ORDER : Aravind Kumar, J. Heard Sri. A.V. Gangadharappa, learned Advocate appearing for petitioners and Sri M.R. Krishnamurthy, learned Advocate appearing for respondents. Perused the records. 2. Petitioners herein had filed a suit O.S. No. 38 of 2006 for declaration and recovery of possession of suit property against respondents. Said suit came to be decreed on 21-10-2009. Petitioners filed Execution Petition No. 34 of 2010 and took possession of some of the properties. On notice being issued in the execution proceedings, respondents 1 to 6 appeared and thereafter filed an appeal in R.A. No. 64 of 2016 (old No. 12 of 2013). There was delay of 10 months in filing the appeal. Hence, an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 came to be filed seeking condonation of delay and it was allowed by First Appellate Court by order dated 18-1-2013. Being aggrieved by the said order, petitioners had approached this Court in W.P. No. 8744 of 2013. This Court was of the view that each of the appellant had to explain the cause for delay and as such, by order dated 12-8-2014 allowed the writ Petition by setting aside the order and matter came to be remitted back to the first Appellate Court for adjudication afresh. Thereafter, appellants-2 to 6 got themselves examined as P.Ws. 1 to 5. On behalf of respondents, second respondent who was the second plaintiff before Trial Court was examined as R.W. 1. After considering the evidence tendered by the parties, First Appellate Court though opined that cause shown by appellants is not to full satisfaction, allowed the application for condonation of delay on the ground that Courts have to adopt liberal approach and as such, condoned the delay on payment of costs of Rs. 3,000/-. Being aggrieved by the said order dated 27-3-2017, respondents 1 to 3 before First Appellate Court have preferred these writ petitions. 3. Sri A.V. Gangadharappa, learned Advocate appearing for petitioners has vehemently contended that First Appellate Court ought not to have condoned the delay particularly in the background of there being no cause, much less sufficient cause having been shown by the appellants. He would also submit that evidence tendered by the parties itself did not inspire confidence in the mind of First Appellate Court and as such, it did not accept the cause shown and as such delay ought not to have been condoned. He would also submit that evidence tendered by the parties itself did not inspire confidence in the mind of First Appellate Court and as such, it did not accept the cause shown and as such delay ought not to have been condoned. Hence, he seeks for allowing the writ petitions and prays for setting aside the order passed by the First Appellate Court. 4. Per contra, Sri Krishnamurthy, learned Advocate appearing for respondents 1 to 5 would support the impugned order. 5. Having heard the learned Advocates appearing for parties and on perusal of records as well as interlocutory application filed by appellants before First Appellate Court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 seeking for condonation of delay, it would disclose that affidavits filed by appellants 2 to 6 are almost identical and similar. In second paragraph of the affidavits filed by the appellants, cause for delay has been explained and it reads as under: "The respondents 1 to 3 ..... at Hosadurga. Myself and other appellants have entrusted all the documents and signed papers and vakalath to appellant 1-Puttappa, who was also the defendant, to look after the case. The appellant 1 engaged Sri B.J. Bharath, Advocate to conduct our case and he was in full charge of my case. I have had an immense belief with appellant 1. I have received notice from the Hon'ble Civil Judge (Junior Division), Hosadurga in Ex. No. 34 of 2010 and then only came to know that the original suit was decreed and to execute the decree execution petition is filed and the appellant 1-Puttappa preferred an appeal against the judgment and decree in O.S. No. 38 of 2006 in R.A. No. 2010; and further came to know that, the said Puttappa has not filed written statement and objection and not filed any documents in O.S. No. 38 of 2006 and the suit was decreed ex-parte." In support of said cause shown by the appellants, they have entered the witness-box except appellant 1 and they have reiterated their plea put forth in the affidavit filed in support of application. First Appellate Court under the impugned order as found from paragraph 14 of impugned order has observed that though some of the appellants having shown sufficient cause, it was of the view that there is considerable grounds available to afford an opportunity to the appellants to contest the matter on merits. First Appellate Court under the impugned order as found from paragraph 14 of impugned order has observed that though some of the appellants having shown sufficient cause, it was of the view that there is considerable grounds available to afford an opportunity to the appellants to contest the matter on merits. In the course of examining the cause shown by the appellants for condoning the delay, First Appellate Court has also looked into records which has culminated in the decree passed in O.S. No. 38 of 2006 which was an ex-parte decree and found that there was no effective representation on behalf of the appellants. Appellants 2 to 6 before the Trial Court has rightly contended in their affidavits as well as in their depositions before Courts below wherein they have clearly stated that they had entrusted the matter to first appellant to take care of their lis and he is stated to have not contested the matter. It is but common in the family to entrust the matter to one person to take care of the dispute whom they believe would protect their interest. According to appellants 2 to 6, first appellant is stated to have not espoused their cause which resulted in ex-parte decree being granted. As such, on service of notice in the execution proceedings, they have filed the appeal and also applications in question seeking condonation of delay. 6. It is trite law that while considering application for condonation of delay, it is not the length of delay which will be considered but it is the cause for delay. When the cause shown for such delay is susceptible to acceptance or being in the vicinity of truth, length of delay recedes to background. Absence of negligence or inaction on the part of a party seeking condonation of delay is not a precondition for interpreting sufficient cause in liberal manner. Underlying principles to be kept in mind is that when the ultimate object of the procedural law is to see substantial justice is done to the parties. When technicalities are pitted against substantial justice, such technicalities will have to kneel before substantial justice as otherwise, interest of justice would suffer. No litigant would stand to benefit by approaching the Courts belatedly. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Another v. Mst. When technicalities are pitted against substantial justice, such technicalities will have to kneel before substantial justice as otherwise, interest of justice would suffer. No litigant would stand to benefit by approaching the Courts belatedly. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Another v. Mst. Katiji and Others, AIR 1987 SC 1353 has indicated the contours for considering an application for condonation of delay and it has been observed therein that they are illustrative in nature and not exhaustive. There cannot be any straight jacket formula in this regard and facts obtained in a case will have to be independently examined. For the purpose of immediate reference, contours laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court in above referred judgment is extracted herein below : "3. The Legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on 'merits’. The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the Legislature is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub-serves the ends of justice-that being the life purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realised that: 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after nearing the parties. 3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable or removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the 'State' which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even handed manner. There is no warrant for according a step motherly treatment when the 'State 1 is the applicant praying for condonation of delay. In fact experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note making, file pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. In any event, the State which represents the collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant non-grata status. The Courts therefore have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression "sufficient cause". So also the same approach has to be evidenced in its application to matters at hand with the end in view to do even handed justice on merits in preference to the approach which scuttles a decision on merits. Turning to the facts of the matter giving rise to the present appeal, we are satisfied that sufficient cause exists for the delay. Turning to the facts of the matter giving rise to the present appeal, we are satisfied that sufficient cause exists for the delay. The order of the High Court dismissing the appeal before it as time barred, is therefore, set aside. Delay is condoned. And the matter is remitted to the High Court. The High Court will now dispose of the appeal on merits after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to both the sides." 7. Keeping these principles in mind, when the facts on hand are examined, it would leave no doubt in the mind of this Court that exercise of discretion by First Appellate Court in condoning the delay taking into consideration totality of circumstances of the case, cannot be said to be either perverse or there being any material irregularity. That apart, by condoning the delay, appeal can be heard on merits and disposed of in accordance with law for which petitioners would also have an opportunity to defend their claim. It would not be an endeavour of the Court to stifle substantial cause by nipping it at the bud and dismissing the appeal on technical grounds. On the other hand, it would be the endeavours of the Courts to see that substantial justice is meted out to the parties who approach the Court. In that view of the matter, I do not find any good ground to entertain these writ petitions. Accordingly, writ petitions are hereby dismissed as being devoid of merits.