JUDGMENT : Jyotirmay Bhattacharya, J. 1. Two First Miscellaneous Appeals were filed challenging the common order being No. 31 dated 10th January 2017 passed by the learned 6th Bench City Civil Court at Calcutta in Title Suit No. 335 of 2015. One of such appeals was filed by the defendant No. 1. The said appeal was registered as FMA No. 355 of 2017. The other appeal was filed by Humayan Properties Ltd. with the leave of the Court as a party adversely affected by the order impugned. The said appeal was registered as FMAT 428 of 2017. Since the common order is under challenge in both these First Miscellaneous Appeals, both the appeals were heard analogously and we propose to dispose of both the aforesaid appeals by common judgment and/or order. 2. By the impugned order an advocate, viz., M.S. Khusboo Bhimani was appointed as a receiver over a restaurant business run under the name and style of Food Plaza at the suit premises as the learned Trial Judge was of the view, that appointment of receiver over the said business is necessary for proper management and administration of the running business at the suit premises. The learned receiver was directed to ensure that status quo with regard to the possession of the suit property is maintained. The learned receiver was also directed to ensure that accounts are prepared properly. The learned receiver was also directed to submit accounts in Court every three months. First of such report was directed to be submitted on 15th February, 2017. The receiver was directed to prepare a list of employees with a rider that no other employee can be inducted without proper information to the receiver. 3. The legality and/or propriety of the said order passed by the learned Trial Judge is impugned in both the aforesaid appeals. 4. Let us now consider the merit of these appeals in the facts of the instant case. 5. The plaintiff filed a suit for declaration. 3. The legality and/or propriety of the said order passed by the learned Trial Judge is impugned in both the aforesaid appeals. 4. Let us now consider the merit of these appeals in the facts of the instant case. 5. The plaintiff filed a suit for declaration. In the said suit he has also prayed for injunction both in the mandatory as well as prohibitory form, So, that his business which was being carried on at the suit premises under the name and style of Food Plaza was not disturbed by the defendant No. 1 and the terms of the agreement which was entered into between the defendant No. 1 and the plaintiff on 1st June, 2010 are performed by the defendant No. 1. The Kolkata Municipal Corporation was impleaded as defendant No. 2 in the said suit, as according to the plaintiff, the defendant No. 1 in collusion with the defendant No. 2 obtained a trade licence in the name of one Ratan Mantose being the son of the defendant No. 1 for running the restaurant business under the name and style of Food Plaza from the suit premises. Accordingly, mandatory injunction was also prayed for against the defendant No. 2 for restraining the said defendant from giving effect to the trade licence, if issued, in the meantime in the name of Ratan Mantose in respect of restaurant business under the name of Food Plaza which the plaintiff alone and no one else is entitled to get trade licence in respect of the said business in the suit premises. Permanent injunction was also prayed for restraining the defendant No. 1, their men, agents and servants from transferring, assessing, parting with and/or dealing with the business of the plaintiff Food Plaza to any third person in any manner. A decree for permanent injunction has also been prayed for restraining the defendant No. 1, their men, agents, servants from interfering with the smooth running of the business Food Plaza by the plaintiff in flat No. 20A Lindsay Street, Kolkata-700087 in any manner. 6. After filing the said suit, the plaintiff filed an application for temporary injunction for restraining the defendant No. 1, their men, agents and servants and associates from transferring, assessing, parting with and/or dealing with the business of the plaintiff Food Plaza to any third person in any manner. 6. After filing the said suit, the plaintiff filed an application for temporary injunction for restraining the defendant No. 1, their men, agents and servants and associates from transferring, assessing, parting with and/or dealing with the business of the plaintiff Food Plaza to any third person in any manner. Temporary injunction was also prayed for restraining the defendant No. 1 from cancelling the agreement dated 1st June, 2010 in any manner. Ad interim order of injunction in similar form was also prayed for in the said application. 7. In the pleadings made out both in the plaint as well as in the injunction application, it was alleged by the plaintiff that the plaintiff entered into an agreement with the defendant No. 1 on 1st June, 2010 for running a fast food centre under the name and style of Food Plaza on the ground floor of premises No. 20A Lindsay Street, Kolkata-700087 within P.S. New Market. As per the terms of the said agreement, the defendant No. 1 has agreed to hand over possession of a vacant plot of land in the said premises to the plaintiff with right to raise construction thereon for enabling the plaintiff to run his business of fast food under the name and style of Food Plaza therefrom for 15 years w.e.f. 1st June, 2010. It was agreed between the said parties that during the continuance of the said agreement the defendant No. 1 will be entitled to get 15% of the daily sale proceeds only from the plaintiff but the said defendant will not be entitled to claim any other interest in the said business with a rider that the defendant No. 1 will never bear any loss damages etc. of the said business. The other terms and conditions which were mentioned in the said agreement are not necessary to be taken note of, for the purpose of disposal of the present proceeding and as such, we do not find it necessary to discuss those terms and conditions in details herein. of the said business. The other terms and conditions which were mentioned in the said agreement are not necessary to be taken note of, for the purpose of disposal of the present proceeding and as such, we do not find it necessary to discuss those terms and conditions in details herein. It was alleged by the plaintiff in his pleadings both in the plaint as well as in the injunction application that on 25th February, 2015 when the plaintiff visited the suit premises, he found that the defendant No. 1 along with her men were present in the suit premises and they were discussing about renovation of the restaurant and when the plaintiff wanted to intervene with the matter, the defendant No. 1 refused to recognize the plaintiff as tenant in the suit premises and he was also abused with filthy languages in front of the staff of the plaintiff. The pleadings made out in plaint of the suit was amended subsequently wherein the plaintiff admitted that the plaintiff was dispossessed from the suit premises on 15th March, 2014 and he was not allowed to enter into the suit premises on and from that day. It was also alleged that he was also assaulted by the defendant and her men and associates. It was admitted in the original plait as well as in the amended plaint that the defendant No. 1 has been carrying on business in the suit premises under the name and style of Food Plaza after obtaining a trade licence in the name of her son from the Kolkata Municipal Corporation. It was also alleged by the plaintiff in the amended plaint that the defendant No. 1 is not giving the share of profit to the plaintiff in terms of the agreement dated 1st June, 2010 which the plaintiff is entitled to, under the said agreement. 8. In these set of facts the plaintiff initially filed an application for temporary injunction seeking aforesaid reliefs. The plaintiff's application for temporary injunction was disposed of by the learned Trial Judge on 31st march, 2016. The parties were directed to maintain status quo with regard to the possession of the suit property and management of business Food Plaza till the next date of hearing. By the said order, the learned Trial Judge was also pleased to appoint an advocate commissioner for ascertaining the following facts. The parties were directed to maintain status quo with regard to the possession of the suit property and management of business Food Plaza till the next date of hearing. By the said order, the learned Trial Judge was also pleased to appoint an advocate commissioner for ascertaining the following facts. "A. In whose possession the suit property is lying. B. Who are in control & management of the business Food Plaza run at the suit property. C. Number of employees working in Food Plaza and who is making payment. D. Extent of construction in the suit property." 9. This part of the impugned order by which local inspection was directed by the learned Trial Judge was challenged in an application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India before this Court and the said revisional application which was registered as C.O. No. 1596 of 2016 was allowed by modifying the impugned order. It was directed that only the report with regard to the point number (A) will be taken into consideration. 10. Inspection was held by the learned advocate commissioner who also submitted his report before the learned Trial Court mentioning therein that a restaurant business was being carried on in the suit premises in the name and style of "Tifin Box" wherefrom fast food items were being sold. It was also reported that neither any hoarding nor any banner in the name and style of Food Plaza could be found in the suit premises. 11. The learned advocate commissioner also reported that he found that the plaintiff has no physical possession over the suit property. He reported that one Moloy Das and Amit Sengupta claiming themselves to be the representatives of one Humayan Properties Ltd. being the appellant in one of such appeals were in total physical possession and control over the suit property. They opened and closed the iron gates and put all padlocks in the presence of the advocate commissioner. 12. The plaintiff/respondent herein subsequently filed an application under Order 40 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code praying for appointment of receiver over the business being run by the defendant No. 1 in the suit premises. They opened and closed the iron gates and put all padlocks in the presence of the advocate commissioner. 12. The plaintiff/respondent herein subsequently filed an application under Order 40 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code praying for appointment of receiver over the business being run by the defendant No. 1 in the suit premises. Such relief was claimed by the plaintiff primarily on the ground that the defendant No. 1 is running the said business over the suit property in violation of the order of status quo passed by the learned Trial Judge on the plaintiff's application for temporary injunction. The impugned order was passed on the plaintiff's said application as the learned Trial Judge was of the view that running of the business in the name of "Tifin Box" as reflected in the report of the Commissioner was in violation of the order of injunction passed by the learned Trial Judge whereby the parties were directed to maintain status quo with regard to the running of the business in the name of Food Plaza. Thus for proper management and administration of the business of the suit properties receiver was appointed by the learned Trial Judge. 13. Let us now consider as to how far the learned Trial Judge was justified in passing the impugned order in the facts of the instant case. 14. We have also mentioned above the factual matrix in which the suit was filed and such interlocutory reliefs were claimed by the plaintiff in the said suit. 15. We have already mentioned above that the plaintiff himself admitted in the plaint that since April, 2014 he was dispossessed from the suit premises and he was not allowed to enter in the suit premises and was also not allowed to participate in the business which was being run in the suit premises by the defendant No. 1. The suit was filed on 12th March, 2015 i.e., after the plaintiff was admittedly dispossessed from the suit premises and/or ousted from the business. No relief has been claimed by the plaintiff in the suit for restoration of his possession in the suit premises and/or his reentry in his business. In our view, in the absence of such relief being claimed, the suit itself is not maintainable being barred under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. 16. No relief has been claimed by the plaintiff in the suit for restoration of his possession in the suit premises and/or his reentry in his business. In our view, in the absence of such relief being claimed, the suit itself is not maintainable being barred under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. 16. Be that as it may, let us now consider as to how far the plaintiff succeeded in proving his prima facie case and/or his prima facie title in the suit business. Though, he alleged in the plaint that he received possession of the suit premises from the defendant No. 1 on the strength of an agreement dated 1st June, 2010 for running his restaurant business after raising construction on the suit land but he has not brought on record any material to show that in fact, he took even in initial steps for running any restaurant business from the suit premises. He was unable to produce trade licence which was necessary to carry on business from any premises within the municipal limits of Kolkata Municipal Corporation. He has also not produced any licence which is necessary for running the restaurant business as per the provision contained in Section 421 of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act 1980. He has also not produced any fire licence issued by the competent authority for running any restaurant business form the suit premises. He has only produced the copy of the application which he allegedly submitted before the Municipal Authority seeking permission to renovate the suit premises. He has also produced the permission which was granted by the Municipal Authority to the plaintiff to renovate the suit premises. 17. It is brought to our notice by Mr. Bhattacharya, learned advocate appearing for the appellants in one of such appeals that Mr. Chatterjee's client has filed a supplementary affidavit annexing thereto the applications which was allegedly submitted by the plaintiff before the Municipal Authority seeking permission to repair or renovate the suit premises and the permission which was granted by the Municipal Authority to the plaintiff in this regard. Mr. Bhattacharya has pointed out that such permission was granted by the Municipal Authority on 27th June, 2010 which was Sunday when the departments of Municipal Corporation remain closed. Mr. Bhattacharya has pointed out that such permission was granted by the Municipal Authority on 27th June, 2010 which was Sunday when the departments of Municipal Corporation remain closed. He thus, invited us not to rely upon those documents which the plaintiff/respondent relied upon to support his contention regarding raising of any construction by the plaintiff over the suit premises. 18. Mr. Bhattacharya has also drawn our attention to the other supplementary affidavit filed by Mr. Chatterjee's client to show that the fire department of the State of West Bengal has informed under the Right to Information Act that the fire licence was obtained by the plaintiff by exercise of fraud for running the said business from the suit premises. Direction was given by the fire department not to renew the said licence any further. 19. It is curious to note here that the fire licence which was produced by the plaintiff shows that such licence was issued for the first time for the year 2014-15. Such fire licence remained valid for the period from 5th August 2014 to 4th August, 2015 and the said fire licence was issued on 9th October, 2014. The plaintiff also got the said fire licence renewed for the subsequent period i.e., for 2016 to 2017, during the pendency of the suit. 20. This Court does not find any justifiable reason for obtaining such fire licence in October 2014 when admittedly the plaintiff was dispossessed from the suit premises and was also ousted from the management of the business since April, 2014. 21. Having regard to the fact that the plaintiff has failed to produce any reliable document to establish that the plaintiff ever commenced any a restaurant business from the suit premises carried on under the name and style of Food Plaza, we have no hesitation to hold that plaintiff never commenced such business over the suit premises nor could he prove running of any business in the said premises under the name and style of Food Plaza. 22. Under such circumstances, we hold that the plaintiff having failed to establish his prima facie case and/or prima facie title over the suit property and/or suit business, the learned Trial Judge was not justified in appointing receiver over such business which is being run by some other persons. 23. Though Mr. 22. Under such circumstances, we hold that the plaintiff having failed to establish his prima facie case and/or prima facie title over the suit property and/or suit business, the learned Trial Judge was not justified in appointing receiver over such business which is being run by some other persons. 23. Though Mr. Bhattacharya's client's claim that his client namely Humayan Properties Ltd. is running the restaurant business, in the said premises, but we find that Bhattachary's client has not produced any document in support of such claim that it is really carrying on restaurant business in the suit premises. The Commissioner's report discloses that the restaurant business under the name of "Tifin Box" is being run from the suit premises and the property was in the control of Mr. Bhattacharya's client and both Mr. Bhattacharya's client and the defendant No. 1 are closely related to each other. However Mr. Bhattacharya's client has produced some documents to prove its ownership over the suit property. 24. On the contrary we find that the plaintiff admitted in his pleading that the defendant No. 1 is carrying on restaurant business in the suit premises. Such admission itself is sufficient to draw conclusion that the plaintiff is not running any business in the suit premises. As such, without expressing our conclusive view with regard to the maintainability of the suit because of the bar of Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, we hold that the learned Trial Judge was not justified in appointing a receiver over the suit property i.e. in the restaurant business in such a case where the plaintiff has not only miserably failed to prove his prima facie case in the suit but also has failed to prove his prima facie title over the business which he alleged commenced and/or had been running over the suit property under the name and style of Food Plaza. 25. We, thus, set aside the impugned order. The appeals are thus allowed. 26. The interlocutory applications are thus disposed of accordingly.