JUDGMENT : AMIT RAWAL, J. This order of mine shall dispose of three appeals bearing RSA No.3021 of 2009 titled as “Secretary, Department of Irrigation, Government of Punjab, Chandigarh and others V/s Vijay Kohli and others”, RSA No.711 of 2013 titled as “State of Punjab and others V/s Jatinder Singh and another” filed at the instance of the appellants-State of Punjab, being defendants against the judgment and decree of the trial Court, whereby the suit at the instance of the plaintiffs has been decreed calling upon them to execute the sale deed and RSA No.147 of 2013 titled as “Mahaveer Singh V/s State of Punjab and others”, filed at the instance of the appellants-plaintiffs, who had not been successful in both the Courts below seeking permanent and mandatory injunction for direction to the respondents/State of Punjab, for execution of the sale deed. RSA-711-2013 The appellants-defendants/State is aggrieved of the judgment and decree of the trial Court and upheld by the lower Appellate Court, whereby the suit of the respondents/plaintiffs seeking mandatory injunction on the premise that the land measuring 66 kanals 5 marals situated in Malwal Tehsil and District Ferozepur was put to auction on 08.12.1999, has been decreed by both the Courts below. The respondents- plaintiffs was successful in the aforementioned auction. The terms of the auction envisages the payment of 10% immediately after auction and 25% within 60 days and remaining amount along with 15% interest in 4 equal installments. However, the plaintiffs opted for the installments. On 23.04.2003, the plaintiffs had deposited a sum of Rs. 18,18,296/-, but no sale deed was executed. In this regard, he had approached this Court for issuance of a writ in the nature of mandamus which was disposed of with a direction to the respondents to pass a speaking order. However, as per the averments in the plaint, a speaking order was passed on the premise that some amount was due i.e. Rs. 2,45,402/- which was assailed by the petitioners, but the petitioners relegated to file a civil suit. Mr. Amit Singh Sethi, Addl. A.G., Punjab, submits that the suit was barred by law of limitation, even a direction could not have been granted in the absence of compliance of the provisions of Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short 'CPC'). Mr. Amit Singh Sethi, Addl. A.G., Punjab, submits that the suit was barred by law of limitation, even a direction could not have been granted in the absence of compliance of the provisions of Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short 'CPC'). However, regarding averments in the plaint-2 were admitted being an official record, much less, the factum of the last payment on 23.04.2003, was admitted, but it was stated that the plaintiffs had not complied with the terms and conditions of the auction. The amount, so asked for, had burgeoned to Rs. 3,78,419/- as on May 2007 and in March 2010, Rs. 4,77,390/-. In the absence of the same, the conveyance deed could not have been executed. Both the Courts below have, thus, erroneously decreed the suit and the same could not be done in the manner and mode, as indicated above. He further submits that there was a specific denial that the plaintiffs had deposited the full and final amount of the auction money along with interest @ 15% as per the terms and conditions of the auction notice. Both the Courts below have committed illegality and perversity in decreeing the suit while not appreciating the fact that the condition No.6 of auction notice (Ex.D-1) envisaged that in case of violation, the bid would automatically be cancelled, therefore, the suit was not maintainable. He further submits that the bid of the plaintiffs had already been cancelled by the competent authority i.e. Superintending Engineer, Ferozepur Canal Circle, Ferozepur, vide letter dated 10.01.2011, which was supported by cogent and convincing reasons. The amount of Rs. 2,45,402/- was found to be due owing to the audit conducted by the audit team which fact is evident from Ex.D-4, thus, the findings of the Courts below are based upon the assumption and presumption, much less, surmises and conjectures and liable to be set aside. The lower Appellate Court had erroneously relied upon the communication dated 20.09.2005 (Ex.D-2/N), whereas there was no confusion of any kind with regard to the recovery of the amount, in question, from the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs was bound by the audit report and therefore, could not have sought indulgence of the Civil Court for execution of the sale deed, thus, urges this Court for setting aside the judgment and decree. On the contrary, Mr. The plaintiffs was bound by the audit report and therefore, could not have sought indulgence of the Civil Court for execution of the sale deed, thus, urges this Court for setting aside the judgment and decree. On the contrary, Mr. Puneet K. Bansal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents submits that the factum of payment of the entire price is evident from the letter dated 20.09.2005 (Ex.P-14), whereby the State affirmed that the auction bidder had received the entire bid amount along with interest @ 15% and the same was sent in response to letter dated 23.08.2005. The aforementioned letter is also Ex.D-2/10, therefore, the Courts below on examination of the oral and documentary evidence found that there was merit in the case of the plaintiffs, thus, urges this Court for dismissal of the appeal. RSA-3021-2009 The prime bone of contention/grievance of the State had been that in fact khasra No.195 was never put to auction, it was due to inadvertence, whereas it should have been khasra No.145 as khasra No.195 is a forest land. In this regard, an application under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC before the appellate stage, for amendment of the written statement was submitted, but the same has erroneously been declined, thus, the aforementioned judgment and decree of the lower Appellate Court, much less, declining of the application has been challenged by taking the aid of the provisions of Order 43 Rule 1-A CPC. A witness of the Department had brought on record Ex.D-1 and Ex.D-2 i.e. certificates to this effect, therefore, the lower Appellate Court ought not to have non-suited the defendants in not amending the written statement as it goes to the root of the matter and at the best, cost could have been imposed, much less, a report from the trial Court should have been sought after allowing the amendment, thus, urges this Court for undertaking the task by invoking the provisions of Order 41 Rule 23 CPC. On the contrary, Mr. Vivek K. Thakur, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents/plaintiffs submits that the documents (Ex.D-1 & Ex.D-2) does not prove the case of the plaintiffs on the premise that Ex.D-1 is certifying that khasra No.195 of Madhopur Cantt., measuring 0.31 acres land of Canal Department had been sold by auction to the plaintiff-Vijay Kohli and Ex.D-2 is/was also in that regard. In the absence of the evidence, even if, the amendment had been allowed, the same would pale into insignificance for want of evidence, in essence, the pleadings would not have been sufficient in the absence of evidence, thus, urges this Court for dismissal of the appeal. He further submits that the possession of the premises was given on 07.03.2000. RSA-147-2013 The appellants-plaintiffs had approached the Civil Court for seeking injunction restraining the respondents/defendants/State from causing any interference into peaceful possession of the plaintiffs over the agriculture land measuring 4.10 acres i.e. land measuring 32 kanals 1 marla including canal rest house and also restraint against the defendants, appellants herein, from dispossession of the plaintiffs on the basis of order dated 29.06.2005 being illegal, wrong, void and non-existence. The contentions of Mr. S.C. Chhabbra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants-plaintiffs is that the judgment of the Courts below have not been taken into consideration the order dated 17.09.2007 passed by the learned Predecessor of the Court, in a miscellaneous appeal, taken up against the order passed under Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 of the CPC, whereby the balance amount had already been deposited. The details of the amount had been proved on record vide Ex.P- 17, Ex.P-18 & Ex.P-19, much less, the payments of 10% and 25% of the amount, in essence, against the total auction amount of Rs. 15,61,000/-, an amount of Rs. 30,38,425/- including interest @ 15%, had been paid to the respondents, yet the defendants wanted to dispossess the plaintiffs by alleging the cancellation of the auction. He further submits that the Executive Engineer had sought the cancellation of the auction against the appellants by referring to the matter to the Superintending Engineer/Canal Officer, which necessitated the appellants to institute a suit, whereas as per letter dated 15.07.2008, the Government of Punjab had appointed Superintending Engineer, Canal Administration as a competent authority to accord final approval of the cases relating to the auction/including agreements with the purchasers and overwhelming documentary evidence including jamabandi (Ex.P-14) and copy of the khasra girdawari (Ex.P-15) to establish the continuous physical possession of the appellants to the land, in question, has been proved on record, but both the Courts below have abdicated in not referring to the aforementioned documents, thus, there is a gross illegality and perversity. The lower Appellate Court had remained oblivious of the aforementioned order regarding deposit of the entire amount, thus, had gone to the arena of surmises and conjectures and by misdirecting, itself, that the appellants-plaintiffs had been defaulter in not making the payments of installments. On the contrary, Mr. Amit Singh Sethi, Addl. A.G., Punjab submits that the suit was ex facie not maintainable and the prayer of mandatory injunction could not have been granted, instead an alternative remedy of seeking specific performance of the terms and conditions of the auction notice, could have been sought, therefore, the suit is liable to be dismissed. The stand of the defendants before the Courts below had been that the plaintiffs had been misguiding the Court and concealing the facts of his failure to comply with the terms and conditions of the auction notice. The defendants have examined Mukhtiar Singh Rana, SDO, Canal Division, Abohar to rebut the claim of the plaintiffs and Ex.D-1, the terms and conditions of the auction, shows that as per the condition No.5, 75% of the auction money was required to be deposited in 60 days or in four equal installments with interest @ 15%, thus, urges this Court for dismissal of the appeal. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and appraised the paper book and of the view that the appeals at the instance of the State of Punjab/appellants being defendants are liable to be dismissed and that of the appellants-plaintiffs to be allowed, for, as regards the facts noticed in RSA-711-2013, it reveals vide Ex.D-2/N and Ex.P-14 the entire amount at the behest of the auction purchaser along with interest @ 15% i.e. balance amount to be deposited in 4 equal installments, had been deposited, even the Court fees for seeking the execution of the sale deed had also been affixed, in essence, deficiency in Court fees has been made good. The plaintiffs had twice approached this Court for seeking the vindication of grievance, however, in the first round of litigation, this Court had directed the authority to pass a speaking order and after passing of the speaking order, a demand of Rs. 2,45,402/- was raised, it was again challenged, but the liberty, as noticed above, was granted to file a civil suit. 2,45,402/- was raised, it was again challenged, but the liberty, as noticed above, was granted to file a civil suit. The question which is to be seen/noticed is whether there had been a breach of obligation on the part of the State. The provisions of Section 39 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (for short 'the 1963 Act') describes a procedure for a party, who is affected from the breach of obligation, in essence, a party can seek the mandatory injunction when there is a breach. For the sake of brevity, the provisions of Section 39 of the 1963 Act read as under:- ''Section 39 of the 1963 Act 39. Mandatory injunctions.—When, to prevent the breach of an obligation, it is necessary to compel the performance of certain acts which the court is capable of enforcing, the court may in its discretion grant an injunction to prevent the breach complained of, and also to compel performance of the requisite acts.'' Both the Courts below have arrived at a concurrent finding of fact that the payment qua outstanding amount had been paid. It is being apprised that during the pendency of the regular second appeal, there was no interim stay, even the sale deed has also been executed on 22.07.2014. The possession is also with the plaintiffs. In my view, the raising of the demand on the basis of the audit report, cannot be fastened upon the plaintiffs as it was an internal affair of the Department viz-a-viz the audit report. The document of the State, itself, reveals the factum of entire payment, therefore, the objection of the audit report being converted into the liability cannot be fastened upon the plaintiffs. I am of the view that the substantial questions of law raised in the present appeal, does not arise for adjudication. RSA No.3021 of 2009 As regards the appeal bearing RSA No.3021 of 2009, there is no force and substance in the submission of Mr. Amit Singh Sethi, Addl. A.G., Punjab with regard to the maintainability of the civil suit in view of the provisions of Section 39 referred supra. The documents (Ex.D-1 and Ex.D-2) do not help the defendants in proving the khasra No.195 to be a forest land. The contents of the certificate (Ex.D-1) is extracted here-in-below:- ''WHOM IT MAY CONCERNED Certified that khasra No.195 of Madhopur Cantt. The documents (Ex.D-1 and Ex.D-2) do not help the defendants in proving the khasra No.195 to be a forest land. The contents of the certificate (Ex.D-1) is extracted here-in-below:- ''WHOM IT MAY CONCERNED Certified that khasra No.195 of Madhopur Cantt. Measuring 0.31 acres land of Canal Department had been sold by auction to the plaintiff Vijay Kohli an party resident of Village Sajanpur.'' Ex.D-2 is only a site plan, in essence, the defendants has failed to lead evidence to substantiate the factum of khasra No.195 being a forest land. Even in the present appeal, no effort has been to move an application for additional evidence. On the contrary, it has been established on record that khasra No.195 was indicated in the terms and conditions of the auction, which was sold and the respondents-plaintiffs had deposited the entire amount and had sought the indulgence of the Court for execution of the sale deed. Even if, this Court had allowed the application for amendment of the plaint that would pale into insignificance for want of an evidence. The pleadings could not have been proved beyond the evidence. In fact, the State was required to not only move an application for amendment, much less, additional evidence to prima facie establish before the lower Appellate Court to bring the case within the provisions of Order 41 Rule 27 CPC for the adjudication of the lis, much less, under Order 41 Rule 23 CPC for remand of the matter for seeking report from the trial Court. Having failed to do so, it is too late in a day to urge and argue that the identity of the property is in dispute and therefore, the matter is required for reconsideration. Keeping in view of the aforementioned facts, I do not find any illegality and perversity in the concurrent findings of fact as the same are based upon the preponderance of oral and documentary evidence, much less, no ground is made out for interference and no substantial question of law arises for determination. The judgment and decree are hereby upheld. Accordingly, the appeals are dismissed. RSA No.147 of 2013 As regard the RSA No.147 of 2013, it is a conceded position on record that in pursuance to the auction held, the plaintiffs had deposited a sum of Rs. The judgment and decree are hereby upheld. Accordingly, the appeals are dismissed. RSA No.147 of 2013 As regard the RSA No.147 of 2013, it is a conceded position on record that in pursuance to the auction held, the plaintiffs had deposited a sum of Rs. 1,56,100/- being 10% of the amount on 29.06.1998, 25% of the amount i.e. 2,34,150/- on 27.08.1998 and thereafter, on 19.06.2008, Rs. 18,48,175/- vide (Ex.P-17), on 07.03.2008 Rs. 4,00,000/- vide Ex.P-18 and on 04.12.2007, Rs. 4,00,000/- (Ex.P-19) as per order dated 17.09.2007. The relevant part of the order reads as under:- “(9) In my view, if the possession is taken back from the plaintiff/appellant by the respondent during the pendency of the civil suit for permanent injunction, the very purpose of the filing or the suit by the appellant/plaintiff would be defeated. The controversy regarding the actual service of notice to make balance payment is got to be decided on merits after production of the original record by the parties. The impugned order dated 30.08.2006, whereby earlier order of status quo dated 15.02.2006 was vacated by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Abohar is not sustainable in the light of the discussion made above. In the given facts and the circumstances, the impugned order dated 09.08.2006 is not set aside. The application under Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 CPC preferred by the appellant is allowed to the effect that during the pendency of the suit, the appellant shall not be dispossessed from the land, in dispute on the following conditions:- (1) That the remaining 75% of the principal amount shall be deposited by the applicant/appellant in the lower Court in three installments-firstly on or before 17.12.2007; second installment on or before 19.03.2008 and third installment along with interest on or before 19.07.2008. However, the trial Court shall be at liberty to produce the case as per law and if final order is passed, this interim order shall come to an end and the trial Court shall pass an appropriate order regarding adjustment or refund of the amount, if any hereafter deposited by the appellant. (2) If the appellant fails to deposit the first installment on or before 17.12.2007, this appeal shall be deemed to have been dismissed. (10) This order shall have no bearings on the merits of the suit. (2) If the appellant fails to deposit the first installment on or before 17.12.2007, this appeal shall be deemed to have been dismissed. (10) This order shall have no bearings on the merits of the suit. However, the trial Court shall dispose of the case at the earliest without waiting for this arrangement.'' In pursuance to the aforementioned order, the factum of deposit of the amount is reflected in the zimini order dated 09.12.2009 of a Civil Judge (Senior Division), Abohar on 09.12.2009 which reads as under:- ''Statement of Shri Vijaypal Singh Mann, Executive Engineer Canal Abohar on SA. Stated that sale deed can be executed in favour of the plaintiff after getting the sanctioned from the prescribed authority if the plaintiff deposited Rs. 3,70,750/- as principal, interest Rs. 1,47,725/- and penalty Rs. 1,96,982/- total amounting to Rs. 20,45,157/- deducted by the amount already deposited, if any.'' thus, in my view, both the Courts below have abdicated in not noticing the aforementioned facts, thus, non-suited the plaintiffs on account of non-adherence to the terms and conditions of the auction notice and not deposit the 75% of the amount. Of course, had there been actual truth, perhaps the appellants-plaintiffs would not have unable to succeed. In my view, the misdirection and the non-mentioning of the particular documents proved on record, itself, is a perversity. No doubt, this Court, on earlier occasions had been framing the substantial questions of law while deciding the appeals but in view of the ratio decidendi culled out by five learned Judges of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in “Pankajakshi (dead) through LRs and others V/s. Chandrika and others AIR 2016 SC 1213 ”, wherein the proposition arose as to whether in view of the provisions of Section 97(1) CPC, provisions of Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918 would apply or the appeal i.e. RSA would be filed under Section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure, so there is need to frame the substantial questions of law or not. The Constitutional Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the decision in “Kulwant Kaur and others V/s. Gurdial Singh Mann (dead) by LRs and others” 2001(4) SCC 262 , on applicability of Section 97(1) of CPC is not a correct law, in essence, the provisions of Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918 had been restored back. The Constitutional Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the decision in “Kulwant Kaur and others V/s. Gurdial Singh Mann (dead) by LRs and others” 2001(4) SCC 262 , on applicability of Section 97(1) of CPC is not a correct law, in essence, the provisions of Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918 had been restored back. For the sake of brevity, the relevant portion of the judgment of five learned Judges of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in “Pankajakshi 's case (supra) reads thus:- “Since Section 41 of the Punjab Act is expressly in conflict with the amending law, viz., Section 100 as amended, it would be deemed to have been repealed. Thus we have no hesitation to hold that the law declared by the Full Bench of the High Court in the case of Ganpat [ AIR 1978 P&H 137 : 80 Punj LR 1 (FB)] cannot be sustained and is thus overruled." [at paras 27 - 29]” 27. Even the reference to Article 254 of the Constitution was not correctly made by this Court in the said decision. Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act is of 1918 vintage. Obviously, therefore, it is not a law made by the Legislature of a State after the Constitution of India has come into force. It is a law made by a Provincial Legislature under Section 80A of the Government of India Act, 1915, which law was continued, being a law in force in British India, immediately before the commencement of the Government of India Act, 1935, by Section 292 thereof. In turn, after the Constitution of India came into force and, by Article 395, repealed the Government of India Act, 1935, the Punjab Courts Act was continued being a law in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of the Constitution of India by virtue of Article 372(1) of the Constitution of India. This being the case, Article 254 of the Constitution of India would have no application to such a law for the simple reason that it is not a law made by the Legislature of a State but is an existing law continued by virtue of Article 372 of the Constitution of India. This being the case, Article 254 of the Constitution of India would have no application to such a law for the simple reason that it is not a law made by the Legislature of a State but is an existing law continued by virtue of Article 372 of the Constitution of India. If at all, it is Article 372(1) alone that would apply to such law which is to continue in force until altered or repealed or amended by a competent Legislature or other competent authority. We have already found that since Section 97(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 has no application to Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act, it would necessarily continue as a law in force.” Therefore, I do not intend to frame the substantial questions of law while deciding the appeal, aforementioned. Keeping in view the aforementioned facts and circumstances of the case, the judgment and decree of the Courts below are not sustainable in the eyes of law and the same are hereby set aside. The suit of the plaintiffs is decreed. Accordingly, the appeal stands allowed. With the aforesaid observations, the appeals bearing RSA No.3021 of 2009 & RSA No.711 of 2013 at the instance of the State/appellants being defendants, are dismissed and the appeal bearing RSA No.147 of 2013, at the instance of the appellants-plaintiffs is allowed.