JUDGMENT : S. N. PRASAD, J. 1. This writ petition under Articles 226 and 267 of the Constitution of India has been filed wherein the Award dated 26.04.1997 passed by the Industrial Tribunal, Orissa, Bhubaneswar in Industrial Dispute Case No.6 of 1985 (Central) is under challenge whereby and where under the reference has been answered against the workmen. 2. The brief fact of the case is that a reference has been made with respect to declaring the action of the management of M/s. Central Coal Fields Limited, Talcher in retrenching S/Shri N.C. Pradhan and 97 others whose names are given with the list appended with effect from 25.9.1981 is legal and justified? If not, to what relief the workmen are entitled. This reference has been made on the behest of the workmen. According to them, they were recruited by the management of M/s. Central Coal Fields Limited, Talcher in the year 1979 for working at different work sites including at the Cross Country Conveyor Belt Project at Jaganath Colliery Limited, they worked continuously under the management till 25.9.1981 when their services were terminated. It is alleged that such termination of their services amounted to retrenchment, but the same having been brought out in contravention of the provisions of Sections 25-F and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is illegal and unjustified. The further plea of the workmen is that the management with a view to avoiding its liabilities in respect of the workmen advanced a false plea that the workmen were employed by the contractor, namely, M/s. R.K. Construction, Talcher engaged by it and as such, there was no employer and employee relationship between the management and the workmen. The management has appeared, filed written statement, challenging the maintainability of the reference and has submitted that there is no employer and employee relationship. The plea is that for construction of the Cross Country Link Conveyor by the management, it calls tenders for supply of labour. M/s. R.K. Construction, Talcher was a tenderer and his tender having been accepted, work orders were issued to him. The plea is that for construction of the Cross Country Link Conveyor by the management, it calls tenders for supply of labour. M/s. R.K. Construction, Talcher was a tenderer and his tender having been accepted, work orders were issued to him. As per the agreement, the said M/s. R.K. Construction, Talcher supplied the labour for the work which commenced on 25.11.1979 and closed by the end of September, 1981, on completion and as per the general terms and conditions of the contract entered into between the management and the contractor, the contractor was liable to comply with the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act and other labour laws as are applicable. It is the plea of the management that since the workmen were employed by the said contractor for the aforesaid Cross Country Conveyor Belt Project and the construction work of the Cross Country Link Conveyor Belt was completed by the end of September, 1981, the services of the workmen were terminated by the contractor. After termination of employment of the workmen, Talcher Mazdoor Sabha, which was representing the workmen during that period, raised industrial dispute on some demands which were taken up for conciliation. After conciliation, a tripartite settlement was signed between the representatives of the Talcher Mazdoor Sabha, the Management and the Assistant Labour Commissioner (Central), Bhubaneswar on 16.1.1982. Thereafter, on 1.3.1983, the management issued a notice calling upon the workmen concerned to intimate by 15.3.1983 if they had any claim against the said contractor because the security deposit made by the said contractor was to be released. According to the management, similar notices were also issued subsequently, but no claim was received. The Tribunal on the basis of the rival submission of the parties has formulated these issues, namely:- 1. Whether the reference is maintainable? 2(a). Whether there exists relationship of employer and employee between the management of CCL and the workmen? 2(b). Whether the members of the second party workmen are the employee of M/s. R.K. Construction? 3. Whether the workmen have been retrenched from their services and whether the retrenchment, if any, is legal and/or justified? The Tribunal has passed the Award on 26.6.1990 and answered the reference declaring therein that the retrenchment of S/Shri N.C. Pradhan and 97 others with effect from 25.9.1981 is illegal and unjustified and they are entitled to reinstatement with full back wages. 3. The Tribunal has passed the Award on 26.6.1990 and answered the reference declaring therein that the retrenchment of S/Shri N.C. Pradhan and 97 others with effect from 25.9.1981 is illegal and unjustified and they are entitled to reinstatement with full back wages. 3. The management, being aggrieved with the Award, has approached this Court vide O.J.C. No.3274 of 1990 whereby and where under the Award passed on 26.6.1990 has been set aside, the case has been remitted before the Tribunal to decide if the cross country link conveyor was a separate undertaking of the first party management and other allied matters. The operative portion of the said direction passed in O.J.C. No.3274 of 1990 is being quoted herein below:- “xx we are of the view that the matter should be sent back on remand to the Tribunal for the specific consideration as to whether the management had undertaken the work which was a distinct one and separate from the usual work of the main undertaking. The tribunal has to consider whether the project itself was an undertaking and for its completion necessary office was founded and on completion of the project the office was presumed to have been disbanded. For this limited purpose we would like to remand the case to the Tribunal and permit the parties to adduce further evidence on this specific point alone. With regard to the other findings, we do not differ from the Tribunal. If as per the ratio of the judgment of the Supreme Court in AIR 1973 SC 878 (supra) the employer is able to prove the necessary ingredients, the case would be decided by applying the principles of section 25-FFF of the Industrial Disputes Act. In the event if it is found otherwise, the conclusion of the Tribunal that there was illegal retrenchment and the workmen were entitled to be reinstated with back wages is to be reiterated and necessary decision will follows. 35. For the aforesaid reasons, we allow the writ application, set aside the award of the tribunal and remand the case to the Tribunal for limited purpose of coming to the conclusion as indicated above by giving opportunity to the parties to adduce evidence again. Such evidence will be considered along with the evidence already on record and the matter shall be disposed of within four months of communication of the writ xxx.” 4. Such evidence will be considered along with the evidence already on record and the matter shall be disposed of within four months of communication of the writ xxx.” 4. The matter has been taken by the Tribunal afresh and thereafter the adjudication has been made taking into consideration the provisions of Sections 25F, 25FF and 25FFF of the Industrial Disputes Act. The parties had appeared and adduced their evidences in support of their claim to establish the applicability of the provision of the Act. The Tribunal, after taking into consideration the fact, had come to the conclusion that the cross country conveyor belt is a distinct and separate undertaking of the first party management to facilitate the supervising staff of the first party management to conveniently supervise the progress of the work of the cross country conveyor belt project and after completion of the same, the entire project was handed over to the Talcher Thermal Power Station by the first party management. The span of time consuming in completing the construction work of the cross country conveyor belt being one year and ten months and as such, by virtue of the statute provision contained in Section 25FFF(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the members of the Union are not entitled for any retrenchment compensation. However, each of the named workmen of the reference is entitled to be paid with a month’s wage in lieu of notice but the notice of retrenchment not having been served on the names of the workmen of the reference. The said reference is challenged under this writ petition wherein the learned counsel for the workmen has submitted that the Tribunal has not examined the factual aspect in coming to the conclusion regarding applicability of Section 25-FFF(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act rather, according to him, it is a case of the provision of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act and it has been held by the Tribunal on earlier occasion, i.e., prior to its remand by virtue of order passed by this Court under the writ petition. He refutes the ground of the management that conveyor belt is the distinct unit from the establishment of the management. 5. He refutes the ground of the management that conveyor belt is the distinct unit from the establishment of the management. 5. We, after having heard learned counsel for the parties and after going through the Award, have found that the workmen have raised the dispute against their retrenchment and for that a reference has been made before the Tribunal to give its declaration regarding legality and propriety of their retrenchment w.e.f. 25.9.1981. Before scrutinizing the finding of the Tribunal, it would be appropriate to refer the provisions of Sections 25-F, 25-FF and 25-FFF of the Industrial Disputes Act, which would be relevant in the facts and circumstances of the instant case to adjudicate upon legality and propriety of the Award. “Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act speaks as follows:- “S. 25F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.? No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until? (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay [for every completed year of continuous service] or any part thereof in excess of six months; and (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government [or such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette]. It is evident from the provision of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act that the said provision contains a mandatory condition to the effect that no workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by the employer until the workman has been given one month’s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice. Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act speaks regarding the process to be resorted by the management for retrenchment of the workman and payment of compensation in case of continuity of the regular service of 240 days. “Section 25FF of the Industrial Disputes Act speaks as follows:- S. 25FF. Compensation to workmen in case of transfer of undertakings.? Where the ownership or management of an undertaking is transferred, whether by agreement or by operation of law, from the employer in relation to that undertaking to a new employer, every workman who has been in continuous service for not less than one year in that undertaking immediately before such transfer shall be entitled to notice and compensation in accordance with the provisions of section 25-F, as if the workman had been retrenched: Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to a workman in any case where there has been a change of employers by reason of the transfer, if? (a) the service of the workman has not been interrupted by such transfer; (b) the terms and conditions of service applicable to the workman after such transfer are not in any way less favourable to the workman than those applicable to him immediately before the transfer; and (c) the new employer is, under the terms of such transfer or otherwise, legally liable to pay to the workman, in the event of his retrenchment, compensation on the basis that his service has been continuous and has been interrupted by the transfer. It is evident from the provision of Section 25FF of the Industrial Disputes Act that same relates to the compensation to be paid to the workman in case of transfer of undertaking subject to certain conditions, i.e., the service of the workman has not been interrupted by such transfer, the terms and conditions of service applicable to the workman after such transfer are not in any way less favourable to the workman than those applicable to him immediately before the transfer and the new employer is, under the terms of such transfer or otherwise, legally liable to pay to the workman, in the event of his retrenchment, compensation on the basis that his service has been continuous and has not been interrupted by the transfer. “Section 25FFF of the Industrial Disputes Act speaks as follows:- S. 25FFF. “Section 25FFF of the Industrial Disputes Act speaks as follows:- S. 25FFF. Compensation to workmen in case of closing down of undertakings.?(1) Where an undertaking is closed down for any reason whatsoever, every workman who has been in continuous service for not less than one year in that undertaking immediately before such closure shall, subject to the provisions of sub- section (2), be entitled to notice and compensation in accordance with the provisions of section 25F, as if the workman had been retrenched: Provided that where the undertaking is closed down on account of unavoidable circumstances beyond the control of the employer, the compensation to be paid to the workman under clause (b) of section 25F shall not exceed his average pay for three months. [Explanation.? An undertaking which is closed down by reason merely of? (i) financial difficulties (including financial losses); or (ii) accumulation of un-disposed of stocks; or (iii) the expiry of the period of the lease or licence granted to it; or (iv) in a case where the undertaking is engaged in mining operations, exhaustion of the minerals in the area in which such operations are carried on; shall not be deemed to be closed down on account of unavoidable circumstances beyond the control of the employer within the meaning of the proviso to this sub- section.] [(1A) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub- section (1), where an undertaking engaged in mining operations is closed down by reason merely of exhaustion of the minerals in the area in which such operations are carried on, no workman referred to in that sub-section shall be entitled to any notice or compensation in accordance with the provisions of section 25F, if? (a) the employer provides the workman with alternative employment with effect from the date of closure at the same remuneration as he was entitled to receive, and on the same terms and conditions of service as were applicable to him, immediately before the closure; (b) the service of the workman has not been interrupted by such alternative employment; and (c) the employer is, under the terms of such alternative employment or otherwise, legally liable to pay to the workman, in the event of his retrenchment, compensation on the basis that his service has been continuous and has not been interrupted by such alternative employment.] [(1B) For the purposes of sub- sections (1) and (1A), the expressions "minerals" and "mining operations" shall have the meanings respectively assigned to them in clauses (a) and (b) of section 3 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 (67 of 1957 ).] (2) Where any undertaking set-up for the construction of buildings, bridges, roads, canals, dams or other construction work is closed down on account of the completion of the work within two years from the date on which the undertaking had been set-up, no workman employed therein shall be entitled to any compensation under clause (b) of Section 25F, but if the construction work is not so completed within two years, he shall be entitled to notice and compensation under that section for every [completed year of continuous service], or any part thereof in excess of six months. It is evident from the provision of Section 25FFF of the Industrial Disputes Act that the compensation is to be paid to the workman in case of closing down of undertakings. Section 25FFF(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act speaks that where any undertaking set-up for the construction of buildings, bridges, roads, canals, dams or other construction is closed down on account of the completion of work within two years from the date on which the undertaking had been set-up, no workman employed therein shall be entitled to any compensation under clause (b) of Section 25F, but if the construction work is not so completed within two years, he shall be entitled to notice on compensation under that section for every [completed year of continuous service], or any part thereof in excess of six months. 6. 6. In the light of this statutory provision, we have examined the factual aspect and the finding of the Tribunal. We have found that the minutes of discussion between the Central Coal Fields Limited, Talcher and Talcher Coal Mines Employees Union was held on 13.7.1984 (Ext.1), from it, it is evident that a cross country conveyor belt at Jaganath Colliery to Talcher Thermal Power Station link conveyor was executed by the Central Coal Fields Limited wherein the labourers were supplied through a labour supply contractor. Approximately 98 workers were engaged for completion of that work. The construction of conveyor work was started in the month of November, 1979 and was completed with the same set of workers in September, 1981 and no other set of workers were engaged at the later stage through any other contractor to complete the said work. It is evident from Ext.-C, which is the agreement in a stamp paper between the first party management and M/s. R.K. Construction for the purpose of supply of labour for construction of the cross country link conveyor from Jaganath Colliery to Talcher Thermal Power Station Transformer Point. Ext. E is a letter of request from M/s. R.K. Construction to the first party management to refund the security money kept in deposit for supply of labour. The workmen witness No.1 has testified that the workmen working as Choukidar and another category of labourers were the employee w.e.f. 25.1.1979 to 25.9.1981. It is evident from the record that the period of work from 25.1.1979 to 25.9.1981 has not been disputed by the workmen witnesses. 7. This fact led the Tribunal to come to the conclusion regarding applicability of the statutory provision as to whether it is violation of Section 25F or 25FF or 25FFF of the Industrial Disputes Act and on the basis of the materials available before it, the Tribunal has came to the conclusion finding that it is a case under Section 25FFF(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. We have examined this part and after going through the provision of Section 25FFF(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act which speaks regarding the setting up of an undertaking and its closure within two years from the date on which the undertaking had been set-up. We have examined this part and after going through the provision of Section 25FFF(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act which speaks regarding the setting up of an undertaking and its closure within two years from the date on which the undertaking had been set-up. We found from the record that the unit was set-up on 25.11.1979 and closed down on 30.09.1981, which is within the period of two years and as such, the provision contained in Section 25FFF(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act will be applicable in the facts and circumstances of the instant case. 8. We, after taking consideration the factual aspect vis-à-vis the statutory provision as referred in above, are of the considered view that the Tribunal has not committed any error in passing the order since it is based upon cogent reason and finding. So far as jurisdiction of this Court to interfere with the finding of the Tribunal is concerned, the rule is settled as has been settled by Hon’ble the Apex Court in the case of Syed Yakoob Vs. K. S. Radhakrishnan and others, AIR 1964 SC 477 wherein at paragraph-7 their Lordships have been pleased to hold as follows:- “7. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art 226 have been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals; these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdictions. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised.” The proposition laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Syed Yakoob (supra) still holds good since the same has been considered by Hon’ble the Apex Court recently in the case of M/s. Pepsico India Holding Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Krishna Kant Pandey, (2015) 4 SCC 270 wherein their Lordships while discussing the scope of Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the matter of showing interference with the finding of the Tribunal has been pleased to hold after placing reliance upon the judgment rendered in the case of Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao Vs. Krishna Kant Pandey, (2015) 4 SCC 270 wherein their Lordships while discussing the scope of Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the matter of showing interference with the finding of the Tribunal has been pleased to hold after placing reliance upon the judgment rendered in the case of Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao Vs. Ashalata S. Guram, (1986) 4 SCC 447 as follows: “17. In case of finding of facts, the court should not interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. Reference may be made to the observations of this Court in Bathutmal Raichand Oswal v. Laxmibai R. Tarta where this Court observed that the High Court could not in the guise of exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 convert itself into a court of appeal when the legislature has not conferred a right of appeal. The High Court was not competent to correct errors of facts by examining the evidence and re-appreciating. Speaking for the Court, Bhagwati, J. as the learned Chief Justice then was, observed at page 1301 of the report as follows: (SCC p. 864, para 7) The special civil application preferred by the appellant was admittedly an application under Article 227 and it is, therefore, material only to consider the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction of the High Court under that article. Did the High Court have jurisdiction in an application under Article 227 to disturb the findings of fact reached by the District Court? It is well settled by the decision of this Court in Waryam Singh v. Amarnath that the ... power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries, C.J., in Dalmia Jain Airways v. Sukumar Mukherjee to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. This statement of law was quoted with approval in the subsequent decision of this Court in Nagendra Nath Bose v. Commr. of Hills Division and it was pointed out by Sinha, J., as he then was, speaking on behalf of the court in that case: It is thus, clear that the powers of judicial interference under Article 227 of the Constitution with orders of judicial or quasi-judicial nature, are not greater than the power under Article 226 of the Constitution. of Hills Division and it was pointed out by Sinha, J., as he then was, speaking on behalf of the court in that case: It is thus, clear that the powers of judicial interference under Article 227 of the Constitution with orders of judicial or quasi-judicial nature, are not greater than the power under Article 226 of the Constitution. Under Article 226 the power of interference may extend to quashing an impugned order on the ground of a mistake apparent on the face of the record. But under Article 227 of the Constitution, the power of interference is limited to seeing that the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority.” 9. In view of the settled proposition as has been held by Hon’ble the Apex Court in the case referred hereinabove, the jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 Constitution of India is very limited and it can only be exercised, if there is any error apparent on the face of the record or if there is any perversity in the finding, but we, after going through the materials available on record and the finding of the Tribunal, as been discussed by us, are of the considered view that the petitioner has failed to make out a case for interfering by this Court seeking under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. In the result, the writ petition fails and it is dismissed.