00 noon. He lodged the information of the same, at 1.45 p.m. on the same day, against unknown persons at P.S. Ujhani, District Budaun. The said witness has proved the said fact and also his verbal FIR (Ex.Ka-1) thereof. This factum has not been disputed by the defence/learned counsel for the appellants. 78. It is also obligatory to mention here that the evidence of last seen can only be relied upon in the case based on circumstantial evidence when close proximity between last seen evidence and the death should be clearly established as has been held by the Apex Court in the case of Bodhraj Vs. State of J & K, (2002) 8 SCC 45 , held that: "31. The last seen theory comes into play where the gap between the point of time when the accused and the deceased were last seen alive and when the deceased is found dead is so small that possibility of any person other than the accused being the author of the crime becomes impossible." 79. Applying the said principle in the case in hand it is conclusively proved beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution that all the four deceased were seen by the reliable witnesses (PW5 and PW6) in the evening/night of 16.07.1980 and their beheaded and castrated semi-decomposed bodies were seen by the Chowkidar of village Kattaiya on 18.07.1980. The evidence of doctors (PW12 and PW20) who executed the postmortem of beheaded bodies as well as heads of the deceased have categorically stated that the deceased were done to death probably in the night of 16/17.07.1980. The above principles laid down in the Bodhraj Vs. State of J & K (supra) can be squarely applied in this case. The evidence of doctors (PW12 and PW20) who executed the postmortem of beheaded bodies as well as heads of the deceased have categorically stated that the deceased were done to death probably in the night of 16/17.07.1980. The above principles laid down in the Bodhraj Vs. State of J & K (supra) can be squarely applied in this case. Therefore, the prosecution has clearly established the close proximity between 'last seen' evidence and the death of all the four deceased in this case. Hence, the 'last seen theory' advanced by the prosecution shall be made one of the major circumstances in this case. 80. In addition to it, the prosecution has also proved the factum of recovery of four heads of the said deceased alongwith Gandasa, (incised weapon of assault), by which the heads of all the deceased were alleged to have been chopped off and other incriminating articles (the last XI circumstance), which were hidden by the appellants in a well of the jungle of village Kattaiya, by the CID, on the pointing out of the appellant Saligram on 23.07.1980. 81. The factum of recovery of dead bodies, i.e. beheaded bodies and also heads of the deceased, 'gandasa' and other incriminating articles, separately, on different times and from different places, is quite an important chain in this case of circumstantial evidence. With a view to prove the said factum, the prosecution has examined number of witnesses and placed scores of documents in this case. Out of them PW9 Puttu Singh is the witness of recovery memo of four heads of the deceased (Ex. Ka.5) and its inquest report (Ex. Ka-6 to 9) as well as material Exs.-Xiii to XXI. The said witness has proved the factum of recovery under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. However, another witness of this fact Dayaram PW10 was declared hostile by the prosecution. Much stress has been given from the side of the appellants on his hostility, submitting that due to his hostility the entire said recovery proceedings stand vitiated, but we do not find any substance in the testimony of PW-10 Daya Ram and in this argument of the learned counsel. 82. The Apex Court in the case of Anter Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan (2004) 10 SCC 657 has held that even if panch witness turned hostile, the evidence of the person who effected the recovery would not stand vitiated. 82. The Apex Court in the case of Anter Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan (2004) 10 SCC 657 has held that even if panch witness turned hostile, the evidence of the person who effected the recovery would not stand vitiated. After considering the scope and ambit of Section 27 of the Evidence Act, 1872 the Supreme Court enumerated the following principles to be adhered to: - "16. The various requirements of the section can be summed up as follows: 1. The fact of which evidence is sought to be given must be relevant to the issue. It must be borne in mid that the provision has nothing to do with the question of relevancy. The relevancy of the fact discovered must be established according to the prescriptions relating to relevancy of other evidence connecting it with the crime in order to make the fact discovered admissible. 2. The fact must have been discovered. 3. The discovery must have been in consequence of some information received from the accused and not by the accused's own act. 4. The person giving the information must be accused of any offence. 5. He must be in the custody of a police officer. 6. The discovery of a fact in consequence of information received from an accused in custody must be deposed to. 7. Thereupon only that portion of the information which relates distinctly or strictly to the fact discovered can be proved. The rest is inadmissible." 83. To substantiate this last part of the circumstances, the prosecution has examined other material witnesses like PW11 C.B.Rai, Dy. S.P. CID, who was the witness of the said recovery of four heads etc. and all the documents pertaining to it. Similarly, PW12 Dr. V.P. Kulshrestha was examined to prove the postmortem reports of the four heads of the deceased (Ex.Ka11 to Ka 14), corroborating that there were clean cut margins in the wounds of the heads and it was possible that these heads were severed on 16.07.1980 at about 8.00 p.m. in the night, through some heavy weapon like 'gandasa' by one single infliction. The evidence of the doctor (PW-11) and the postmortem reports (Ex. Ka 11 to Ka-14) firmly corroborate the story of the prosecution and connect the appellants with the recovered incriminating materials, weapon as well as all the four heads. 84. The evidence of the doctor (PW-11) and the postmortem reports (Ex. Ka 11 to Ka-14) firmly corroborate the story of the prosecution and connect the appellants with the recovered incriminating materials, weapon as well as all the four heads. 84. In addition to this, PW-13 M. P. Singh, S.I., who is a link witness to the arrest of appellant Saligram was also examined. PW14 Constable Ved Prakash was examined as link evidence, who had taken the body of Chhotey Lal for postmortem. Sri Yogendra Singh, Dy. S.P. (PW15), Investigating Officer of the murder case of Chhote Lal and the witness of recovery of heads of deceased was also examined by the prosecution, who in turn has proved the relevant recovery memo and the proceedings indicated therein. PW-16 head constable Nar Singh has proved the chick FIR (Ex. Ka1) and its corresponding GD report no. 26 dated 18.07.1980 (Ex. Ka-16). In addition to him, prosecution has examined PW-17 constable 417 C.P. Mahesh Chandra, PW 18 Samsuddin, brother-in-law of deceased Zaki, who proved the proceedings with regard to the link evidence of chemical examination of the sealed material, recovered during the investigation and the site of the 'madaiya' of Zaki and its conditions after the incident and other related facts and stated that he had visited the place during investigation and shown the place to the police, respectively. PW-19 constable 502 Mahipal Singh is also a link evidence with regard to the identification proceedings. 85. Similarly, PW-20 Dr. R.P.Jauhari has conducted the postmortem of the castrated and beheaded bodies of all the four deceased and proved the ante mortem and postmortem injuries and decomposed conditions of the bodies, parts of which were eaten by maggots and also made observations with regard to the internal and external condition of the said bodies. PW 20 doctor has overall found one common injury on all the bodies namely, head or head along with part of neck was absent from the body. In some of them, margins of soft tissues of the wounds are eaten by maggots or in some cases also by birds. According to him, the death was caused due to the severing of the head from the neck and he proved all the related postmortem reports (Ex. Ka-21 to Ka 24) and stated that all the four deceased had died at the same time on 16/17.07.1980 in the night. According to him, the death was caused due to the severing of the head from the neck and he proved all the related postmortem reports (Ex. Ka-21 to Ka 24) and stated that all the four deceased had died at the same time on 16/17.07.1980 in the night. However, the margin in time of death could vary from 20-24 hours, either way. 86. PW-21 Randhir Singh, S.I. of the concerned police station was also examined by the prosecution, who was the first investigating Officer in this case. The said witness has proved the FIR (Ex. Ka-1), inquest proceedings of the beheaded bodies of the deceased and the reports thereof (Ex. Ka 26 to Ka 29), sketch of the bodies, challan of the bodies, report to RI & CMO, sample seal (Ex. Ka-30 to Ex. Ka-45) as well as the sealing of the bodies and other investigation proceedings thereof. He also corroborated that on 20.07.1980, the investigation was transferred from him to CID. The witness also proved the recovery of torn pieces of clothes of the deceased, which are 9 in number, recovered from the field of one Punni r/o Kattaiya, during search of the heads of the victims. According to him, the torn pieces of clothes tallied with the clothes worn by the deceased. Accordingly, he prepared the recovery memo and site plan and proved them, respectively (Ex. Ka-46 and Ex. Ka-47). 87. The witnesses PW-22 to PW-26, examined by the prosecution are all constables and head constables of police, who had assisted during investigation and are link witnesses to the recovered materials, either by sending them to 'malkhana' or taking them from there for chemical examination or assisting in identification parade or in postmortem proceedings. PW27 Head constable Ram Swaroop, who was the then S.I. Posted at police station Bilsi, has proved the repeat disclosure statement given by the appellant Saligram at Police Outpost Mujaria, which also led to the recovery of the heads of the deceased, weapon of assault 'gandasa' and other incriminating articles, from the said well. He also proved that at the time of this disclosure statement before the Investigating Officer, Inspector CID Nagchandra Nath, other police personnel and C.I.D. personnel (named by him in his evidence) were present and thereafter, he conducted the recovery proceedings on the disclosure and pointing out by the appellant Saligram. He also proved that at the time of this disclosure statement before the Investigating Officer, Inspector CID Nagchandra Nath, other police personnel and C.I.D. personnel (named by him in his evidence) were present and thereafter, he conducted the recovery proceedings on the disclosure and pointing out by the appellant Saligram. He has proved four heads and incriminating materials recovered during recovery proceedings (Ex. 18, 19 and 1 to 11) and the recovery memo Ex. Ka 5 as well as the inquest reports of the heads (Ex. Ka 6 to Ex. 9), its sketch, challan, report CMO & RI and sample seal etc., pertaining to all the four deceased (Ex. Ka 48 to Ka 63). He described in detail the entire proceedings related to the said recovery. 88. In addition to it, prosecution has examined material witness PW 28 Nagchandra Nath, Inspector Crime Branch CID, the main Investigating Officer of this case. The witness has not only categorically described in detail the entire investigation proceedings, the disclosure statement given by the appellant Saligram and in consonance thereof recovery under Section 27 of the Evidence Act on the pointing out by the appellant Saligram but also proved all the documents pertaining to it and the material recovered during investigation. He proved site plan (Ex. Ka 25) recovery memo of torch (Ex. Ka 65), the site plan with regard to the 'madaiya' of Zaki (Ex. Ka 66) and the materials recovered from the site (Ex. Ka 67), one 'angauchha' recovered in the field of Zaki (Ex. Ka 68) the blood stained soil and plain soil recovery memo (Ex. Ka 69). He placed and proved the material before the court as 'angauchha' (Ex. 22). He recorded the statements of the witnesses and accused persons. He proved the GD report no. 29 of 21.7.1980 (Ex. Ka 70), the GD regarding arrest of Saligram report no. 12 of 23.07.1980 at about 9.05 a.m. (Ex. Ka 71). 89. The Investigating Officer (PW-28) also proved the disclosure statement of Saligram made before him and other witnesses at the Police Station Bilsi, Budaun and on his pointing out the recovery of 4 heads of the deceased, weapon of assault 'gandasa' (Ex. 18), blood stained clothes (Ex. 1 to Ex. 9) and Takhta (wooden board) (Ex. 19) as well as recovery memo of the same (Ex. Ka 5). 18), blood stained clothes (Ex. 1 to Ex. 9) and Takhta (wooden board) (Ex. 19) as well as recovery memo of the same (Ex. Ka 5). He also proved the entire recovery proceedings conducted by him, thereafter, filing of the chargesheet (Ex. 74) and site plan (Ex. Ka 72). 90. The prosecution has also examined PW 29 constable Shahid Husain, PW30 head constable 82 Harpal Singh, PW31 Constable 873 Om Prakash, PW32 Head constable Virendra Singh, PW33 constable 156 Veerpal Singh, PW 34 constable 295 Rajeshwar Tripathi, PW35 Constable 67 Ram Prasad Tyagi as link evidence to the identification proceedings. 91. Further, PW36 Head constable 40 Lajja Ram, who was the then head muharrir of police station Bilsi has proved the GD report no. 8 at 7.05 a.m., GD report no. 10 at 8.25 a.m. of 23.07.1980 (Ex. Ka 76 and Ka 15, respectively). He has also proved the GD report no. 12 when the police force along with M.K. Kaushik S.O. and other officers of CID along with accused Saligram proceeded for the recovery of the incriminating articles in this case. According to him confessional statement of Saligram was also recorded in the GD report no.12 dated 23.07.1980 (Ex. Ka 71) and the entry at report no. 45 at 20 hours on 23.07.1980 of apprehending accused Ram Bilas, Ramveer (Ex. Ka 77). He also proved GD No. 27 at 21.05 hours dated 23.07.1980 of the police station concerned about returning of the aforementioned police officers along with appellant Saligram with the sealed recovered material (Ex. Ka 78). 92. PW 37 Constable 180 Satyapal Singh, PW38 S.I. Shamshad Ahmad, the then head moharrir of P.S. Ujhiyani, PW 39 Constable muharrir Mohd. Akram, PW40 Head Constable Trimal Singh, PW41 Constable Ram Kumar Sharma, PW42 H.C.37 Indrapal Giri, PW 43 C.P. 625 Harpal Singh, PW 44 C.P.698 Balvir Singh and PW 45 C.P.31 Suresh Chandra are formal/link witnesses pertaining to the recovery proceedings or transmission of the sealed materials for keeping them in malkhana or taking them for their chemical examination or for taking the body for postmortem examination. 93. In this case prosecution has also examined PW-46 C.L.Sharma, the then S.P. of District Budaun, who reached the police outpost Majaria of Police Station Bilsi, after getting information that the appellant Saligram has confessed and made a disclosure statement for recovery of four heads etc. 93. In this case prosecution has also examined PW-46 C.L.Sharma, the then S.P. of District Budaun, who reached the police outpost Majaria of Police Station Bilsi, after getting information that the appellant Saligram has confessed and made a disclosure statement for recovery of four heads etc. The appellant Saligram, along with other police officers and the CID officers as well as the investigating officer, was placed before the said witness and on being inquired he again admitted this fact. The witness also accompanied them for the said recovery. According to him on the pointing out of the appellant Saligram the aforesaid incriminating material along with four heads of the deceased were recovered before him and after the said recovery the wives of the said deceased and their relatives came to the spot/well and identified the heads of the deceased as well as the recovered clothes. The witness has also proved the recovery memo (Ex. Ka 5), which contains his signature as well as the signature of other witnesses present there. He stated that all the formalities and sealing of the recovered materials were done before him on the spot and he further identified the recovered 'gandasa' (Ex. 18) also. 94. Lastly, the prosecution has examined PW 47 Head constable Dinesh Singh, the then Head muharrir of Police Station Sahaswan, District Budaun, who has proved the verbal report lodged by M.K.Kaushik, S.H.O. Sahaswan on 10.02.1980 under Section 399, 402, 307 IPC against Vedanti etc., in which the deceased Chhote Lal was named as witness (Ex. Ka 79). 95. We have scanned all the evidence narrated above with regard to the last circumstance, i.e., disclosure statement of one of the appellants Saligram and on his pointing out, the recovery of four heads of the deceased, weapon of assault 'gandasa' and other incriminating articles from the said well before all the witnesses present at spot. In this aspect all the material witnesses, including the investigating officer and the concerned Superintendent of Police have been cross-examined at length by the defence but they stood intact in their cross-examination. Therefore, the entire documentary and oral evidence, adduced by the prosecution in this respect, as mentioned above, appears to be cogent and trustworthy. Their unshaken statements and all the police and medical documents in this respect corroborate the prosecution version. Therefore, the entire documentary and oral evidence, adduced by the prosecution in this respect, as mentioned above, appears to be cogent and trustworthy. Their unshaken statements and all the police and medical documents in this respect corroborate the prosecution version. No material discrepancy, omission or commission, illegality or glaring fact, have been elicited by the defence during their cross-examination, which may vitiate the entire recovery proceedings or demolish the prosecution case. 96. Therefore, we are of the view that the prosecution has firmly proved this last part of the circumstance also. 97. The said disclosure statement as well as the recovery of all the four heads of the deceased, weapon of assault 'gandasa' and other incriminating articles under Section 27 of the Evidence Act on the pointing out by one of the appellant Saligram of the case has been assailed by the counsel for the appellant broadly on four grounds: A. As to whether the accused-appellant Saligram was under formal arrest when the alleged disclosure statement (Ex. Ka 71) was made by him. B. Multiple disclosure statements allegedly made by the appellant Saligram, (i) before the investigating officer and other police officers of Police Station Bilsi; (ii) before the Superintendent of Police, Budaun at police outpost Majaria and (iii) before the public witnesses and its admissibility. C. Recovery of heads, 'gandasa' and other incriminating articles made on the alleged disclosure statement and pointing out of the appellant Saligram and his actual presence at the time of recovery at the spot, because the recovery memo (Ex. Ka 13) does not contain his signature/thumb impression and there is no mention in the memo that the said memo was read over and explained to the appellant Saligram, as such its admissibility. D. Even if alleged disclosure statement and recovery proceeding under Section 27 of the Evidence Act is relied upon against the appellant Saligram, even then it is not admissible against the other six appellants. 98. Now we analyze the above argument of the learned counsel for the appellants, one by one point wise. (A). As discussed above, these arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant are fallacious and divorced from the background facts proved on record. 98. Now we analyze the above argument of the learned counsel for the appellants, one by one point wise. (A). As discussed above, these arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant are fallacious and divorced from the background facts proved on record. We must dilute this specially by setting out our detailed reasons herein after: Section 25 of the Evidence Act prohibits confession made to a police officer to be proved against a person accused of any offence. The justification for this protective umbrella stands elevated to the level of fundamental right guaranteed under Article 20 (3) of the Constitution of India, encompassing what is commonly known as rule against self incrimination. Section 26 of the Evidence Act only enlarges what is contained in Section 25 by stipulating that a confession made by a person in the custody of police shall not be proved against him unless it is made in the immediate presence of a magistrate. Similarly, Section 27 of the Evidence Act is in the nature of a proviso or an exception to the general rule, partially lifting the ban imposed by Section 25 and 26 as above. It reads as under: "How much of information received from accused may be proved.-Provided that, when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved." The expression 'fact' as used in Section 27 quoted above is defined in Section 3 of the Evidence Act in the following manner: ""Fact". "fact means and includes- (1) anything, state of things, or relation of things, capable of being perceived by the senses; (2) any mental condition of which any person is conscious." The provision contained in Section 27 of the Evidence Act has been the subject matter of a series of authoritative and illuminating pronouncements, the earliest landmark decision being one reported as Pulukuri Kotayya Vs. Emperor AIR 1947 PC 67 , the exposition of law therein in the following words having ever since been treated as locus classicus:- "It is fallacious to treat the 'fact discovered' within the section as equivalent to the object produced; the fact discovered embraces the place from which the object is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to this and the information given must relate distinctly to this fact. Information as to past user or the past history, of the object produced is not related to his discovery in the setting in which it is discovered. Information supplied by a person in custody that 'I will produce a knife concealed in the roof of my house' does not lead to the discovery of the knife; knives were discovered many years ago. It leads to the discovery of the fact that a knife is concealed in the house of the informant to his knowledge, and if the knife is proved to have been used in the commission of the offence, the fact discovered is very relevant. But if to the statement the words be added 'with which stabbed A', these words are inadmissible since they do not relate to the discovery of the knife in the house of the informant." In the decision of State Vs. Navjot Sandhu @ Afsan Guru (2005) 11 SCC 600 , the Apex Court traced the jurisprudential development on the subject and observed that: "125. We are of the view that Kottaya case (supra) is an authority for the proposition that "discovery of fact" cannot be equated to the object produced or found. It is more than that. The discovery of fact arises by reason of the fact that the information given by the accused exhibited the knowledge or the mental awareness of the informant as to its existence at a particular place." This decision also refers to ambit and scope of Section 8 of the Evidence Act and quotes with approval the following passage from Prakash Chand Vs. State (Delhi Administration) AIR 1979 SC 400 and has observed as under: "There is a clear distinction between the conduct of a person against whom an offence is alleged, which is admissible under Section 8 of the Evidence Act, if such conduct is influenced by any fact in issue or relevant fact and the statement made to a police officer in the course of an investigation which is hit by Section 162 Criminal Procedure Code. What is excluded by Section 162, Criminal Procedure Code is the statement made to a police officer in the course of investigation and not the evidence relating to the conduct of an accused person (not amounting to a statement) when confronted or questioned by a police officer during the course of an investigation. For example, the evidence of the circumstance, simpliciter, that an accused person led a police officer and pointed out the place where stolen articles or weapons which might have been used in the commission of the offence were found hidden, would be admissible as conduct, under Section 8 of the Evidence Act, irrespective of whether any statement by the accused contemporaneously with or antecedent to such conduct falls within the purview of Section 27 of the Evidence Act (vide H.P. Admn. V. Om Prakash)." In another case of A.N.Venkatesh and another Vs. State of Karnataka (2005) 7 SCC 714 it was held by the Supreme Court that: 9. By virtue of Section 8 of the Evidence Act, the conduct of the accused person is relevant, if such conduct influences or is influenced by any fact in issue or relevant fact. The evidence of the circumstance, simpliciter, that the accused pointed out to the police officer, the place where the dead body of the kidnapped boy was found and on their pointing out the body was exhumed, would be admissible as conduct under Section 8 irrespective of the fact whether the statement made by the accused contemporaneously with or antecedent to such conduct falls within the purview of Section 27 or not as held by this Court in Prakash Chand v. State (Delhi Admn.) (supra). Even if we hold that the disclosure statement made by the accused appellants (Ex. P15 and P16) is not admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, still it is relevant under Section 8." In Chandra Prakash Vs. State of Rajasthan 2014 Cri. Even if we hold that the disclosure statement made by the accused appellants (Ex. P15 and P16) is not admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, still it is relevant under Section 8." In Chandra Prakash Vs. State of Rajasthan 2014 Cri. L.J. 2884, a similar argument was raised that when the accused led to the discovery of the articles ceased, he was not formally arrested. The Apex Court referred the case of Anter Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan (supra) wherein it was held as under: "16. The various requirements of the section can be summed up as follows: (1) The fact of which evidence is sought to be given must be relevant to the issue. It must be borne in mind that the provision has nothing to do with the question of relevancy. The relevancy of the fact discovered must be established according to the prescriptions relating to relevancy of other evidence connecting it with the crime in order to make the fact discovered admissible. (2) The fact must have been discovered. (3) The discovery must have been in consequence of some information received from the accused and not by the accused's own act. (4) The person giving the information must be accused of any offence. (5) He must be in the custody of a police officer. (6) The discovery of a fact in consequence of information received from an accused in custody must be deposed to. (7) Thereupon only that portion of the information which relates distinctly or strictly to the fact discovered can be proved. The rest is inadmissible." While adverting with similar question as the case in hand, the Supreme Court in the case of Vikram Singh and others Vs. State of Punjab (2010) 3 SCC 56 has categorically held as under: "Mr. Sharan has, however, referred us to Section 46 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure to argue that till the appellants had been arrested in accordance with the aforesaid provision they could not be said to be in police custody. We seen that Section 46 deals with 'Arrest how made'. We are of the opinion that word "arrest' used in Section 46 relates to a formal arrest whereas Section 27 of the Evidence Act talks about custody of a person accused of an offence. We seen that Section 46 deals with 'Arrest how made'. We are of the opinion that word "arrest' used in Section 46 relates to a formal arrest whereas Section 27 of the Evidence Act talks about custody of a person accused of an offence. In the present case the appellants were undoubtedly put under formal arrest on the 15th February 2005 whereas the recoveries had been made prior to that date but admittedly, also, they were in police custody and accused in an offence at the time of their apprehension on the 14th February 2005. Moreover in the list of the judgment in the Constitution Bench and the observation that the words in Section 27 "accused of any offence" are descriptive of the person making the statement, the submission that this Section would be operable only after formal arrest under Section 46(1) of the Code, cannot be accepted. This argument does not merit any further discussion." By applying the above principle which was held by the Apex Court that the fact as to whether the accused was formally arrested or not, would not vitiate the factum of leading to discovery in the case in hand it is clear that even if the formal arrest was done after recovery, it would also not make any difference. Drawing strength from the proposition of law mentioned above and the view taken by the Supreme Court in the aforementioned cases, we conclude that the disclosure attributed to the appellant Saligram leading to the prosecution unravelling the crime/discovery is relevant and significant and is hence highly incriminating against the appellants, therefore, there is no substance in the argument (A) advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants. (B). The argument of learned counsel for the appellants on this point (B) is misconceived. The prosecution by plenty of cogent and trustworthy oral and documentary evidence discussed above has proved the recovery of incriminating articles along with four heads of the deceased beyond reasonable doubt. There is no law which prevents the investigating officer or the senior police officers to verify the disclosure statement made by him again and again, i.e., before the senior police officers like Superintendent of Police concerned and before other public witnesses, so that they are also made aware of the said statement. There is no law which prevents the investigating officer or the senior police officers to verify the disclosure statement made by him again and again, i.e., before the senior police officers like Superintendent of Police concerned and before other public witnesses, so that they are also made aware of the said statement. It appears from the evidence on record that the Superintendent of Police concerned after getting information of the disclosure statement made by the appellant Saligram reached the police outpost concerned. Mere repetition of the disclosure statement by the accused/appellant, by which it appears that the police authorities wanted to make themselves doubly sure and to make transparent before reaching the spot for discovery, does not prejudice the interest of the accused persons/appellants in this case. Therefore, this argument (B) also has no legs to stand. ©. Now, we deal with the question of absence of signature/thumb impression of the appellant Saligram on the recovery memo (Ex. Ka-5) and lack of reference that the said memo was read over and explained to the accused/appellant. In State of Rajasthan Vs. Teja Ram (1999) 3 SCC 507 , the Apex Court examined the said issue at length and considered the provisions of Section 162(1) Cr.P.C., which read as under: "no statement made by any person to a police officer in the course of an investigation done, if reduced to writing, be not signed by the person making it." However, the prohibition contained in Section 162 (1) Cr.P.C. is not applicable to any statement made under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, as explained by the provisions under Section 162 (2) Cr.P.C. Therefore, the Apex Court concluded as under: "30. The resultant position is that the Investigating Officer is not obliged to obtain the signature of an accused in any statement attributed to him while preparing seizure memo for the recovery of any article covered by Section 27 of the Evidence Act. But if any signature has been obtained by an Investigating Officer, there is nothing wrong or illegal about it. In Golakonda Venkateswara Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2003) 9 SCC 277 , the Apex Court once again reconsidered the entire issue, and held that merely because the recovery memo was not signed by the accused, will not vitiate the recovery itself, as every case has to be decided on its own facts. In Golakonda Venkateswara Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2003) 9 SCC 277 , the Apex Court once again reconsidered the entire issue, and held that merely because the recovery memo was not signed by the accused, will not vitiate the recovery itself, as every case has to be decided on its own facts. In the event that the recoveries are made pursuant to the disclosure statement of the accused, then, despite the fact that the statement has not been signed by him, there is certainly some truth in what he said, for the reason that, the recovery of the material objects was made on the basis of his statement. The Supreme Court further explained this aspect by way of its earlier judgment in Jaskaran Singh Vs. State of Punjab 1997 SCC (Cri) 651 as, in this case, there was a dispute regarding the ownership of a revolver and the cartridge recovered therein. The prosecution was unable to lead any evidence in the aforementioned case to show that the crime weapon belonged to the said appellant and observations were made by the Apex Court in the said context. Therefore, the Apex Court held as under in Golakonda Venkateswara Rao case (supra). 14 "……The fact that the recovery is in consequence of the information given is fortified and confirmed by the discovery of wearing apparel and skeletal remains of the deceased which leads to believe that the information and the statement cannot be false." In view of the above, the instant case is squarely covered by the ratio of the aforesaid judgments, and the submission advanced in this regard contrary to it, is therefore, not acceptable. On this point it is further argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that the disclosure statement allegedly made by Saligram and the recovery of incriminating articles along with four heads of the deceased on his pointing out is also marred with contradictory statement of PW1 Smt. Rampa, who in her cross-examination in para 22 of page 45 has stated that when she and other women returned after identifying the recovered heads of the deceased, the CID personnel also came along with them in the village and in the evening they arrested Saligram from his residence on the said day. The heads were recovered 3-4 hours before arrest of the appellant Saligram, which is contrary to the material on record, i.e., recovery memo (Ex. The heads were recovered 3-4 hours before arrest of the appellant Saligram, which is contrary to the material on record, i.e., recovery memo (Ex. Ka-5) and all the statements made by the other public witnesses of the recovery memo as well as police and CID personnel/officers mentioned above. It also appears that the police personnel/officers with a view to protect the factum of the said concocted recovery and disclosure statement, had advanced this false and fabricated evidence which cannot be made basis for proving the last circumstance of recovery of incriminating materials and heads of the deceased persons. Further, one of the panch witness (PW10) turned hostile with regard to the said disclosure and discovery as alleged by the prosecution. We are not inclined to accept the above submission made by the learned counsel for the appellants. The Apex Court in Anter Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan (2004) 10 SCC 657 has held that even if the panch witness (public witness of the recovery memo) turned hostile, the evidence of the person who effected the recovery would not vitiate. After considering the scope and ambit of Section 27 of the Evidence Act the Supreme Court enumerated the following principles to be adhered:- "16.The various requirements of the section can be summed us as follows: 1. The fact of which evidence is sought to be given must be relevant to the issue. It must be borne in mid that the provision has nothing to do with the question of relevancy. The relevancy of the fact discovered must be established according to the prescriptions relating to relevancy of other evidence connecting it with the crime in order to make the fact discovered admissible. 2. The fact must have been discovered. 3. The discovery must have been in consequence of some information received from the accused and not by the accused's own act. 4. The person giving the information must be accused of any offence. 5. He must be in the custody of a police officer. 6. The discovery of a fact in consequence of information received from an accused in custody must be deposed to. 7. Thereupon only that portion of the information which relates distinctly or strictly to the fact discovered can be proved. 5. He must be in the custody of a police officer. 6. The discovery of a fact in consequence of information received from an accused in custody must be deposed to. 7. Thereupon only that portion of the information which relates distinctly or strictly to the fact discovered can be proved. The rest is inadmissible" With regard to the alleged contradiction in the statement (cross-examination) of one witness PW2 Smt. Rampa, an illiterate and rustic village lady, grief and panic stricken, as observed above, other voluminous oral and documentary evidence led by the prosecution in this regard cannot be thrown away. She is the signatory of the said recovery memo (Ex. Ka-5). She also affirms that the disclosure was made before her and the proceedings, with regard to the execution of the said memo and the said recovery from the well was effected before her and other witnesses in the presence of the police and CID personnel/officers, within the jurisdiction of District Budaun. Merely the above contradiction, as referred by the appellant side, the entire evidence of PW2 Rampa as well as other trustworthy witnesses including the witnesses of the memo/panch witness (PW-9 Puttu Singh and PW 10 Daya Ram) and other evidence of police and CID personnel/officers and the identification of the heads of all the deceased and other incriminating articles cannot be doubted and her statement should be judged in totality. Moreover, human memory is frail and the proceedings in Court are not a memory test. Stray lapse of this nature cannot belittle the contents of a material document (recovery memo Ex. Ka-5), contemporaneously prepared, executed and attested. It is further pertinent to point out that every discrepancy, contradiction, and variation in prosecution evidence may not be sufficient to adversely affect the prosecution case. Sometimes, variation merely indicates that witnesses have not been tutored. So long as the core of the prosecution evidence is intact and trustworthy, minor discrepancies in the prosecution evidence are not sufficient to discard otherwise trustworthy testimony of prosecution witnesses. The Apex Court in Meharban Singh and others versus State of Madhya Pradesh, (1996) 10 SCC 615 has held that it is the duty of courts to evaluate the discrepancy and to see whether minor discrepancy in fact adversely affects the trustworthy character of evidence or not. The Apex Court in Meharban Singh and others versus State of Madhya Pradesh, (1996) 10 SCC 615 has held that it is the duty of courts to evaluate the discrepancy and to see whether minor discrepancy in fact adversely affects the trustworthy character of evidence or not. If the courts can believe the trustworthy character of evidence, then minor discrepancies are not sufficient to discard the evidence of otherwise trustworthy witnesses. Further when the appellant herein made a disclosure statement before the witnesses, the recovery memo (Ex. Ka-5) a disclosure statement (Ex. Ka-71) was prepared, which was also mentioned in the concerned GDs (Ex.71 and 77). Thereafter recovery memo (Ex. Ka-5) was also duly executed at the spot. The evidence on record reveals that the same was duly signed by not only by the police and CID personnel/officers but also by the independent witnesses, a senior police officer to the rank of Superintendent of Police (PW 46) of the district and other independent witnesses, namely PW9 Puttu Singh, PW10 Daya Ram and others present there at the spot. Admittedly PW10 Daya Ram was declared hostile by the prosecution as observed above. His hostility would also not vitiate the disclosure and recovery proceedings in question. Therefore, no legitimate question arose regarding the effect of the information, recovery and the evidence of police, CID and other public witnesses relating to the recovery and also the sanctity of their evidence, in respect of the said recovery made by the aforementioned police and CID personnel/officers in the case in hand on the disclosure and pointing out by the appellant Saligram. This issue was also considered at length by the Supreme Court in State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) Vs. Sunil (2001) 1 SCC 652 , wherein it was held as under: "20…..But if no witness was present or if no person had agreed to affix his signature on the document, it is difficult to lay down, as a proposition of law, that the document so prepared by the police officer must be treated as tainted and the recovery evidence unreliable. The court has to consider the evidence of the investigating officer who deposed to the fact of recovery based on the statement elicited from the accused on its own worth. 21. We feel that it is an archaic notion that actions of the police officer should be approached with initial distrust. The court has to consider the evidence of the investigating officer who deposed to the fact of recovery based on the statement elicited from the accused on its own worth. 21. We feel that it is an archaic notion that actions of the police officer should be approached with initial distrust. We are aware that such a notion was lavishly entertained during British period and policemen also knew it. Its hang over persisted during post-Independence years, but it is time now to start placing at least initial trust on the actions and the documents made by the police. At any rate, the court cannot start with the presumption that the police records are untrustworthy. As a proposition of law the presumption should be the other way around. That official acts of the police have been regularly performed is a wise principle of presumption and recognised even by the legislature. Hence when a police officer gives evidence in court that a certain article was recovered by him on the strength of the statement made by the accused it is open to the court to believe the version to be correct if it is not otherwise shown to be unreliable. It is for the accused, through cross-examination of witnesses or through any other materials, to show that the evidence of the police officer is either unreliable or at least unsafe to be acted upon in a particular case. If the court has any good reason to suspect the truthfulness of such records of the police the court could certainly take into account the fact that no other independent person was present at the time of recovery. But it is not a legally approvable procedure to presume the police action as unreliable to start with, nor to jettison such action merely for the reason that police did not collect signatures of independent persons in the documents made contemporaneous with such actions." In view of the above there is no force in the argument led by the learned counsel for the appellants with regard to point ©. (D). The last contention of the learned counsel for the appellants made at point (D) also appears to be against the principles of law. It is a case based on circumstantial evidence. (D). The last contention of the learned counsel for the appellants made at point (D) also appears to be against the principles of law. It is a case based on circumstantial evidence. On the evidence on record it has been proved beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution that the entire incident in question was executed by all the seven appellants with a common object and with substantial motive, as discussed above. The 'common object', as contemplated by Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, does not require prior concert or meeting of minds before the attack. Generally no direct evidence is available regarding the existence of common object which, in each case, has to be ascertained from the attending facts and circumstances. When a concerted attack is made on the victim by a large number of persons, armed with deadly weapons, it is often difficult to determine the actual part played by each offender and it is easy to hold that such persons, who attacked the victim, had the 'common object' for an offence which was known to be likely committed in prosecution of such an object. It is true that a mere innocent person, in an assembly of persons or being a by-stander does not make such person a member of an unlawful assembly, but where the persons forming the assembly are shown to be having identical interest in pursuance of which, some of them come armed and others though not armed, they would, under the normal circumstances, be deemed to be the members of the 'unlawful assembly'. In this case also the accused persons/appellants have been proved to be on inimical terms with all the deceased/informant-party. The enmity between the parties had been aggravated on account of the sudden murder of Chhote Lal, the close relation/acquaintance of the appellants. Some of the accused persons/appellants who came to the spot and apprehended the deceased persons were also shown to have been armed with deadly weapons. The facts and circumstances of the case unequivocally prove the existence of the 'common object' of such persons forming the 'unlawful assembly', who had come to the spot and apprehended all the deceased, against whom they had strong animus as well as immediate motive, in consequence of which, four precious lives were lost. The facts and circumstances of the case unequivocally prove the existence of the 'common object' of such persons forming the 'unlawful assembly', who had come to the spot and apprehended all the deceased, against whom they had strong animus as well as immediate motive, in consequence of which, four precious lives were lost. Further, on account of the sudden murder of Chhote Lal, enmity of all the appellants against the 'Muraos' and 'Muslims' resulted in the immediate motive for murder of all the four deceased, as narrated above. Therefore, the disclosure statement made by one of the appellants herein of the said unlawful assembly and recovery of all the four heads of the deceased persons, weapon of assault 'gandasa' and other incriminating materials, on the pointing out by him, is one of the major circumstances, which led to joining of the dots to complete the chain of the circumstances. Hence, in our opinion, this last circumstance (XI), can also be used against rest of the appellants and there is no reason why the admissible/cogent and plenty of prosecution evidence in this regard should not be considered against the rest of the appellants of the same unlawful assembly, who had committed the crime in question, in furtherance of the 'common object' of the said assembly. In the case of Rakesh and others Vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) 227 (2016) DLT 92. The Apex Court in almost similar incident of murder has held as under:- "20. The evidence of Inspector Satya Prakash (PW-24), corroborated by the testimonies of Devendra Kumar (PW-7), ASI Asha Devi (PW-10), ASI Ramphal Singh (PW-16) and Constable Sanjeev Kumar (PW-19), however, proved that on 20.01.2005, appellant Rakesh made a disclosure (Ex. PW-16/A) and led the investigating police and pointed out a wheat firm in the area near jungle of Ahmednagar in district Bulandshahr (UP) where the dead body of the victim had been disposed of on the night of 12-13.01.2005. The Investigating Officer (PW-24) recorded formal proceedings (Ex. PW10/B) in this regard and then made a contact with the local police. PW-16/A) and led the investigating police and pointed out a wheat firm in the area near jungle of Ahmednagar in district Bulandshahr (UP) where the dead body of the victim had been disposed of on the night of 12-13.01.2005. The Investigating Officer (PW-24) recorded formal proceedings (Ex. PW10/B) in this regard and then made a contact with the local police. SI Brij Mohan Singh (PW-20) affirmed and corroborated the testimony of PW-24 in this regard it is this input which led to the discovery of the fact that the victim had actually died and his dead body had been found and seized by officials of police station BB Nagar, Bulandshahr (UP) on 13.1.2005 in which regard FIR (Crime) No. 2/2005 under Section 302/201 IPC had also been registered (vide Ex. PW-20/C). 26. From the above evidence of unimpeachable character, we have no hesitation in concluding that the victim had died homicidal death around the midnight of 12-13.01.2005 in the area of agriculture fields along the highway near village Ahmednagar within the jurisdiction of police Station BB Nagar of district Bulandshahr (UP). The injuries on the dead body clearly revealed he was strangulated with intent to cause death. The place where the dead body had been dumped leaves no room for doubt that the perpetrator (s) intended to destroy evidence. 60. The confirmation of the identity of the appellant Majnoj Sirohi by Rajender @ Lilu (PW-8) as the person who was accompanying Pappu @ Dharmesh (absconder) at the time of the taxi being taken on hire for the purported journey to Garh Ganga seals the chain of circumstances adding the element of "last seen" concerning him (appellant Manoj Sirohi). Since he has not offered any explanation and since the victim was subjected to homicidal death on the same night soon after being hired with his taxi, we unhesitatingly uphold the view taken by the trial court that the prosecution has proved beyond all doubts that appellant Manoj Sirohi was party to the criminal conspiracy and was complicit with appellant Rakesh in commission of the offences of kidnapping and murder of the victim." In Ismail Vs. Emperor AIR 1946 Sind 43, it was held that where, as a result of information given by the accused, another co-accused was found by the police the statement by the accused made to the police as to the whereabouts of the co-accused was held to be admissible under Section 27 as evidence against the accused. In this regard, we ourselves also take reliance of the decision of the Supreme Court in the above context, in the case of Mehboob Ali and others Vs. State of Rajasthan 2016 (92) ACC 529 and the observations made by the Apex Court in Navjot Sandhu's (supra) case. Further, in a similar case of State of Maharashtra v. Damu 2000 (6) SCC 269 the above proposition of law was reiterated by the Supreme Court. Therefore, in view of the settled principles of law laid down in the aforementioned cases, this disclosure statement of Saligram and thereby recovery of four heads and other incriminating articles, completes the entire chain of aforementioned circumstances (I to XI), pointing towards the complicity of not only the appellant Saligram alone but also all the members of the unlawful assembly, consisting of the seven appellants. In view of the above, there is no substance in this last argument (D) of the learned counsel for the appellants. 99. In view of the above observation and logical analysis of the entire evidence adduced by the prosecution to substantiate the charges against the appellants, we are of the definite opinion that the prosecution has not only proved all the circumstances (I to XI), mentioned herein above, but also established that the said chain of circumstances is complete in all respect. 100. In a case based on circumstantial evidence where no eye- witness account is available, there is another principle of law which must be kept in mind. The principle is that when an incriminating circumstance is put to the accused and the said accused either offers no explanation or offers an explanation which is found to be untrue, then the same becomes an additional link in the chain of circumstances to make it complete. This view has been taken in a catena of decisions of the Apex Court, State of Tamil Nadu Vs. Rajendran (1999) 8 SCC 679 (para 6); State of U.P. Vs. Dr. Ravindra Prakash Mittal AIR 1992 SC 2045 (para 40); State of Maharashtra Vs. This view has been taken in a catena of decisions of the Apex Court, State of Tamil Nadu Vs. Rajendran (1999) 8 SCC 679 (para 6); State of U.P. Vs. Dr. Ravindra Prakash Mittal AIR 1992 SC 2045 (para 40); State of Maharashtra Vs. Suresh (2000) 1 SCC 471 (para 27); Ganesh Lal Vs. State of Rajasthan (2002) 1 SCC 731 (para 15) and Gulab Chand Vs. State of M.P. (1995) 3 SCC 574 (para 4). 101. Therefore, it is obligatory on the part of the appellants while they were being examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C., to furnish some cogent explanation with respect to the incriminating circumstances that inculpate them in relation to the crime in question, to decide as to whether or not the chain of circumstances is complete. 102. In the case of State of Maharashtra Vs. Suresh (supra) it was held by the Apex Court that when the attention of the accused-appellants is drawn to such circumstances that inculpate them in relation to the commission of the crime and they failed to offer an appropriate explanation or give a false answer with respect to the same, the said act of the accused-appellants, may be counted as providing a missing link to complete the chain of circumstances. We may hasten to add that the appellants herein have also not given any explanation whatsoever, when the aforementioned incriminating circumstances put to them under Section 313 Cr.P.C. This view was also reiterated by the Supreme Court in the case of Sunil Clifford Daniel Vs. State of Punjab (2012) 11 SCC 205 . 103. The cardinal principle having an important bearing on the 'burden of proof' is that sufficiency and weight of the evidence is to be considered. To use the words of Lord Mansfield in Blatch v. Archer (1774) 1 Cowp 63, Cowp at p.65- 'according to the proof which it was in the power of one side to prove, and in the power of the other to have contradicted'. Since it is exceedingly difficult, if not absolutely impossible, for the prosecution to prove facts which are especially within the knowledge of the opponent or the accused, it is not obliged to prove them as part of its primary burden. Since it is exceedingly difficult, if not absolutely impossible, for the prosecution to prove facts which are especially within the knowledge of the opponent or the accused, it is not obliged to prove them as part of its primary burden. ….On the principle underlying in Section 106, Evidence Act, the burden to establish those facts is cast on the person concerned; and if he fails to establish or explain those facts, an adverse inference of fact may arise against him, which coupled with the presumptive evidence adduced by the prosecution or the Department would rebut the initial presumption of innocence in favour of that person, and in the result, prove him guilty. As pointed out by Best (in Law of Evidence, 12th Edn., Article 320, p.291). "18. The question of burden of proof where some facts are within the personal knowledge of the accused was examined in State of West Bengal Vs. Mir Mohammad Omar and others (2000) 8 SCC 382 . In this case the assailants forcibly dragged the deceased Mahesh from the house where he was taking shelter on account of the fear of the accused and took him away at about 2.30 in the night. Next day in the morning his mangled body was found lying in the hospital. The trial Court convicted the accused under Section 364 read with Section 34 IPC and sentenced them to 10 years RI. The accused preferred an appeal against their conviction before the High Court and the State also filed an appeal challenging the acquittal of the accused for murder charge. The accused had not given any explanation as to what happened to Mahesh after he was abducted by them. The learned Sessions Judge after referring to the law on circumstantial evidence had observed that there was a missing link in the chain of evidence after the deceased was last seen together with the accused persons and the discovery of the dead body in the hospital and had concluded that the prosecution had failed to establish the charge of murder against the accused persons beyond any reasonable doubt. This Court took note of the provisions of Section 106 of the Evidence Act and laid down the following principle in paras 31 to 34 of the reports : "31. This Court took note of the provisions of Section 106 of the Evidence Act and laid down the following principle in paras 31 to 34 of the reports : "31. The pristine rule that the burden of proof is on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused should not be taken as a fossilised doctrine as though it admits no process of intelligent reasoning. The doctrine of presumption is not alien to the above rule, nor would it impair the temper of the rule. On the other hand, if the traditional rule relating to burden of proof of the prosecution is allowed to be wrapped in pedantic coverage, the offenders in serious offences would be the major beneficiaries and the society would be the casualty. 32. In this case, when the prosecution succeeded in establishing the afore-narrated circumstances, the court has to presume the existence of certain facts. Presumption is a course recognised by the law for the court to rely on in conditions such as this. 33. Presumption of fact is an inference as to the existence of one fact from the existence of some other facts, unless the truth of such inference is disproved. Presumption of fact is a rule in law of evidence that a fact otherwise doubtful may be inferred from certain other proved facts. When inferring the existence of a fact from other set of proved facts, the court exercises a process of reasoning and reaches a logical conclusion as the most probable position. The above principle has gained legislative recognition in India when Section 114 is incorporated in the Evidence Act. It empowers the court to presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened. In that process the court shall have regard to the common course of natural events, human conduct etc. in relation to the facts of the case. 34. When it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that Mahesh was abducted by the accused and they took him out of that area, the accused alone knew what happened to him until he was with them. If he was found murdered within a short time after the abduction the permitted reasoning process would enable the court to draw the presumption that the accused have murdered him. If he was found murdered within a short time after the abduction the permitted reasoning process would enable the court to draw the presumption that the accused have murdered him. Such inference can be disrupted if the accused would tell the court what else happened to Mahesh at least until he was in their custody." 104. Applying the aforesaid principles the Apex Court in the case of Trimukh Maroti Kirkan Vs. State of Maharashtra (2006)10 SCC 681 while maintaining the conviction under Section 364 read with Section 34 IPC reversed the order of acquittal under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC and convicted the accused under the said provision and sentenced them to imprisonment for life. 105. This principle is also squarely applicable in the case in hand because the appellants of this case in their statements under Section 313 Cr.P.C. when confronted with regard to the incriminating circumstances that inculpate them in relation to the crime in question, failed to give any explanation whatsoever and made evasive denial. Therefore, we are of the view that in this case also non-submission of cogent explanation by the appellants provides a missing link for completing the chain of circumstances narrated above and hence, unerringly points towards the guilt of all the appellants. 106. Therefore, in the case in hand all the circumstances mentioned above (I to XI) which are relied upon by the prosecution, as well as accepted by the trial court, appear to be firmly established and proved by the prosecution. All the circumstances also appear to be firm and forming a complete chain establishing the guilt of all the appellants alone and suggesting no other inference. Further, the aforementioned circumstances are fully proved and conclusive in nature, affirming the chain of circumstances without any gap which points only to the guilt of the appellants and leads to no other inference. This also gets further affirmed by non submission of any explanation by the appellants under Section 106 of the Evidence Act in this case. Hence, it appears that the trial court has correctly appreciated the evidence on record, in view of the settled legal position and in the right perspective. 107. This also gets further affirmed by non submission of any explanation by the appellants under Section 106 of the Evidence Act in this case. Hence, it appears that the trial court has correctly appreciated the evidence on record, in view of the settled legal position and in the right perspective. 107. For the aforementioned reasons and in the circumstances of this case, we find no error or infirmity in the impugned judgment, the punishment awarded for the offences for which the appellants have been convicted cannot be said to be disproportionate or unduly harsh. 108. Thus, in the light of the above discussions, we are in agreement with the finding and conclusion arrived at by the learned trial judge. We are also satisfied with the conviction and sentence awarded to all the appellants by the learned Sessions Judge concerned, in this case of ghastly crime. Hence, we do not find any reason to interfere with the findings recorded by the court below. The appeal lacks merit and is therefore, dismissed accordingly. 109. Consequently, the conviction of the surviving appellants Saligram, Ram Bilas, Munendra Kumar and Ramvir for the offences under Sections 148/147 IPC, respectively, Section 302 read with Sections 149 and Section 364 read with Section 149 and 201 IPC are confirmed. Surviving appellants are directed to serve out the remaining part of the sentences awarded by the trial court in the impugned judgment and order dated 05.02.1983 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge VII (Higher Criminal Court), Budaun in Sessions Trial No. 550 of 1980 (State Vs. Saligram and seven others), arising out of Case Crime No. 401 of 1980, P.S. Ujhani, District Budaun. 110. All the surviving appellants who are on bail are directed to surrender immediately. Their bail is cancelled and sureties are discharged. The concerned trial court is also directed to get them arrested and send them to jail to serve out the remaining part of the sentences awarded by the trial court concerned and affirmed by this Court. 111. Office will certify this order to the trial court concerned through the sessions judge, Budaun within 15 days. Concerned trial court shall comply with the directions of this Court and communicate the compliance report of this judgment within 30 days thereafter.