Abdul Aziz v. Member Board of Revenue, Orissa, Cuttack
2017-07-20
S.K.MISHRA
body2017
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : S.K. Mishra, J. In this writ petition, the petitioner being the purchaser of the land in question in an auction preceding challenges the order passed by the learned Member, Board Revenue, Orissa, Cuttack on 29.02.2000 in Settlement Revision No. 116 of 1998 directing for correction of Record of Rights in favour of the opposite party nos.4 to 12. 2. The facts are not disputed. Raubha Kirtan Majhi was original recorded tenant of Khata No.130/7 of village Palasapada, PS. Chandahandi, Dist.-Nabarangpur. Rameswar Majhi, the predecessor in interest (father) of opposite party nos.6, 7 and 8 was recorded with respect to Khata No.130/8 of the same village. In both the holdings Ac.6.98 and Ac.4.04 dec., lands were recorded in the name of Raubha Kirtan Majhi and Rameswar Majhi. Certificate cases were initiated with respect to the scheduled property and because of nonpayment of Government loan by one Bhaghirathi Majhi, who is the common ancestor of the parties. Accordingly, as per the orders of the Certificate Officer, Certificate Execution Proceedings no. 79/70 C.A.90/79, C.A.80/70, C.A.191/73, BL.201/73 and BL.414/73 were initiated relating to property of late Bhagirathi Majhi. It was held by the Certificate Officer that Bhagirathi Majhi has obtained loan from Government and failed to repay the same. Hence, the properties were auctioned in a certificate proceeding. It is also not disputed that the petitioner was the highest bidder and purchased the property on auction for lawful consideration of Rs.20,000/-, which was deposited to the Government of Odisha. It is contended that the petitioner is still in possession of the lands in question. 3. After above 20 years, the descendents of Bhaghirathi Majhi filed objection case under Section 21(1) of Orissa Survey and Settlement Act, 1958, hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’, inter alia, alleging that the sale executed by the Certificate Officer is void, illegal and not operative particularly in view of certain judgment passed by this Court. They further claim that they are in possession of the property in question. 4. It is also not disputed that the said Bhaghirathi Majhi, the predecessor in interest of the opposite party nos.4 to 12 was a member of Scheduled Tribe category and the present opposite party nos.4 to 12 are also scheduled tribes and the provisions of the Orissa Scheduled Areas Transfer of Immovable Property (By Scheduled Tribes) Regulation-II of 1956 is applicable to them. However, the learned Asst.
However, the learned Asst. Settlement Officer dismissed their application and ordered that the record of rights shall not be changed and shall remain in the name of petitioner. The opposite party nos.4 to 12 preferred Appeal No.23/98 before the Addl. Settlement Officer, Jeypore, which was dismissed on 10.06.1998 confirming the order passed by the Asst. Settlement Officer passed in Objection Case No. 1247/1997. 5. Thereafter, the opposite party nos.4 to 12 preferred Settlement Revision No.116/98 on the file of the learned Member, Board of Revenue, Orissa, Cuttack. The learned Member, Board of Revenue, Orissa, Cuttack, as per the order dated 29.02.2000, allowed the revision filed by the opposite party no. 4 to 12 and thereby set aside both the orders passed by the learned Asst. Settlement Officer and Addl. Settlement Officer. The learned Member, Board of Revenue, Orissa, Cuttack also directed that the land record should be prepared in the name of legal heirs of Bhaghirathi Majhi, who are arrayed as opposite party nos.4 to 12 in this writ petition. Such order is assailed in this writ petition. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the order passed by the learned Member, Board of Revenue, Orissa, Cuttack is illegal and liable to be set aside on three grounds:- Firstly, it is contended that since the petitioner has purchased the land in an auction sale under the Orissa Public Demand Recovery Act, 1962, permission under Regulation 2 of 56 is not necessary. Secondly, it is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that even if it is held that permission is necessary for alienating land in an execution proceeding, the petitioner has perfected his title by way of adverse possession, which is the finding of the learned Asst. Settlement Officer. Thirdly, it is contended that since on 20.08.1998 record of rights published in favour of the petitioner, the same should not be disturbed after long lapse of time, specifically, when the Commissioner does not have jurisdiction to declare the auction to be avoid. 7. The learned counsel for the opposite parties, on the other hand submitted that all these legal contentions are no more debatable as the law has already been settled and in support of his contention, he relies on several judgments.
7. The learned counsel for the opposite parties, on the other hand submitted that all these legal contentions are no more debatable as the law has already been settled and in support of his contention, he relies on several judgments. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the opposite party nos.4 to 12 as well as learned Additional Government Advocate, Mr. M.R. Dhala at length. 8. This question first arose before this Court, in the case of Somanath Sipka vs. State of Orissa and others, 1984(1) OLR 805, wherein a similar question arose with regard to violation of Sub-section (3) of Section 22 of the Orissa Land Reforms Act, 1960. It is apt quote the exact words of the Court. They read as follows:- “XXX Mr. Mishra, the learned counsel for the opposite party no.5, however, contents that Sub-section 3 of Section 22 of the Orissa Land Reforms Act has no application since the property in question has not been sold in execution of a decree but in a certificate proceeding. It is difficult to accept the contention of Mr. Mishra, the learned counsel for the opposite party no.5, since a certificate is in the nature of a decree and under law has the effect of a decree and a proceeding before the Certificate Officer is in the nature of an execution proceeding. That apart, Subsection (3) of Section 22 of the Act is there on the statute with the obvious object of protecting the property of the weaker sections of the society (i.e., Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes) from exploitation by the higher class and there is no justification as to why in construing that provision, a sale of property in a certificate proceeding will not be included therein. Section 22(1) makes a sale void excepting in cases provided for in Clauses (a) and (b) thereof. Sub-section (3) of Section 22 is an injunction against the authorities not to sell without prior permission even in execution of a decree unless the person who is purchasing is also a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe man. XXX” 9.
Section 22(1) makes a sale void excepting in cases provided for in Clauses (a) and (b) thereof. Sub-section (3) of Section 22 is an injunction against the authorities not to sell without prior permission even in execution of a decree unless the person who is purchasing is also a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe man. XXX” 9. Similarly, in the case of Satyabhama Pandey vs. Bhagirathi Jaipuria and others, 1988 (II) OLR 420, this Court has held that after amendment, which came into force on 02.10.1973, of the Orissa Land Reforms Act, 1960, without a written permission from the Revenue Officer, with respect to a land belonging to a scheduled tribe, cannot be sold even in an execution of a decree of the Civil Court to a person not belonging to a scheduled tribe. Therefore, after the said amendment, a written permission of the Revenue Officer is a pre-condition for sale of a holding belonging to a scheduled tribe even in execution of a decree against him to a non-scheduled tribe person. 10. In the case of Laxmi Gauda and others vs. Dandasi Goura (deceased by L.R.) and others, AIR 1992(OR) 5, a Division Bench of this Court has highlighted and explained scope of Regulation 2 of 1956. In this case also, land of a scheduled tribe was sold in auction for realization of land revenue. The Division Bench of this Court headed by Hon’ble Chief Justice B.L. Hansaria, the then Chief Justice of this Court ruled that Regulation 2 of 1956 was amended by Regulation 1 of 1975 introducing Section 7-D thereby amending Article 65 of the Limitation Act, in its application to the scheduled area and substituting the period of 12 years, occurring in Article by 30 years. It was further held that Section 3 of the Regulation specifically provided that any Scheduled Tribe without the previous permission of the Revenue Authority sells any immovable property to a non-Scheduled Tribe, it shall be absolutely null and void. It is in consonance with the earlier judgment cited in the preceding paragraph. Moreover, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that he has perfected his title by way of adverse possession is also negatived. In view of the fact that he has sold the property, which was confirmed on 29.09.1977 and 15.10.1977 and ordered to deliver was issued by said Certificate Officer.
Moreover, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that he has perfected his title by way of adverse possession is also negatived. In view of the fact that he has sold the property, which was confirmed on 29.09.1977 and 15.10.1977 and ordered to deliver was issued by said Certificate Officer. So, by the time, the sale was executed and the petitioner came into possession of the same, there had been an amendment which came into force on 2nd October, 1973. It is not disputed that by the time of objection raised by the present opposite party nos.4 to 12, 30 years of continuous of possession was not completed. 11. Moreover, the learned counsel for the opposite parties submits that by virtue of the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Amarendra Pratap Singh vs. Tej Bahadur Prajapati and others, (2004) 10 SCC 65 , which was followed by this Court in the case of David Edison alias Adison Lima and others vs. Addl. District Magistrate, Rayaguda and others, 2004 (Supplementary) OLR 947, the plea of adverse possession is not maintainable in such case. At paras 25 and 26, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid down the law. It is appropriate to take note of the exact words used by Hon’ble Supreme Court. “25. Reverting back to the facts of the case at hand, we find that in the land, the ultimate ownership vests in the State on the principle of eminent domain. Tribals are conferred with a right to hold land, which right is inalienable in favour of non-tribals. It is clear that the law does not permit a right in immovable property vesting in a tribal to be transferred in favour of or acquired by a non-tribal, unless permitted by the previous sanction of a competent authority. The definition of “transfer of immovable property” has been coined in the widest-possible terms. The definition makes a reference to all known modes of transferring right, title and interest in immovable property and to make the definition exhaustive, conspicuously employs the expression “any other dealing with such property”, which would embrace within its sweep any other mode having an impact on right, title or interest of the holder, causing it to cease in one and vest or accrue in another.
The use of the word “dealing” is suggestive of the legislative intent that not only a transfer as such but any dealing with such property (though such dealing may not, in law, amount to transfer), is sought to be included within the meaning of the expression. Such “dealing” may be a voluntary act on the part of the tribal or may amount to a “dealing” because of the default or inaction of the tribal as a result of his ignorance, poverty or backwardness, which shall be presumed to have existed when the property of the tribal is taken possession of or otherwise appropriated or sought to be appropriated by a non-tribal. In other words, a default or inaction on the part of a tribal which results in deprivation or deterioration of his rights over immovable property would amount to “dealing” by him with such property, and hence a transfer of immovable property. It is so because a tribal is considered by the legislature not to be capable of protecting his own immovable property. A provision has been made by para 3-A of the 1956 Regulations for evicting any unauthorised occupant, by way of trespass or otherwise, of any immovable property of a member of a Scheduled Tribe, the steps in regard to which may be taken by the tribal or by any person interested therein or even suo motu by the competent authority. The concept of locus standi loses its significance. The State is the custodian and trustee of the immovable property of tribals and is enjoined to see that the tribal remains in possession of such property. No period of limitation is prescribed by para 3-A. The prescription of the period of twelve years in Article 65 of the Limitation Act becomes irrelevant so far as the immovable property of a tribal is concerned. The tribal need not file a civil suit which will be governed by the law of limitation; it is enough if he or anyone on his behalf moves the State or the State itself moves into action to protect him and restores his property to him. To such an action neither Article 65 of the Limitation Act nor Section 27 thereof would be attracted. 26.
To such an action neither Article 65 of the Limitation Act nor Section 27 thereof would be attracted. 26. In our opinion, the abovesaid shall be the position of law under the 1956 Regulations were “transfer of immovable property” has been defined and also under the 1950 Act where “transfer of holding” has not been defined. Acquisition of title in favour of a non-tribal by invoking the doctrine of adverse possession over the immovable property belonging to a tribal, is prohibited by law and cannot be countenanced by the court.” The aforesaid discussions take care to the first two contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner and this Court comes to the conclusion that permission under para-2 of regulation 2 of 56 is necessary even in case of a auction sale in pursuance of proceeding under the Orissa Public Demand Recovery Act, 1962 and in such cases of void sale, void unauthorized possession by the purchaser belonging to a category otherwise then scheduled tribe cannot take plea of adverse possession. 12. The last and final contention is that commissioner is in exercise power under Orissa Survey Settlement Act should not have declared the sale deed void and he has no jurisdiction to declare the sale void. Such argument is of no substance. The law is very clear and settled in this respect. If there is a violation of the provisions of the OLR Act or the Regulation 2 of 1956 inasmuch as no permission of the Revenue Authority has been taken before the executing sale deed in favour of a person, not belongs to scheduled tribe by a Scheduled Tribe, is void ab initio. Any Court or Authority, which are discharging the public function and in seisin of the matter, can take into consideration this principle of law and simply refuse to act upon such document which is void ab initio. It is not disputed that consolidation of operation was going on and the Commissioner of Land Reforms has jurisdiction to decide the revision case under Sections 36 and 37 of the O.C.H. and P.F.L. Act. Therefore, he does have jurisdiction to ignore any document, which is void ab initio and refuse to act upon the same. 13.
It is not disputed that consolidation of operation was going on and the Commissioner of Land Reforms has jurisdiction to decide the revision case under Sections 36 and 37 of the O.C.H. and P.F.L. Act. Therefore, he does have jurisdiction to ignore any document, which is void ab initio and refuse to act upon the same. 13. In that view of the matter, this Court is of the opinion that there is hardly any scope for interference with the order passed by the Revisional Authority and, therefore, this Court is not inclined to allow the writ petition. Hence, the writ petition is dismissed being devoid of merit. No costs.