JUDGMENT : Heard on admission. 2. This is an appeal filed under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, challenging the judgment and decree dated 25-2-2014, passed by First Additional District Judge, Balaghat, in Regular Civil Appeal No. 34-A/2013, affirming the judgment and decree dated 23-8-2013, passed by 4th Civil Judge Class-II, Balaghat, in Civil Suit No. 136-A/2013, whereby the suit filed by the respondent/plaintiff for eviction on the ground under section 12(1)(b) [section 12(1)(a)] of M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) has been decreed. 3. Brief facts of the present case in short are that the plaintiff/respondent filed a suit for possession and arrears of rent. It was pleaded that the plaintiff had purchased the suit land and house by registered sale deed on 29-3-2011 from one Smt. Manjula Bai w/o Viththal Rao Kothari. It is submitted by him that the appellant was residing as a tenant in the suit house on a sum of Rs. 150/- per month before execution of the registered sale deed and thereafter the appellant has become tenant of the respondent. A legal notice on 29-9-2011 was sent by the plaintiff to the appellant. Since the appellant failed to respond to the aforesaid notice, the tenancy was terminated from the midnight of 31-10-2011 and informed the appellant to deliver the vacant possession of the suit house on 1-11-2011. It is further pleaded that the appellant did not deliver the vacant possession and therefore, the suit was filed for eviction on the ground that the appellant has failed to pay the arrears of the rent. 4. The appellant filed the written statement and denied the case of the plaintiff and submitted that prior to execution of the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff, original owner Manjula Bai had executed an agreement dated 30-6-2005 with one Dilip Kumar and therefore after the execution of the agreement with Dilip Kumar, he ceased to be tenant of Manjula Bai. It is further submitted that Dilip Kumar had also filed a suit for specific performance on the strength of the aforesaid agreement. The trial Court framed the issues and Issue No. 3 was that whether the appellant/defendant was tenant of the plaintiff and the Issue No. 4 was that whether the plaintiff failed to make payment of the rent and he is in arrears of rent since April, 2011. The trial Court framed the issues and Issue No. 3 was that whether the appellant/defendant was tenant of the plaintiff and the Issue No. 4 was that whether the plaintiff failed to make payment of the rent and he is in arrears of rent since April, 2011. The said issue was also answered affirmatively. 5. The trial Court after extensive evaluation of the oral and documentary evidence recorded the finding that the appellant/defendant is tenant of the respondent/plaintiff and failed to make the payment of the rent and was in arrears of rent. Paras 17 and 18 are reproduced as under:- ^^17- lk{; ds iwoZ fo'ys"k.k ls ;g rF; Áekf.kr gS fd oknh }kjk oknxzLr edku fnukad 29-3-2011 ds iathd`r foØ; i= ÁŒihŒ 1 ^^lh** ds ek/;e ds Ø; fd;k x;kA ;g rF; Hkh Áekf.kr gksrk gS fd oknh }kjk ekSf[kd :i ls Áfroknh ls fdjk;s dh ekax dh xbZ] uksfVl ÁŒihŒ 3 fnukad 20-9-2011 Áfroknh dks Ásf"kr fd;k x;k] tks Áfroknh dks ÁkIr gqvk] ftlesa oknh }kjk foØ; i= fnukad 29-3-2011 ds vk/kkj ij oknxzLr edku dk edku ekfyd gksrs gq;s Áfroknh mEesn ¼ÁŒlhŒ 1½ dh vksj ekg vÁSy 2011 ls fdjk;s dk Hkqxrku cdk;k gksus ds vk/kkj ij fdjk;s dh ekax dh xbZ] tks /kkjk 109 laifRr varj.k vf/kfu;e] 1882 ds v/khu i;kZIr lwpuk gSA 18- mijksDr lk{; ds fo'ys"k.k mijkar ;g rF; Áekf.kr gksrk gS fd oknh foØ; i= ÁŒihŒ ^^lh** fnukad 29-3-2011 ds vk/kkj ij oknxzLr edku dk Lokeh gqvk] mDr fnukad dks Áfroknh mEesn ¼ÁŒlkŒ 1½ oknxzLr edku esa 150@& :i;s ekfld nj ls fdjk;snkj ds :i esa dkfct FkkA oknh ,oa Áfroknh ds e/; Hkw&Lokeh rFkk vfHk/kkjh ds laca/k Áekf.kr gksrs gSA Qyr% okn Á'u Øekad 2 ,oa 3 ldkjkRed :i ls ^^gka** esa fu.khZr fd;s tkrs gSA iwoZ fo'ys"k.k ls ;g rF; Hkh Áekf.kr gksrk gS fd Áfroknh mEesn ¼ÁŒlkŒ 1½ }kjk ekg vÁSy 2011 ls ekfld fdjk;k jkf'k dk Hkqxrku oknh dks ugha fd;k x;k] ftlls ekg vÁSy 2011 ls ekg vDVwcj 2011 rd lkr ekg dk 1050@& ¼,d gtkj ipkl½ :i;s fdjk;s dk Hkqxrku Áfroknh dh vksj cdk;k gksuk Áekf.kr gksrk gSA vr% oknÁ'u Øekad 4 ldkjkRed :i ls ^^gka** esa fu.khZr fd;k tkrk gSA** 6. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and decree, the appeal was filed. The same was also dismissed and the findings of the trial Court were affirmed. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and decree, the appeal was filed. The same was also dismissed and the findings of the trial Court were affirmed. The Lower Appellate Court found that after the execution of the registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiff by Ex.P-1, the appellant had become tenant of the plaintiff and did not make the payment of rent and therefore, there was no illegality in the impugned judgment and decree of possession and payment of arrears of rent. Para-22 of the Lower Appellate Court is relevant to be extracted as under:- ^^22- blds foijhr Lo;a eatwykckbZ ds }kjk oknxzLr edku foØ; djus dk lkSnk Áfroknh ls gksus ls Li"V badkj fd;k x;k gS] ftlls Li"V gS fd oknxzLr edku foØ; djus dk dksbZ lkSnk ugha fd;k x;k vkSj dHkh mlds }kjk dksbZ vfxze ÁfrQy dh jkf'k ÁkIr Hkh ugha dh xbZ gSA vr% oknh }kjk oknxzLr Hkwfe vkSj edku mldh iwoZ Hkwfe Lokeh eatwykckbZ ls fof/kor jftLVMZ foØ; i= Án'kZ ih&1 }kjk Ø; dj vkf/kiR; fd;k tkuk Áekf.kr ik;k tkrk gS vkSj bl laca/k esa oknh }kjk v/khuLFk U;k;ky; esa fof/kor ;g rF; Áekf.kr fd;k x;k gSA vkSj bl laca/k esa v/khuLFk U;k;ky; }kjk fudkyk x;k fu"d"kZ vkSj mlds vk/kkj ij ikfjr fu.kZ; rFkk mlds ifjÁs{; esa ikfjr fMdzh rF;] fof/k ,oa ÁfØ;k ds vuq:i ik;k tkrk gS] ftlesa gLr{ksi djus dh dksbZ vko';drk ugha gSA** 7. Learned counsel for the appellant vehemently argued that during the pendency of the first appeal and the second appeal, the appellant had deposited the entire amount and therefore, no decree of eviction could have been passed against him. To buttress his submission, he relied on the judgment passed by a Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Vinod Kumar Agrawal v. Chandrakant Pandey, 2007 (2) M.P.L.J. 566 : 2007 (5) MPHT 308 and seeks this Court to overturn the concurrent findings of both the Courts. 8. In the present case after consideration of the evidence, the trial Court has passed the decree of eviction on the ground of arrears of rent. 8. In the present case after consideration of the evidence, the trial Court has passed the decree of eviction on the ground of arrears of rent. The Apex Court in the cases of Jamnalal v. Radheshyam, 2000 (2) M.P.L.J. (S.C.) 385 : (2000) 4 SCC 380 , Atmaram v. Shakuntala Rani, (2005) 7 SCC 211 , E. Palanisamy v. Palanisamy, (2003) 1 SCC 123 , Parmeshwar Prasad v. Parmeshwari Devi, (2000) 10 SCC 193 , Mohammad Yunus v. Gurubux Singh, 1995 Supp (1) SCC 418, Madan Mohan v. Krishann Kumar Sood, 1994 Supp (1) SCC 437, J.L. Varandani v. Ashalata Mukherjee, (1990) 4 SCC 40 , Arjun Khiamal Mankhijani v. Jamnadas C. Tuliani, (1989) 4 SCC 612 , Mrs. Manju Choudhary v. Kulal Kumar Chandra, (1988) 1 SCC 363 , Vasumatiben Gaurishankar Bhatt v. Naviram Mancharam Vora, AIR 1967 SC 405 , Mungilal v. Sirgan Chand Rathi (Deceased), AIR 1965 SC 101 , Vora Abbasbhai Alimahomed v. Haji Gulamnabi Haji Safibhai, AIR 1964 SC 1341 , Sheodhari Rai v. Suraj Prasad Singh, AIR 1954 SC 758 and Smt. Sushila Shrivastava v. Nafees Ahmed Qureshi, 2001 (2) M.P.L.J. 613 : (2001) 1 JLJ 351 held that once non payment of rent is established then the Court had no option but to decree the suit on the ground contemplated under section 12(1)(b) [section 12(1)(a)] of the Act. The reliance placed by the appellant in the case of Vinod Kumar Agrawal (supra), the ratio laid down by the Coordinate Bench also not applied in the facts of the present case, as in the said case there was no decree for eviction under section 12(1)(a) of the Act. On the contrary the suit was dismissed by the trial Court and the question which was considered in the said case was that whether the Courts below had acted illegally in dismissing the suit for arrears of rent. In the facts of the said case, the Court found that once the trial Court had directed for deposit of the rent and the same was deposited by the tenant, then the appellant is precluded from raising the ground on eviction on the ground of arrears of rent. Thus, the said judgment would not be of any help to the appellant in the facts of the said case and the present case. No other point was argued by the learned counsel for the appellant. 9. Thus, the said judgment would not be of any help to the appellant in the facts of the said case and the present case. No other point was argued by the learned counsel for the appellant. 9. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the appeal filed by Dinesh who claimed of decree on the basis of so called agreement executed by original owner Manjula Bai has also been dismissed. However, I am afraid that this is a ground for consideration of this appeal for admission. 10. In view of the aforesaid facts and considering the material on record, in the opinion of this Court, the arguments advanced by the appellant cannot be countenance in exercise of jurisdiction under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The entire gamut of material is in the realm of facts. The findings recorded by both the Courts below are impregnable in nature. No question of law much less substantial question of law arises warranting interference under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 11. I do not find any illegality or perversity in the concurrent findings recorded by the Courts below. The question raised by the appellant could not be held to be a question of law rather than substantial question of law as the concurrent findings of the Courts below are based on appreciation of evidence, which cannot be interfered by this Court at this stage under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure as laid down by the Apex Court in the cases of Kalyan Singh v. Ramswaroop, 1995 MPLJ Online (S.C.) 5 : 1996 JLJ 247 and Machalabai v. Nanakram, 2006 (2) M.P.LJ. 484. 12. Even otherwise, it is well settled in law that the jurisdiction of this Court to interfere with the findings of the fact under section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code is limited where the findings is either perverse or based on no evidence. This Court cannot interfere with the findings of the fact until and unless the same is perverse or based on no evidence or contrary to material on record. It is equally settled law that the Court in exercise of power under section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code cannot re-appreciate the evidence even if another view is possible. This Court cannot interfere with the findings of the fact until and unless the same is perverse or based on no evidence or contrary to material on record. It is equally settled law that the Court in exercise of power under section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code cannot re-appreciate the evidence even if another view is possible. [See Narayan Rajendra v. Lekshmy Sarojini, (2009) 5 SCC 264 , Hafazat Hussain v. Abdul Majeed, (2011) 7 SCC 189, Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin, (2012) 8 SCC 148 , D.R. Rathna Murthy v. Ramappa, 2011 (2) M.P.LJ. (S.C.) 507 : (2011) 1 SCC 158 and Vishwanath Agrawal v. Sarla Vishwanath Agrawal, 2012 (4) M.P.L.J. (S.C.) 265 : (2012) 7 SCC 288 ]. 13. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I have not found any perversity or infirmity in appreciation of evidence by the Courts below or any circumstances giving rise to any question of law much less the substantial question of law requiring any consideration at this stage under section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Hence, this appeal being devoid of any such question deserves to be and is hereby dismissed at the stage of admission. There shall be no order as to costs.