JUDGMENT Hon’ble Dr. Kaushal Jayendra Thaker, J.—This appeal challenges the award passed by First Additional District Judge vested with the power to Motor Accident Claim Tribunal in MACT No. 113 of 1991 filed by Smt. Usha Pandey, the Tribunal granted compensation of Rs. 2,40,000/- with 12% interest. 2. This Court in the year 1994 passed the following order : “Issue notice. Call for the lower Court record. List for final disposal at the stage of admission. Put up after service of notice and receipt of record. Stay Application - Issue notice.”. 3. We are in the year 2017, though case is called out. No one is present on behalf of respondent to oppose this appeal. 4. Heard Sri K.S. Amist holding brief of Sri Vinod Swaroop, learned counsel for appellant. 5. Brief facts as they emerge from the record that the Tribunal was approached with a prayer to grant compensation of Rs. 11,00,000/- in favour of original claimants. The claim petition was filed by widow on her behalf and on behalf of two minor children of the deceased who died in the vehicular accident. It was the stand of the claimants that on 31.1.1991 Arun Kumar Pandey was going by his cycle when he reached near police station Naubasta, a tanker bearing Tanker No. UHJ-8361 being driven rashly and negligently dashed with Arun Kumar Pandey resulting into the death of said Arun Kumar Pandey. The driver of the truck was nabbed on the spot. An FIR was lodged against the driver of the truck and charge-sheet was also laid against him. The Tribunal framed the three issues and held all the three issues against the Insurance Company. The Insurance Company raised the issues of contributory negligence and that there was a breach of conditions under Section 147 of Act, 1988 and thirdly that the compensation awarded by Tribunal was excessive. 6. The learned counsel for appellant submitted that the vehicle Tanker did not hit the cyclist and the cyclist was knocked down by a three wheeler which was not insured with the appellant and, therefore, it was not liable to pay any compensation. It is further submitted that cyclst came in between the three wheeler and the truck and, therefore, it was urged before this Court orally that the cyclist was also negligent for the cause of accident. 7. It is further submitted that cyclst came in between the three wheeler and the truck and, therefore, it was urged before this Court orally that the cyclist was also negligent for the cause of accident. 7. It would be relevant to discuss the principles for deciding contributory negligence and for that the principles for considering negligence will also have to be looked into. It has been held by the Court and the principles enunciated by the Courts are discussed herein below : “1. Negligence means failure to exercise required degree of care and caution expected of a prudent driver. Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon the considerations, which ordinarily regulate conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. Negligence is not always a question of direct evidence. It is an inference to be drawn from proved facts. Negligence is not an absolute term, but is a relative one. It is rather a comparative term. What may be negligence in one case may not be so in another. Where there is no duty to exercise care, negligence in the popular sense has no legal consequence. Where there is a duty to exercise care, reasonable care must be taken to avoid acts or omissions which would be reasonably foreseen likely to caused physical injury to person. The degree of care required, of course, depends upon facts in each case. On these broad principles, the negligence of drivers is required to be assessed. 2. It would be seen that burden of proof for contributory negligence on the part of deceased has to be discharged by the opponents. It is the duty of driver of the offending vehicle to explain the accident. It is well-settled law that at intersection where two roads cross each other, it is the duty of a fast moving vehicle to slow down and if driver did not slow down at intersection, but continued to proceed at a high speed without caring to notice that another vehicle was crossing, then the conduct of driver necessarily leads to conclusion that vehicle was being driven by him rashly as well as negligently. 3. 10th Schedule appended to Motor Vehicle Act contain statutory regulations for driving of motor vehicles which also form part of every Driving License. 3. 10th Schedule appended to Motor Vehicle Act contain statutory regulations for driving of motor vehicles which also form part of every Driving License. Clause-6 of such Regulation clearly directs that the driver of every motor vehicle to slow down vehicle at every intersection or junction of roads or at a turning of the road. It is also provided that driver of the vehicle should not enter intersection or junction of roads unless he makes sure that he would not thereby endanger any other person. Merely, because driver of the Truck was driving vehicle on the left side of road would not absolve him from his responsibility to slow down vehicle as he approaches intersection of roads, particularly when he could have easily seen, that the car over which deceased was riding, was approaching intersection. 4. In view of the fast and constantly increasing volume of traffic, motor vehicles upon roads may be regarded to some extent as coming within the principle of liability defined in Rylands v. Fletcher, (1868) 3 HL (LR) 330. From the point of view of pedestrian, the roads of this country have been rendered by the use of motor vehicles, highly dangerous. ‘Hit and run’ cases where drivers of motor vehicles who have caused accidents, are unknown. In fact such cases are increasing in number. Where a pedestrian without negligence on his part is injured or killed by a motorist, whether negligently or not, he or his legal representatives, as the case may be, should be entitled to recover damages if principle of social justice should have any meaning at all. 5. These provisions (Section 110A and Section 110B of Motor Act, 1988) are not merely procedural provisions. They substantively affect the rights of the parties. The right of action created by Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 was ‘new in its species, new in its quality, new in its principles. In every way it was new. The right given to legal representatives under Act, 1988 to file an application for compensation for death due to a motor vehicle accident is an enlarged one. This right cannot be hedged in by limitations of an action under Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. New situations and new dangers require new strategies and new remedies. 6. The right given to legal representatives under Act, 1988 to file an application for compensation for death due to a motor vehicle accident is an enlarged one. This right cannot be hedged in by limitations of an action under Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. New situations and new dangers require new strategies and new remedies. 6. In the light of the above discussion, we are of the view that even if Courts may not by interpretation displace the principles of law which are considered to be well-settled and, therefore, Court cannot dispense with proof of negligence altogether in all cases of motor vehicle accidents, it is possible to develop the law further on the following lines; when a motor vehicle is being driven with reasonable care, it would ordinarily not meet with an accident and, therefore, rule of res-ipsa loquitor as a rule of evidence may be invoked in motor accident cases with greater frequency than in ordinary civil suits (per three-Judge Bench in Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab, 2005 0 ACJ(SC) 1840). 7. By the above process, the burden of proof may ordinarily be cast on the defendants in a motor accident claim petition to prove that motor vehicle was being driven with reasonable care or that there is equal negligence on the part of driver of another vehicle.” 8. While going through the record and the issue No. 1 as framed by Tribunal, it is an admitted position of fact that accident occurred at 10.30 a.m.A driver of three wheeler lodged a complaint with the concerned police station wherein name of the driver of the tanker was shown as accused. The FIR does not speak about anything about accident with a three wheeler. The driver of the tanker did not setup into the witness box. The charge-sheet was laid against him. The deceased died on the spot and there is a finding of fact that the driver of the truck did not take proper care while driving the vehicle, even if the submission of the counsel for appellant is believed that a three wheeler was taking a turn and that is how the accident occurred, just because a three wheeler was taking a turn, he could not have dashed with the cyclist and it was the truck driver who had hit the cyclist. The driver of the truck driving vehicle in rash and negligent manner and that is how the accident occurred. The cyclist cannot be said to be driving his cycle in a rash and negligent manner. Hence the submissions of contributory negligent and or the truck not causing the accident cannot be upheld and is rejected. 9. Section 147 and 149 of Act, 1888 reads as follows : “Section 147 Requirements of policies and limits of liability.— (1) In order to comply with the requirements of this Chapter, a policy of insurance must be a policy which— (a) is issued by a person who is an authorised insurer; and (b) insures the person or classes of persons specified in the policy to the extent specified in sub-section (2)— (i) against any liability which may be incurred by him in respect of the death of or bodily 27 [injury to any person, including owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle] or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place; (ii) against the death of or bodily injury to any passenger of a public service vehicle caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place: Provided that a policy shall not be required— (i) to cover liability in respect of the death, arising out of and in the course of his employment, of the employee of a person insured by the policy or in respect of bodily injury sustained by such an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment other than a liability arising under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923) in respect of the death of, or bodily injury to, any such employee— (a) engaged in driving the vehicle, or (b) if it is a public service vehicle engaged as conductor of the vehicle or in examining tickets on the vehicle, or (c) if it is a goods carriage, being carried in the vehicle, or (ii) to cover any contractual liability. Explanation.—For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party shall be deemed to have been caused by or to have arisen out of, the use of a vehicle in a public place notwithstanding that the person who is dead or injured or the property which is damaged was not in a public place at the time of the accident, if the act or omission which led to the accident occurred in a public place. (2) Subject to the proviso to sub-section (1), a policy of insurance referred to in sub-section (1), shall cover any liability incurred in respect of any accident, up to the following limits, namely:— (a) save as provided in clause (b), the amount of liability incurred; (b) in respect of damage to any property of a third party, a limit of rupees six thousand: Provided that any policy of insurance issued with any limited liability and in force, immediately before the commencement of this Act, shall continue to be effective for a period of four months after such commencement or till the date of expiry of such policy whichever is earlier. (3) A policy shall be of no effect for the purposes of this Chapter unless and until there is issued by the insurer in favour of the person by whom the policy is effected a certificate of insurance in the prescribed form and containing the prescribed particulars of any condition subject to which the policy is issued and of any other prescribed matters; and different forms, particulars and matters may be prescribed in different cases. (4) Where a cover note issued by the insurer under the provisions of this Chapter or the rules made thereunder is not followed by a policy of insurance within the prescribed time, the insurer shall, within seven days of the expiry of the period of the validity of the cover note, notify the fact to the registering authority in whose records the vehicle to which the cover note relates has been registered or to such other authority as the State Government may prescribe. (5) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, an insurer issuing a policy of insurance under this section shall be liable to indemnify the person or classes of persons specified in the policy in respect of any liability which the policy purports to cover in the case of that person or those classes of persons. Section 149. Duty of insurers to satisfy judgments and awards against persons insured in respect of third party risks.— (1) If, after a certificate of insurance has been issued under sub-section (3) of Section 147 in favour of the person by whom a policy has been effected, judgment or award in respect of any such liability as is required to be covered by a policy under clause (b) of sub-section (l) of Section 147 (being a liability covered by the terms of the policy) 1[or under the provisions of Section 163A] is obtained against any person insured by the policy, then, notwithstanding that the insurer may be entitled to avoid or cancel or may have avoided or cancelled the policy, the insurer shall, subject to the provisions of this section, pay to the person entitled to the benefit of the decree any sum not exceeding the sum assured payable thereunder, as if he were the judgment debtor, in respect of the liability, together with any amount payable in respect of costs and any sum payable in respect of interest on that sum by virtue of any enactment relating to interest on judgments. (2) No sum shall be payable by an insurer under sub-section (1) in respect of any judgment or award unless, before the commencement of the proceedings in which the judgment or award is given the insurer had notice through the Court or, as the case may be, the Claims Tribunal of the bringing of the proceedings, or in respect of such judgment or award so long as execution is stayed thereon pending an appeal; and an insurer to whom notice of the bringing of any such proceedings is so given shall be entitled to be made a party thereto and to defend the action on any of the following grounds, namely:— (a) that there has been a breach of a specified condition of the policy, being one of the following conditions, namely:— (i) a condition excluding the use of the vehicle— (a) for hire or reward, where the vehicle is on the date of the contract of insurance a vehicle not covered by a permit to ply for hire or reward, or (b) for organised racing and speed testing, or (c) for a purpose not allowed by the permit under which the vehicle is used, where the vehicle is a transport vehicle, or (d) without side-car being attached where the vehicle is a motor cycle; or (ii) a condition excluding driving by a named person or persons or by any person who is not duly licensed, or by any person who has been disqualified for holding or obtaining a driving licence during the period of disqualification; or (iii) a condition excluding liability for injury caused or contributed to by conditions of war, civil war, riot or civil commotion; or (b) that the policy is void on the ground that it was obtained by the non- disclosure of a material fact or by a representation of fact which was false in some material particular. (3) Where any such judgment as is referred to in sub-section (1) is obtained from a Court in a reciprocating country and in the case of a foreign judgment is, by virtue of the provisions of Section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) conclusive as to any matter adjudicated upon by it, the insurer (being an insurer registered under the Insurance Act, 1938 (4 of 1938) and whether or not he is registered under the corresponding law of the reciprocating country) shall be liable to the person entitled to the benefit of the decree in the manner and to the extent specified in sub-section (1), as if the judgment were given by a Court in India: Provided that no sum shall be payable by the insurer in respect of any such judgment unless, before the commencement of the proceedings in which the judgment is given, the insurer had notice through the Court concerned of the bringing of the proceedings and the insurer to whom notice is so given is entitled under the corresponding law of the reciprocating country, to be made a party to the proceedings and to defend the action on grounds similar to those specified in sub-section (2). (4) Where a certificate of insurance has been issued under sub-section (3) of Section 147 to the person by whom a policy has been effected, so much of the policy as purports to restrict the insurance of the persons insured thereby by reference to any condition other than those in clause (b) of sub-section (2) shall, as respects such liabilities as are required to be covered by a policy under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 147, be of no effect: Provided that any sum paid by the insurer in or towards the discharge of any liability of any person which is covered by the policy by virtue only of this sub-section shall be recoverable by the insurer from that person. (5) If the amount which an insurer becomes liable under this section to pay in respect of a liability incurred by a person insured by a policy exceeds the amount for which the insurer would apart from the provisions of this section be liable under the policy in respect of that liability, the insurer shall be entitled to recover the excess from that person. (6) In this section the expression “material fact” and “material particular” means, respectively a fact or particular of such a nature as to influence the judgment of a prudent insurer in determining whether he will take the risk and, if so, at what premium and on what conditions, and the expression “liability covered by the terms of the policy” means a liability which is covered by the policy or which would be so covered but for the fact that the insurer is entitled to avoid or cancel or has avoided or cancelled the policy. (7) No insurer to whom the notice referred to in sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) has been given shall be entitled to avoid his liability to any person entitled to the benefit of any such judgment or award as is referred to in sub-section (1) or in such judgment as is referred to in sub-section (3) otherwise than in the manner provided for in sub-section (2) or in the corresponding law of the reciprocating country, as the case may be. Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, “Claims Tribunal” means a Claims Tribunal constituted under Section 165 and “award” means an award made by that Tribunal under Section 168.” 10. While going through the record and second issue, I do not find that there is any breach of policy under the new Act as the accident occurred in the year 1991 and the submission that fitness of the vehicle had already expired on the date of accident and, therefore, the Insurance Company was not liable. This submission in the grounds of appeal is not substantiated by any evidence on record and hence the said ground fails and is negatived as there is no breach of policy conditions proved by the appellant - Insurance Company. 11. The submission is that the compensation awarded namely Rs. 2,40,000/- with 12% interest is excessive. While going through the record it is found that the deceased is survived by a widow and two minor children. The submission is that Rs. 30,000/- under the head of loss of consortium and loss of life is on higher side. The Tribunal while considering the totality of compensation as the deceased was aged 30 years give multiplier of 16 and that is how Rs. 1,60,000/- was ordered under the said Act. The submission is that Rs. 30,000/- under the head of loss of consortium and loss of life is on higher side. The Tribunal while considering the totality of compensation as the deceased was aged 30 years give multiplier of 16 and that is how Rs. 1,60,000/- was ordered under the said Act. The Tribunal did not give any amount under the head of future loss of income and added certain other amount and awarded a sum of Rs. 2,40,000/- to the claimants. While considering the rate of interest it is true that the normal rate of interest should have been 9% but considering the totality and facts and circumstances and the fact that no future prospect is considered. The rate of interest is also maintained. The compensation awarded for the death of the sole breadwinner, cannot said to be so excessive so as to called for any interference by this Court. 12. The appeal is dismissed. Interim order, if any, stands vacated.