JUDGMENT : 1. Both the appeals arise out of the same judgment and decree dated 8.4.2011 passed by learned Addl. District & Sessions Judge, Fast Track, Anoopgarh, Headquarter Suratgarh, therefore, they are being decided by this common order. 2. Appeal No.233/2011 has been preferred by defendant appellant Mal Chand and appeal No.143/2011 has been preferred by defendant appellant Anil Kumar to assail the judgment and decree dated 8.4.2011 passed by learned Addl. District & Sessions Judge, Fast Track, Anoopgarh, Headquarter Suratgarh in Civil Original Suit No.27/08 (54/1995). Learned trial Court has decreed the suit for specific performance of contract to sell dated 20.4.1990 and declared that sale deed executed in respect of shop No.71 situated in Dhan Mandi, Suratgarh by defendant No.1 Shiv Kumar in favour of defendant No.2 Malchand and defendant No.3 Shambhu Dayal on 18.7.1998 and also the sale deed executed further by defendant No.3 Shambhu Dayal in favour of defendant No.4 Anil Kumar on 11.9.1998 shall be null and void as against plaintiff Smt. Poonam Bansal. It was further directed that defendant Shiv Kumar will execute sale deed in respect of said shop No.71 in favour of plaintiff or any person as indicated by her within a period of two months failing which plaintiff shall be entitled to get the sale deed executed in her favour through Court. Further, the defendants were restrained from alienating the said shop to any other person. Taking note of the conduct of defendant No.1 and 2, learned trial Court also proceeded to impose a cost of Rs.3000/- on each of them as special damages in favour of plaintiff. Counter claim filed by defendant No.2 Mal Chand was rejected by the trial Court 3. Succinctly, the facts giving rise to this appeal are that suit for specific performance was initially filed by plaintiff Smt. Poonam Bansal through her power of attorney holder Mal Chand stating that an agreement to sell was executed by defendant Shiv Kumar in favour of plaintiff on 20.4.1990 in respect of shop No.71 admeasuring 30 x 90 ft. i.e. 2700 sq. ft. situated in Dhan Mandi, Suratgarh for a sum of Rs.79,779/-. Said agreement was got attested by Notary Public. It was agreed between them that when the permission to sale of said shop is obtained from the competent authority, sale deed would be executed within a period of six months therefrom. i.e. 2700 sq. ft. situated in Dhan Mandi, Suratgarh for a sum of Rs.79,779/-. Said agreement was got attested by Notary Public. It was agreed between them that when the permission to sale of said shop is obtained from the competent authority, sale deed would be executed within a period of six months therefrom. Possession of the shop was handed over when the agreement was entered into. Thereafter, on 20.10.1990, it was agreed upon between the parties that because of some matrimonial dispute pending between defendant Shiv Kumar and his wife, he is not in a position to get the sale deed executed and within fifteen days from decision of the said matrimonial dispute, he would get the same executed. Petition filed by wife of defendant against him was rejected in the month of December, 1992. Thereafter, plaintiff pursued the defendant for execution of the sale deed but he continued to avoid. Subsequently, he demanded a sum of rupees one lac more for enhancement in price of the shop. Plaintiff tried to resolve the matter through some mediator but failed. She served the defendant a notice dated 3.1.1994 but he did not execute the sale deed. Thereafter, suit was filed by plaintiff through her power of attorney holder Mal Chand. 4. During pendency of the suit, some dispute arose between plaintiff Smt. Poonam Bansal and her power of attorney holder Mal Chand as he got the sale deed executed for half of the shop in dispute in his own name and half of the shop was sold to one Shambhu Dayal on 18.7.1998, a person in whom Mal Chand had his confidence. In turn, Shambhu Dayal executed sale deed for this half portion of the shop in favour of Anil Kumar on 11.9.1998. For this reason, plaintiff Smt. Poonam Bansal, by way of filing an application before the trial Court obtained permission to pursue the suit at her own level. She also got Mal Chand, Shambho Dayal and Anil Kumar impleaded as defendants No.2, 3 and 4 respectively in the suit. It was also alleged that defendants are intending to sale the disputed shop further. It was also alleged that sale deed executed on 18.7.1998 and 11.9.1998 are sham, fictitious and without any consideration and have been executed under conspiracy just to frustrate the suit filed by the plaintiff. It was also alleged that defendants are intending to sale the disputed shop further. It was also alleged that sale deed executed on 18.7.1998 and 11.9.1998 are sham, fictitious and without any consideration and have been executed under conspiracy just to frustrate the suit filed by the plaintiff. The vendees are only benamidars and in fact, shop has been purchased by Malchand himself. 5. In the written statement filed by Shiv Kumar, agreement to sale dated 20.4.1990 itself was denied. It was stated that Shiv Kumar never intended to sale the said shop nor he executed any such agreement to sell. In fact, he was in need of money and contacted husband of plaintiff for advancing loan. He asked Shiv Kumar to get some document executed in regard to the shop just for his satisfaction before advancing the loan amount, that is why he signed the documents as prepared by husband of plaintiff. It was also stated that actual value of the shop was Rs. three lacs and it was not possible to sale the same for a sum of Rs.79,779/- only. It was also stated that permission to sale the said shop had already been granted to the defendant, hence, there was no question to execute the sale deed of the said shop on a later date. It was further stated that the said agreement is neither registered nor stamped sufficiently and hence it is not admissible in evidence as such the suit is liable to be dismissed. 6. In reply to the amended plaint filed by Smt. Poonam Bansal on 2.8.2004, newly impleaded defendants Mal Chand, Shambhu Dayal and Anil Kumar also filed their written statements separately. Mal Chand stated in the written statement that under the power of attorney executed by Smt. Poonam Bansal in his favour, he was entitled to act on her behalf and in that capacity, sale deed executed on 18.07.1998 in respect of half of the shop was proper and legal. It has also been stated that due to some losses occurred to the husband of plaintiff, they decided to shift from Suratgarh to Bhatinda in the year 1994 and the plaintiff fully authorized him to take steps in regard to the disputed shop while renouncing her interest therein. It has also been stated that due to some losses occurred to the husband of plaintiff, they decided to shift from Suratgarh to Bhatinda in the year 1994 and the plaintiff fully authorized him to take steps in regard to the disputed shop while renouncing her interest therein. Shiv Kumar demanded more money for enhanced value of the shop and looking to his limited financial resources, Mal Chand decided to purchase only half of the shop and rest of the shop was purchased by Shambhu Dayal. It has been further stated that since the shop in dispute had been sold out by its owner Shiv Kumar on 18.7.1998 through registered sale deed, hence, the agreement to sell in regard to the said shop is no more in existence. The counter claim has also been filed by Mal Chand on the ground that power of attorney executed in his favour has not been revoked by plaintiff Poonam Bansal and despite this, plaint has been filed by her against him, hence, he is entitled to get a sum of Rs.10,000/- as special cost. 7. Defendant No.3 Shambhu Dayal and defendant No.4 Anil Kumar, by way of their separate written statements, had stated that they were the bonafide purchasers of the shop for valid consideration. They were not having any knowledge about the pending dispute regarding shop, hence, the suit is liable to be dismissed against him. Defendant No.4 – Anil Kumar had taken this additional plea also that he purchased half of the share on 11.9.1998 and the suit has been filed against him in August, 2004, hence, it is barred by limitation. 8. On the basis of the pleadings, following issues were framed by learned trial Court :- “1. Whether the plaintiff has always been and is ready and willing to purchase the disputed shop and is thus, entitled for specific performance of the agreement dated 20.4.1990. … (Plaintiff) 2. Whether the agreement dated 20.4.1990 was got executed in lieu of the loan amount advanced to defendant Shiv Kumar, without there being any intention on his part to sell the shop. … (Defendant) 3. Whether the possession of the disputed shop was not handed over to plaintiff by the defendant as he himself was not in possession thereof on the date of agreement. … (Defendant) 4. What is the effect of the agreement to sell being unregistered. … (Defendant) 5. Relief. … (Defendant) 3. Whether the possession of the disputed shop was not handed over to plaintiff by the defendant as he himself was not in possession thereof on the date of agreement. … (Defendant) 4. What is the effect of the agreement to sell being unregistered. … (Defendant) 5. Relief. 6. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get the sale deeds executed in favour of the defendants No.2 to 4 on 18.7.1998 and 11.9.1998 declared null and void as against her as mentioned in Para-10A of the plaint. … (Plaintiff) 7. Whether defendants No.2 to 4 are genuine purchasers for consideration and without any knowledge about the pending dispute regarding disputed shop and if so, what is its effect on the suit. … (Defendants No.2 to 4) 8. Whether the suit filed by plaintiff is barred by time and is not maintainable. … (Defendants No.1 and 4)” 9. After recording the evidence and concluding the hearing, learned trial Court proceeded to decide all the aforesaid issues in favour of plaintiff respondent No.2, except Issue No.3 and decided the suit in the manner aforesaid. 10. During arguments, learned counsel appearing for the appellant has contended that appellant Malchand took all the steps regarding entering into compromise and getting the sale deed of the disputed shop executed in his favour on basis of the power of attorney executed on 29.12.1993 by plaintiff Poonam Bansal in his favour. He entered into compromise with Shiv Kumar on 18.7.1998 and also got the sale deed executed in regard to half of the shop in his favour as well as rest part of the shop in favour of Shambhu Dayal on 18.7.1998. Till that date, the power of attorney was very much in currency and thus, the steps taken by Malchand would be deemed to have been taken on behalf of plaintiff Poonam Bansal. In this regard, he has referred the provisions contained in Section 2 of the Power of Attorney Act, 1882. Later on, the said power of attorney was allegedly cancelled on 2.8.1998 but notice thereof was not given to Malchand as required under Section 208 of Contract Act, 1872. Learned counsel for the appellant has further stated that the suit filed for specific performance of the contract comes to an end as soon as the sale deed was executed by Shiv Kumar in favour of power of attorney holder of plaintiff Poonam Bansal. Learned counsel for the appellant has further stated that the suit filed for specific performance of the contract comes to an end as soon as the sale deed was executed by Shiv Kumar in favour of power of attorney holder of plaintiff Poonam Bansal. So, it should have not been continued thereafter and all the proceedings which have taken place after 18.7.1998 are of no significance. 11. His second limb of arguments is that Poonam Bansal and her husband decided to leave Suratgarh and relinquished all the interests in the disputed shop in favour of Malchand. This is the reason for which Malchand got the sale deed executed in his name as also in name of Shambhu Dayal for raising required fund to be paid to Shiv Kumar as the enhanced price of the shop. In light of these circumstances, his contention is that learned trial Court has erred in granting discretionary relief in favour of plaintiff as regards specific performance of the agreement dated 20.4.1990. He has also raised the contention that respondent No.4 Anil Kumar purchased the disputed shop from Shambhu Dayal on 11.09.1998 whereas the amended suit has been filed impleading Anil Kumar as party in the year 2004, which is barred by limitation as per the provisions contained in Section 54 of Limitation Act. Learned counsel for the appellant has further argued that learned trial Court has not properly analyzed the ocular as well as documentary evidence available on record. The impugned judgment completely lacks proper appreciation of evidence. On the contrary, learned trial Court has adopted a biased attitude towards appellant Malchand presuming his conduct to be deceitful and guided by the conspiracy between Shiv Kumar and Malchand. Learned counsel for the appellant has further stated that suit was filed for specific performance of the agreement only but learned trial Court has further extended the scope and granted relief declaring the sale deeds dated 18.7.98 and 11.09.1998 illegal and void as against plaintiff. On this count also, the judgment impugned is liable to be quashed and set aside. Learned counsel for the appellant has also raised the issue that sale deed made in favour of Malchand, Shambhu Dayal and Anil Kumar cannot be cancelled without payment of court fees. On this count also, the judgment impugned is liable to be quashed and set aside. Learned counsel for the appellant has also raised the issue that sale deed made in favour of Malchand, Shambhu Dayal and Anil Kumar cannot be cancelled without payment of court fees. Learned counsel has referred certain judicial pronouncements in regard to the contentions mentioned above and has prayed that the impugned judgment and decree be quashed and set aside. 12. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent No.2 has argued that the impugned judgment suffers no infirmity. It is based on proper appreciation of evidence and all the facts and circumstances of the case in hand. It has also been stated that whatever transactions took place regarding the disputed shop during the pendency of the suit are governed by the principles of lis pendence as contained under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Learned trial Court has taken into consideration this aspect of the matter and has arrived at the right conclusion. It has also been contended that Malchand was never authorized to get the sale deed executed in his favour on the basis of the power of attorney. He had done so with dishonest intention and in furtherance of the conspiracy hatched against plaintiff Poonam Bansal, he had sold the property to Shambhu Dayal and Anil Kumar. Deceitful conduct of Malchand was also highly deprecated by this Court in the order dated 15.1.2004 passed in SB Civil Revision No.1016/98. In view of all these circumstances, the judgment impugned is perfect and is liable to be upheld. 13. I have given thoughtful consideration to the rival contentions advanced at Bar and gone through the relevant record in light thereof. 14. While adverting to the contention raised by learned counsel for the appellant that Malchand entered into compromise with original defendant Shiv Kumar and got the sale deed executed in his name in respect of half of the shop on the strength of power of attorney executed in his favour, it seems necessary to consider the language of power of attorney, Ex.19A executed on 29.12.1993. On close scrutiny of the language, it appears that Smt. Poonam Bansal executed this power of attorney in favour of Malchand to initiate legal proceedings and to take all the necessary steps incidental thereto including the power to enter into agreement in regard to shop No.71. On close scrutiny of the language, it appears that Smt. Poonam Bansal executed this power of attorney in favour of Malchand to initiate legal proceedings and to take all the necessary steps incidental thereto including the power to enter into agreement in regard to shop No.71. But this power of attorney does not authorize him at all to get the sale deed executed in his own name for and on behalf of Poonam Bansal. 15. Perusal of record of this case reveals that as soon as Malchand entered into compromise with Shiv Kumar on 18.7.1998, he also got the sale deed executed in his name for half of the shop on the same day i.e. 18.7.1998 and also got the sale deed executed in respect of remaining half shop in favour of Shambhu Dayal. It is also important to note that on the application filed on 18.7.1998 before the trial Court, the suit was not disposed off in light of the compromise. The case was posted for orders on the date already fixed i.e. 01.09.1998. It is really surprising to note that Malchand got the sale deed executed in his favour and also in favour of Shambhu Dayal even prior to disposal of the suit filed on behalf of Smt. Poonam Bansal. On perusal of the order-sheets of learned trial Court, it appears that Poonam Bansal filed an application on 1.8.1998 informing the trial Court that because of some dispute arising with Malchand, she had denied him to plead the case further. It was also mentioned therein that Malchand and Shiv Kumar had deceitfully entered into compromise without the consent and knowledge of plaintiff and hence, plaintiff had revoked the power of attorney executed in favour of Malchand. In light of these circumstances, unwarranted conduct of Malchand came to notice of trial Court and therefore, the suit was not decided on the basis of the said compromise. 16. Learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the termination of power of attorney was effected on 2.8.1998 and in support thereof only receipt of courier has been produced by the plaintiff and not the receipt given under the hand of Malchand. His contention is that in such circumstance as per provisions of Section 208 of Contract Act, termination of power of attorney was not proper and otherwise also it was in existence at least on 18.7.1998. His contention is that in such circumstance as per provisions of Section 208 of Contract Act, termination of power of attorney was not proper and otherwise also it was in existence at least on 18.7.1998. Learned counsel has also taken recourse to Section 2 of Powers of Attorney Act so as to justify the compromise by Malchand for and on behalf of Poonam Bansal. He has also referred to the judgment in Kashi Ram Vs. Raj Kumar ( AIR 2000 Raj. 405 ) and further contended that notice of such revocation was not given to Shiv Kumar and therefore, the compromise entered into between him and Malchand on 18.7.1998 cannot be faulted with. Reliance has also been placed by him on KHMWCCI Society Vs. Radheylal, reported in AIR 1971 MP 191 in this regard. Keeping in view the principles laid down in above referred cases, at the most it can be inferred that the power of attorney executed by Poonam Bansal in favour of Malchand remained in existence on 18.7.1998. But despite this, bare perusal of the language employed in said power of attorney made it explicitly clear that Malchand was authorized thereby to enter into compromise only but not to get the sale deed executed in his name or any other person nominated by him. This fact can also not be lost sight of that though the said compromise was produced before the trial Court on 18.7.1998 but the matter was adjourned for the date already fixed in the case i.e. on 01.09.1998 for orders. Prior to passing of any order regarding disposal of the suit on the basis of the compromise, Malchand got the sale deed executed in his name as also in favour of Shambhu Dayal. Malchand was not authorized by way of power of attorney Ex.19A to get the sale deed executed in his favour or in favour of any other person as nominated by him. This conduct of Malchand also runs contrary to the provisions contained in Section 188 of Contract Act, which requires a person to do every lawful thing which is necessary in order to do such act for which he has been given the authority to do. But, on the contrary, Malchand got the sale deed executed. This conduct of Malchand also runs contrary to the provisions contained in Section 188 of Contract Act, which requires a person to do every lawful thing which is necessary in order to do such act for which he has been given the authority to do. But, on the contrary, Malchand got the sale deed executed. Since, power of attorney holder Malchand exceeded the authority given to him, his conduct cannot be justified by taking recourse to the plea that the power of attorney was in existence on 18.7.1998. Reliance has also been placed by learned counsel for appellant on judgment rendered by Allahabad High Court in Second Appeal No.95/1989 titled as “Chandrama Singh & Ors. Vs. Mirza Anis Ahmad”. It was held in this case that the relationship of Principal and Agent established through a registered deed could be validly terminated by a registered deed only. This is not the issue in this case in hand. Power of Attorney was not registered herein. It was further held in the referred case that nothing further can be read or added to the terms mentioned in the deed regulating the rights and liabilities of parties thereto. This judgment, thus, rather support the case of respondent, that in absence of authority to get the sale deed executed in his name, power of attorney holder Malchand was not authorized to do so. 17. In aforementioned circumstances, Smt. Poonam Bansal submitted an application under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC and another application under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC for getting necessary amendments in the plaint while impleading Malchand and Shambhu Dayal as defendants. The said applications were allowed and necessary amendments in the plaint were incorporated while impleading Malchand and Shambhu Dayal as defendants. In light of these amendments made in the plaint, learned trial Court has granted the declaratory relief to the plaintiff declaring the sale deeds executed on 18.7.1998 and 11.9.1998 to be void against the rights of plaintiff. Thus, the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the appellant that learned trial Court has extended the scope of the suit and granted relief beyond that cannot be sustained. Though initially the suit was filed for specific performance of contract but later on, paras 10 A, B, C and AA were included in the light of changed circumstances and also the relief clause was accordingly amended. Though initially the suit was filed for specific performance of contract but later on, paras 10 A, B, C and AA were included in the light of changed circumstances and also the relief clause was accordingly amended. In light of these amendments, learned trial Court has rightly proceeded to grant the relief so claimed and there appears no infirmity in the judgment impugned on this count. 18. In so far as contention raised regarding non-payment of court fees, it is to be noted that Shambhu Dayal and Anil Kumar are subsequent purchasers of the property during pendency of the suit. It is also not in dispute that they have purchased the property without obtaining permission from the Court, so their rights are governed by the principle of lis pendence as contained in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act and are subservient to the rights of the parties of the suit. They were not even necessary party in the suit. In view of this, the relief declaring their sale-deeds void and ineffective as against the rights and title of plaintiff can be given even without payment of Court fees on account of operation of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. 19. Learned counsel for the appellant has also argued that after the compromise having been entered into between Malchand and Shiv Kumar, the suit automatically comes to an end when the sale deed was executed in favour of Malchand, being power of attorney holder of Poonam Bansal. But this argument also does not satisfy this Court. When the matter was posted by learned trial Court for orders on the date already fixed i.e. 01.09.1998, an application came to be filed by Poonam Bansal on 4.8.1998 seeking permission to contest the case by herself. Original defendant Shiv Kumar expressed his no objection on this prayer and the same came to be allowed vide order dated 5.9.1998. Against the said order, Malchand preferred a revision petition before this Court, which was decided under order dated 15.1.2004. Threadbare analysis was done in view of various legal provisions and ultimately in view of the attending circumstances of the matter, order dated 5.9.1998 was upheld. Thereafter, plaintiff Poonam Bansal pursued the matter while getting necessary amendments as discussed above. 20. Against the said order, Malchand preferred a revision petition before this Court, which was decided under order dated 15.1.2004. Threadbare analysis was done in view of various legal provisions and ultimately in view of the attending circumstances of the matter, order dated 5.9.1998 was upheld. Thereafter, plaintiff Poonam Bansal pursued the matter while getting necessary amendments as discussed above. 20. Learned counsel for the appellant has also argued that learned trial Court has not properly appreciated the ocular as well as documentary evidence and has arrived at the conclusions only under the presumption that defendant Malchand has deceitfully got the sale deed executed. When the judgment impugned is perused in light of this contention, it comes out that issue wise analysis of the oral evidence has been elaborately made but prior to that, on the basis of the evidence available on record, learned trial Court has inferred that some undisputed facts have been revealed by the evidence. Those facts have been narrated in para 17 of the impugned judgment. Further, while discussing the various issues, reference has been made to the relevant witnesses. Thus, it cannot be said that the oral evidence has been completely ignored while deciding the issues. Reference has been made to relevant part of the evidence in respect of various issues. Further, learned trial Court has also specifically mentioned that original defendant Shiv Kumar has not come in the witness box. It is important to note that he was a very vital witness and abstaining himself from being examined as a witness go a long way to support the case of the plaintiff in some material aspects. Further, this is also to be noted that on 11.1.2011, compromise has been submitted by Poonam Bansal and the original defendant Shiv Kumar admitting that in furtherance of the agreement dated 20.4.1990, Shiv Kumar is ready to execute the sale deed in favour of Poonam Bansal in respect of the disputed shop. In light of this compromise also, the evidence was not required to be critically examined while deciding various issues. 21. However, if issue-wise discussions made by learned trial Court is perused, it comes out that initially as per the agreement to sell Ex.1, it was decided between Poonam Bansal and Shiv Kumar to get the sale deed executed within six months from getting the permission to sale the shop. 21. However, if issue-wise discussions made by learned trial Court is perused, it comes out that initially as per the agreement to sell Ex.1, it was decided between Poonam Bansal and Shiv Kumar to get the sale deed executed within six months from getting the permission to sale the shop. Vide Ex.4, said permission to sale the shop was granted on 21.4.1990. Prior to expiry of six months from 21.4.1990, the parties again mentioned some terms on the back of Ex.1 wherein Shiv Kumar sought extension of time for executing the sale deed on account of some matrimonial dispute between him and his wife. Documents Ex.6 to Ex.12 have been produced by the plaintiff in respect of the said matrimonial dispute pending between them which fortify the reason for seeking extension of time by Shiv Kumar. All these facts have been analyzed by learned trial Court while deciding issue No.1. Readiness and willingness on part of the plaintiff for seeking performance of the agreement dated 20.4.1990 has also been inferred by learned trial Court in view of the facts that as soon as plaintiff came to know about the conduct of Malchand and subsequent purchasers of the disputed shop, she immediately impleaded them as party and got the plaint amended to pursue her cause. Decision arrived at by trial Court regarding issue No.1 appears logical. It is also proper in view of the fact that original defendant Shiv Kumar has not contested this issue. Hence, the finding in respect of issue No.1 appears proper and is sustained. 22. So far as issue No.2 is concerned, the objection was raised initially by Shiv Kumar that he never intended to sell the disputed shop but again because of his non-examination as a witness and also for entering into compromise with the plaintiff, this objection bears no significance. The findings arrived at by learned trial Court in this regard appear to be perfect. 23. Issue No.3 has been decided by learned trial Court against plaintiff. No cross objection has been preferred by him against this finding. Hence, there is no need to analyze this issue in detail. 24. So far as issue No.4 is concerned, it has been elaborately discussed by learned trial Court while referring to various judgments rendered by Hon’ble Supreme Court. Issue No.3 has been decided by learned trial Court against plaintiff. No cross objection has been preferred by him against this finding. Hence, there is no need to analyze this issue in detail. 24. So far as issue No.4 is concerned, it has been elaborately discussed by learned trial Court while referring to various judgments rendered by Hon’ble Supreme Court. In light of the judgment cited in AIR 2003 SC 4548 , it has been inferred by learned trial Court that if the objection regarding admissibility of the document is not taken by the party at the time of tendering it into evidence, it cannot be raised thereafter. Further, learned trial Court has referred to the compromise which had been entered between Shiv Kumar and Poonam Bansal agreeing to get the sale deed executed and thus, the objection raised by Shiv Kumar has been over-ruled. Thus, the finding of learned trial Court in respect of issue No.4 is also found proper. 25. Issue No.5 pertains to relief clause only. 26. As regards issues No.6 and 7, much has been discussed in the foregoing paras. In light of the evidence available on record and the circumstances in which sale deed was executed by Shiv Kumar in favour of Malchand and Shambhu Dayal on 18.7.1998 as also sale deed executed by Shambhu Dayal in favour of Anil kumar on 11.09.1998, it is apparently clear that these hasty transactions were undertaken just to frustrate the rights and interests of plaintiff Poonam Bansal in respect of the disputed shop, which was a lis between the original parties. Ample discussion has been made by learned trial Court in respect of the conduct and intention of Malchand, Shambhu Dayal and Anil Kumar. It has also been stated that though Shiv Kumar claimed the market value of the property to be Rs. three lakhs but he had sold the said property for a sum of Rs.80,000/- only, which clearly shows that Shambhu Dayal and Malchand were not genuine and bonafide purchasers of the said property. It is also an important aspect to be noted that despite the suit was pending, Malchand hastened to purchase the shop on the same day on which the compromise was submitted i.e. on 18.7.1998. It is also an important aspect to be noted that despite the suit was pending, Malchand hastened to purchase the shop on the same day on which the compromise was submitted i.e. on 18.7.1998. PW-5 Poonam Bansal has also stated in her statement that under connivance, Malchand and Shiv Kumar moved an application before the trial Court and without her consent, for his own benefit Malchand got the sale deed of half of the shop executed in his name and half of the shop in name of Shambhu Dayal. She has also stated that Shambhu Dayal further sold this half shop to Anil Kumar though this fact was made known to Anil Kumar by her husband and Babulal Soni that the suit is pending before the Court. Poonam Bansal has vehemently opposed this suggestion in her cross-examination that she realized the total sum of the agreement from Malchand and relinquished her all rights and interests in favour of Malchand as regards the disputed shop. On considering the statement given by DW-1 Malchand, the fact of receiving Rs.80,000/- by Poonam Bansal and relinquishing her rights and interests in the said shop is not established. Though he has stated in his affidavit that he received a written receipt for Rs.80,000/- from Poonam Bansal, which is now misplaced but in his cross-examination, he has stated that he did not submit that receipt of Rs.80,000/- because he was not asked by the Court to do so. He has thus taken contrary stands. Further, he had not been able to explain as to from where he got the sum of Rs.80,000/- in cash. He had also admitted that there is no reference of the sum of Rs.80,000/- in sale deed Ex.A/1. Though one witness namely Ganpat Ram has been produced in support of payment of Rs.80,000/- to Poonam Bansal, but this fact has not been stated in the written statement filed by Malchand. Further, Ganpat Ram has also denied that any such receipt was written in his presence. On perusal of the cross-examination of DW-3/1 Shambhu Dayal and DW-4/1 Anil Kumar, who were subsequent purchasers of the half portion of the shop, it comes out that they have not been able to satisfactorily explain from where they got the amount which they claimed to pay for purchasing half portion of the shop. On perusal of the cross-examination of DW-3/1 Shambhu Dayal and DW-4/1 Anil Kumar, who were subsequent purchasers of the half portion of the shop, it comes out that they have not been able to satisfactorily explain from where they got the amount which they claimed to pay for purchasing half portion of the shop. Both of them have also admitted that the market value of the shop was more than the money which they have paid. These circumstances support the possibility that they were sham purchasers and the said sale deeds were executed just to frustrate the interest of Smt. Poonam Bansal in the said shop. 27. During course of arguments, learned counsel for the respondent No.2 has contended that even if Shambhu Dayal and Anil Kumar claimed to purchase the half portion of the disputed shop but since the matter was already pending before the Court, doctrine of lis pendence is applicable and their rights are subservient to the rights of the plaintiff. He has also relied upon the judgment rendered in Sanjay Verma Vs. Manik Roy & Ors., reported in AIR 2007 SC 1332 . Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as follows in the above referred judgment :- “The principles specified in Section 52 of the T.P. Act are in accordance with equity, good conscience or justice because they rest upon an equitable and just foundation that it will be impossible to bring an action or suit to a successful termination if alienations are permitted to prevail. A transferree pendente lite is bound by the decree just as much as he was a party to the suit. The principle of lis pendens embodied in Section 52 of the T.P. Act being a principle of public policy, no question of good faith or bona fide arises. The principle underlying Section 52 is that a litigating party is exempted from taking notice of a title acquired during the pendency of the litigation. The mere pendency of a suit does not prevent one of the parties from dealing with the property constituting the subject-matter of the suit. The Section only postulates a condition that the alienation will in no manner affect the rights of the other party under any decree which may be passed in the suit unless the property was alienated with the permission of the Court.” 28. The Section only postulates a condition that the alienation will in no manner affect the rights of the other party under any decree which may be passed in the suit unless the property was alienated with the permission of the Court.” 28. It is obvious that the property was not purchased by Shambhu Dayal and Anil Kumar with the permission of the Court. Thus, the inference arrived at by learned trial Court with regard to issues No.6 and 7 appear to be correct. 29. Issue No.8 pertains to the issue of suit being time barred. Learned trial Court has made its observation in respect of the plea raised by Shiv Kumar only but the objection raised by defendant – respondent No.4 Anil Kumar has not been specifically dealt with by learned trial Court. Anil Kumar has raised the plea that he purchased the shop on 11.09.1998 whereas the suit has been filed against him in August, 2004. Anil Kumar has separately preferred first appeal against the judgment impugned on this count. Learned counsel for Anil Kumar has raised the objection while referring to Section 54 of the Limitation Act. In this regard, judgment relied upon by learned counsel for the respondent Poonam Bansal in case of Kasturi Vs. Iyyamperumal & Ors., reported in AIR 2005 SC 2813 seems relevant. In this case, Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that in a suit for specific performance of contract for sale, the lis between the appellant purchaser and respondent vendor shall only be gone into and it is not open to the Court to decide whether third party has acquired any title or possession of the contracted property as that would not be germane for decision in the suit for specific performance. It has also been held that third party or strangers to the contract are not necessary party as effective decree could be passed even in their absence also. In light of these principles, it was never incumbent upon Poonam Bansal to implead the subsequent purchaser i.e. Anil Kumar in the suit filed for specific performance of contract as a subsequent purchaser of the shop. He was not a necessary party in the suit. In light of these principles, it was never incumbent upon Poonam Bansal to implead the subsequent purchaser i.e. Anil Kumar in the suit filed for specific performance of contract as a subsequent purchaser of the shop. He was not a necessary party in the suit. Thus, when he was not at all a necessary party, the question whether the suit was filed against him within limitation or not, does not have any significant bearing, as even the suit could have been decided in his absence. 30. Secondly, this aspect is also significant to be considered that as soon as Poonam Bansal came to know about the sale deed dated 11.09.1998 executed in favour of Anil Kumar, she moved an application on 13.10.1998 under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC to implead him as defendant No.4 and also sought necessary amendment in the plaint accordingly. But as Malchand preferred a revision against the order dated 5.9.1998, allowing Poonam Bansal to continue with the suit, the proceedings pending before the trial Court were stayed and it was informed to the trial Court on 20.11.1998. This is why, no order could be passed on the application filed on 13.10.1998 until the said revision petition was decided vide order dated 15.1.2004. Thereafter, the amended plaint came to be filed against Anil Kumar. In view of these circumstances also, it cannot be said that the suit filed against Anil Kumar was barred by limitation. Hence, the inference drawn by learned trial Court with regard to issue No.8 also appears proper and is sustained. In view of above discussion, the appeal preferred by Anil Kumar is found bereft of merit and cannot be allowed. 31. Learned counsel for the appellant, while referring to provisions contained in Section 20 (2) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 has contended that learned trial Court ought not to have granted the decree of specific performance of the contract as this is a discretionary relief and the facts and circumstances of the case do not warrant such relief to be granted. He has relied upon the following judgments in this regard :- 1. AIR 2003 SC p. 1391 (Manjunath Anandappa Urf. Shivappa Hanasi Vs. Tammanasa & Ors.) 2. AIR 2014 1 SC p.47 (I.S. Sikandar (D) By LRs. Vs. K. Subramani & Ors.) 3. AIR 2014 SC p.2253 (Shamsher Singh & Ors. Vs. Rajinder Kumar & Ors.) 4. He has relied upon the following judgments in this regard :- 1. AIR 2003 SC p. 1391 (Manjunath Anandappa Urf. Shivappa Hanasi Vs. Tammanasa & Ors.) 2. AIR 2014 1 SC p.47 (I.S. Sikandar (D) By LRs. Vs. K. Subramani & Ors.) 3. AIR 2014 SC p.2253 (Shamsher Singh & Ors. Vs. Rajinder Kumar & Ors.) 4. AIR 2016 SC p.153 (Ramesh Chand (Dead) through L.Rs. Vs. Asruddin (Dead) through LRs & Anr.) 5. J.T. 1999 (8) SC p.608 (Dadarao & Anr. Vs. Ramrao & Ors.) 6. 2013 (4) WLC (Raj.) p.220 (Baldev Raj Chopra Vs. Rakesh Kumar) 32. Learned counsel for the appellant has further stated that Shambhu Dayal and Anil Kumar were bonafide purchasers for money and their rights will be affected if the decree for specific performance of the agreement dated 20.4.1990 is granted. In this regard, it is worth mentioning that in view of the discussions made above, Malchand, Shambhu Dayal and Anil Kumar have not been found to be bonafide purchasers for money of the property in dispute. On the contrary, factual matrix of the case clearly reveals that the sale deeds have been executed in their favour just to frustrate the rights and title of Poonam Bansal. Further, rights of subsequent purchasers are governed by the principles of lis pendence. They were not even necessary party. Admittedly, they have not purchased the property after obtaining permission from the Court. So, their rights are subservient to the rights of party to the suit. More over, in the facts and circumstances of case in hand, the circumstances as mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 20 of Specific Relief Act, 1963 are not found to exist in which the Court may decide not to grant decree of the specific performance. Further, learned counsel for the appellant has not been able to show as to how learned trial court has not properly exercised the discretion while granting decree for specific performance. The discretion exercised by learned trial Court cannot be faulted with in the facts and circumstances of the case. In these circumstances, various pronouncements relied upon by learned counsel for the appellant as mentioned above do not extend any help to the appellant. 33. The discretion exercised by learned trial Court cannot be faulted with in the facts and circumstances of the case. In these circumstances, various pronouncements relied upon by learned counsel for the appellant as mentioned above do not extend any help to the appellant. 33. In the result, after having considered all the contentions raised by learned counsel for both the appellants and after perusing the evidence on record, this Court is of the considered view that there is no force in both the appeals and the same are accordingly dismissed.