Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. The petitioner is an elected Pradhan of Gram Panchayat, Krangla who has been placed under suspension and has therefore filed the instant petition claiming therein the following substantive relief : 1. That appropriate writ order or directions may very kindly be issued and the impugned orders dated 21.01.2015 (Annexure P-8), 9.1.2017 (Annexure P-14), whereby the petitioner has been put under suspension, order dated 11.1.2017 (Annexure P-15), whereby the enquiry has been initiated against the petitioner and the order passed by the appellate authority dated 6.3.2017 (Annexure P-17) may very kindly be quashed and set aside in the interest of law and justice. 2. Brief facts of the present case are that in the year, 2005, the petitioner was elected as Pradhan of Gram Panchayat, Krangla and remained as such till the year, 2010, when he though contested the election but lost. However, in the election held in the year, 2016 he was again re-elected as Pradhan. 3. It appears that a complaint was lodged before the Deputy Commissioner, Shimla on 3.11.2010 alleging therein that there were some financial irregularities in the works executed by the Gram Panchayat, Krangla during the earlier tenure of the petitioner. The complaint was sent to Block Development Officer, Nankhari, who later on issued a notice to the petitioner informing about the details of the scheme on which no work was allegedly done even though the budget allocated for the same was shown to have been spent. 4. It appears that consequent to this communication, a joint representation was signed and sent by certain residents of Gram Panchayat, Krangla to the Block Development Officer, Nankhari Stating that all the works had been executed in the Gram Panchayat to the satisfaction of the residents of the village and these works were actually executed by the residents of the village and payments had also been received by them. 5. The Block Development Officer issued notice dated 11.9.2012 to the petitioner informing him that a detailed inspection of the work done had been conducted by a Committee constituted by him, which revealed that works had not been executed on the ground while payments thereof were shown to have been made. The petitioner was asked to deposit the amount spent under these scheme, however, the petitioner disputed these allegations. Thereafter another Committee was constituted by the Block Development Officer, in which the petitioner was also associated. The petitioner was asked to deposit the amount spent under these scheme, however, the petitioner disputed these allegations. Thereafter another Committee was constituted by the Block Development Officer, in which the petitioner was also associated. 6. In the inspection so conducted by this Committee, it was found that an amounts of Rs. 99,014/- and Rs.1,39,000/- totaling Rs.2,38,014/- were due from the petitioner for the works shown to have been executed under 12th Finance Commission and Hariyali schemes. Since the works, in fact, were not found to have been done on the ground, the petitioner vide letter dated 21.1.2015 was asked to deposit this amount. Later, the issue of recovery was followed up by the Block Development Officer by asking Tehsildar, Rampur to recover this amount which was ultimately deposited by the petitioner with Tehsildar, Rampur. In the meanwhile, an FIR also came to be registered against the petitioner. 7. On 19.10.2016, one Shri Ram Dass filed a complaint against the petitioner which was addressed to the Hon’ble Chief Minister seeking action against the petitioner under The Himachal Pradesh Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 (for short the Act of 1994). The matter was referred to the District Panchayat Officer for preliminary inquiry, who after holding inquiry came to the conclusion that as against the 19 works alleged to have been executed by the petitioner in his capacity as Pradhan, the works at sl. Nos. 3, 11, 12, 17 and 19 which works out to Rs.70,636/- had not at all been executed at the spot and despite this payments had been made. Whereas regarding the works at sl. Nos. 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 18, there was no technical evaluation of the same and yet the payments had been made, which prima facie established that the petitioner had violated the provisions of the Act, The Himachal Pradesh Panchayati Raj (General) Rules, 1997 (for short the Rules of 1997) and The Himachal Pradesh Panchayati Raj (Finance, Budget, Accounts, Audit, Works, Taxation and Allowances) Rules, 2002 (for short, the Rules of 2002). 8. On receipt of the inquiry report from the District Panchayat Officer, the Deputy Commissioner, Shimla vide his order dated 23.11.2016 issued a show cause notice to the petitioner asking him to explain why he should not be placed under suspension pending the inquiry against him on nineteen (19) different charges. 9. 8. On receipt of the inquiry report from the District Panchayat Officer, the Deputy Commissioner, Shimla vide his order dated 23.11.2016 issued a show cause notice to the petitioner asking him to explain why he should not be placed under suspension pending the inquiry against him on nineteen (19) different charges. 9. The petitioner replied to the show cause notice and denied the allegations. However, the Deputy Commissioner, Shimla vide order dated 09.01.2017 placed the petitioner under suspension on the ground that his continuance in the office could influence the inquiry and create an apprehension of tampering of record. Subsequently, vide order dated 11.1.2017, the Deputy Commissioner, Shimla charge-sheeted the petitioner and the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Rampur was appointed as the Inquiry Officer. 10. The petitioner assailed these orders by filing CWP No. 165 of 2017, however, the same was withdrawn with liberty reserved to approach the Divisional Commissioner. However, even the Divisional Commissioner vide his order dated 6.3.2017 dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioner constraining him to file the instant writ petition. 11. It is averred that the instant is a case which is completely based on political vendetta and every attempt is made by the respondents to nail the petitioner by hook and crook. It is further averred that all the works in question stand duly evaluated and inspected by the Technical Assistant, which completely belies the version put-forth by the respondents that no works or sub-standard works have been executed at the spot or the works have not been evaluated from the Technical Assistant. 12. The petition is contested by the respondents, wherein they have defended the action as one strictly in accordance with the Act and Rules. 13. It is once again maintained that as regards works at sl. Nos. 3, 11, 12, 17 and 19, the same have not been executed on the spot and payments thereof have been made whereas as regards the remaining works, it is alleged that the payments have been made without getting the same assessed by the Technical Assistant. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record of the case. 14. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record of the case. 14. It is more than settled that the scope and extent of powers of judicial review of High Court contained under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would vary from case to case, the nature of the order, the relevant statute as also the other relevant factors including the nature of powers exercised by the public authority. 15. In State of U.P. and another versus Johri Mal (2004) 4 SCC 714 , a Bench of three Hon’ble Judges of the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that power of judicial review of the Court was not intended to assume a supervisory role or done the robes of omnipresent and the following principles of judicial review were laid down:- “JUDICIAL REVIEW: 22. The power of judicial review is now well-defined in a series of decisions of this Court. It is trite that the court will have no jurisdiction to entertain a writ application in a matter governed by contract qua contract (assuming such professional engagement to be one), as therein public law element would not be involved. (See Life Insurance Corporation Vs. Escorts Ltd. and Ors. [ AIR 1986 SC 1370 ], F.C.I. and Ors. Vs. Jagannath Dutta and Ors., [ AIR 1993 SC 1494 ], State of Gujarat and Ors. Vs. Meghji Pethraj Shah Charitable Trust and Ors., [ (1994) 3 SCC 552 ], Assistant Excise Commissioner and Ors. Vs. Issac Peter and Ors., (1994) 4 SCC 104 ], National Highway Authority of India Vs. M/s. Ganga Enterprises & Anr. 2003 (7) SCALE 171 ). 23. In any event, the modern trend also points to judicial restraint in administration action as has been held in Tata Cellular Vs. Union of India [ (1994) 6 SCC 651 ]. (See also Monarch Infrastructure (P) Ltd. Vs. Commissioner, Ulhasnagar Municipal Corporation and Others [ (2000) 5 SCC 287 ] and W.B. State Electricity Board Vs. Patel Engineering Co. Ltd. and Others [ (2001) 2 SCC 451 )] and L.I.C. and Anr. vs. Consumer Education and Research Centre and Ors., [ AIR 1995 SC 1811 ]. 24. The legal right of an individual may be founded upon a contract or a statute or an instrument having the force of law. Patel Engineering Co. Ltd. and Others [ (2001) 2 SCC 451 )] and L.I.C. and Anr. vs. Consumer Education and Research Centre and Ors., [ AIR 1995 SC 1811 ]. 24. The legal right of an individual may be founded upon a contract or a statute or an instrument having the force of law. For a public law remedy enforceable under Article 226 of the Constitution, the actions of the authority need to fall in the realm of public law -be it a legislative act or the State, an executive act of the State or an instrumentality or a person or authority imbued with public law element. The question is required to be determined in each case having regard to the nature of and extent of authority vested in the State. However, it may not be possible to generalize the nature of the action which would come either under public law remedy or private law field nor is it desirable to give exhaustive list of such actions. 25. In Council of Civil Services Unions Vs. Minister for the Civil Service [(1985) AC 374] while extending the scope of judicial review the House of Lords decided that judicial review should not be available if the particular decision under challenge was not justiciable. However, in granting relief the Court shall take into consideration the factors like national security issue. In Constitution Reform in the UK by Dawn Oliver, it is stated at page 210: "In the CCSU case the House of Lords decided that judicial review should not available if the particular decision under challenge was not justiciable. In effect they respected the political Constitution and deferred to government in some sensitive areas. In this case the Government was alleging that for them to have consulted the unions before the decision was taken would have provoked industrial action at GCHQ, which would in turn have been damaging to national security. In the view of the House of Lords this made an otherwise reviewable decision not suitable for judicial review - not justiciable. Other decisions taken under the royal prerogative, which the court indicated would be non- justiciable, included treaty making and foreign affairs. In the view of the House of Lords this made an otherwise reviewable decision not suitable for judicial review - not justiciable. Other decisions taken under the royal prerogative, which the court indicated would be non- justiciable, included treaty making and foreign affairs. Despite the outcome of the CCSU that the prerogative is in principle reviewable and that were it not for the national security issue the government should have consulted the unions before imposing these changes was a major step forward in the judicialization of government action, including the actual conduct of government, and a step away from the political Constitution." 26. However, we may notice that judicial review was held to be available when justiciability of foreign relations came to be considered in R. (Abbasi) Vs. Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] EWCA Civ., 6 November 2002 stating: "Although the statutory context in which Adan was decided was highly material, the passage from Lord Cross' speech in Cattermole supports the view that, albeit that caution must be exercised by this Court when faced with an allegation that a foreign state is in breach of its international obligations, this Court does not need the statutory context in order to be free to express a view in relation to what it conceives to be a clear breach of its international obligations, this Court does not need the statutory context in order to be free to express a view in relation to what it conceives to be a clear breach of international law, particularly in the context of human rights." 27. In Council of Civil Services Unions Vs. Minister of Civil Service the power of judicial review was restricted ordinarily to illegality, irrationality and impropriety stating: "If the power has been exercised on a non-consideration or non-application of mind to relevant factors, the exercise of power will be regarded as manifestly erroneous. If a power (whether legislative or administrative) is exercised on the basis of facts which do not exist and which are patently erroneous, such exercise of power will stand vitiated." 28. If a power (whether legislative or administrative) is exercised on the basis of facts which do not exist and which are patently erroneous, such exercise of power will stand vitiated." 28. The Scope and extent of power of the judicial review of the High Court contained in Article 226 of the Constitution of India would vary from case to case, the nature of the order, the relevant statute as also the other relevant factors including the nature of power exercised by the public authorities, namely, whether the power is statutory, quasi judicial or administrative. The power of judicial review is not intended to assume a supervisory role or done the robes of omnipresent. The power is not intended either to review governance under the rule of law nor do the courts step into the areas exclusively reserved by the suprema lex to the other organs of the State. Decisions and actions which do not have adjudicative disposition may not strictly fall for consideration before a judicial review court. The limited scope of judicial review, succinctly put is : (i) Courts, while exercising the power of judicial review, do not sit in appeal over the decisions of administrative bodies; (ii) A petition for a judicial review would lie only on certain well-defined grounds. (iii) An order passed by an administrative authority exercising discretion vested in it, cannot be interfered in judicial review unless it is shown that exercise of discretion itself is perverse or illegal. (iv) A mere wrong decision without anything more is not enough to attract the power of judicial review; the supervisory jurisdiction conferred on a Court is limited to seeing that Tribunal functions within the limits of its authority and that its decisions do not occasion miscarriage of justice. (v) The Courts cannot be called upon to undertake the Government duties and functions. The Court shall not ordinarily interfere with a policy decision of the State. Social and economic belief of a Judge should not be invoked as a substitute for the judgment of the legislative bodies. (See Ira Munn Vs. State of Ellinois, 1876 (94) US (Supreme Reports) 113) 16. Having set out the parameters of judicial review, we now proceed to examine the case of the petitioner as to whether it is really an outcome of political vendetta or any other extraneous consideration or is there sufficient ground to proceed against the petitioner. 17. (See Ira Munn Vs. State of Ellinois, 1876 (94) US (Supreme Reports) 113) 16. Having set out the parameters of judicial review, we now proceed to examine the case of the petitioner as to whether it is really an outcome of political vendetta or any other extraneous consideration or is there sufficient ground to proceed against the petitioner. 17. However before doing so, it would be necessary to first refer to the powers of suspension of the respondent and the same is contained in Section 145 of the Act, 1994 and the relevant extract thereof is reproduced as under:- “145. Suspension of office bearers of Panchayats- 1(c) Where on a complaint made against him the preliminary enquiry prima-facie discloses the misappropriation, misutilization or embezzlement of Panchayat funds or he has been found guilty of misconduct in the discharge of his duties: 18. At this stage, it needs to be reiterated that even though we are not to act as an appellate authority, yet, in view of the plea of victimisation, we would still like to prima facie satisfy ourselves with regard to veracity of the stand of the respondents with respect to accusation made against the petitioner. For this purpose, we would mainly confine ourselves to the allegations with respect to the works at sl. Nos. 3, 11, 12, 17 and 19, as the allegations against the other works are only to the effect that the payments had been made without the assessment of the work by the Technical Assistant. 19. The respondents after holding inquiry have come to the following conclusions with respect to the works at sl. Nos. Nos. 3, 11, 12, 17 and 19, as the allegations against the other works are only to the effect that the payments had been made without the assessment of the work by the Technical Assistant. 19. The respondents after holding inquiry have come to the following conclusions with respect to the works at sl. Nos. 3, 11, 12, 17 and 19:- 3 'kh"kZ gfj;kyh en ls o"kZ 2007&2008 esa fuekZ.k ckoM+h FkVckbZ ds fy, Lohd`r vuqnku jkf'k eq0 8000@& : ds nq:i;ksx ckjsA bl dk;Z ckjs iqoZ okMZ lnL; Jh gjh flag o Jh yksd jkt [kkph ds C;ku o dfu"B vfHk;Urk dh LFky dh HkkSfrd fjiksVZ vuqlkj ;g dk;Z gqvk gS tks fd vkt Hkh ekSds ij ekStwn gSA bl dk;Z dh vnk;xh fcuk rduhdh vkadyu ds dh xbZ gsA bl rjg iz/kku }kjk fg0iz0 iapk;rh jkt vf/kfu;e 1994 fg0iz0 iapk;r jkt ¼lke;U;½fu;e 1997 o foRr fu;e 2002 ds izko/kkuksa dk Li"V mYy?ku fd;k x;k gSSA tkp vf/kdkjh }kjk izLrqr fjiksVZ ls izLrqr gksrk gS fd iz/kku }kjk ;g dk;Z ekSdk ij ugha fd;k x;k gS o QthZ vnk;xh dh xbZ gS rFkk fg0 iz- iapk;rh jkt vf/kfu;e 1994 fg0iz0 iapk;r jkt ¼lkekU;½ fu;e 1997 o foRr fu;e 2002 ds izko/kkuksa dk Li"V mYya?ku fd;k x;k gSA 11- 'kh"kZ gfj;kyh en ls o"kZ 2008&09 esa fuekZ.k iksyh VSad cychj Bkdqj ds [ksr ds fy, Lohd`r vuqnku jkf'k eq0 15000@& : ds nq:i;ksx ckjsA bl dk;Z ds fuekZ.k ckjs rduhdh lgk;d }kjk viuh fjiksVZ esa izLrqr fd;k x;k gS fd cychj ds [ksr esa VSad rks cuk gS] ijUrq eq>s ugh ekywe fd fdl en ls cuk gS D;ksa muds lkFk u rks f'kdk;rZdrkZ miyC/k Fkk vkSj u gh Jh eksgu ykyA bl dk;Z dh vnk;xh fcuk rduhdh vkadyu ds dh xbZ gSA bl rjg iz/kku }kjk fg0iz0 iapk;rh jkt vf/kfu;e 1994 fg0iz0 iapk;r jkt ¼lkekU;½ fu;e 1997 o foRr fu;e 2002 ds izko/kkuksa dk Li"V mYy?ku fd;k x;k gS tkap vf/kdkjh }kjk izLrqr fjiksVZ ls izLrqr gksrk gS fd iz/kku }kjk ;g dk;Z ekSdk ij ugh fd;k x;k gS o QthZ vnk;xh dh xbZ gS rFkk fg0iz0 iapk;rh jkt vf/kfu;e 1994 fg0iz0 iapk;r jkt ¼lkekU;½ fu;e 1997 o foRr fu;e 2002 ds izko/kkuksa dk Li"V mYy?ku fd;k x;k gSS 12- “kh"kZ gfj;kyh en ls o"kZ 2008&09 esa fuekZ.k o"kkZ ty lap; ;kstuk tqCcM+ ds fy, Lohd`r vuqnku jkf'k eq0 20000@& : ds nq:i;ksx ckjsA bl dk;Z ds fuek.kZ esa tkfoan yky o Jh jke nkl us vius C;ku esa crk;k fd ;g VSad gfj;kyh en ls ugha cuk gS vkSj ;g VSad ckxckuh foHkkx dh vuqnku jkf'k ls fufeZr gqvk gSA Jh eksgu yky iz/kku }kjk crk;k x;k fd ;g VSad gfj;kyh en ls cuk gSA ftldh vnk;xh Jh tkafoan yky dks nh xbZ gSA dfu"B vfHk;ark }kjk viuh fjiksVZ esa izLrqr fd;k x;k gS fd ekSds ij ,d VSad cuk gS mls ;g ekqywe ugha gS fd ;g VSad fdl en ls cuk gSA rRdkyhu iz/kku Jh eksgu yky }kjk bl dk;Z dh vnk;xh rduhdh ewY;kadu ds i'pkr dh tkuh pkfg, Fkh ijUrq dk;Z dh vnk;xh fcuk rduhdh ewY;kadu ds dh xbZ gSA bl rjg iz/kku }kjk fg0iz0 iapk;rh jkt vf/kfu;e 1994 fg0iz0 iapk;r jkt ¼lkekU;½fu;e 1997 o foRr fu;e 2002 ds izko/kkuksa dk Li"V mYy?ku fd;k x;k gSS tkap vf/kdkjh }kjk izLrqr fjiksVZ ls izLrqr gksrk gS fd iz/kku }kjk ;g dk;Z ekSdk ij ugh fd;k x;k gS o QthZ vnk;xh dh xbZ gS rFkk fg0iz0 iapk;rh jkt vf/kfu;e 1994 fg0iz0 iapk;r jkt ¼lkekU;½fu;e 1997 o foRr fu;e 2002 ds izko/kkuksa dk Li"V mYy?ku fd;k x;k gSS 19- 'kh"kZ 12ok fork;ksx ls o"kZ 2010&11 esa ejEer ckoM+h djkyVk yokM+h ds fy, Lohd`r vuqnku jkf'k eq0 20000@& : ds nq:i;ksx ckjsA Jh jke nkl }kjk vius C;ku esa dgk x;k gS fd ckoM+h djkyVk yckM+h dk dk;Z ugh gqvk gSA mu }kjk vius C;ku esa ;g Hkh Li"V fd;k x;k gS fd lM+d dk fuekZ.k 2005&06 esa 'kq: gks x;k gS vkSj o"kZ 2009&10 esa bl esa ljdkjh cl pyuh 'kq: gks xbZ Fkh vkSj bl ckoM+h ds fy, jkf'k 2010&11 esa 12ok fork;ksx ls Lohd`r dh xbZ FkhA dfu"B vfHk;ark fodkl [k.M uu[kMh dh HkskSfrd fjiksVZ vuqlkj yksd fuek.Zk foHkkx }kjk lM+d esa yxkbZ xbZ nhokj ds Hkhrj ,d NksVh lh ckoM+h ekStwn gSA mu }kjk viuh fjiksVZ esa ;g Hkh izLrqr fd;k x;k gS fd muds fy, ;g vuqeku yxkuk laHko ugha gS fd bl ckoM+h ds ejEer dk;Z gqvk Fkk ;k ughaA iapk;r lfpo }kjk fjiksVZ esa jksdM+ i`"B 7 ij jkf'k dh fudklh rFkk [kpkZ n'kkZ;k x;k gSA ijUrq ;g O;; fcuk rduhdh vkadyu ds fd;k x;k gS tkap vf/kdkjh }kjk izLrqr fjiksVZ ls izLrqr gksrk gS fd iz/kku }kjk ;g dk;Z ekSdk ij ugh fd;k x;k gS o QthZ vnk;xh dh xbZ gS rFkk fg0iz0 iapk;rh jkt vf/kfu;e 1994 fg0iz0 iapk;r jkt ¼lkekU;½fu;e 1997 o foRr fu;e 2002 ds izko/kkuksa dk Li"V mYy?ku fd;k x;k gSS 20. Confronted with these observations, the learned counsel for the petitioner Shri Sanjeev Bhushan, Sr. Advocate, would vehemently argue that all these works not only stand executed on the spot but even stand approved by the Panchayat in its meetings held from time to time and the payment against the said works have already been released to the persons executing the work. However, before examining this contention, we may at this stage make note of certain statutory provisions as are relevant for the adjudication of this case. 21. Section 99 of the Act of 1994, which deals with the Panchayat Fund reads thus:- “99. Panchayat Fund:-(1) Every Panchayat shall establish a fund to be called the Panchayat Fund and all sums received by the Panchayat, shall form part of the said fund. (2) Subject to the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder, all property vested in the Panchayat and the Panchayat fund shall be applied for the purposes of this Act or for other purposes connected with the activities for the development of Panchayat generally or for such other expenses as the State Government may approve on an application of Panchayat or otherwise in the public interest. The Panchayat Fund shall be kept in the nearest Government Treasury or Sub-Treasury or Post Office or Cooperative Bank or Scheduled Bank. (3) An amount allotted to the Panchayat by the State Government or any other person or local authority for any specified work or purpose shall be utilized exclusively for such work or purpose and in accordance with such instructions as the State Government may either generally or specially issue in this behalf. (3) An amount allotted to the Panchayat by the State Government or any other person or local authority for any specified work or purpose shall be utilized exclusively for such work or purpose and in accordance with such instructions as the State Government may either generally or specially issue in this behalf. (4) The amount from the Gram Panchayat Fund shall be withdrawn, only under the joint signatures of the (Secretary or the Panchayat Sahayak) of Gram Panchayat and Pradhan, if there is casual vacancy in the office of the Pradhan, under the joint signatures of the (Secretary or the Panchayat Sahayak) or Gram Panchayat and the Up-Pradhan and, if there are casual vacancies simultaneously in the offices of both the Pradhan and the Up-Pradhan, under the joint signatures of the (Secretary or the Panchayat Sahayak) of Gram Panchayat and any member of the Gram Panchayat authorized by the Gram Panchayat in this behalf:) (Provided that the Panchayat Sahayak shall not withdraw the amount from the Gram Panchayat fund as joint signatory unless authorised by the Director for this purpose.) Provided further that in a particular Panchayat, the Panchayat Sahayak shall withdraw the amount from the Gram Panchayat Fund as a joint signatory only in case there is no Panchayat Secretary posted in that Panchayat.] (5) The amount from the Panchayat Samiti Fund shall be withdrawn only under the joint signatures of Executive Officer, by whatever name called, of the Panchayat Samiti and Chairman or any other member of the Panchayat Samiti authorized by the Panchayat Samiti. (6) The amount from the Zila Parishad Fund shall be withdrawn only under the joint signatures of the Secretary, by whatever name called, of the Zila Parishad and Chairman or any other member of the Zila Parishad authorized by the Zila Parishad.” 22. Section 23 of the Act of 1994, provides for constitution and functions of Standing Committees and in terms of sub section (4) thereof all developmental works of the gram panchayat are to be executed by the Works Committee in the manner as may be prescribed and if considered necessary the gram panchayat may form sub-committee to supervise and monitor performance of such works and to obtain accounts thereof. 23. The mode of making payment is prescribed under Rule 44 of the Rules of 2002, which reads thus:- “44. 23. The mode of making payment is prescribed under Rule 44 of the Rules of 2002, which reads thus:- “44. Payment.- The Pradhan of the Gram Panchayat or Chairman of the Panchayat Samiti or Chairman of the Zila Parishad, as the case may be, and the Secretary of the Panchayat concerned, while incurring or authorizing expenditure out of the Panchayat Fund shall observe the following canons of financial propriety, namely:- (i) the strict economy shall be observed at every stage; (ii) the same vigilance in respect of the expenditure incurred out of the Panchayat Fund shall be exercised as a person of ordinary prudence would exercise in respect of expenditure of his own money; (iii) the expenditure shall not prima facie be more than the occasion demands; (iv) no power shall be exercised in sanctioning expenditure or passing an order which will directly or indirectly be to their own advantage; (v) The money out of the Panchayat Fund shall not be utilized for the benefit of a particular person or section of the community, unless- (a) the amount of expenditure involved is insignificant; or (b) a claim for the amount could be enforced in the court of law; or (c) the expenditure is in pursuance of a recognized policy or practice; and (vi) the amount of allowances granted to meet expenditure of a particular type shall be so regulated that the allowances are not on the whole a source of profit to the recipients. Money indisputably payable shall not, as far as possible be left unpaid.” 24. Chapter XI of the Rules of 2002 relates to the Panchayati Raj Public Works Rules and Rules 106 to 108 thereof relate to the final assessment and completion report, release of funds against work and role of the Vigilance Committee, which reads thus:- “106. Money indisputably payable shall not, as far as possible be left unpaid.” 24. Chapter XI of the Rules of 2002 relates to the Panchayati Raj Public Works Rules and Rules 106 to 108 thereof relate to the final assessment and completion report, release of funds against work and role of the Vigilance Committee, which reads thus:- “106. Final Assessment and completion report.- (1) Before the release of final payment, the final assessment report shall be made in the following manner:- (i) In the case of Gram Panchayat the works costing upto the value of Rs.50,000/- by the Takniki Sahayak; (ii) in the case of works of Gram Panchayats, costing more than Rs.50,000/- upto Rs.3.00 lacs and works of Panchayat Samiti or Zila Parishad, as the case may be, costing upto Rs.3.00 lacs by the Junior Engineer; (iii) in case of works of Panchayats costing more than Rs.3.00 lacs upto Rs.10.00 lacs by the Junior Engineer; with the counter signatures of the Assistant Engineer; and (iv) in case of works costing more than Rs.10.00 lacs by the Junior Engineer with the consultation of the Executive Engineer. (2) On the completion of the work the executing agency shall furnish a completion report to the Panchayat concerned and the final work shall be assessed by the technical authority as specified in sub-rule(1) and the final payment shall be released to the executing agency on the furnishing of final assessment report by the technical authority and on receiving the said assessment report the Panchayat concerned shall issue a completion certificate. (3) In the case of works of Panchayats to be executed under Account-A the Panchayat concerned shall keep the completion certificate in its record and in the case of works to be executed under Account-B, a copy of the completion certificate shall be furnished to the agency which has released the funds for the execution of works. 107. (3) In the case of works of Panchayats to be executed under Account-A the Panchayat concerned shall keep the completion certificate in its record and in the case of works to be executed under Account-B, a copy of the completion certificate shall be furnished to the agency which has released the funds for the execution of works. 107. Release of funds against work.-(1) The funds shall be released by the Panchayat concerned, for the execution of works through participatory body or registered body, as the case may be, in the following manner:- (a) first instalment, 25% of the estimated cost of work at the beginning of the work; (b) second instalment, 25% of estimated cost of work after visit/inspection measurement by the technical authority subject to test check and completion of at least 30% work; (c) third instalment of 25% of estimated cost of work after completion of at least 50% work; (d) Fourth and final instalment of 25% of estimated cost of work after completion of work; (e) For works costing less than Rs.50,000/- the funds may be released in two instalments, 50% of which shall be paid as the first instalment and the remaining 50% on the completion of work as the second instalment. (2) For works to be executed by the Panchayat departmentally, the payments for muster-rolls and materials etc. shall be made on actual bills. (3) For works to be executed through contract/work order, advance payment is not to be normally made and payments are to be made in accordance with the tender specifications. The Panchayat may, if it deems necessary, release funds for making running payments to the contractors through its Secretary or any other regular employee. 108. Role of the Vigilance Committee:- Vigilance Committee shall have the powers to inspect all works being executed by the Gram Panchayat including records and accounts being maintained in respect of these works as per provisions of sub-section (4) of section 7 of the Act.” 25. The procedure for recording proceedings of meeting is envisaged under Rule 27, which reads thus:- “27. Procedure for recording proceedings of meetings.- (1) The register or proceedings shall be maintained by the Panchayat Secretary. The Panchayat Secretary shall obtain the signature or thumb marks of the members present at the meeting. In the beginning to confirm the presence for determining the quorum. Procedure for recording proceedings of meetings.- (1) The register or proceedings shall be maintained by the Panchayat Secretary. The Panchayat Secretary shall obtain the signature or thumb marks of the members present at the meeting. In the beginning to confirm the presence for determining the quorum. He shall maintain the register of proceedings in Hindi in Devnagri script. Proceedings shall be signed by the Pradhan or the person presiding over the meeting, besides the member present at the end of the meeting. If any member walkout during the meeting the fact should be recorded in the proceedings. (2) Proceedings of the last meeting shall be read out in the subsequent meeting, confirmed and signed by the person presiding over the meeting. (3) Confirmation of accounts of construction and developmental works shall be an essential agenda item in every Panchayat meeting. The details of the income and expenditure of the preceding month in respect of each item shall be placed in the meeting for consideration and approval in the prescribed proforma. Other items of the agenda will be taken up for discussion after the approval of the preceding months income and expenditure statement. 26. The proforma for placing the income and expenditure statement on going developmental works in the meeting of panchayats have to be recorded as per Form 34 which provides as under:- FORM-34 [See rules 18(3), 27(3), 97(5) and 105(5)] PROFORMA FOR PLACING THE INCOME AND EXPENDITURE STATEMENT OF ONGOING DEVELOPMENTAL WORKS IN THE MEETING OF PANCHAYATS 1. Date of meeting of Panchayat at …………………………………….. 2. Name of work …………………………………….. 3. Name of Scheme …………………………………….. 4. Date on which works started …………………………………….. 5. Latest position of work …………………………………….. 6. Sanctioned amount …………………………………….. 7. Detail of expenditure …………………………………….. 8. Total expenditure …………………………………….. MATERIAL: Sl. No. Date Detail of material Source of purchase Material received Qty. Rate Amount (A) (B) (C) Material Actually used – (Quantity) Expenditure on material 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. WAGES: Sl. No. Muster-roll Month Working days of un-skilled Labourers Working days of skilled labourers 1 2 3 4 5 1. 2. 3. Amount paid to un-skilled labourers Amount paid to skilled labourers Total Expenses 6. 7. 8. 1. 2. 3. Signature of Gram Panchayat Avam Vikas Adhikari/Secretary of PS/ZP The details of the above expenditure were read out in the meeting and we agreed to it. 1. Pradhan, Gram Panchayat/Chairman Panchayat Samiti/Zila Parishad. 2. 2. 3. Amount paid to un-skilled labourers Amount paid to skilled labourers Total Expenses 6. 7. 8. 1. 2. 3. Signature of Gram Panchayat Avam Vikas Adhikari/Secretary of PS/ZP The details of the above expenditure were read out in the meeting and we agreed to it. 1. Pradhan, Gram Panchayat/Chairman Panchayat Samiti/Zila Parishad. 2. Up-Pradhan, Gram Panchayat/Vice-Chairman, PS/ZP 3. Member: (1) …………………………………….. (2) …………………………………….. (3) …………………………………….. 27. It is more than settled that an action to be taken in a particular manner as provided by a statute, must be taken, done or performed in the manner prescribed or not at all. More than eighty years back, the Hon’ble Privy Council in Nazir Ahmad Vs King Emperor, ( AIR 1936 PC 253 ) held that where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the things must be done in that way or not at all and this has been approved and further expanded by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in catena of judgments (Refer: Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh & anr. Vs. State of Vindh-P, AIR 1954, SSC 322; Deep Chand Vs. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1961, SC 1527; State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Singhara Singh & ors., AIR 1964, SC 358; Chandra Kishore Jha Vs. Mahavir Prasad, 1999(8) SCC 266 ; Dhananjaya Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka, 2001 (4), SCC 9; State of Jharkhand & ors. Vs . Ambay Cements and anr., (2005) 1, SCC 368; Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Limited Vs. Essar Power Limited, 2008 (4), SCC 755; Zuari Cement Ltd Vs. Regional Director, ESIC, Hyderabad & ors, AIR 2015, SC 2764; And Uddar Gagan Properties Ltd Vs. Sant Singh & ors, Civil Appeal No.5072 of 2016 decided on 13th May, 2016). 28. It would be noticed that majority of the provisions as quoted above have been given a complete go bye by the petitioner. Be in respect of holding meeting, maintaining record or releasing the payment etc. Even the works at sl. Nos. 3, 11, 12, 17 and 19 have prima facie not been executed at the spot, whereas the payment for the remaining works have been made in violation of the provisions of the Act and Rules as referred hereinabove. 29. Even otherwise, this petition is clearly not maintainable as the petitioner admittedly has already deposited the outstanding amount and thus waived his right to file the present petition. 30. 29. Even otherwise, this petition is clearly not maintainable as the petitioner admittedly has already deposited the outstanding amount and thus waived his right to file the present petition. 30. Thus, on the basis of the aforesaid discussion, it cannot be held that the petitioner is being victimized or that no prima facie case is established against him. Accordingly, we find no merit in this petition and the same is accordingly dismissed. 31. However, it needs to be clarified that since the matter is pending investigation/disciplinary proceedings, it would not be proper for this Court to record firm findings regarding the guilt, leaving no room to the petitioner to urge the contrary. The effect of the judgment would then pre-empt the entire decision leaving practically nothing for the disciplinary authority or criminal court to decide. 32. Therefore, the aforesaid findings shall for all intents and purposes be treated as prima facie and not conclusive. 33. Somewhat similar issue came up before a Coordinate Bench of this Court in LPA No. 480 of 2012, titled as State of H.P. & Anr. vs. Sakshi Sharma & Ors., decided on 3.9.2014, wherein it was observed as under:- “10. We have considered the rival contentions and are of the considered view that since the matter was pending investigation/ disciplinary proceedings, it was not proper or appropriate at this stage for the learned Single Judge to have recorded firm findings regarding the guilt of the police officials leaving no room for these police officials to urge the contrary. The effect of the judgment if allowed to stand would be to pre-empt the entire decision leaving nothing for the disciplinary authority or competent criminal court to decide. The findings recorded by the learned Single Judge have therefore definitely prejudiced the case of the police officials. Further, in case the findings so recorded are allowed to stand, it would be an onslaught and encroachment and would also amount to taking over the reigns of the disciplinary authorities and/or the criminal courts. 11. It has to be remembered that while exercising the powers of a Constitutional Court a firm finding of fact in such like case can be returned only in exceptional cases. 11. It has to be remembered that while exercising the powers of a Constitutional Court a firm finding of fact in such like case can be returned only in exceptional cases. The observations made by the learned Single Judge may though be founded upon the material on record, nonetheless they remain only tentative for want of conclusive proof and at best can be termed to be prima facie views only. No doubt, in the case in hand, the allegations are serious, even the circumstances somewhat seem to support them, even the consequences are quite apparent, yet the material on record is not within the degree of conclusive proof on the basis of which firm findings of fact could have been returned. These at best may have given rise to a strong suspicion, but yet could not have been held to be conclusive. The truth must surface in the interest of those who are accusing and/or are being accused, therefore, to reach a definite conclusion, the investigation and disciplinary proceedings are inevitable whereafter alone the guilt, if any, of the police officials can be established. 12. This Court otherwise cannot be oblivious to the fact that in teeth of such firm findings as recorded by the learned Single Judge, no subordinate court or even the disciplinary authority would dare to go beyond these findings. More so when the order passed by the learned Single Judge does not even state that the findings as recorded are only tentative or prima-facie. Obviously, therefore, the findings so recorded in our considered view amounts to prejudging the issues because the matter is pending investigation/disciplinary proceedings and it is possible that on its conclusion the Court /disciplinary authority may have sufficient material with it on the basis of which whatever has been said in the judgment could be sustained. However, it is equally possible that the material which the Court/ disciplinary authority may collect may not be enough to substantiate those allegations. When both the possibilities are there, the learned Single Judge should not have returned firm findings at this pre-mature stage. 14. However, it is equally possible that the material which the Court/ disciplinary authority may collect may not be enough to substantiate those allegations. When both the possibilities are there, the learned Single Judge should not have returned firm findings at this pre-mature stage. 14. The findings recorded by the learned Single Judge are otherwise required to be taken only prima facie and tentative for yet another reason, because if taken to be final or conclusive, this would be contrary to the settled proposition of law that “unless a person is convicted, he is presumed to be innocent.” The presumption of innocence is a human right. The law does not hold a person guilty or deem or brand a person as a criminal only because an allegation is made against that person of having committed a criminal offence – be it an allegation in the form of a First Information Report or a complaint or an accusation in a final report under Section 173 of the Criminal Procedure Code or even on charges being framed by a competent Court as held by the Hon’ble Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in a recent decision in Manoj Narula vs. Union of India W.P.(C) No. 289 of 2005 decided on 27.8.2014 wherein it has been held as follows: “24. The law does not hold a person guilty or deem or brand a person as a criminal only because an allegation is made against that person of having committed a criminal offence – be it in the form of an off-the-cuff allegation or an allegation in the form of a First Information Report or a complaint or an accusation in a final report under Section 173 of the Criminal Procedure Code or even on charges being framed by a competent Court. The reason for this is fundamental to criminal jurisprudence, the rule of law and is quite simple, although it is often forgotten or overlooked – a person is innocent until proven guilty. This would apply to a person accused of one or multiple offences. The reason for this is fundamental to criminal jurisprudence, the rule of law and is quite simple, although it is often forgotten or overlooked – a person is innocent until proven guilty. This would apply to a person accused of one or multiple offences. At law, he or she is not a criminal – that person may stand ‘condemned’ in the public eye, but even that does not entitle anyone to brand him or her a criminal.” Therefore, merely because a First Information Report is lodged against a person or a criminal complaint is filed against him or even a charge has been framed against a person, he cannot be presumed to be guilty because this itself would frustrate and, eventually, defeat the established concept of criminal jurisprudence that an accused is presumed to be innocent till he is proved to be guilty and there is indeed a long distance between the accused “may have committed the offence” and “must have committed the offence” which must be traversed by the prosecution by adducing reliable and cogent evidence. [See: Narendra Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2004) 10 SCC 699 , Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing Sharma v. State of Maharashtra, (2005) 5 SCC 294 , Ganesan v. Rama Ranghuraman (2011) 2 SCC 83 , State of Uttar Pradesh v. Naresh, (2011) 4 SCC 324 and Kailash Gour and others v. State of Assam (2012) 2 SCC 34 ]. 34. However, before parting, we are constrained to observe that day in and day out, this Court is flooded with litigation which either relates to the suspension or removal of the Pradhan that too on account of misconduct as envisaged under Section 146 of the Act, 1994, which reads thus:- “146. 34. However, before parting, we are constrained to observe that day in and day out, this Court is flooded with litigation which either relates to the suspension or removal of the Pradhan that too on account of misconduct as envisaged under Section 146 of the Act, 1994, which reads thus:- “146. Removal of office bearers of Panchayats.-(1) [The State Government, in the case of office bearers of Panchayats, the Divisional Commissioner having jurisdiction, in the case of office bearers of Zila Parishad, and the Deputy Commissioner having jurisdiction, in the case of office bearers of Panchayat Samiti and Gram Panchayat, as the case may be,] may after such enquiry as it may deem fit to make at any time, remove an office bearers:- (a) if he has incurred any disqualification under this Act; or (b) if he has been guilty of misconduct in the discharge of his duties; or (c) if he refuses to act or becomes incapable of acting or is adjudged an insolvent; or (d) if he without reasonable cause absents himself from more than half of the meetings convened within a period of six months; or (e) if his continuance in office is undesirable in the interest of the public; Provided that no person shall be removed unless he has been given an opportunity to show cause why he should not be removed from his office. Explanation.- For the purpose of this sub-section “misconduct” shall include- (a) Any action which adversely affects- (i) The sovereignty, unity and integrity of India; or (ii) The harmony and the spirit of common brotherhood amongst all the people of State transcending religious, linguistic, regional, caste, or sectional diversities; or (iii) The dignity of women; (a) Gross negligence in the discharge of the duties under this Act; (b) The failure of the Pradhan of a Gram Panchayat, or Chairman of Panchayat Samiti or Zila Parishad, to convene the meeting of the Gram Sabha, Gram Panchayat, Panchayat Samiti or Zila Parishad, as the case may be, at regular intervals as specified under this Act. [(1-A) The State Government, the Divisional Commissioner or the Deputy Commissioner, as the case may be, may, on consideration of the enquiry report or if it thinks proper, for reasons to be recorded in writing, revoke the suspension order and instead of removing an office bearer, warn him to be vigilant in the discharge of his duties or may also debar him from taking part in any act or proceedings of the Panchayat for the period of six months.] (2) A person who has been removed under sub-section (1) shall forthwith cease to be member of any other Panchayat of which he is a member, such person shall also be disqualified for a period of six years to be elected as office bearer of a Panchayat under this Act. 35. We find that even though these petitions are vehemently contested by the departments, yet none of the replies so filed specifically point out the violation of the various provisions of the Panchayati Raj Act and Rules, more particularly, the Rules of 2002, some of which have already been noted by us (supra). What is more strange if not shocking is that even records of the audit as are required to be carried out under Section 79 of the Act, 2002 are not annexed with the replies so as to buttress and strengthen the same. After all, the illegality as may have been committed by the office bearers or officials of the department can conveniently come to the fore in case there is regular audit of the Accounts. This constrains us to gather an impression that probably the provisions of the law are not being strictly adhered to by the departments or else, they ought to have put their best foot-forward to contest these cases. Therefore, we direct the Principal Secretary, Panchayati Raj to ensure that there is strict adherence and compliance with the provisions of the Act and at the same time regular audits and inspections are conducted by the respondents in accordance with Chapter X of the Rules of 2002. 36. The petition is disposed of in the aforesaid terms, leaving the parties to bear their costs.