ORDER Petitioners, who possessed similar status relating to C.W.J.C. No.4315 of 2011 under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, filed instant petition for review of the order dated 24.08.2016 whereby and whereunder the said writ was disposed of directing the learned lower Court to decide the issue of jurisdiction at first instance before proceeding ahead with the trial. It is further evident that aforesaid order dated 24.08.2016 passed in C.W.J.C. No.4315 of 2011 was put under challenge in L.P.A. No.1931 of 2016 and the same was disposed of as withdrawn giving liberty to take recourse to appropriate provision of law vide order dated 19.10.2016 and under garb of aforesaid liberty, petitioners have filed instant petition for review. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioners have raised manifold argument pin-pointing the deficiency persisting in the order impugned dated 24.08.2016 and in likewise manner, has also submitted that as there happens to be apparent error while dealing with the issue, consequent thereupon, needs to be reviewed, which is found duly acknowledgeable under Section 114 read with Order XLVII, Rule-1, 2 of the C.P.C. 3. The major plank of argument as raised on behalf of petitioners is with regard to non-appreciation of relevant rules in its right perspective. The learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that though the order impugned suggest that Rule-18 of 2006 Rules is being quoted below, but same has not been quoted and instead thereof, Paragraph-10 as well as Paragraph-11 of the order impugned is nothing, but repetition of Rule-18 of 2008 Rules. That suggest non-appreciation of 2006 Rules in its right perspective. Furthermore, it has also been submitted that Amended 2008 Rules has been introduced much after filing of the Title Suit by the petitioners whereupon there would not be enforcement of amended Rule of 2008. Therefore, the finding having recorded in the order impugned identifying an alternative remedial procedure would not apply in the facts and circumstances of the case. Furthermore, it has also been submitted that Amended 2008 Rules has been introduced much after filing of the Title Suit by the petitioners whereupon there would not be enforcement of amended Rule of 2008. Therefore, the finding having recorded in the order impugned identifying an alternative remedial procedure would not apply in the facts and circumstances of the case. On this score, it has also been submitted that as per 2006 Rules D.D.C. has got no role to play, consequent thereupon, removal of petitioners by an order of D.D.C., happens to be wrong, illegal in its entirety and that being so, the aforesaid order rightly been challenged under present forum coupled with passing of appropriate order by the learned lower Court directing the defendant to pay the salary for the period whereunder petitioners discharged their duty. 4. It has also been submitted that there happens to be no bar in entertaining a Title Suit with regard to service matter in terms of Section 9 of the C.P.C., because of the fact that there happens to be no exclusion under 2006 Rules. In the aforesaid legal event, it has been urged that part of the order passed by the learned lower Court allowing the prayer of the petitioners directing the O.Ps./ defendants to pay salary for the period during course of which, petitioners have had discharged their duty, being based upon equity, should be restored, which could only be materialized after allowing prayer of the petitioners. So, submitted that in the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, the order impugned is fit to be reviewed. 5. Learned A.C. to G.P. has refuted the submission made on behalf of petitioners and submitted that there happens to be no glaring error visible which could attract and justify the prayer of the petitioners, whereupon instant petition is fit to be dismissed. 6. In Chairman and Managing Director, Central Bank of India and others Vs. Central Bank of India Scheduled Castes/ Scheduled Tribes Employees Welfare Association and others reported in (2016) 13 SCC 135, it has been observed:— “12. It is clearly an error on the face of the record inasmuch as no such consequence follows. In fact, the aforesaid quoted portion is directly in conflict with not only the earlier portion of paragraph 34, but the entire conclusion on the issue on which there is a detailed discussion from paragraph Nos. It is clearly an error on the face of the record inasmuch as no such consequence follows. In fact, the aforesaid quoted portion is directly in conflict with not only the earlier portion of paragraph 34, but the entire conclusion on the issue on which there is a detailed discussion from paragraph Nos. 26 to 32 and even in earlier paragraphs of the judgment. It is this error, which is apparent on the face of the record, viz. the reservation is provided in promotion by selection respect of posts carrying salary of less than 5,700 per month, that has led to further error that such reservation in the matter of promotion is applicable from Scale I upward up to Scale VI. 13. What constitutes an error apparent on the face of the record is explained in State of Rajasthan & Anr. Vs. Surendra Mohnot & Ors. (2014) 14 SCC 77 , with the aid of an earlier judgment, in the following manner: “25. To appreciate what constitutes an error apparent on the face of the record, the observations of the Court in Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde Vs. Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale, AIR 1960 SC 137 , are useful: (AIR p.137) “An error which has to be established by a long-drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record. Where an alleged error is far from self-evident and if it can be established, it has to be established, by lengthy and complicated arguments, such an error cannot be cured by a writ of certiorari according to the rule governing the powers of the superior court to issue such a writ.” 26. In the case at hand, as the factual score has uncurtained, the application for review did not require a long-drawn process of reasoning. It did not require any advertence on merits which is in the province of the appellate court. Frankly speaking it was a manifest and palpable error. A wrong authority which had nothing to do with the lis was cited and that was conceded to. An already existing binding precedent was ignored. At a mere glance it would have been clear to the Writ Court that the decision was rendered on the basis of a wrong authority. The error was self-evident. A wrong authority which had nothing to do with the lis was cited and that was conceded to. An already existing binding precedent was ignored. At a mere glance it would have been clear to the Writ Court that the decision was rendered on the basis of a wrong authority. The error was self-evident. When such self-evident errors come to the notice of the Court and they are not rectified in exercise of review jurisdiction or jurisdiction of recall which is a facet of plenary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, a grave miscarriage of justice occurs...” 14. The Court also made the following pertinent observations: (2014) 14 SCC 77 , “28. We have already stated the legal position with regard to legal impact as regards the concession pertaining to the position in law. That apart, we think that an act of the Court should not prejudice anyone and the maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit gets squarely applicable...” 7. Whether Title Suit is entertainable relating to lis concerning service matter is a burning question which had properly been explained in the order impugned. However, the same is taken afresh, as issue has been reagitated. Way back, in a case Raja Ram Kumar Bhargava (dead) by LRs., Appellant Vs. Union of India, Respondent reported in A.I.R. 1988 SC 752, it has been held:— “9. But the claim of Rs.12,282.11 said to represent interest on the refund of Excess Profit Tax does not admit of such an easy exit. Shri Nariman urged that this claim rested on an altogether different and surer legal footing. Learned Counsel said that Section 21 of the Excess Profit Tax 1940 incorporated and assimilated into itself as a part of its own legislative-scheme, inter-alia, Section 66 of the 1922 Act and the provisions so built into Section 21 by the legislative expedient of incorporation-and not merely of reference-continue to be operative notwithstanding the repeal of the 1922 Act and that, therefore, the claim for interest based on Section 21 of the Excess Profit Act 1940 pre-eminently survives. Learned Counsel submitted that the claim for interest has been negatived by the High Court without examining the scheme of Excess Profit Act 1940 and merely as a corollary of the untenability of the claim of interest on the refund of the income-tax. Learned Counsel submitted that the claim for interest has been negatived by the High Court without examining the scheme of Excess Profit Act 1940 and merely as a corollary of the untenability of the claim of interest on the refund of the income-tax. The distinctive nature of this part of the suit claim pertaining to the interest on Excess Profit Tax has not been specifically dealt with by the High Court. Section 66(7) of the 1922 Act which, by virtue of Section 21 of the Excess Profit Tax Act 1940, is attracted to cases of refunds of Excess Profit Taxes stipulates that notwithstanding that a reference has been made to the High Court, tax shall be payable in accordance with the assessment made in the case provided that if the amount of assessment is reduced as a result of such reference, the amount over-paid shall be refunded "with such interest as the commissioner may allow". Several High-Courts have taken the view that the provision mandates the grant of interest, the discretion of the Commissioner being in the area of the rate of such interest (See Liquidators of Pursa Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Income-Tax, Bihar & Ors., 32 ITR 603; Khushalchand Daga Vs. N. M. Joshi, 3rd Income-tax officer A-I Ward, Bombay & Ors, 130 ITR 180). But then, even if the right to claim interest on the refunds of Excess Profit Tax could be said to have been preserved, the question yet remains whether a suit for its recovery is at all maintainable. The question turns on the scope of the exclusionary clause in the statute. The effect of clauses excluding the civil courts' jurisdiction are considered in several pronouncements of the judicial committee and of this Court (See Secretary of State Vs. Mask & Co., AIR 1940 P.C. 105 ; K.S. Venkataraman & Co. Vs. State of Madras, [1966] 2 SCR 299: Dhulabhai & Ors. Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr, [1968] 3 . SCR 662. The Premier Automobilies Ltd. Vs. Kamlakar Shantaram Wadke & Ors., AIR 1975 SC 2238 ). Generally speaking. Mask & Co., AIR 1940 P.C. 105 ; K.S. Venkataraman & Co. Vs. State of Madras, [1966] 2 SCR 299: Dhulabhai & Ors. Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr, [1968] 3 . SCR 662. The Premier Automobilies Ltd. Vs. Kamlakar Shantaram Wadke & Ors., AIR 1975 SC 2238 ). Generally speaking. the broad guiding considerations are that wherever a right, not pre-existing in common law, is created by a statute and that statute itself provided a machinery for the enforcement of the right, both the right and the remedy having been created uno-flatu and a finality is intended to the result of the statutory proceedings, then, even in the absence of an exclusionary provision the civil courts' jurisdiction is impliedly barred. If, however, a right pre-existing in common-law is recognised by the statute and a new statutory remedy for its enforcement provided, without expressly excluding the civil courts' jurisdiction, then both the common-law and the statutory remedies might become concurrent remedies leaving open on element of election to the persons of inherence. To what extent, and on what areas and under what circumstances and conditions, the civil courts' jurisdiction is preserved even where there is an express clause excluding their jurisdiction, are considered in Dhulabhai's case.” 8. In Nahar Industrial Enterprises Limited Vs. Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation with Axis Bank Limited Vs. Rajshree Sugars and Chemicals Limited with Axis Bank Limited Vs. Nahar Industrial Enterprises Limited and Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited Vs. Nahar Industrial Enterprises Limited and others reported in (2009) 8 SCC 646 , it has been observed:— “110. It must be remembered that the jurisdiction of a civil court is plenary in nature. Unless the same is ousted, expressly or by necessary implication, it will have jurisdiction to try all types of suits. 111. In Dhulabhai Vs. State of M.P. AIR 1969 SC 78 , this Court opined: (AIR pp.89-90, para 32) “32. …The result of this inquiry into the diverse views expressed in this Court may be stated as follows:- * * * (2) Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the court, an examination of the scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the civil court. Where there is no express exclusion the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. In the latter case it is necessary to see if the statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right or liability and further lays down that all questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by the Tribunals so constituted, and whether remedies normally associated with actions in civil courts are prescribed by the said statute or not. * * * (7) An exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court is not readily to be inferred unless the conditions above set down apply.” 9. The brief facts of the case as has been pleaded relates with termination of service of the petitioners by the D.D.C., who according to petitioners, was not competent enough relating to appointment/ termination of Panchayat Teachers, who were appointed under the guise of Bihar Panchayat Primary Teachers (Appointment and Service Condition) Rules, 2006, whereunder they were appointed on the basis of appointment letter issued by the Panchayat Secretary as authorized by the majority votes of the committee in terms of subsequent administrative circular as, the local Mukhiya, Respondent No.5, declined to participate on account of being interested in appointment of her niece (Bhagini), joined and continued thereafter. At an initial stage, the State/ defendant/ opposite party was injuncted, but after appearance, filing of show-cause and considering the alternative remedial procedure prescribed under Rule-18 thereof, the same was vacated by the learned lower Court vide order dated 14.09.2009. However, the learned lower Court directed to pay the remuneration for the period during which petitioners discharged their duty, which was annulled under Misc. Appeal No.21 of 2009 by the District Judge, Bhojpur at Arrah against which C.W.J.C. No.4315 of 2011 was filed, which has been disposed of by the order impugned, the subject matter of instant review petition. 10. However, the learned lower Court directed to pay the remuneration for the period during which petitioners discharged their duty, which was annulled under Misc. Appeal No.21 of 2009 by the District Judge, Bhojpur at Arrah against which C.W.J.C. No.4315 of 2011 was filed, which has been disposed of by the order impugned, the subject matter of instant review petition. 10. It has rightly been pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioners that there happens to be repetition of Rule-18 of 2008 at two different Paragraphs consecutively, that means to say, at Paragraph-10 as well as Paragraph-11 of the order impugned and this mistake though appears to be on account of some electronic fault, however, divulges apparent error, which needs correction and so, Paragraph-10 is corrected by attracting provision of Section 114 read with Order-XLVII, Rule-1, 2 C.P.C. directing replacement of Paragraph-10 of order impugned as:— Rule 18 of 2006 Rules reads as follows:- 18. f'kdk;r-µbl fu;ekoyh ds vèkhu fu;kstu LFkkUkkUrj.k vFkok lsok 'kÙkksZa lEcUèkh ekeyksa esa fdlh Hkh izdkj dh f'kdk;r dk fu.kZ; ysus dh 'kfDr mi&fodkl vk;qDr dks gksxh rFkk iapk;r f'k{kd ds ekeys esa iz[k.M fodkl inkfèkdkjh dh gksxhA lEcUèkh inkfèkdkjh vf/kdre 30 fnuksa ds vUnj f'kdk;rksa dk fu.kZ; ns nsaxsA 11. Let the same be part and parcel of Paragraph-10 of the order dated 24.08.2016 as well as be read accordingly. As discussed above, alternative remedial forum is found duly prescribed and further, as per the settled principle of law, whenever there happens to be such provision available, then in that event, it is difficult to accept that the jurisdiction of Civil Court will survive as is found impliedly barred which, the learned lower Court also perceived vide order dated 14.09.2009, while withdrawing the stay and for that, instead of allowing wastage of time, both for the petitioners as well as the Court, the learned lower Court has rightly been directed under order impugned to decide the jurisdictional issue at a first glance, which is being re-affirmed, independently without being influenced by the finding so recorded. 12. Accordingly, instant petition is dismissed subject to modification of Paragraph-10 of the order impugned, as indicated hereinabove.