K. Thimmappa Son of Late Konerappa v. State by Lokayuktha Police - Represented by State Public Prosecutor, High Court Complex, Bangalore
2017-01-10
ANAND BYRAREDDY
body2017
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : Anand Byrareddy, J. This appeal is preferred against a judgment convicting the appellant for offences punishable under Section 7 and Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as 'the PC Act', for brevity), whereby the appellant has been sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one year and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/- for an offence punishable under Section 7 of the PC Act and to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of three years and to pay a fine of Rs.15,000/- for an offence punishable under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act. 2. It was the case of the prosecution that the complainant, one Najeeb Ahmed, had alleged that he was the lessee of a granite quarry and when he had approached the appellant in his capacity as the Deputy Director of the Department of Mines and Geology, seeking transport permits from time to time, in respect of the mined material, there was a demand for illegal gratification. Since the complainant no longer wished to meet any such illegal demand, it is alleged, that when on 6.9.2005 he had sought such a permit and when there was a demand for a sum of Rs.20,000/- as a condition precedent to grant such a permit and which was to be paid on 13.9.2005, the complainant is said to have lodged a complaint with the Superintendent of Police, Lokayuktha, to take action against the appellant. And that it was pursuant to the same that the proceedings had been initiated against the appellant. It was the case of the prosecution that the Superintendent of Police had received the complaint telephonically at about 3.00 p.m. on 13.9.2005 and the complainant who had called from Kothalavadi was directed to remain there and it is stated that the Superintendent of Police voluntarily went and met the complainant and received a written complaint from him at Kothalvadi and after returning to Mysore had entrusted the matter to the Police Inspector, Lokayukta, Mysore, PW-5 - who had thereafter registered a case and took further steps. In that, a trap was arranged to apprehend the accused red handed, while he was to receive the illegal gratification. It then transpires that the complainant had visited the appellant at his office in Chamarajnagar to receive the permit.
In that, a trap was arranged to apprehend the accused red handed, while he was to receive the illegal gratification. It then transpires that the complainant had visited the appellant at his office in Chamarajnagar to receive the permit. At that time, as there were many others present in the office of the appellant, he is said to have requested the appellant to drop him at the Mysore Railway Station in his car as he was leaving his office for the day. And it is stated that the appellant was apprehended at the Mysore Railway Station, by PW-5 and his men, in the presence of other witnesses, when he had received the currency notes which had been treated with phenolphthalein powder in order to trap the appellant. The appellant having been charge sheeted on the above basis, he had pleaded not guilty and had stood trial. The prosecution had examined 6 witnesses and had got marked several exhibits and material objects, and after recording the statement of the appellant under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the trial court had framed the following points for consideration. "1. Whether the prosecution proves beyond all reasonable doubt that accused, working as a Deputy Director in the Mines and Geology Department and that on 13.09.2005, accused demanded a sum of Rs.20,000/- from the complainant - Najeeb Ahamad, as illegal gratification, other than legal remuneration, to show official favour and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988? 2. Whether the prosecution proves beyond all reasonable doubt that accused, on the aforesaid date, by misusing his official position by corrupt or illegal means, obtained the pecuniary advantage to an extent of Rs.20,000/- as a motive for an act to show the official favour, that is to grant permit to the complainant for transportation of mines and thereby he has committed an offence of criminal misconduct under Section 13(1)(d), which is punishable under Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988? 3. What order?" The trial court has held the points in the affirmative and convicted the appellant. It is that which is under challenge in this appeal. 3. The learned counsel for the appellant would contend that the trial court has erroneously concluded that there was a valid sanction in embarking on the prosecution of the appellant.
3. What order?" The trial court has held the points in the affirmative and convicted the appellant. It is that which is under challenge in this appeal. 3. The learned counsel for the appellant would contend that the trial court has erroneously concluded that there was a valid sanction in embarking on the prosecution of the appellant. In this regard he would point out that a plain perusal of the reasoning of the trial court in this regard would demonstrate that it is not in accordance with the established position of law and hence on that count alone the appeal ought to succeed. Elaborating further, it is pointed out that the validity of the sanction order to prosecute the appellant was vehemently contended before the trial court and though the trial court did not choose to frame the said issue as a point for consideration, the trial court had devoted paragraphs 24 to 51 in arriving at its conclusion that there was a valid sanction order. The relevant paragraphs are hereby extracted, in having pronounced thus : "47. It is important to note that I have already pointed out that in Ex.P.12, it is clearly mentioned that what are the documents placed before the sanctioning authority and there are details of the documents and also the statement of the witnesses and no doubt in the cross-examination of P.W.4, it is elicited that a draft sanction order was sent along with the letter. Further, it has to be noted that witness categorically says that they have filled up the draft and also made the changes wherever it was required and further, an answer was elicited from the mouth of the witnesses that while appreciating the note, there was no mention about the documents being verified and that does not mean to say that the sanctioning authority has not applied its mind and I have already mentioned that it is clear from Ex.P12 that what are the documents enclosed along with the letter of A.D.G.P. and it contains the details of the allegations made against the accused. No doubt, in the letter, it is mentioned that the sanction has to be given within 3 months and merely mentioning of period of 3 months, it cannot be contended that the sanctioning authority has not applied its mind. 48.
No doubt, in the letter, it is mentioned that the sanction has to be given within 3 months and merely mentioning of period of 3 months, it cannot be contended that the sanctioning authority has not applied its mind. 48. On perusal of the sanction order, it is clear that along with the A.D.G.P. letter, the documents were sent and the same were verified and the competent authority - Government i.e. the Chief Minister has given the sanction to prosecute the accused. Hence, the contention of the defence cannot be accepted. 49. The counsel also relied upon the judgment of Madhya Pradesh High Court regarding the sanction. The Madhya Pradesh High Court held that: "Sanctioning authority was Secretary of Home Department and the sanction given by the Deputy Secretary was not valid." 50. This judgment is not applicable to the case on hand and though, it was suggested that the Secretary was the competent authority to issue the sanction. 51. The counsel appearing for the defence did not place the material before the Court that the Secretary was the competent authority and here, it has to be noted that the accused was working as a Deputy Director, Mines and Geology Department and the competent authority is the Government to take disciplinary action against the accused. Hence, the sanction order to be issued by the competent authority only. Hence, the contention of the accused cannot be accepted." It is seen that the order of Sanction does indicate the material that was placed before the sanctioning authority. Though there is an admission that a draft sanction order was sent along with the letter seeking sanction, nothing much turns on the said circumstance. The order of sanction is seen to be issued in the name of the Governor. The Secretary to the Government has authenticated the said order of sanction which was issued in the name of the Governor. It was thus issued by the State in discharge of its statutory function in terms of Section 19 of the PC Act. The order of sanction was an executive action of the State having been issued in the name of the Governor. It was authenticated in the manner specified by Rule 19 of the Karnataka Government (Transaction of Business) Rules, 1977.
The order of sanction was an executive action of the State having been issued in the name of the Governor. It was authenticated in the manner specified by Rule 19 of the Karnataka Government (Transaction of Business) Rules, 1977. (Hereinafter referred to as the 1977 Rules', for brevity) Further, Rule 36 of the 1977 Rules requires that all cases of the nature specified in the Second Schedule to the said Rules, should be submitted to the Chief Minister by the Secretary of the Department. It is in compliance with the said Rule that the matter had been referred to the Chief Minister. The observation by the trial court that the Chief Minister having signed the order it is deemed an order of Sanction granted by the Government, is an incorrect observation. A plain reading of Rule 19 of the 1977 Rules would make this position clear. The same is extracted hereunder for ready reference. "19. (1) Orders and instruments made and executed in the name of the Governor of Karnataka, shall be authenticated by the signature of a Principle Secretary, a Secretary, an Additional Secretary, a Special Secretary, a Joint Secretary, a Deputy Secretary, an Under Secretary, a Desk Officer or any other officer holding these posts on ex-officio basis or by such other officer as may be specially empowered in that behalf by the Governor in the manner specified below, and such signature shall be deemed to be the proper authentication of such order or instrument. By Order and in the name of the Governor of Karnataka, (Signature) Name and designation of the Officer authorised to sign (2) Amendment to the Karnataka Civil Services Rules, [Manual of Contingent Expenditure, Karnataka Financial Code and Karnataka Treasury Code] which are of a routine nature and which do not involve any question of policy or heavy financial commitments may be made by the Secretary to Government, Finance Department with the prior approval of the Minister-in-charge of the Finance Department and the Chief Minister." In any event, there is no substance in the contention of the counsel for the appellant as to the order of Sanction being bad in law.
In that, the assertion that there was no application of mind by the sanctioning authority to the relevant material or that the same had been issued mechanically as evident from the fact that a draft sanction order had been readily provided along with the very letter seeking sanction, or that the sanctioning authority had not been examined as a witness by the prosecution, cannot be readily accepted as grounds which would vitiate the order of sanction. It is settled law that the grant of sanction can be proved by producing the original of the order of sanction and adducing evidence to demonstrate that the relevant materials were placed before the sanctioning authority to apply his mind. (See : State of Maharashtra v. Mahesh G. Jain, (2013) 8 SCC 119 ). This has been adequately complied with in the case on hand. Secondly, a draft sanction order having been forwarded by the Investigating Officer along with his letter seeking sanction, would not make any difference, if the sanctioning authority is shown to have applied his mind to the relevant material. (See : C.S. Krishnamurthy v. State of Karnataka, (2005) 4 SCC 81 ) Thirdly, the examination of the sanctioning authority as a witness by the prosecution is not mandatory. As the sanction order is passed in discharge of routine official functions, there is a presumption that the same was bona fide and does not require to be endorsed formally by a testimony before court. (See: State of Madhya Pradesh v. Jiyalal, AIR 2010 SC 1451 ). On the merits of the case it is contended that it was the case of the prosecution that the appellant had demanded illegal gratification in order to provide a permit sought for by the complainant. However, it was on record that the complainant had already received the permit as on 13.9.2005 itself and hence the alleged demand and acceptance of the bribe amount being a subsequent event, it could not be said that such alleged illegal gratification was in consideration of any official work to be performed by the appellant and hence the very basis for the case of the prosecution is absent. It is contended that the very registration of the case being in accordance with law is in serious doubt.
It is contended that the very registration of the case being in accordance with law is in serious doubt. It is pointed out that the complaint allegedly having been made telephonically by PW-2, at 3-00 p.m. on 13.09.2005 and PW-6 on receipt of the call is said to have directed PW-2 to remain at Kothalwadi, from where the telephone call was said to have been made and thereafter PW-6 is said to have personally rushed there, received a written complaint from PW-2 and is said to have come back to Mysore and entrusted the same to PW-5 to take further steps in accordance with law. PW-5 in turn is said to have registered a case at 4-00 p.m. The same was said to have been despatched to the court at 5-00 p.m., but the same was submitted to the Court only at 9-50 p.m. This sequence of events it is urged would indicate that the complaint and FIR were created subsequent to the entrustment mahazar, thereby rendering the entire exercise of the alleged trap a gross illegality, as the complaint, Exhibit P-8 and the FIR, Exhibit P-14, are inadmissible under Section 154 Cr.P.C. and are hit by Section 162 Cr.P.C. This aspect is completely ignored by the trial court. It is pointed out that according to PW-5, after he received the complaint, he had entrusted the phenolphthalein tainted currency notes forming the bribe amount of Rs.20,000/- to PW-2, the complainant in the presence of PW-1 and PW-3. And is said to have instructed the complainant to pay the said bait amount on demand by the appellant. He was then asked to go and meet the appellant at Chamrajanagar, from where he was to bring the appellant to the Mysore Railway Station. And the trap was to be sprung at the Mysore Railway station. However, the evidence of PW-5 in this regard is inconsistent with the above sequence of events alleged and it is contended that there is no corroboration of this by PW-1 and PW-3. One other glaring infirmity that the counsel for the appellant seeks to point out is that according to the complainant he had gone to receive the permit on 6.9.2005 itself, on which date the appellant is said to have made a demand for bribe and it is only on 13.9.2005 that he had lodged the complaint.
One other glaring infirmity that the counsel for the appellant seeks to point out is that according to the complainant he had gone to receive the permit on 6.9.2005 itself, on which date the appellant is said to have made a demand for bribe and it is only on 13.9.2005 that he had lodged the complaint. This is totally in variance with the charge framed and would vitiate the entire proceedings. It is further pointed out that the total inconsistency in the evidence of PW-1, PW-2 and PW-3, would completely defeat the case of the prosecution as the same cannot be reconciled. It is pointed out that according to PW-2, he had lodged the complaint when on his way to Chamrajnagar, he had been met by PW-1 a little later along the way and he is said to have kept the treated bait money in his pocket, with an instruction not to touch the same and hand it over to the appellant on his demand for the bribe. It is further deposed that he then went to Chamrajnagar and met the complainant in his office, where there were several others present. The appellant is said to have handed over the permit sought for by the complainant and requested him that he be dropped off in his car at the Mysore Railway Station and that when they were in the car together, the complainant is said to have handed over the bribe amount to the appellant, and that there was none else present in the car. On the other hand, PW-1 had stated that the treated bait money was kept in the pocket of PW-2, in the office of PW-5, with instructions that it must be paid to the appellant on demand and in the presence of PW-3. Further, after PW-2 left for Chamarajanagar to fetch the appellant, PW-1, PW-3 and PW-5 are said to have proceeded to the Mysore Railway station and the entire team had taken their position a little away from the Railway station, when at 7-45 p.m., the appellant and the complainant arrived there in the car of the complainant.
Further, after PW-2 left for Chamarajanagar to fetch the appellant, PW-1, PW-3 and PW-5 are said to have proceeded to the Mysore Railway station and the entire team had taken their position a little away from the Railway station, when at 7-45 p.m., the appellant and the complainant arrived there in the car of the complainant. PW-3 is said to have been instructed to go near the car in order to witness the demand and acceptance of the bribe amount, and on the pre-arranged signal being given by PW-2 of unbuttoning his shirt, the appellant is said to have been surrounded and caught with the bribe amount. Added to this, PW-3 had stated that when PW-2 and the appellant arrived at the station, he had gone upto the car and that he had seen the appellant and the complainant alight from the car and the appellant is said to have demanded the bribe amount and that the complainant had handed over the said amount, which was counted by the appellant before putting the same in his pocket. It is hence emphasized that the three different versions as above are wholly irreconcilable and render the prosecution case a falsity. It is further pointed out that in the light of the complainant not having supported the case of the prosecution, he was treated as a hostile witness and even in his cross examination it is not elicited that there was a demand by the appellant on which the bribe amount had been handed over to him. There is no corroborative evidence either, by way of the testimony of PW-1, PW-3 or PW-5. 4. On the other hand the learned counsel for the respondent seeks to justify the judgment of the court below. 5. However, as rightly pointed out by the counsel for the appellant, the trial court has chosen to ignore the several inconsistencies in the evidence of the key witnesses. It is noticed that the evidence of the complainant, PW-2 was most crucial in the prosecution seeking to make out a case. The said witness has not supported the case of the prosecution. However, the court below has chosen to rely on selective statements of the complainant in seeking to make out a case for the prosecution. This would hardly support the charges framed.
The said witness has not supported the case of the prosecution. However, the court below has chosen to rely on selective statements of the complainant in seeking to make out a case for the prosecution. This would hardly support the charges framed. Though it is the settled legal position that the entire evidence of a hostile witness need not be trashed and that such portions of the evidence that would yet support the case of the prosecution could be relied upon, is stretched to an absurd limit by the court below in stringing together stray statements which rendered completely superfluous when read in conjunction with the composite say of the complainant in his testimony. Similarly, the trial court is in complete error in having found that the supporting witnesses namely, PW-1, PW-3 and PW-5 have corroborated the evidence of PW-2. On a plain reading of the testimony of the said witnesses, it is found to be otherwise. And further, the evidence of PW-2 is certainly not in support of the prosecution and hence the same being corroborated by the inconsistent evidence of the supporting witnesses is not apparent. Consequently, the judgment of the court below is vitiated and is accordingly set aside. The appeal is allowed and the accused is acquitted. The bail bond furnished by the appellant is cancelled. The fine amount paid by the appellant shall be refunded to him.