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2017 DIGILAW 775 (CAL)

State of West Bengal v. Tapan Kumar Das

2017-09-14

MIR DARA SHEKO, RAKESH TIWARI

body2017
JUDGMENT : Mir Dara Sheko, J. 1. This is a very disturbing to note, when an issue has been settled by the Division Bench of this Court on and again, against one of which appeal was preferred before the Supreme Court which also was dismissed, instead of following the same this Court deals with such settled issue sometimes afresh and in doing so unprecedently is attempting to unsettle the settled issue, as again happened in this case, very reluctantly we are discharging our obligations in disposing of this appeal following the settle law on the issue with the hope that instead of reopening Pandora’s box there will be full stop disallowing increase in the scope of litigation on the settled issue. 2. The subject Institution, namely, Daguagandhi Smriti Junior High School has a long drawn history of litigation since its Managing Committee in one hand was trying for its recognition to achieve financial aid from the State and, on the other hand, the respondents/writ petitioners claiming themselves organizing teachers have been trying to establish their right of getting appointment through Court proceedings. Therefore, the germane of the matter as available on record was since the month of November, 1991. 3. Mr. Majumder, learned Counsel appearing for the appellants, submitted that either in the old Act of the year 1963 or even after enactment of the School Service Commission Act, 1997 the concept of organizing teacher was nowhere. Submitted, while the School Service Commission Act, 1997 came into force w.e.f. 1st November, 1997 without being repugnant to other provisions working in the field then the provision and procedure for selection, appointment and approval are to be followed as provided therein. He further submitted that if any teaching or non-teaching staff are appointed de hors the Rule then they would have no status whether they would have been working in the institution prior to or after recognition by the Government, because, any such organizing teaching or non-teaching staff had no approved status for being appointed unless they are appointed through regular selection process against the vacancy. He, accordingly relied upon the following cases:- "(1) F.M.A 1425 of 2003 reported in (2006) 2 CLJ 489 [Manindra Nath Sinha and others v. State of West Bengal and others] [order of Supreme Court dated 4th December, 2014 in Civil Appeal No. 7897 of 2010]. He, accordingly relied upon the following cases:- "(1) F.M.A 1425 of 2003 reported in (2006) 2 CLJ 489 [Manindra Nath Sinha and others v. State of West Bengal and others] [order of Supreme Court dated 4th December, 2014 in Civil Appeal No. 7897 of 2010]. (2) State of West Bengal & Others v. Smritikana Maity & Others reported in 2008(1) CLH (Cal) 316. (3) State of West Bengal & Others v. Gopal Singh & Others reported in (2008)1 WBLR (Cal) 229. (4) Aloke Jyoti Maitra v. the State of West Bengal & Ors. Reported in 2003(2) CLJ 553 - Single Bench decision." 4. Per contra, learned Senior Counsel, Mr. Bhattacharya, representing the respondents/petitioners submitted that the respondents were attached to the subject institution since before its recognition and that would be available from the inspection report submitted by the District Inspector of Schools (SE), Purba Medinipur on 27th November, 1991 from where the names of the respondents/petitioners would be appearing as working staff. He further submitted that though at that stage the status of the respondents/petitioners were organizing teachers but it would not mean that they would not have any status. He rather tried to impress upon that the organizing teachers also would have some indefeasible right and such right would have to be considered depending upon the relevant facts and circumstances available from the case. Our attention was drawn to the order of the learned Single Bench of this Court as was passed in W.P. 23483(W) of 2007 on 20th November, 2009 where learned Single Bench of this Court had directed the District Inspector of Schools (SE), Purba Medinipur, to grant financial assistance to the subject school as well as to approve services of the petitioners from the date of recognition of the school. The said judgment however was assailed in appeal. The Division Bench of this Court as regard recognition part did not interfere with since after the order of the learned Writ Court the institution was recognized. But modifying the order of learned Writ Court the Division Bench directed the "appropriate authority" to consider the question of approval in accordance with Government orders. Mr. Bhattacharya accordingly, invited our attention to the order dated 30th December, 2013 issued by the District Inspector of Schools (SE), Purba Medinipur, by which the approval of appointment of the five respondents/petitioners was accorded. 5. Mr. Mr. Bhattacharya accordingly, invited our attention to the order dated 30th December, 2013 issued by the District Inspector of Schools (SE), Purba Medinipur, by which the approval of appointment of the five respondents/petitioners was accorded. 5. Mr. Bahttacharya argued that pursuant to the order of the Division Bench once the approval of order of appointment of the respondents was accorded by the District Inspector of Schools (SE) then how he would be the competent authority to review and cancel his own order. This action of the District Inspector of Schools (SE) gave rise to the instant writ petition No. WP 25186(W) of 2015. However, to substantiate the status of the respondents/petitioners who used to work in the institution as organizing teachers before recognition of the school and were so appointed later by the Managing Committee, Mr. Bhattacharya relied upon the case of Gourhari Patra v. State of West Bengal reported in (1992) 2 ILR 198 at para 14 and in the case of Bhudev Biswas v. State of West Bengal & Ors. Reported in (2006) 2 Cal LT 231 (HC) at para 8. Consider the materials on record the provisions of law the cases cited the Bar. 6. For proper appreciation the relevant portion from paragraph 14 of the case of Gourhari Patra (supra) delivered by the learned Single Bench at that stage is set out:- "14. The petitioners by reason of the approval of the panel and appointment thus made in their favour acquired certain constitutional right and the said right constitute, right to livelihood and work which are integrated and interdependent rights. The Court is required to expand the reach and sweep of fundamental rights rather not to attenuate the meaning and content of the said fundamental rights. Reach of Art. 21 of the Constitution is that any executive action which has and had the effect of adversely affecting the right to work and livelihood must be supported by authority of law. That the District Inspector of Schools after approving the panel cannot review the matter in the absence of any provisions in the statute. Power of review being a creature of stature the District Inspector of Schools in the absence of such power if wholly incompetent to revise or review the approval of the appointment. That the District Inspector of Schools after approving the panel cannot review the matter in the absence of any provisions in the statute. Power of review being a creature of stature the District Inspector of Schools in the absence of such power if wholly incompetent to revise or review the approval of the appointment. The Court cannot allow such arbitrary actions of the District Inspector of Schools which, in any view, transgress the limit of r. 5(d) of the Recruitment Rules. The District Inspector of Schools, being a creature of statute, is bound to act in terms of the statute and not to act contrary to the Rules and not to take such decision as is wholly impermissible in law. This is a well-settled principle. It is not understood as to how, why and under what circumstances the District Inspector of Schools without issuing a notice calling upon the petitioner and also upon the school authorities to explain or to show cause why the panel thus approved by him should be kept in abeyance. It is not understood how the District Inspector of Schools could issue the orders impugned in the writ application in clearest breach of the fundamental of audi alterm partem. The court does not approve of the action of the District Inspector of Schools in issuing the impugned orders without taking recourse to fair procedure as is indicated above. The Court cannot allow legal escapism to transcend the judicial activism." The above decision was holding the field while the West Bengal School Service Commission Act, 1997 did not come. Therefore when the statute came with all full-fledged provisions to take overall control and to regulate the entire procedure of selection of teaching and non-teaching staff of a recognised school. Equally paragraph 8 of Sri Bhudev Biswas (supra) passed by the Division Bench of this Court is also set out hereunder:- "8. Everything would depend in this case on one singular fact that as to whether there was any inspection by the DLIT and if so and further whether the petitioner was appointed after the said inspection. It goes without saying that if the petitioner was found to be present and employed during that inspection the petitioner could be termed as an organizing teacher and would get the benefit of the approval as per the settled law. It goes without saying that if the petitioner was found to be present and employed during that inspection the petitioner could be termed as an organizing teacher and would get the benefit of the approval as per the settled law. However, it seems that the petitioner has to draws a complete blank on that. Firstly it is to be seen that the finding that petitioner was appointed only after the inspection has been recorded by the Director of School Education as back as in the year 1990. For the reason unknown the petitioner sat over that order and did not challenge the same in any way. That order of the Director of School Education became binding on the petitioner. It is only when the petitioner was reeling under the pressure during the pendency of the writ petition, that he for the first time challenge the order by making and application for amendment of the writ in the year 2000, that is after 10 years of the order passed. One look at the order passed by the Director of School Education suggest that the director of School Education had taken up that exercise at the instance of this Court's order dated 12th December, 1989. Therefore, it is only for the sole purpose of seeing as to whether the petitioner was an organizing teacher, that the exercise had been undertaken. The director of School Education has also made reference to the earlier communication dated 8th July, 1988 wherein there is a clear cut mention that the school authorities has applied for inspection of the school in 1974 itself. The Director of School Education has also referred to the earlier inspection report dated 8th July, 1988 which suggest that the petitioner was not in the service of the school on that date. The petitioner's case before the Director of School Education was that he was employed on 2nd April, 1984, however since the Director took the view that since he was employed only after the inspection by the DLIT he could not be viewed as organizing teacher. This finding is to be found in the last paragraph of the order. We are not prepared to accept that the responsible officer like Director of School Education would pass any remarks regarding inspection of the school in a casual manner unless he was armed with the records supporting the said facts. This finding is to be found in the last paragraph of the order. We are not prepared to accept that the responsible officer like Director of School Education would pass any remarks regarding inspection of the school in a casual manner unless he was armed with the records supporting the said facts. After all, the Director of School Education was deciding this matter as per the orders passed by this Court. Learned Counsel for the petitioner, however, attacked this order suggesting that there is no reference to any particular report. However, there also the learned Counsel has to draw blank in paragraph 10 of his writ petition the petitioner referred to a document dated 15th July, 1988. The assertion is as follows: "10. That the said school was inspected on several occasions by the District Inspector of Schools (SE), Darjeeling and Assistant Inspector of Schools (SE), Darjeeling and they submitted their respective inspection reports. The District Inspector of Schools (SE), Darjeeling by his office Memo No. 24/SLG dated 15.7.1988 submitted an inspection report to the Director of School Education, West Bengal and a Xerox copy of the same is annexed hereto and marked with letter 'C'. In the said inspection report it was reported that the petitioner was working as Assistant Teacher of the said school with effect from 2.4.1984." 7. By the aforesaid citations Mr. Bhattacharya tried to establish the indefeasible right of the petitioners who were working in the subject institution as organising teachers before recognition of the institution. The instance of the case of Gourhari Patra (supra) was very academic. The learned Single Bench in that occasion criticised the power and jurisdiction of the District Inspector of Schools (SE) who after approving the panel reviewed the same in absence of any provisions in the statute. In the case on hand the fact is otherwise because the order of learned Single Bench dated 28.11.2009 was assailed in MAT 695 of 2010 wherein the Division Bench of this Court by order dated 25th July, 2013 directed the "appropriate authority" to consider the question of approval of appointment of the petitioners who were not appointed in that stage despite of attempts and persuasion held by the petitioners. Therefore, the principles discussed in the case of Gourhari Patra remained academic in view of its facts and circumstances stated above and, therefore, the respondents/writ petitioners are not entitled to get any benefit of the principles enunciated therein specially when the facts and circumstances of that case are distinguishable. 8. In the case of Bhudeb Biswas (supra) the Division Bench of this Court held that the termed as organising teacher would get the benefit of approval for being appointed in the educational institution if during inspection by DLIT they would be found present as employed in said institution and accordingly the indefeasible right of the petitioners termed as organising teacher was kept protected. 9. Mr. Bhattacharya submitted that the Division Bench while delivered the judgment in the case of Manindra Nath Singh (supra) on 6th September, 2006 did not take note of the case of Bhudev Biswas (supra) delivered by the same strength of Bench of this Court on 12th January, 2006 protecting the indefeasible right of the teachers claimed to have been working as organizing teachers till before recognition of the concerned educational institution. In the case of Bhudev Biswas (supra) this was the lis whether there was any inspection in the institution by the DLIT and if inspection was held whether the petitioner claimed to be organizing teacher was appointed before or after said inspection. It was held by this Court that if the petitioner was found present as employed during such inspection by the DLIT the petitioner could be termed as an organizing teacher but would get benefit of approval by being appointed in that institution as per settled law. It appears that the affairs relevant to the case of Bhudev Biswas held in between 1984 to 1993, since there was recalled of order preventing to join, the writ petition was filed in the year 1993. 10. In the instant case the respondents/writ petitioners did not produce their respective letter of appointment as to appreciate who had issued and what mode was adopted in issuing the same. The respondents, of course, heavily relied upon the inspection report dated 27.11.1991 held by the District Inspector of Schools (SE). As pointed out by Mr. 10. In the instant case the respondents/writ petitioners did not produce their respective letter of appointment as to appreciate who had issued and what mode was adopted in issuing the same. The respondents, of course, heavily relied upon the inspection report dated 27.11.1991 held by the District Inspector of Schools (SE). As pointed out by Mr. Majumder in the second page of such report against the column 'C' under the heading 'Management' against the column 'date of formation of the organizing committee two dates were mentioned viz 2.1.72 2.7.90' on which there is no explanation on record. Be that as it may, to regularize the process for appointment of teaching and non-teaching in the recognized educational institution, the West Bengal Act, (IV) of 1997 has been enacted with the name of the West Bengal School Service Commission Act, 1997. Apart from Government Circulars as published time to time, not being repugnant to the parent provision, Section 7 of such Act, 1997 specifies the function of regional Commission, whereas Section 8 provides the manner and scope of selection of persons and procedure for conduct of business of Commission and Section 9(1) and sub-section (2) has provides about recommendations of the Commission. The cumulative effect of the above provisions unambiguously have specified that in any recognized institution, be it of fully Government or, Government Aided against the vacancy of teaching or non-teaching staff in the institution there shall be advertisement followed by selection procedure and recommendation for approval of the appointment, failing which any act and action shall be de hors the Rule. 11. Though the case of Aloke Jyoti Maitra was decided on 1st August, 2003 by learned Single Bench of this Court where the subject school was ultimately upgraded w.e.f. May 1998 where the petitioner used to work as teacher since about 1993, of course, as organizer teacher, to said school, paragraphs 19, 21 and 22 are set out hereunder also to answer on the lis of this case. "Paragraph 19:- In the present case, according to the existing rules, Managing Committee is not vested with authority to appoint any teacher beyond sanctioned strength. But by way of Government instruction, such illegal Act is sought to be regularized. Therefore, the present case is worse case than the one reported in AIR 1972 SC 1767 (supra) where statutory rule was framed to regularize illegal Act. But by way of Government instruction, such illegal Act is sought to be regularized. Therefore, the present case is worse case than the one reported in AIR 1972 SC 1767 (supra) where statutory rule was framed to regularize illegal Act. Paragraph 21:- Therefore, it is clear that the initial appointment of the petitioner was contrary to the rules and any executive instruction issued by Government cannot approve the illegal appointments contrary to the rules. Paragraph 22:- I, thus, find substance in the preliminary objection raised by Mr. Dutta that even if the allegations contained in the writ application are all true, the appointment given to the petitioner by Managing Committee could not be regularized by approving his appointment. I agree with conclusion arrived at by Barin Ghosh, J. in the unreported decision relied upon by Mr. Dutta for the reasons mentioned above." 12. Since at the very inception of this judgment we have expressed our displeasure for making attempt to re-open a settled issue again to the opposite dimension the case of same Medinipur District was dealt with by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Manindra Nath Sinha and Ors. In that case Manindra Nath Sinha and Ors. claiming themselves as organizing member of the educational institution of Medinipur District had applied before the District Inspector of School for regularization of their services which was refused. Accordingly writ was filed which was dismissed affirming the order of the District Inspector of School (SE). To answer on the lis of this case paragraphs 20, 21, 22, 23, 27 and 28 from the case of Manindra Nath Sinha and Ors. (supra) are accordingly set out hereunder:- "Paragraph 20:- According to the existing rules, there is no scope of appointment of an Organizing Managing Committee and even a regularly appointed Managing Committee is not vested the authority to appoint any teacher or non-teaching staff beyond the sanctioned strength; but by way of Government instructions such illegal act is sought to be regularized. Therefore, the facts of the present case are worse than those involved in the case of R.N. Nanjundappa (supra), where statutory rules were framed to regularize illegal act. Paragraph 21:- We, thus, find that by merely issuing Government instructions, illegal acts committed by the Organizing Managing Committee which is a total busybody cannot be regularized in this way. Therefore, the facts of the present case are worse than those involved in the case of R.N. Nanjundappa (supra), where statutory rules were framed to regularize illegal act. Paragraph 21:- We, thus, find that by merely issuing Government instructions, illegal acts committed by the Organizing Managing Committee which is a total busybody cannot be regularized in this way. The moment the school is recognized, the Managing Committee is to be constituted in accordance with the Act and the Rules framed thereunder and such duly-constituted Managing Committee can alone appoint teachers and non-teaching staff according to the provision contained in Rule 28 of the Management Rules within the sanctioned strength but even there, there is no right conferred upon the duly-constituted Managing Committee to appoint any staff who before the recognition of the school was appointed by the Organizing Managing Committee and even the guidelines or circulars did not permit the appointment of any staff before the school is recognized and the sanctioned strength is declared. Paragraph 22:- Therefore, it is clear that initial appointments of the writ petitioners, even if those were really made, were contrary to the rules and any executive instruction issued by the Government cannot approve the illegal appointment contrary to the statutory rules. Paragraph 23:- As regards the applicability of the doctrine of promissory estoppels raised by Mr. Deb, we are of the view that if the appointment itself is dehors the existing statutory enactments, there is no question of applicability of the doctrine of promissory estoppels. According to the Parent Act, namely. The West Bengal Board of Secondary Education Act, 1963 and the rules framed thereunder, there is no provision of appointment of organizer-teacher by a so-called Organizing Managing Committee before a school has been recognized by the Board. There is no statutory provision for giving appointment to the so-called organizer-staff after a school is recognized by the Board. According to the present law, a Managing Committee is to be duly constituted and such duly-constituted Managing Committee alone will appoint teachers and non-teaching staff by complying with the requirements of the Management Rules. In the case before us, such formalities were admittedly not complied with. The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Ltd. (supra), relied upon by Mr. In the case before us, such formalities were admittedly not complied with. The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Ltd. (supra), relied upon by Mr. Deb rather lays down that the doctrine of promissory estoppels is not applicable against the Government if it is under the obligation or liability to act differently by operation of law. In a subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bangalore Development Authority v. R. Hanumania, reported in 2005 (12) SCC 508 it has been clearly held that the principle of promissory estoppels cannot be invoked to permit or condone a breach of law or to compel the Government to do an act prohibited by law. It was pointed out in that case, that in the absence of any statutory provision enabling the Bangalore Development Authority to reconvey the land acquired to implement scheme for framing of sites and allotment thereof, the Authority could not be directed to reconvey a part, of the land merely because it had earlier promised to do so. We, thus, find no substance in the contention of Mr. Deb on the question of invocation to the principle of promissory estoppels in the facts of the present case. Paragraph 27:- We, therefore, approve the decision of the case of Aloke Jyoti Maitea v. The State of West Bengal & Ors. (supra), holding almost the selfsame view. Paragraph 28:- In view of our aforesaid finding, there is no necessity of even entering into the question whether the writ petitioners were really acting as organizing-staff. Nevertheless, we have decided to go into the question as elaborate submissions were made." 13. Since Mr. Bhattacharya pointed out before us that in the case of Manindra Nath Sinha the case of Bhudev Biswas (supra) was not considered, on scrutiny we find that the fact on which the case of Bhudev Biswas was decided was relevant from the period from 1984 to 1993. Since Mr. Bhattacharya pointed out before us that in the case of Manindra Nath Sinha the case of Bhudev Biswas (supra) was not considered, on scrutiny we find that the fact on which the case of Bhudev Biswas was decided was relevant from the period from 1984 to 1993. Whereas the School Service Commission Act, has come up in the year 1997 w.e.f. 01.11.1997, from which a few relevant sections like 7, 8(1), (2) and 9(1), (2) and 10 are set out:- "Section 7:- Functions of Regional Commission.-Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any contract, custom or usage to the contrary, it shall be the duty of the Regional Commission to select persons for appointment to the posts of Teachers in schools within it territorial jurisdiction. 8. Manner and scope of selection of persons and procedure for conduct of business of Commission.- (1) The manner and scope of selection of persons for appointment to the posts of Teachers shall be such as my be prescribed. (2) The procedure for the conduct of business of the Commission shall be such as may be provided for by regulations. 9. Effect of recommendation of Commission.- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any contract, custom or usage to the contrary, appointments to the posts of Teachers in a school shall be made by the Managing Committee, by whatever name called, or by the ad-hoc committee, or by the administrator, if any (where there is no managing committee), of that school on the recommendation of the Regional Commission having jurisdiction. (2) Any appointment of a Teacher made on or after the commencement of this Act in contravention of the provisions of this Act shall be invalid and shall have no effect and the Teacher so appointed shall not be a Teacher within the meaning of clause (p) of section 2. 10. Protection of Teachers.- Notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in this Act the terms and conditions of service of Teachers in the employment of a school immediately before the commencement to this Act shall not be varied to the disadvantage of such Teachers in so far as such terms and conditions relate to the appointment such Teachers to the posts held by them immediately before the commencement of this Act." 14. Even in the Old West Bengal Secondary Education Act, 1963 concept of organizer teacher or organizer staff was also nowhere, meaning thereby it was neither in the Old Act nor in the present Act there was no concept of organizer teaching or non-teaching staff. Even in the new Act there is no saving clause so far as those so called organizer teaching or non-teaching staff for their absorption who were not in the place following selection procedure with a view to fill up the declared vacancy. Meaning thereby, any backdoor appointment had/has no legal sanctity. Therefore either to claim status or to provide status would be simply misnomer. Manindra Nath Sinha and Ors. being aggrieved by the judgment delivered by the Division Bench of this Court on September 6, 2006 preferred Civil Appeal No. 7897 of 2010 before the Supreme Court and upon hearing at length the Supreme Court comprised of three Judges Bench dismissed the appeal, order of which is set out:- "After having considered the submissions advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the appellants, and also after having heard Mr. Bandopadhaya at great length, we are satisfied, that the impugned order passed by the High Court does not call for any interference by this Court. The instant appeal is accordingly dismissed." 15. Therefore, in view of the above the deciding factors related distinctly with relevant period between the case of Bhudev Biswas and Manindra Nath Sinha as happened further in due course as a consequence of dismissal of civil appeal as stated above the issues regarding organizer teacher or staff in one hand and any appointment de hors the Rule or provision of Act on the other hand would remain abandoned for all time to come. Meaning thereby, in absence of any saving clause so far as the alleged organizer teacher or non-teaching staff, either in the Old Act, 1963, or, in the New Act, nothing can be done, if there appointment are not done maintaining the procedure. As a consequence thereof, question of approval in that case would remain far off. Meaning thereby, in absence of any saving clause so far as the alleged organizer teacher or non-teaching staff, either in the Old Act, 1963, or, in the New Act, nothing can be done, if there appointment are not done maintaining the procedure. As a consequence thereof, question of approval in that case would remain far off. That is the reason the Appellate Court in MAT 569 modifying the order of the Single Bench by which the respondents were granted financial assistance and to get the approval of the services was modified to the extent as follows:- "The appropriate authority to consider the question of approval of the appointment of the writ petitioners No. 3-10 with effect from the date of recognition of the school in accordance with Government Orders including the one brought to our notice by Mr. Sanyal. They shall pass a reasoned order and this exercise shall be completed as early as possible preferably within three months from the date of communication of this order." 16. The aforesaid order in appeal had therefore four components for compliance viz. "(a) It would have to be done by "appropriate authority". (b) Question of approval of the appointment would have to be considered. (c) Reasoned order would have to be passed. (d) The exercise would have to be completed within stipulated period." 17. From record it appears that pursuant to the direction of the Division Bench in MAT 695 (supra) the concerned District Inspector of Schools (SE) issued order on 30.12.2013 approving appointment of the respondents. We did not find however that the respondents ever put their alleged initial appoint order on record the said order dated 30.12.2013 must have been issued as an interim measure so that till before full consideration of relevant law on the same the school administration may not suffer from contempt proceeding if the "consideration" as directed by the Bench would not be completed within stipulated period. However, since no argument is advanced at the bar as to whether the concerned District Inspector of Schools (S.E). was the "competent authority" to consider the points, we also refrained from giving any observation on the point. Because in absence of the point, urged by the parties, or, in absence of the lis any such observation of the Bench would be obiter dictum. was the "competent authority" to consider the points, we also refrained from giving any observation on the point. Because in absence of the point, urged by the parties, or, in absence of the lis any such observation of the Bench would be obiter dictum. Rather when the respondents had replied to claim and enjoy benefit upon the order dated 30.12.2013 who had passed the said order with alleged authority, then we observe that he would have the same authority to review it in passing reasoned order examining the provisions of the Act and the leading decisions holding the field in compliance with the direction of the Division Bench (supra). 18. If we go by the order dated 30th may, 2014 preceded by 30th December, 2013 then there can be only conclusion that the earlier order was issued as an interim measure which can never be equated with final order. Eventually by considering the necessary provision of law available both in the Act and through Judge made laws the decision of the District Inspector of Schools (SE) was just, proper and legal. Therefore if we go by the later instance the District Inspector of Schools (SE) would be said to have complied with the order of the Division Bench and the effect of said action ought not to be altered by the impugned order of this Court in view of the settled proposition of law discussed above. Meaning thereby, the respondents are bound by the settled proposition of law which is holding the field as already discussed above. 19. In addition we took opportunity again to quote paragraphs 25, 26 and 27 from the case of State of West Bengal and Ors. v. Smritikana Maity with State of West Bengal v. Harendra Mondal and Ors. delivered by the Division Bench of this Court on September 14, 2007. "Paragraph 25:- It is true that the State had recognized a number of people who were appointed by the managing committee for unrecognized classes, although such appointments were illegal and in clear violation of the Rules, but such recognition/regularization being contrary to law cannot be treated as precedent. delivered by the Division Bench of this Court on September 14, 2007. "Paragraph 25:- It is true that the State had recognized a number of people who were appointed by the managing committee for unrecognized classes, although such appointments were illegal and in clear violation of the Rules, but such recognition/regularization being contrary to law cannot be treated as precedent. Paragraph 26:-We are also of the view that inclusion of names of such organizer teachers in the report of the DLIT (District Level Inspection Team) can never be taken into consideration until and unless it is shown that such appointment is given by a validity constituted managing committee of a recognized aided institution within the sanctioned strength and that such appointment is given according to the provisions of the relevant Rules. Paragraph 27:- As we have already discussed above, in the case of Uma Devi (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court having considered various judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as also of other High Courts observed that appointments made without following due process or the rules for appointment do not confer any right on the appointees and that the Court cannot direct their absorption or regularization or re-engagement or making them permanent." Therefore what more is required to decide the lis and/or to determine the status of the persons said to have been working in the educational institution since before its recognition without being appointed following due process of rules and procedures laid down in the Act. 20. Learned Trial Court however, though did not take note of the settled law, nonetheless during disposal of the writ petition learned Writ Court was pleased to reiterate to follow the "due procedure". We also do lay our observation that such "due procedure" means as is available in the Act both in the old and the new where there is no repugnancy as well as available through the judgment law settling the issue up to the Supreme Court, so that any indisciplined act and action dehors the Rule may not be allowed to be stretched further. In view of above the order dated 2nd March, 2017 delivered in Writ Petition 25186 (W) of 2015 is set aside and quashed and the appeal being MAT 582 of 2017 is hereby allowed. 21. As a consequence thereof the application being CAN 4443 of 2017 stand disposed of. 22. No order as to costs. 23. In view of above the order dated 2nd March, 2017 delivered in Writ Petition 25186 (W) of 2015 is set aside and quashed and the appeal being MAT 582 of 2017 is hereby allowed. 21. As a consequence thereof the application being CAN 4443 of 2017 stand disposed of. 22. No order as to costs. 23. Urgent certified copy be supplied, if applied for on observing all usual formalities.