JUDGMENT : S.N. Prasad, J. This writ petition is under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India wherein the award dated 30.12.1999 passed by the Labour Court, Sambalpur in I.D. Case No. 50 of 1993 is under challenge. 2. The petitioner has made a dispute against his termination which ultimately been referred before the Labour Court for its adjudication by making the following reference:- “Whether the action of the management of M/s. Orissa Cement Ltd., Rajgangpur in terminating the employment of Sri Jagadish Chandra Das with effect from 6.10.1990 on the ground that he failed to produce the Lineman ‘B’ Licence within the stipulated period in spite of the fact that such inability on the part of the workman was beyond his control which has also been duly explained to the management and thereupon extension of the period sought for, is legal and/or justified ? If not, to what relief the workman is entitled?” 3. The Tribunal while adjudicating the issue by recording the deposition and by going through the various documents produced by the respective parties has answered the reference against the workman which has been assailed by filing this writ petition before this Court on the ground that the Tribunal has not appreciated the fact in right perspective, the Tribunal has not taken into consideration the violation of the principle laid down under Article 14 of the Constitution of India since he has not given parity with the other employees who were similarly situated and as such the award is perverse, hence the same needs interference by this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. 4. Learned counsel appearing for the opposite parties has opposed the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner by submitting that there is no infirmity in the award rather the petitioner since was not possessing the required eligibility condition of having Lineman ‘B’ certificate as such his appointment has been held to be illegal. The other workmen who have been appointed in absence of Lineman ‘B’ certificate cannot be a ground for the workman to take parity with the workers who have got appointment contrary to the eligibility condition of the recruitment rule, in view of the principle that Article 14 of the Constitution of India which does not attract negative equality. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents on record. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents on record. 5. The undisputed fact in this case is that the workman has been appointed on 12.5.1987 under the management, the opposite parties on temporary basis. The post requires a qualification of having Lineman ‘B’ Certificate but admittedly the petitioner was not having the same at the time of his engagement and as such he has been terminated from service. The workman-petitioner has raised a dispute before the competent authority which ultimately has been culminated into a reference and has been referred before the Labour Court for its adjudication, the Labour Court has adjudicated the issue against the workman on the ground that the post on which he has been appointed requires requisite qualification on possessing Lineman ‘B’ certificate which the petitioner was not possessing, hence he was not terminated. 6. According to the Labour Court, if any eligibility condition is prescribed, the workman or engagee has to possess the same, otherwise the appointment is said to be illegal. The Tribunal has taken note of the plea of the workman with respect to other persons namely Subash Chandra Rout and P.C. Dutta who according to the applicant have also been appointed without any Lineman ‘B’ certificate and as such he is also not entitled to be given similar treatment while negative the said plea on the ground of Article 14 of the Constitution of India having not applicable for negative equality, has answered the award against the petitioner. 7. It is settled that the scope of interference of the High Court to issue writ of Certiorari sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is very limited as has been discussed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the catena of decisions, few of them are being discussed. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Supreme Court by its Full Bench in the case of Syed Yakoob Vrs. K.S. Radhakrishnan and others reported in AIR 1964 SC 477 wherein at paragraph-7 their Lordships have been pleased to hold as follows:- “7. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals; these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdictions. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of tact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the. Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was' insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was' insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised.” We have also perused the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Swaran Singh and another vrs. State of Punjab and others reported in (1976) 2 SCC 868 , their Lordships discussing the power of writ court under Article 226 for issuance of writ of Certiorari has been pleased to hold at para-12 and 13, that certiorari jurisdiction can be exercised only for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals. A writ of certiorari can be issued only in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction which is different from Appellate jurisdiction. The writ jurisdiction can extends only to cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals in excess of their jurisdiction or as a result of their refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in them or they act illegally or improperly in the exercise of their jurisdiction causing grave miscarriage of justice. In regard to finding of fact recorded by an inferior tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued only if in recording such a finding, the tribunal has acted on evident which is legally inadmissible or has refused to admit admissible evidence or if the finding is not supported by any evidence at all, because in such cases the error amounts to an error of law, a pure error of fact, however grave, cannot be corrected by a writ. In another judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Heinz India Private Limited and another vrs. In another judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Heinz India Private Limited and another vrs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others reported in (2012) 5 SCC 443 , their Lordships has been pleased to hold at para-66 and 67, which is being quoted herein below:- “66. That the Court dealing with the exercise of power of judicial review does not substitute its judgment for that of the legislature or executive or their agents as to matters within the province of either, and that the court does not supplant “the feel of the expert” by its own review, is also fairly well settled by the decisions of this Court. In all such cases judicial examination is confined to finding out whether the findings of fact have a reasonable on evidence and whether such findings are consistent with the laws of the land. 67. In Dharangadhra Chemical Works Ltd. vrs. State of Saurashtra reported in AIR 1957 SC 264 , this Court held that decision of a tribunal on a question of fact which it has jurisdiction to determine is not liable to be questioned in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution unless it is shown to be totally unsupported by any evidence. In the case of Thansingh Nathmal reported in AIR 1964 SC 1419 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has been pleased to hold that the High Court does not generally determine questions which require an elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right to enforce for which the writ is claimed.” Yet in another judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of M/s. Pepsico India Holding Pvt. Ltd. Vrs. Krishna Kant Pandey, (2015) 4 SCC 270 wherein their Lordships while discussing the scope of Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India in the matter of showing interference with the finding of the Tribunal has been pleased to hold after placing reliance upon the judgment rendered in the case of Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao Vrs. Ashalata S. Guram, (1986) 4 SCC 447 as follows: “17. In case of finding of facts, the court should not interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. Ashalata S. Guram, (1986) 4 SCC 447 as follows: “17. In case of finding of facts, the court should not interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. Reference may be made to the observations of his Court in Bathutmal Raichand Oswal v. Laxmibai R. Tarta where this Court observed that the High Court could not in the guise of exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 convert itself into a court of appeal when the legislature has not conferred a right of appeal. The High Court was not competent to correct errors of facts by examining the evidence and re-appreciating. Speaking for the Court, Bhagwati, J. as the learned Chief Justice then was, observed at p. 1301 of the report as follows: (SCC p. 864, para 7) “The special civil application preferred by the appellant was admittedly an application under Article 227 and it is, therefore, material only to consider the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction of the High Court under that article. Did the High Court have jurisdiction in an application under Article 227 to disturb the findings of fact reached by the District Court? It is well settled by the decision of this Court in Waryam Singh v. Amarnath that the power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries, C.J., in Dalmia Jain Airways v. Sukumar Mukherjee to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. This statement of law was quoted with approval in the subsequent decision of this Court in Nagendra Nath Bose v. Commr. of Hills Division and it was pointed out by Sinha, J., as he then was, speaking on behalf of the court in that case: It is thus, clear that the powers of judicial interference under Article 227 of the Constitution with orders of judicial or quasi-judicial nature, are not greater than the power under Article 226 of the Constitution. Under Article 226 the power of interference may extend to quashing an impugned order on the ground of a mistake apparent on the face of the record. Under Article 226 the power of interference may extend to quashing an impugned order on the ground of a mistake apparent on the face of the record. But under Article 227 of the Constitution, the power of interference is limited to seeing that the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority.” Thus, it is evident that the proposition laid down in the case of Syed Yakoob (supra) still holds good. 8. Thus, it is settled that if there is any perversity or error apparent on the face of record or the order is without jurisdiction, the High Court may interfere with in exercising of power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, but according to our considered view, no such ground is available in this writ petition, hence this Court cannot be said as an appellate court to reverse the fact finding given by the Labour Court, which is based upon cogent evidence depending upon the relevant fact brought before it and also the Award is under limits of authority. In view thereof, the award passed by the Labour Court does not warrant any interference by this Court. Hence, we decline to exercise the power conferred under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India to reverse the fact finding given in Award on the basis of the reasons discussed above. Accordingly, the writ petition fails and is dismissed.