JUDGMENT : 1. This application under Article-227 of the Constitution has been filed seeking annulment of an order passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Jajpur in Civil Revision No.17 of 1998. By the said order the Revisional Court while setting aside the order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Jajpur in Misc. Case No. 44 of 1996 arising out of Title Suit No.16/1979 (a suit for partition) refusing to set aside the final decree in making the preliminary decree final, has directed the trial court to treat the petition filed by the present opposite party no. 1-defendant no. 9 (the revisionist petitioner) as one under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter in short called as ‘the Code’) for review of the final decree and accordingly, to dispose of the same on merit. 2. Heard learned counsel for the petitioners. None appeared on behalf of the opposite parties. I have perused the orders passed by the trial court in Misc. Case No.44 of 1996 registered on the basis of the petition filed by the plaintiff-petitioner under section 151 of the Code as also the order passed in Civil Revision No.77/1988, which is impugned in the present proceeding. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner-plaintiff submitted that the revision under section 151 of the Code was not maintainable and, therefore, the learned Revisional Court ought to have dismissed the same at the threshold. He further submitted that since an appeal lies against the final decree as provided in law, the only course available to the opposite party no.1-defendant no. 9 was to carry an appeal banking upon the grounds projected in the application under section 151 of the Code and, therefore, the trial court had rightly rejected the application. According to him, the Revisional Court has exceeded in its jurisdiction not only by entertaining the revision but then also has committed grave error of law by directing the trial court to treat the said petition as an application for review and decide the same afresh on merit. It was further submitted that the grounds projected in the said application even though taken congnizance of, on their face value, do not at all fall within the scope for review of the final decree 4. It was further submitted that the grounds projected in the said application even though taken congnizance of, on their face value, do not at all fall within the scope for review of the final decree 4. In order to decide the fate of the present proceeding, some relevant factual aspects concerning the case as also the grounds taken in the petition filed by the opposite party no.1-defendant no. 9 nomenclature as one under section 151 of the Code for setting aside the final decree are to be kept in view. The following factual aspects are relevant:- The preliminary decree was passed on 20.11.1981. It was on contest against some of the defendants and passed ex parte against few others including the present opposite party no. 1. The petitioner-plaintiff then moved for final decree which was passed on 19.09.1983. Thereafter Execution proceeding having been filed, finally possession has been delivered. As the position stood thus, this opposite party no. 1 came forward in the year 1996 i.e. after a lapse of a decade and three years with a petition praying therein to pass the final decree afresh as said final decree had not been passed in consonance with the preliminary decree without proper allotment of share to him. The ground in specific is that the Civil Court Commissioner has acted contrary to the mandate in as much as it has not allotted 4 annas share to the opposite party no. 1-defendant no. 9 from the 4 annas share of Rajkishore. 5. The learned Trial Court’s rejection is on the ground that since appeal lies to question the final decree on those grounds, the challenge to it at a stage subsequent thereto questioning the very acceptance of the report of the Civil Court Commissioner leading to pass the final decree of which the report is a part has no legal foundation and is not entertain-able. The view of the Trial Court is that such a prayer based on the ground as aforesaid is not legally tenable and it would amount to review of the decree which is permissible only in case of clerical or arithmetical errors, which is not the case here. The view of the Trial Court is that such a prayer based on the ground as aforesaid is not legally tenable and it would amount to review of the decree which is permissible only in case of clerical or arithmetical errors, which is not the case here. The learned Revisional Court appears to have proceeded to approach into the matter in hand by straightway stating that there can be more than one final decree without further clarifying was to under what circumstances and in view of what type of preliminary decree. Next it has been said that Executing Court even though cannot go beyond the decree, has ample power to interpret the decree although the decree cannot be substituted with a new decree. I am not able to cull out the position of law that the Revisional Court has hinted thereby not only as to be made applicable to the present case but also as to how a move for review in the present factual setting of the case derives the support there from. Next, distinguishing in the matter of application of the ratio decision in case of Gurei Bewa & Others Vrs. Pabitra Rout & Others; 1984(1) OLR 463, it has been said that since no appeal or revision has been filed against final decree for necessary correction although the petition under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not maintainable, yet the same can be deemed and treated as a petition for review and the matter can be disposed of on merit. 6. As provided under Order 20, Rule 3 of the Code, as a general rule, a judgment, decree or final order drawn up and signed cannot subsequently be altered, varied or amended, except under section 152 of the Code or on review. The provision of section 152 of the Code permits corrections of any clerical or arithmetical mistakes or errors arising from an accidental slip or omission. In the present case, the preliminary decree has been made final on 19.09.1983 upon acceptance of the report of the Civil Court Commissioner. The opposite party no. 1-defendant no. 9 after lapse of 13 years has come forward to complain that said final decree has not been passed in accordance with the preliminary decree by not allotting him the share as directed in the preliminary decree. The opposite party no. 1-defendant no. 9 after lapse of 13 years has come forward to complain that said final decree has not been passed in accordance with the preliminary decree by not allotting him the share as directed in the preliminary decree. So, even assuming that in dividing the properties, the Commissioner committed some error in making the allotment, the fact remains that the Court has accepted the report of the Commissioner which was not so objected to and passed the final decree. There is no question of clerical or arithmetical mistakes or errors arising from an incidental slip or omission. The challenge in essence is to the report of the Commissioner attributing latches for having not acted in conformity with the mandate given in the preliminary decree. The Court is also not permitted to exercise its inherent power under section 151 of the Code in the present case which in substance seeks setting aside the final decree. Said power cannot be invoked in cases where it would conflict with any specific provision of the Code or is contrary to the intention of the Legislature. In other words, where the Code contains express provision for obtaining a remedy and a party has not resorted to them, the Court cannot exercise its inherent powers under section 151 of the Code as that would amount to circumventing the express provisions. The opposite party no. 1defendant no. 9 although had the right of appeal against the final decree, he has not resorted to the said remedy. The attack to the final decree here in specific is on the ground that despite the direction in the preliminary decree, the Civil Court Commissioner although has given half share over the property of Rajkishore to the petitioner-plaintiff after deducting the transfers effected by Rajkishore yet; the rest half has not been so shown to have been allotted in favour of the opposite party no. 1-defendant no. 9. Even assuming for a moment that such factual assertion is correct, it is not a case of unjust and improper allotment of land in the share of the petitioner-plaintiff by way of excess allotment or otherwise. As per the preliminary decree, half of the land of Rajkishore has been allotted to the petitioner-plaintiff. The rest half thus even though specifically has not allotted to the opposite party no. 1-defendant no. As per the preliminary decree, half of the land of Rajkishore has been allotted to the petitioner-plaintiff. The rest half thus even though specifically has not allotted to the opposite party no. 1-defendant no. 9 in the allotment sheet, it can be so construed in view of the preliminary decree. Upon acceptance of the above contention, it can be so interpreted which is permissible. Moreover, the petitioner-plaintiff in the execution of the final decree is not said to have got more than half of the property of Rajkishore and that is not being so complained of. The opposite party no. 1-defendant no. 9 has come forward to lodge the above complaint after lapse of 13 years from the passing of the final decree in order to rectify the omission as above and that too after delivery of possession of the property allotted to the petitioner and after having failed in his attempt to thwart the delivery of possession of the allotted land to the petitioner-plaintiff. This omission in my considered view in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case as projected by the opposite party no.1-defendant no.9 if factually found to be correct, upon just proper interpretation of the decree can be so ascertained and there arises no case of deprivation if the factual positions as are pleaded in support are established. The ratio of the decision in case of Papu Khan & Others Vs. The ratio of the decision in case of Papu Khan & Others Vs. Fatima Biwi & Others; AIR 1973 Orissa 235 relied upon by the Revisional Court clearly appears to have been rendered on different factual background of the case; where not only that the challenge was within a short period of time from passing of the final decree but also the error was apparent on the face of the record to take a view that the final decree was not in consonance with the preliminary decree where the extent of land allotted to a party which was objected to by another party was at great variance with the specific share allotted to the said party in the preliminary decree and in that event, the Court finding error apparent on the face of the record had directed the court below to treat the application of the complaining party as regards the allotment of land to another party in excess to the share allotted to him in the preliminary decree, as review application, leaving however the question of limitation open. 7. In the instant case, the delay is inordinate and the explanation given in the application as is seen is too general that it was because of wrong legal advice which on its face value cannot be accepted especially if one sees the subsequent conduct. In view of such long lapse of time and the fact that a valuable right has accrued upon rest of the parties to the suit in terms of the final decree which has held the field for so long, when also the possibility of other third parties come into the fore is not altogether ruled out, at this stage to entertain the review of the final decree, in my considered view would not be permissible. The final decree having been further executed with notice to this opposite party no.1-defendant no.9 despite the objection, at this distance of time again to raise the issue questioning the final decree for being passed again or review is barred in law. Even assuming the error so pointed out to be factually correct, it does not appear to be an error apparent on the face of the record and also said final decree may be available to be so interpreted in any further proceeding arising out of or consequential thereto. Even assuming the error so pointed out to be factually correct, it does not appear to be an error apparent on the face of the record and also said final decree may be available to be so interpreted in any further proceeding arising out of or consequential thereto. Furthermore, another aspect cannot be brushed aside that here the petitioner-plaintiff in his objection very much claims to be only in possession of the properties allotted to him only under the said preliminary decree which has been so delivered to him through court on 01.10.1985 in Execution Case No. 17 of 1984 and that is no more open to challenge as in the Execution case, the objection to the delivery of possession has been turned down. This opposite party no. 1-defendant no. 9 and others in the said Execution case had objected for delivery of possession to the land allotted to the petitioner-plaintiff in respect of few plots and therefore on 01.10.1986 at the first instance, the possession of the lands under those plots had not been delivered to the petitioner-plaintiff, but it has been so delivered at subsequent point of time by order in the said Execution proceeding which has reached its finality. So, the opposite party no. 1-defendant no. 9 had all the opportunities even at that stage to complain against the final decree which was towards the last part of the year, 1985. But that having not been done, the present move after more than a decade there from by merely saying that there was lack proper legal advice in the matter does not suffice at all more so when said move is barred under law. The Revisional Court has not at all touched all these above important aspects which adversely impact upon the course directed to be adopted after such long lapse of time. In the above factual setting of the case and in view of the aforesaid discussion and reasons, the Revisional Court appears to have committed error of law by passing the impugned order directing the court below to treat this petition as one for review of the final decree and consider it afresh on merit even foreclosing the matter of limitation. In the above factual setting of the case and in view of the aforesaid discussion and reasons, the Revisional Court appears to have committed error of law by passing the impugned order directing the court below to treat this petition as one for review of the final decree and consider it afresh on merit even foreclosing the matter of limitation. The said Revisional Court’s order being thus found to have been passed beyond the bounds of its authority leading to abuse of process of law and thereby causing miscarriage of justice, I am inclined to interfere with the same in exercise of power under Article 227 of the Constitution and the same is hereby quashed and consequentially the order of the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Jajpur in Misc. Case No. 44 of 1996 stands restored. 8. The application is accordingly allowed. No order as to cost.