JUDGMENT : Kaushal Jayendra Thaker, J. 1. Heard learned counsel for appellant and perused the record. 2. This appeal at the behest of UPSRTC challenges the judgment and award dated 20.1.1988 passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal in favour of respondent Nos. 1 to 6-widow and minor children of Murari Lal who died in the vehicular accident. The claimants instituted claim petition being MACP No. 23 of 1985 claiming a sum of Rs. 3,15,500/-. 3. On 7.6.1985 at about 6:00 p.m. when the deceased was going on motorcycle, when he reached near Village Pipraul in District Shahjahanpur, bus owned by the appellant came from the opposite side, bieng driven in a rash and negligent manner and dashed Murari Lal, who died on spot. Vehicle was totally damaged. Another person Anil Kumar also succumbed injuries. Legal heirs and dependants instituted claim under Section 110 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1939. Deceased, who was alleged to be 50 years of age was earning Rs. 4,000/- per month by way of agricultural operations. The appellant filed its written statement and as usual contended that the accident did not involved his bus and in alternative contended that bus was on left side and was being driven at a moderate speed. The Tribunal framed about 6 issues and all were held in favour of the claimants. 4. The Insurance Company has challenged this award mainly on two grounds one is negligence having not been decided and second is quantum awarded was on the higher side. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that unless it was proved that the accident occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the driver of vehicle involved, the appellant cannot be held liable under Motor Vehicle Act, 1939. Learned counsel for appellant further submits that the motorcyclist i.e. deceased Murari Lal while driving motor cycle No. USD 931 saw pigs on the road and tried to save the pigs and in doing so he lost his balance and dashed against the bus and it was his negligence that caused accident. It is further submitted that the claim Tribunal did not appreciate the evidence, led by the owner of bus. The conductor i.e. Khushi Lal who deposed as D.W.1, ought to have been believed and report submitted by driver at Exhibit A1 corroborated the statement of Khushi Lal. 6. It is further submitted that the claim Tribunal did not appreciate the evidence, led by the owner of bus. The conductor i.e. Khushi Lal who deposed as D.W.1, ought to have been believed and report submitted by driver at Exhibit A1 corroborated the statement of Khushi Lal. 6. It is urged by the counsel for the appellant that compensation awarded is on higher side and considering his income as Rs. 1,500/- was on a higher side and the Claim Tribunal erred in awarding separate compensation to each of the dependents of deceased taking into consideration that the family dependency and pecuniary loss caused to the family, since there was no pecuniary loss to the family, hence award of Rs. 1,30,200/- is clearly illegal. 7. While going through the decision as far as issue of negligence is concerned, it will have to borne in mind the principles enunciated by Hon'ble Courts for deciding negligence. It is not in dispute that the driver of bus was employed by the appellant. The Tribunal while deciding issue of negligence held as follows :- "There is allegation by the petitioners that bus was being driven by O.P. no. 1 rashly and negligently on account of that bus driver knocked down motorcycle by bus which resulted the death of Murari lal and Anil Kumar. In support of tis, P.W. 1 who is Pradhan of the Village Pipraula has been examined who has stated that bus was being driven in rash and negligent manner and caused accident. The accident had taken place near his village. Against this, the O.P. No. 1 Khushi Ram who has stated that he was conductor of the bus He could not know as to how the accident had taken place because he could not see and it was also impossible for him to see infront of the bus as to which is coming from the opposite direction. Therefore, the statement of O.P. No. 1 regarding rash and negligent driving; and whose fault was in driving, on account of that accident had taken place, has nothing to do. His statement does not support to the version of O.Ps. and the report Ext. A1 lodged by the driver has been filed which shows that pigs were running on the road. The motor cyclist tried to save pigs; balance had been lost by him. His statement does not support to the version of O.Ps. and the report Ext. A1 lodged by the driver has been filed which shows that pigs were running on the road. The motor cyclist tried to save pigs; balance had been lost by him. The motor cycle itself dashed against the bus; that resulted the said accident. Nabi Ullah driver is alive and is in service. He has nothing to do to help the O.Ps. Further in a case of accident whoever might be driving rashly and negligently heirs of the deceased will get damages. As such, who caused negligence is immaterial. This issue is decided accordingly." 8. It would be relevant to discuss the principles for deciding contributory negligence and for that the principles for considering negligence will also have to be looked into. 9. Negligence means failure to exercise required degree of care and caution expected of a prudent driver. Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon the considerations, which ordinarily regulate conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. Negligence is not always a question of direct evidence. It is an inference to be drawn from proved facts. Negligence is not an absolute term, but is a relative one. It is rather a comparative term. What may be negligence in one case may not be so in another. Where there is no duty to exercise care, negligence in the popular sense has no legal consequence. Where there is a duty to exercise care, reasonable care must be taken to avoid acts or omissions which would be reasonably foreseen likely to caused physical injury to person. The degree of care required, of course, depends upon facts in each case. On these broad principles, the negligence of drivers is required to be assessed. 10. It would be seen that burden of proof for contributory negligence on the part of deceased has to be discharged by the opponents. It is the duty of driver of the offending vehicle to explain the accident. On these broad principles, the negligence of drivers is required to be assessed. 10. It would be seen that burden of proof for contributory negligence on the part of deceased has to be discharged by the opponents. It is the duty of driver of the offending vehicle to explain the accident. It is well settled law that at intersection where two roads cross each other, it is the duty of a fast moving vehicle to slow down and if driver did not slow down at intersection, but continued to proceed at a high speed without caring to notice that another vehicle was crossing, then the conduct of driver necessarily leads to conclusion that vehicle was being driven by him rashly as well as negligently. 11. 10th Schedule appended to Motor Vehicle Act contain statutory regulations for driving of motor vehicles which also form part of every Driving License. Clause-6 of such Regulation clearly directs that the driver of every motor vehicle to slow down vehicle at every intersection or junction of roads or at a turning of the road. It is also provided that driver of the vehicle should not enter intersection or junction of roads unless he makes sure that he would not thereby endanger any other person. Merely, because driver of the Truck was driving vehicle on the left side of road would not absolve him from his responsibility to slow down vehicle as he approaches intersection of roads, particularly when he could have easily seen, that the car over which deceased was riding, was approaching intersection. 12. In view of the fast and constantly increasing volume of traffic, motor vehicles upon roads may be regarded to some extent as coming within the principle of liability defined in Rylands V/s. Fletcher, (1868) 3 HL (LR) 330. From the point of view of pedestrian, the roads of this country have been rendered by the use of motor vehicles, highly dangerous. 'Hit and run' cases where drivers of motor vehicles who have caused accidents, are unknown. In fact such cases are increasing in number. Where a pedestrian without negligence on his part is injured or killed by a motorist, whether negligently or not, he or his legal representatives, as the case may be, should be entitled to recover damages if principle of social justice should have any meaning at all. 13. In fact such cases are increasing in number. Where a pedestrian without negligence on his part is injured or killed by a motorist, whether negligently or not, he or his legal representatives, as the case may be, should be entitled to recover damages if principle of social justice should have any meaning at all. 13. These provisions (sec.110A and sec.110B of Motor Act, 1988) are not merely procedural provisions. They substantively affect the rights of the parties. The right of action created by Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 was 'new in its species, new in its quality, new in its principles. In every way it was new. The right given to legal representatives under Act, 1988 to file an application for compensation for death due to a motor vehicle accident is an enlarged one. This right cannot be hedged in by limitations of an action under Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. New situations and new dangers require new strategies and new remedies. 14. In the light of the above discussion, we are of the view that even if courts may not by interpretation displace the principles of law which are considered to be well settled and, therefore, court cannot dispense with proof of negligence altogether in all cases of motor vehicle accidents, it is possible to develop the law further on the following lines; when a motor vehicle is being driven with reasonable care, it would ordinarily not meet with an accident and, therefore, rule of res-ipsa loquitor as a rule of evidence may be invoked in motor accident cases with greater frequency than in ordinary civil suits (per three-Judge Bench in Jacob Mathew V/s. State of Punjab, 2005 0 ACJ(SC) 1840). 15. By the above process, the burden of proof may ordinarily be cast on the defendants in a motor accident claim petition to prove that motor vehicle was being driven with reasonable care or that there is equal negligence on the part of driver of another vehicle. 16. As far as driver is concerned, he was the best person to have deposed about the accident. He has not stepped into witness box and charge-sheet was laid against driver of bus. As far as negligence is concerned, the conductor was sitting behind in bus and has deposed un-conclusively as to who was negligent and how accident occurred was not seen by him. He has not stepped into witness box and charge-sheet was laid against driver of bus. As far as negligence is concerned, the conductor was sitting behind in bus and has deposed un-conclusively as to who was negligent and how accident occurred was not seen by him. Hence, the Tribunal has rightly not relied on his testimony. The submission of the counsel that the owner is not liable unless the driver is proved to have been negligent. I am afraid that the said submission and ground of challenge is not available as the Tribunal has given a finding that the driver of the bus employed by the appellant was negligent and therefore the Insurance Co. being the owner of the vehicle would be liable to indemnify the claimants. 17. As far as compensation is concerned the Tribunal has awarded a sum of Rs. 1,30,200/-by considering his income as Rs. 1,500/- per month for which about 11 decisions have been cited by the Tribunal and has considered that the amount of Rs. 4,000/- p.m. was not proved. The deceased had major son and as the widow was dependent on the deceased, she would be totally entitled to the amount. The reasons given by the Tribunal are that the dependent widow would be entitled to Rs. 3,6000/-. The son who was 14 years of age was given multiplier of 4 and that is how Rs. 14,400/- was awarded. The son who was 12 years of age was given multiplier of 6 and that is how he has been awarded Rs. 19,600/-. Daughter, who was 16 years of age was given multiplier of 2 and and has been awarded Rs. 7,200/-. The learned judge has been over complicating the issues of compensation, but it cannot be said that the said amount was not just and proper. 18. Accordingly, appeal is dismissed. Decree is confirmed. Interim relief is vacated forthwith and amount be deposited forthwith as per award of Tribunal, if not yet deposited.