ORDER : VIRENDER SINGH, J. Heard on IA No. 824/2017, an application for granting stay and also on admission. 2. In this second round of litigation, the petitioner has challenged the order dated 30-1-2017 passed by State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Gwalior (in short “STAT”) in Revision No. 327/2016 (Annexure-P/21) whereby order dated 26-8-2016 passed by Regional Transport Authority, Ujjain (in short “RTA”) in case No. 55/2015 granting Stage Carriage Permit (in short “SCP”) (Annexure-P/9) to respondent No. 1 has been confirmed. 3. Facts in brief are that the petitioner who is a Stage Carriage Passenger Transport business concern was allotted SCP No. 36/94 and 47/89-90 from Mahidpur to Jaora a distance of 75 kms. Respondent No. 1, a competing operator, applied for and was granted SCP for plying the bus on the same route. The order was challenged by the petitioner in W.P. No. 1315/2016, which was allowed and SCP granted in favour of respondent No. 1 was cancelled on the ground that the same was granted by three members board while the Board had already been dissolved vide notification dated 5-11-2015 and RTA was authorized for the purpose. The matter was remanded back to the RTA, Ujjain for reconsideration vide order dated 5-4-2016 (Annexure-P/2). After remand, case No. 55/15 was notified in Agenda dated 24-7-2016. The petitioner filed objection to the application of respondent No. 1 mainly on the ground that the time cycle granted to respondent No. 1 was in confrontation with the time cycle already granted to the petitioner vide SCP No. 36/94 and 47/89-90 and it is affecting three permanent SCP granted to the petitioner. The other grounds taken by the petitioner were that the SCP was granted to respondent No. 1 without considering the time cycle of the SCP already in operation, respondent No. 1 did not comply with the provisions of Rule 72(3) of the M.P. Motor Vehicle Rules, 1994 (for short Rules, 1994), the vehicle proposed for the SCP applied for was not free and was already covered under SCP No. 36/11 issued to respondent No. 1, applied SCP was not in the interests of the public at large etc. 4. After hearing the parties, overruling the objections of the petitioner, the RTA granted SCP to respondent No. 1 vide order dated 26-8-2016 (Annexure- P/9). 4. After hearing the parties, overruling the objections of the petitioner, the RTA granted SCP to respondent No. 1 vide order dated 26-8-2016 (Annexure- P/9). The petitioner submitted a revision against the order of RTA before STAT which was also dismissed vide order dated 30-1-2017 (Annexure-P/21), therefore, the phase come before this Court. 5. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that learned STAT committed an error in not appreciating the Rule 72(3) of the Rules, 1994. The STAT erred in not appreciating the vehicle proposed for grant of SCP was already covered by another permit on the date of application i.e. 6-8-2015. The petitioner was not heard on the proposed change of time table. It is further submitted that learned STAT committed error in holding that frequency in the route is 10 to 20 minutes. Learned STAT failed to appreciate that RTA granted SCP to respondent No. 1 for a time table which was never proposed by her. Referring page 259 to 261 of the record of RTA, learned STAT itself found that the said change in proposed time table was on record but it was not clear as to when it was filed, and therefore, erred in holding that the opportunity of hearing for the changed time table was granted to the petitioner. Learned STAT also did not consider that after hearing the matter on 22-7-2016, a fresh application (Annexure-P/12) was filed by respondent No. 1 on 30-9-2016 but even in this application no change was proposed in the time table and the same time table as has been proposed in the original application was proposed, which clearly shows that no opportunity of hearing on the changed time table was granted to the petitioner. The petitioner therefore prayed for quashment of grant made vide order dated 26-8-2016 (Annexure-P/9), the permit issued (Annexure-P/13) by the RTA and the impugned order dated 30-1-2017 (Annexure-P/21) passed by the STAT. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Division Bench of this Court passed in Kalim Mohd. v. STAT, reported in 1994 (1) MPWN 15 , order passed in Misc. Pet. No. 969/1993 Madanlal v. STAT and the judgment passed by Hon'ble Apex Court in K.V.S. Ram v. Bangalore Metropolitin Corporation, Civil Appeal No. 412/2012 decided on 14-1-2015. v. STAT, reported in 1994 (1) MPWN 15 , order passed in Misc. Pet. No. 969/1993 Madanlal v. STAT and the judgment passed by Hon'ble Apex Court in K.V.S. Ram v. Bangalore Metropolitin Corporation, Civil Appeal No. 412/2012 decided on 14-1-2015. In these judgment learned Courts relied upon the principles of natural justice held that while granting any permit (SCP) all objectors shall be granted an opportunity of hearing. 7. Dismissing all the objections and denying all the allegations made by the petitioner, respondent No. 1, in its reply has submitted that the petitioner has filed this writ petition under Article 227 of Constitution of India against the concurrent findings of fact of two authorities/Tribunals below, which could not be disturbed under writ jurisdiction by this Court. 8. It is submitted that frequency of timing on the route was 10 minutes and there is no clash of timings with the petitioner. Timings proposed by respondent No. 1 with her application and on the day of hearing were in public interest and in conformity with the decision of the High Court; having no clash with the petitioner as there was a gap of 10 to 20 minutes with the petitioner on common routes. Objection regarding change of timings is misconceived as there is no concept/provision for frequency of timing in the new Motor Vehicle Act. In view of this, the Government of M.P. subsequently deleted the clause 12 relating to the frequency from its circular dated 30-6-2012. Besides, circular dated 30-6-2012 was not published in official Gazette as per section 67 of the M.V. Act. As per new policy of liberalization there is no limitation in granting permits on regional and inter-regional routes nor existing operators have right to object the same as held by Hon'ble Apex Court in (1992) 1 SCC 168 : AIR 1992 SC 443 . This Court has held the same in M.P. No. 627/1993, Ram Lal Gound v. STAT decided on 31-3-1993 has held as under considering the growing population and consequent increase in the number of travelling public, one cannot claim to fulfill that need. Under the circumstance even if more than one bus is required to run on the same timings and route, it will not affect any one but will serve the public interest. Apart from this, the chart of frequency referred by the petitioner has no legal sanctity. 9. Under the circumstance even if more than one bus is required to run on the same timings and route, it will not affect any one but will serve the public interest. Apart from this, the chart of frequency referred by the petitioner has no legal sanctity. 9. It is further submitted that it was held by this Court in Pawan Arora v. State of M.P., 2015 (2) M.P.L.J. 172 that as per the provisions of section 80 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 application for permit including list of time table as well as documents in support of such application may be filed till the date of hearing without an application for modification of permit and as per liberalized policy of the Act existing operators have no right for filing objections or to claim hearing. 10. Respondent No. 1 applied for grant of fresh permit on 6-8-2015 and deposited required fee of Rs. 1,500/- applicable at that relevant time. As per remand order in revision No. 1315/2016, RTA re-considered the application (Annexure-P/1) of respondent No. 1 and granted fresh permit thereon vide its order dated 26-8-2016 (Annexure-P/5), therefore, public notice dated 30-9-2016 (Annexure-P/11) and application filed there by respondent No. 1 have no relevancy in the matter in question. It is well settled by the Hon'ble Apex Court in AIR 1960 SC 980 and by High Court of Madhya Pradesh in 2002 (1) M.P.L.J. 168 : AIR 2002 NOC 124 (M.P.) that enhancement of Court-fees does not apply to the pending cases filed prior to the amendment of Court-fees. Though subsequent Notification dated 7-9-2016 (Annexure-P/10) enhancing of fees is not applicable to her, even then she has deposited the enhanced fees. 11. Respondent No. 1 has duly complied with the provisions of Rule 72(3). The proposed vehicle was spared on the date of consideration/hearing i.e. on 22-7-2016 as well as on the date of grant i.e. 26-8-2016. 12. Modified timings were placed before the RTA during course of hearing on 22-7-2016. The petitioner and several other objectors were duly heard by the RTA on merits as well as on the point of modified timings and has legally fixed the timings with slight modification exercising the power under section 72(3) of M.V. Act and as such there is no illegality in fixing the timings. 13. The petitioner and several other objectors were duly heard by the RTA on merits as well as on the point of modified timings and has legally fixed the timings with slight modification exercising the power under section 72(3) of M.V. Act and as such there is no illegality in fixing the timings. 13. It is averred by the answering respondent that she was granted permit on 26-8-2016 as per application dated 10-6-2015, which become final. Subsequently filing of application (Annexure-P/12) as per demand of office for the purpose of issuance of permit does not vitiate the grant as well as issuance of permit. No permit is granted on the application Annexure-P/12. Hence, the petitioner could not be heard on this application but it does not affect merits of the case. Besides, the petitioner has not challenged the order of issuance of the permit. 14. It is further submitted that respondent No. 1 is plying vehicle on the route in pursuant of the grant of permit No. SCP16/F/16/9246 w.e.f. 6-10-2016 and providing facilities to the travelling public, against which no complaint received from the public that the timing of permit are not suitable to it, therefore, in the interest of justice, petition as well as interim relief claimed by the petitioner be dismissed as not maintainable as well as on merits. 15. In rejoinder to the reply, the petitioner has submitted that it is well settled law where the Tribunal acts illegally, improperly without giving opportunity of hearing and findings of Tribunal are based on no evidence such an order can be challenged and interfered with. It is submitted that till date of hearing i.e. 22-7-2016 and also till date of order i.e. 26-8-2016 no new time table was proposed, even thereafter on 30-9-2016 when the new application was filed, the same time table of departure i.e. Jaora at 09.50 A.M. and Tal 10.55 A.M. was proposed. The finding of STAT that record does not show as to when amended time table was produced before the RTA, itself shows that no amended time table was produced and no opportunity to raise objection on amended time table i.e. Jaora departure 09.25 A.M. (in place of 09.50 A.M.) and Tal departure 10.35 A.M. (in place of 10.55 A.M.) was ever given to the petitioner. It has been settled by Division Bench of this Court that grant of a time table different from one originally proposed result in violation of principles of natural justice, which can always be corrected. 16. The petitioner denying all the contentions raised by respondent No. 1 in her reply has submitted that section 67(1)(d) read with section 71 do lay down that the RTA has control over grant of such timings which do not result in contravention of provisions relating to speed limits prescribed under the Motor Vehicles Act and Rules and prayed for allowing the petition. 17. We have carefully considered the contentions of both the parties, examined the record and have gone through the orders of RTA and STAT as well. 18. There is nothing on record to show that the provisions of section 72(3) of M.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1994 have not been complied while filing the application. Learned STAT has dealt with this objection in para 7 of its order and the conclusions are sustainable. 19. The main contention of the petitioner is that timings of frequency granted to the respondent No. 1 was in clash with the timings already granted in his favour of the petitioner vide SCP No. 36/94 and 47/89-90. After examining the record learned STAT in para 9 of the impugned order has rightly held that there is no clash between the timings of permit granted to respondent No. 1 and permit already granted in favour of the petitioner. Findings of learned STAT are in fact, findings of the fact and cannot be interfered at this stage as held by Hon'ble the Apex Court in Babhutmal Raichand Oswal v. Laxmibai R. Tarte, (1975) 1 SCC 858 : AIR 1975 SC 1297 , Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaqim, (1983) 4 SCC 566 : AIR 1984 SC 38 and followed by Division Bench of this Court in Mahendra Gupta v. State of M.P., W.P. No. 6227/2013 decided on 4-4-2014. Otherwise also findings are based on proper appreciation of facts and therefore needs no interference. 20. The petitioner has filed his written objections and he was also heard orally. Mustaqim, (1983) 4 SCC 566 : AIR 1984 SC 38 and followed by Division Bench of this Court in Mahendra Gupta v. State of M.P., W.P. No. 6227/2013 decided on 4-4-2014. Otherwise also findings are based on proper appreciation of facts and therefore needs no interference. 20. The petitioner has filed his written objections and he was also heard orally. He was granted proper opportunity of hearing before grant in favour of respondent No. 1 and after hearing the objections of the parties, learned RTA granted SCP to respondent No. 1 with slight modification in the time table to avoid clashes with the frequency of time table already granted in favour of the petitioner as per relevant scheme/policy in the interest of public at large. Learned STAT has examined this issue in para 11-14 of its order and found that as mentioned in the order of the RTA, opportunity of hearing was also granted to the petitioner on modified time table also. Therefore, no illegality can be inferred in the grant of SCP on this ground. We are also in consensus with the learned STAT. 21. Besides as per the provisions/scheme of new Motor Vehicle Act, 1988, no one can claim his right for a particular timings for plying the vehicle. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mithilesh Garg v. Union of India, (1992) 1 SCC 168 : AIR 1992 SC 443 has held that:— “It cannot be said that too many operators on a route are likely to affect adversely the interest of weaker section of the profession. The transport business is bound to be ironed out ultimately by the relation of demand and supply. Cost of a vehicle being as it is the business requires huge investment. The intending operators are likely to be conscious of the economics underlying the profession. Only such number of vehicles would finally remain in operation on a particular route as are economically viable. In any case the transport system in a State is meant for the benefit and convenience of the public. The policy to grant permits liberally under the Act directed towards the said goal.” 22. Only such number of vehicles would finally remain in operation on a particular route as are economically viable. In any case the transport system in a State is meant for the benefit and convenience of the public. The policy to grant permits liberally under the Act directed towards the said goal.” 22. A Division Bench of this Court in an order dated 31-3-1993 passed in W.P. No. 627/1993, Ram Lal Gound v. STAT, Gwalior held that:— “The main grievance of the petitioner is that the bus of the respondent will ply 10 minutes before his bus and would, therefore, adversely affect him. There is no substance in the submission. Considering the growing population and consequent increase in the number of travelling public, appellant cannot claim to fulfill that need. Under the circumstances, even if more than one bus is required to run on the same timing and route, it will not affect anyone but will serve the public interest.” 23. Following the judgment in W.P. No. 766/2001, Chhatar Singh v. STAT, Gwalior, this Court has held that:— “Merely because the timing granted to the petitioner and the respondent No. 3 are same and clashes with each other that cannot be ground for interfering in such matters. The petitioner has not pointed out violation of any statutory rule or regulation or any other provisions having force of law, his personal interest and inconvenience cannot be a ground for interference in such matters. The Appellate Court having exercised its jurisdiction correctly. I am not inclined to interfere in the matter. As no error can be found out in the exercise of jurisdiction by the competent authorities. That apart, the reasons given by the learned Appellate Tribunal for rejecting the revision does not call for any interference in the light of the observations made in the decision referred to by the State Appellate Tribunal in its decision.” 24. Thus, on this ground also the petitioner is not entitled for any relief. 25. Judicial pronouncements relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner, thus, not applicable in the present case, as it is clear from the record that while considering the application for grant of SCP to respondent No. 1 learned, RTA not only granted opportunity of hearing to the petitioner but also opportunity of hearing was granted on the amended/modified time table of respondent No. 1. 26. 26. The petitioner has raised an objection that the vehicle proposed by respondent No. 1 was not free and was covered under another permit granted in her favour but as observed by the learned STAT in para 8 of the impugned order that the vehicle was got released from that permit by the respondent on 30-1-2016, that means the vehicle was not covered by any permit on the date of hearing i.e. 22-7-2016. Nothing contrary is on record, therefore, no ground for interfering the findings is made out. 27. It is noteworthy that the new Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 was introduced with the object to liberalize schemes for grant of Stage Carriage Permits on non nationalized routes (Clause 3(g) of the Statement of Object). A comparative readings of the provisions of old and the new act makes it clear that the procedure for grant of permits under the new Act has been liberalized to such an extent that an intended operator can get a permit irrespective of number of operators already in the field. There is no justification in the plea of the petitioner that overlapping or clashes of timings would made plying of the buses on the route uneconomical or unprofitable and would make the business loss making business that would ultimately be not in the interest of public. Rather we think the competition would be in the interest of public at large. It will encourage the operators to provide better services then their competitive operator. That will also eliminate monopoly of few operators which adversely affect the public interest. The apprehension of the petitioner that too many operators on a route will be against the interest of the business and also against the interest of the public is without any basis. The transport system in the State is meant for convenience of public if more or more permits granted on a particular route it would fulfil this object. 28. Thus, in the light of the foregoing discussion and facts and law, contention of the petitioner do not find any support from the pleadings as well as documents filed in support of the same. Nothing is available on record to show that the learned RTA violated any provision of law or of any principle recognized by the law of the land in granting the SCP to respondent No. 1. Nothing is available on record to show that the learned RTA violated any provision of law or of any principle recognized by the law of the land in granting the SCP to respondent No. 1. The Learned STAT considered all the grounds or the objections raised by the petitioner and found no substance in those grounds. We do not find any illegality or perversity in the impugned order or any ground to interfere with the same (impugned order). The petition filed by the petitioner having no merits, deserves to be and is dismissed hereby. Consequently, IA No. 824/2017 is also stands closed.