JUDGMENT Hon’ble Manoj Kumar Gupta, J.—The instant petition has been filed seeking issuance of a writ of prohibition prohibiting the Settlement Officer Consolidation, Jaunpur from proceeding with the hearing of appeal No. 1707/3086 Kanta v. Nikku and others filed before him under Section 11(1) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 (The Act). The objection filed by the petitioner under Section 9-A(2) of the Act for partition of joint holding of khata No. 235 was allowed by the Consolidation Officer by an ex parte order dated 30.5.2016. Aggrieved thereby, Kanta, the second respondent filed an appeal under Section 11(1) of the Act before the Settlement Officer Consolidation, Jaunpur. The petitioner contends that the appeal filed by the second respondent under Section 11(1) of the Act is not maintainable in view of provisions of Section 41 of the Act read with Section 201 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901 (Land Revenue Act). It is urged that under Section 201, which is attracted to the present proceedings in view of Section 41 of the Act, specifically prohibit an appeal being filed against an ex parte order. The remedy available to such a party is to file a restoration application before the same authority which has passed the ex parte order. 2. Section 41 of the Act provides as under : 41. Application of U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901.—Unless otherwise expressly provided by or under this Act, the provisions of chapters IX and X of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901 shall apply to all proceedings including appeal and applications under this Act. 3. Thus, Section 41 of the Act makes applicable the provisions of Ch.IX and X of the Land Revenue Act to all proceedings including appeal and application under the Act unless a contrary provision is expressly provided by or under the Act. Sections 200 and 201 of the Land Revenue Act contained in Ch IX reads thus : “200. Hearing in absence of party.—Whenever any party to such proceeding neglects to attend on the day specified in the summons or on any day to which the case may have been postponed, the Court may dismiss the case for default or may hear and determine it ex parte. 201. No appeal from orders passed ex parte or by default.—No appeal shall lie from an order passed under Section 200 ex parte or by default. 201. No appeal from orders passed ex parte or by default.—No appeal shall lie from an order passed under Section 200 ex parte or by default. Rehearing on proof of good cause for non-appearance.—But in all such cases, if the party against whom judgment has been given appears either in person or by agent (if a plaintiff, within fifteen days from the date of such order, and if a defendant, within fifteen days after such order has been communicated to him, or after any process for enforcing the judgment has been executed or at any earlier period), and shows good cause for his non-appearance, and satisfies the officer making the order that there has been a failure of justice, such officer may, upon such terms as to costs or otherwise as he thinks proper, revive the case and alter or rescind the order according to the justice of the case: Order not be altered without summons to adverse party.—Provided that no such order shall be reversed or altered without previously summoning the party in whose favour judgment has been given to appear and be heard in support of it.” 4. The Act does not specifically contain any provision akin to Section 200 of the Land Revenue Act and thus, the authorities under the Act, while deciding a dispute get invested with the power to proceed ex parte by virtue of Section 200. Under the Act, there is also no provision for filing a restoration application for recall of the ex parte order and the said power gets conferred on the authority by virtue of provisions of Section 201 of the Land Revenue Act. This has been settled by series of decisions by this Court, (Naubat and others v. DDC, 2005 (99) RD 527 ; Devesh Singh v. DDC, 2005 (98) RD 446). 5. The main contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that once the power to seek recall of an ex parte order has been made available to an aggrieved party by virtue of provisions contained under Section 201 of the Land Revenue Act, the embargo created thereunder for filing an appeal against an order passed ex parte or in default would also get attracted and thus no appeal would be maintainable under Section 11(1) of the Act. It is submitted that when certain procedure is prescribed by law, proceedings are to be held by following such procedure or else it would be illegal. In this regard reliance has been placed on the decision of the Privy Council in Nazir Ahmad v. King-Emperor, AIR 1936 PC 253 and the Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Singhara Singh and others, AIR 1964 SC 358 . Apart from these judgements, learned counsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance on the decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Jagir Singh and others v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 1986 RD 89. 6. After giving to a thoughtful consideration of the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioner and having regard to the provisions of the Act as well as the provisions contained under the Land Revenue Act, this Court finds that the issue is no more res integra. Way back in 1967, a learned Single Judge of this Court in Mst. Ishraji and another v. Commissioner, Varanasi Division and others, had the occasion to specifically deal with the same issue as to whether an appeal under Section 11 of the Act would be maintainable against an order passed by the Consolidation Officer ex parte. It has been held that Section 41 only makes applicable such provisions of U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901 in relation to which there is no other contrary provision expressly provided by or under the Act. Section 11(1) of the Act which reads as under, is held to contain a contrary provision contemplating filing of an appeal not merely against an order passed on merits, but also against an ex parte order : 11. Appeals—(1) Any party to the proceedings under Section 9-A, aggrieved by an order of the Assistant consolidation Officer or the Consolidation Officer under that section, may, within 21 days of the date of the order file an appeal before the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, who shall after affording opportunity of being heard to the parties concerned, give his decision thereon which, except as otherwise provided by or under this Act, shall be final and not be questioned in any Court of law. 7. The relevant observation in the judgement of the learned Single Judge are as under : “5. 7. The relevant observation in the judgement of the learned Single Judge are as under : “5. Section 41 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act opens with the phrase “Unless otherwise expressly provided by or under this Act.” So far as the applicability of Section 201 is concerned if any other provision of the Consolidation of Holdings Act provides for an appeal against an order passed ex parte or by default then Section 201 will not apply. Its applicability would be excluded by the opening part of Section 41. Section 11 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act is general. It provides an appeal against all kinds of orders of the Consolidation Officer passed under Section 10 of the Act. Section 10 relates to the disposal of disputed cases. Under it the Consolidation Officer has to hear the parties and record evidence tendered and decide the objections. A decision of the objections results in an order which has been made appealable under Section 11 without any distinction. Disposal of an objection ex parte or by default would also be an order under Section 10 and would hence be appealable under Section 11 governing such an order, the result would be that there is a provision providing for an appeal against such an order. The provisions of Section 41 read with Section 201 of the Land Revenue Act will hence not be attracted. The Assistant Director of Consolidation was, therefore, in error in holding that Section 11 was subject to Section 41 of the Act. The appeal before the Settlement Officer was maintainable and was validly decided.” 8. The same issue once again was dealt with by another learned Single Judge in Devesh Singh and others v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Banda and others, 2005 (98) RD 446, holding as under : “9. A perusal of Section 11 quoted above, permits any party to the proceeding under Section 9-A(2) of the Act aggrieved by an order of the Assistant Consolidation Officer/Consolidation Officer under that section, to file an appeal. Thus, right has been given to every party to the proceeding under Section 9-A(2) of the Act to file appeal. The right conferred on a party to file appeal, has not been restricted to the party if he takes the ground that the order is ex parte. Thus, right has been given to every party to the proceeding under Section 9-A(2) of the Act to file appeal. The right conferred on a party to file appeal, has not been restricted to the party if he takes the ground that the order is ex parte. Thus, where the party who is filing appeal even if takes ground that the order is ex party or the order is otherwise bad on merit, in both situation, he can file appeal. In view of aforesaid, submission that if the order of the Assistant Consolidation Officer/Consolidation Officer is said to be ex parte, the appeal will not be maintainable, deserves rejection and it is held that against the order of Assistant Consolidation Officer/Consolidation Officer, passed in proceedings under Section 9-A(2) of the Act, in both class of cases, appeal would be maintainable.” 9. True it may be that the main part of Section 201 forbids availability of the remedy of appeal against an order passed ex parte or in default but, there is no manner of doubt that such provision would not be applicable to the proceedings under the Act in view of language employed under Section 11 of the Act which take within its ambit all kinds of orders, whether on merits or ex parte or passed in default, to be challenged in an appeal before the Settlement Officer Consolidation. At the same time, in the absence of any specific provision under the Act for recall of the ex parte orders or of dismissal of proceedings in default, the second part of Section 201 would be available to a party for filing restoration application before the same authority. Thus, a party against whom an ex parte order has been passed has two options. It can file an appeal under Section 11(1) of the Act before the Settlement Officer Consolidation and wherein the appellate authority would be competent to examine the correctness of the order on merits as well as the issue as to whether the procedure prescribed under law for proceeding ex parte, had been followed or not. However, therein, the appellate authority would not be empowered to go into the sufficiency of the cause for non-appearance nor would it have power to set aside the order on such ground. However, therein, the appellate authority would not be empowered to go into the sufficiency of the cause for non-appearance nor would it have power to set aside the order on such ground. The party seeking setting aside of the ex parte order on such ground, can only take recourse the second part of Section 201 by filing restoration application before the same authority, who would have power to examine as to whether the party was prevented by sufficient cause from appearing, resulting in passing of the ex parte order. In such an event, the authority will have the power to set aside the ex parte order only if it is of the opinion that good cause for non appearance has been shown and that there has been a failure of justice. There cannot be any dispute with the principle that where a power is given to do certain act in a particular way, that must be done in that way or not at all. However in the opinion of the Court, the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner in support of such proposition are not of much help as it has been held above that the filing of the appeal against an ex parte order is envisaged under the Act itself. 10. Jagir Singh (supra), on which reliance has been placed by learned counsel for the petitioner, also does not advance the submission made by learned counsel for the petitioner. In that case, the appeal filed before the Settlement Officer Consolidation was dismissed in default. A restoration application was filed which also was dismissed in default. The party in default, did not file any further application for recall of the orders but filed a revision before the Deputy Director of Consolidation challenging both the orders. The Deputy Director of Consolidation allowed the revision and set aside the order by which restoration application was dismissed in default. The order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation allowing the revision was challenged before this Court by filing a writ petition contending that no revision was maintainable against an ex parte order. This Court while observing that though there is no absolute bar in filing a revision, held that since the ground taken for attacking the order was regarding sufficiency of cause for non-appearance, the same ought to have been raised by filing a restoration application before the same authority. This Court while observing that though there is no absolute bar in filing a revision, held that since the ground taken for attacking the order was regarding sufficiency of cause for non-appearance, the same ought to have been raised by filing a restoration application before the same authority. For convenience of reference, the relevant part from the said judgement is reproduced : “6. In my opinion, learned counsel for the petitioner is not right when he says that the revision against the order dated April, 26, 1972 was absolutely barred but I agree with his contention that no revision was maintainable against the order dated April 26, 1972 on the grounds raised by the opposite party No. 2 in his revision application. A perusal of the certified copy of the revision application filed by the learned counsel for the petitioners in the Court shows that the ground for attacking the order dated April 26, 1972 of the Settlement Officer Consolidation were in the nature of restoration application in as much as he tried to impress upon the Court that there was sufficient cause for non-appearance in the Court of Settlement Officer Consolidation on April 26, 1972 then his restoration application was dismissed in default. In my opinion, if the opposite party No. 2 wanted to satisfy the Court that he was prevented from appearing before the Settlement Officer Consolidation on April 24, 1971 then he should have approached to the Settlement Officer Consolidation himself but he could not get any relief by filing revision before the Deputy Director of Consolidation. Thus the Deputy Director of Consolidation committed an error apparent on the face of the record in deciding the revision application on the allegations which could have been taken in the restoration application in as much as in the revisional jurisdiction he has to find out whether the subordinate Court has acted in accordance with law or not.” 11. Thus, even in the said judgement, this Court held that the revision against an ex parte order is not absolutely barred, though having regard to the plea that was taken before the revisional authority for challenging the ex parte order, the remedy was by way of a restoration application. This is also the view of this Court. Thus, even in the said judgement, this Court held that the revision against an ex parte order is not absolutely barred, though having regard to the plea that was taken before the revisional authority for challenging the ex parte order, the remedy was by way of a restoration application. This is also the view of this Court. Thus, the maintainability of the appeal before the Settlement Officer Consolidation is to be determined by having regard to the pleas raised in assailing the impugned order. 12. The memo of appeal has been brought on record and a perusal thereof reveals that therein the second respondent has not sought setting aside of the order dated 30.5.2016 on the ground that he was prevented by sufficient cause in participating in the proceedings. On the contrary, the specific ground taken was that the order was passed without giving notice to him. It has been alleged that the date fixed in the case was 24.5.2015 but arguments were heard a day before. Thus, he has challenged the correctness of the procedure adopted by the Consolidation Officer in proceeding to pass the order impugned. A further plea was taken that on the eastern side, the appellant had been in possession since the time of his ancestors, whereas the petitioner (Nikku) was in possession of northern side and thus, the manner in which partition has been affected, is illegal. In the opinion of the Court, these grounds can only be subject-matter of consideration in appeal filed under Section 11(1) of the Act. The appeal filed by the second respondent was thus, perfectly maintainable and the Settlement Officer Consolidation had rightly entertained the appeal and is fully competent to decide the same on merits. 13. The petition lacks merit and is accordingly dismissed.