Dussa Srinu v. Superintendent Of Prisoner's Agricultural Colony, Cherlapalli
2017-02-06
SURESH KUMAR KAIT, U.DURGA PRASAD RAO
body2017
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER : 1. "This petition is filed by the petitioners/appellants [A-1 and A-2] under Section 428 of Cr.P.C., seeking to set-off remand their remand period from 28-8-2007 to 29-11-2007 in Criminal Appeal No. 1458 of 2009 and consequently direction may be given to the Jail Superintendent of Prisoners Agricultural Colony, Cherlapalli, Ranga Reddy district to add the remand period of the petitioners. 2. The petitioners are A-1 and A-2 in S.C.No. 222 of 2008 on the file of the Court of II-Additional Sessions Judge, Nalgonda at Suryapet. The petitioners were prosecuted as A-1 and A-2 in the aforesaid sessions case along with two other accused for the offences punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of IPC and Section 307 read with Section 34 of IPC. The petitioners along with two others were found guilty and they were convicted and sentenced lo suffer imprisonment for life. 3. Then case of petitioner is that at the time of conviction set-off under Section 428 Cr.P.C. was not granted to the petitioners because life imprisonment was imposed. 4. Sri D. Purnachandra Reddy, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners submit that questioning the same the petitioners along with two other accused approached this Court by way of Criminal Appeal No. 1458 of 2009 and the said criminal appeal and the same was partly allowed, vide judgment dated 3-3-2014. Consequently, this Court set aside the conviction and sentence inflicted on A-3 and A-4 and confirmed the conviction and sentence inflicted on A-1 and A-2 without any observation with regard to set-off the remand period of A-1 and A-2 from 28-8-2007 to 29-11-2007 under Section 428 Cr.P.C. 5. Learned counsel further submits that under Section 428 Cr.P.C. period of detention undergone by the accused to be set-off against the sentence of imprisonment where an accused has undergone during the investigation, inquiry or trial of the same case even before the date of such conviction. Accordingly, the liability of such person to undergo imprisonment on such conviction shall be restricted to the remainder, if any, of the term of imprisonment imposed on him. 6. Learned counsel submits that before the commencement of trial, the petitioners were arrested in Crime No. 62 of 2007 of P.S. Mothey on 28-8-2007 and released on bail on 29-11-2007. The remand period of petitioners is 94 days.
6. Learned counsel submits that before the commencement of trial, the petitioners were arrested in Crime No. 62 of 2007 of P.S. Mothey on 28-8-2007 and released on bail on 29-11-2007. The remand period of petitioners is 94 days. Because set-off was not granted by the learned Sessions Judge in S.C.No. 222 of 2008. these 94 days remand period was not added to the petitioners imprisonment period as is evident from the Nominal Roll of the petitioners, the remand period is shown as zero. 7. On the other hand, learned Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the State does not oppose the present petition and submits that as per the settled rule of law and the amendment carried out it Section 428 Cr.P.C. by Act No. 25/2005 with effect from 23-6-2006, the period of detention shall be set-off. 8. Section 44 convenience is re-produced as under: Section 428 Cr.P.C. Period of detention undergone by the accused to be set-off against the sentence of imprisonment :- Where an accused has, on conviction, been sentenced to imprisonment for a term [not being imprisonment in default of payment of fine], the period of detention, if any, undergone by him during the investigation, inquiry or trial of trial of the same case and before the date of such conviction, shall be set against the term of imprisonment imposed on him on such conviction, and the liability of such person to undergo imprisonment on such conviction shall be restricted to the remainder, if any, of the term of imprisonment imposed on him: [Provided that in cases referred to in Section 433-A, such period of detention shall be set off against the period of four years referred to in that section. 9. In addition to above, clarification was made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bhagirath v. Delhi Administration reported in AIR 1985 SC 1050 , whereby held as under: 14. The reasoning in Kartar Singh, AIR 1982 SC 1439 that an order of remission does not interfere with the sentence recorded by the court but merely affects the execution of the sentence, stands answered by the interpretation which we have put upon the language of Section 43 that persons sentenced lo imprisonment for life are sentenced to imprisonment for a term. It is not because of remission that a sentence of life imprisonment becomes an imprisonment for a term. 15.
It is not because of remission that a sentence of life imprisonment becomes an imprisonment for a term. 15. We have also already answered the last of the reasons given in Kartar Singh that the question is not whether the beneficent provision contained in Section 428 should be extended to life convicts on equitable considerations. We enter a most respectful caveat. Equity sustains law and the twin must meet. They cannot run in parallel streams. Equitable considerations must have an important place in the construction of beneficent provisions, particularly in the field of criminal law. To exclude such considerations is to denude law's benevolence of its true and lasting content. Lastly, the view expressed by the Joint committee in its Report does not yield to the inference that the mischief sought to be remedied has no relevance where gravity of offence requires the imposition of imprisonment for life. As we have indicated earlier, graver the crime, longer the sentence and, longer the sentence, greater the need for set-offs and remissions. Punishments are no longer retributory. They are reformative. 16. The order passed by this Court in Sukhlal Hansda related to the cases of 24 prisoners who were sentenced to life imprisonment. Most of those prisoners had undergone imprisonment for a period which, after taking account of the remissions earned by them, exceeded fourteen years. It was held by this court that, for the purpose of considering whether the cases of those prisoners should be examined for premature release under the relevant provisions of the West Bengal Jail Manual, there was no reason why the period of imprisonment undergone by them as under-trial prisoners should not be taken into account. The Court directed that the cases of the prisoners should be considered by the State Government, both for the purpose of setting off the period of detention undergone by them as under-trial prisoners and for taking into account the remissions earned by them. The order passed by the Court does not discuss the point which arises before the though, the observations made therein are consistent more with the view which we have taken than with the view taken in Kartar Singh, AIR 1982 SC 1479. 17.
The order passed by the Court does not discuss the point which arises before the though, the observations made therein are consistent more with the view which we have taken than with the view taken in Kartar Singh, AIR 1982 SC 1479. 17. For these reasons, we allow the appeal and the writ petition and direct that the period of detention undergone by the two accused before us as under-trial prisoners, shall be set-off against the sentence of life imprisonment imposed upon them, subject to the provision contained in Section 433-A and, provided that orders have been passed by the appropriate authority under Section 432 or Section 433 of Cr.P.C. 10. Thereafter, in case of Yadiki Nadipi Yerikala Reddy Alias Boreddi and others v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2) reported in 1999 (2) ALT (Crl.) 99 (D.B) (A.IL) = 1999 Crl.L.J. 4821, this Court held as under: 4. A Division Bench of this Court, to which one of us [Dr. Matilal B. Naik, J.] is a party, in Criminal Petition No. 445 of 1999 in Criminal Appeal No. 466 of 1991 had occasion to consider the implication of the contingency arising out of granting set-off in respect of the period of detention already undergone by the accused persons during pre-trial period, under Section 428 Cr.P.C. pertaining to the sentences awarded for the offences punishable under Section 302 IPC also. Following the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in Bhagirath v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1985 SC 1050 : 1985 Crl.L.J. 1179, the Division Bench, by an order dated 28-4-1999 held that the benefit arising out of Section 428 Cr.P.C. could be extended to the convicts who are sentenced to suffer life imprisonment also. 5. In view of the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in die above decision which is followed by a Division Bench of this Court in Criminal Petition No. 445 of 1999 dated 28-4-1999 as indicated above, we hold that these petitioners are also entitled for the benefit of set-off in respect of the period of detention undergone by them prior to their conviction under Section 428 Cr.P.C. even for the sentence of life imprisonment imposed on them in S.C.No. 225 of 1994 by the Sessions Judge, Cuddapah, by judgment dated 24-10-1996.
We accordingly direct the learned Sessions Judge, Cuddapah, to issue modified warrants of commitment to the Superintendent, Central Prison, Cuddapah indicating the entitlement of the petitioners for the set-off period under Section 428 Cr.P.C. even for the sentence of imprisonment for life. 11. Keeping in view the submission of the counsel for the parties and the settled proposition of law, we are of the considered opinion that the petitioners [A-1 and A-2] are entitled to set-off of remand period from 20-8-2007 to 29-11-207 under Section 428 of Cr.P.C. in Criminal Appeal No. 1458 of 2009. 12. Accordingly, we hereby direct the Jail Superintendent of Prisoners Agricultural Colony, Cherlapalli, Ranga Reddy district to add the remand period of the petitioners [A-1 and A-2] in the Nominal Roll. 13. In view of the above reasons, this petition is allowed."