ORDER : Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. Plaintiff in Title Suit No. 3 of 1999 instituted in the Court of Sub-Judge-Ist, Dhanbad is the petitioner herein. Respondent-B.C.C.L and its official were impleaded as principal defendants while other parties being the brothers of the plaintiffs were impleaded as proforma respondents. Plaintiff sought a decree as against the defendant nos. 1 to 3 declaring that Schedule' A' & 'B' premises are not public premises and have not vested with defendant no. 1 and that no proceedings in the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 can be initiated in respect of Schedule-A & B premises. As such the order passed in Eviction Case no. 29/86 is illegal, void and malafide and not binding upon the plaintiff. He further sought a declaration restraining the defendant nos. 1 to 2 from interfering with the plaintiff's possession over the Schedule 'A' & 'B' lands on the strength of the order passed in Eviction Case no. 29/86. On the relief being allowed consequential decree of cost was also prayed for. 3. The plaintiff contended through the plaint that after vesting of Zamindari under Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 the Jharia Raj Estate vested in the State of Bihar. Plot no. 69 of Khata no. 11 Mouza Dobari (Mouza No. 142) measuring an area 11.62 Acres were recorded in the name of B.N. Bagchi and Dobari Colliery in the last records of rights. Plot no. 85 of Khata no. 17 measure 15 Acres 13 Decimals in the said Mouza Dobari No. 142 were recorded as “Gair Abadk Malik” in the name of Raja Shiv Prasad Singh, the Zamindar of Jharia Raj Estate in the last records of right. 4. By a sale deed dated 22nd January, 1944, M/s. B.N. Bagchi and brothers Dobari Colliery Limited sold a portion of the said Plot no. 69 measuring 3.17 acres out of 11.62 acres to Shri Ram Bahadur Singh, father of the plaintiff for valuable consideration and put him in possession. After death of his father, plaintiff and proforma respondents were fully seized and possessed of Schedule' A' lands. It has further been pleaded that by a Hukumnama dated 21st July, 1945 Shri Jagat Narayan Singh, the ancestor of the plaintiff and proforma respondents took settlement of 11.58 acres of land out of 15.13 acres of Plot no. After death of his father, plaintiff and proforma respondents were fully seized and possessed of Schedule' A' lands. It has further been pleaded that by a Hukumnama dated 21st July, 1945 Shri Jagat Narayan Singh, the ancestor of the plaintiff and proforma respondents took settlement of 11.58 acres of land out of 15.13 acres of Plot no. 85 of the said Mouza Dobari No. 142 described as Schedule' B' property. After his death, his widow Smt. Parwati Devi gifted the Schedule' B' land to Shri Ram Bahadur Singh by a gift deed dated 22nd April, 1964 and from the date of said gift Shri Ram Bahadur Singh became fully seized and possessed of Schedule' B' land. Plaintiff and proforma respondents are therefore in possession of Schedule' B' land after the death of Ram Bahadur Singh. 5. The other averments relate to contention of plaintiff of incidences of his possession over Schedule' A' & 'B' land such as electrical connection, water connection and telephone connection etc. and that he has been paying rent to the State of Bihar etc. Plaintiff has thereafter contended that on declaration made by the Central Government under Coking Coal Mines (Emergency Provisions) Ordinance, 1971, the custodian did not take possession of Schedule' A' & 'B' lands as they are not belonging to any coal mine. Their possession was never questioned, disputed or obstructed. Thereafter on enactment of Coking Coal Mines (Nationalization) Act, 1972, Dobari Colliery was listed at serial no. 152 and compensation has been awarded to the owners by the Central Government. Under the said Act, management of all other coal mines were taken over by the Central Government. It has further contended that possession of the plaintiff over Schedule 'A' & 'B' premises were never disturbed or obstructed and they have continued in the peaceful possession to the knowledge of all concerned including defendant-B.C.C.L In the list of assets prepared by Valuation Committee appointed by the Central Government Schedule' A' & 'B' premises were not included consciously as they had not been nationalized. Therefore, Schedule' A' & 'B' premises could not be treated as a public land under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971. 6. Plaintiff based on these assertion raised a cause of action that defendant-B.C.C.L could not evict them from Schedule' A' & 'B' lands treating it to be a public premises covered under the Act of 1971. Therefore, Schedule' A' & 'B' premises could not be treated as a public land under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971. 6. Plaintiff based on these assertion raised a cause of action that defendant-B.C.C.L could not evict them from Schedule' A' & 'B' lands treating it to be a public premises covered under the Act of 1971. On orders passed in Eviction case no. 29/86 dated 18th September, 1998 against defendant nos. 4 and 5 only they came to learn that proceedings for eviction were being undertaken. Miscellaneous Appeal preferred by defendant no. 1 bearing no. 49 of 1998 was also pending before District Judge, IIIrd, Dhanbad. Plaintiff alleged that order passed in Case no. 29/86 is illegal, invalid and without jurisdiction. Plaintiff further asserted that in a summary proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971, questions of right, title, interest and possession cannot be decided. Based on these averments and cause of action, the relief as indicated in the foregoing paragraphs were sought for. 7. The suit was at the state of arguments after conclusion of evidence of plaintiff as well as contesting defendant-B.C.C.L when the application for impleadment of interveners under Order 1, Rule 10(2) of Civil Procedure Code was filed before learned Court. The application at Annexure-2 contends that interveners are the grandsons of Late Jagat Narain Singh from his only daughter, Smt. Dulari Devi and have necessary interest in the suit property described in Schedule' B' of the plaintiff. The interveners have therefore sought impleadment in the suit as according to them the plaintiff has sought declaration in respect of Schedule' A' & 'B' premises of plaint that is not a public premises and not vested in B.C.C.L. Interveners apprehended that on the basis of forged and fabricated documents of gift, the plaintiff would be able to get a declaration in their favour. Therefore, to avoid multiplicity of the suit, such a prayer for addition was made. This was objected by the plaintiff by filing a rejoinder/Annexure-3. Plaintiff also averred therein that Dulari Devi was the only daughter of Jagat Narayan Singh. Therefore, to avoid multiplicity of the suit, such a prayer for addition was made. This was objected by the plaintiff by filing a rejoinder/Annexure-3. Plaintiff also averred therein that Dulari Devi was the only daughter of Jagat Narayan Singh. After the death of Jagat Narayan Singh, his interest in those properties including the property described in Schedule B of the plaint devolved upon his widow Parvati Devi, who in consideration of love and affection towards Ram Bahadur Singh, gifted Schedule-B property to Shri Ram Bahadur Singh by gift deed dated 22nd April, 1964 and ever since Ram Bahadur Singh and his successors remained in possession thereof. They also contended that the proceedings for mutation were being held in the year 1991. The Circle Officer considered the objections filed by interveners and after proper inquiry as well as inspection in respect of Schedule' B' lands, came to the conclusion that lands under those mutation cases had been in exclusive possession of Ram Bahadur Singh and there was no illegality in those two gift deeds. The orders of mutation dated 26th August, 1991 and 28th September, 1991 were passed. The interveners never chose to approach any Civil Court being aggrieved by the claim of possession of schedule' B' properties, through gift deed executed by Parvati Devi to Ram Bahadur Singh. 8. Counsel for the petitioner submits that in the background of the aforesaid averments and relief that is being sought in the Title Suit, the interveners cannot have any reason to seek impleadment as no relief has been sought for against them. The relief even if granted would not amount to a declaration of right, title, interest and possession of the plaintiff over the suit property. If the interveners have a dispute in relation to claim of ownership and possession over the suit property that may be an independent cause of action for them, if permissible in law subject to period of limitation to be raised through an independent suit. Therefore, at the fagend of the proceedings, impleadment of interveners would be an unnecessary exercise leading to recasting of issues; adducing of further evidence and rehearing of the suit, which has been instituted in 1990. The interveners do not have any justification to seek impleadment after 11 years of the institution of the suit at the time of its final argument. 9. Learned counsel for the interveners/respondent no. The interveners do not have any justification to seek impleadment after 11 years of the institution of the suit at the time of its final argument. 9. Learned counsel for the interveners/respondent no. 8 submits that impleadment of interveners was necessary for proper an effective adjudication of the suit. Plaintiff has in the averment made in the plaint set up a false case of his ownership and possession over Schedule' B' properties as well. The claim based upon a gift deed of 1964 is also not consistent on their part as time and again they have been relying upon different gift deeds such as unregistered gift deed of 1965. In case, interveners are not impleaded as necessary party in the suit, miscarriage of justice may also result. Their impleadment was also necessary to avoid multiplicity of proceeding. 10. Counsel for contesting Respondent-B.C.C.L has submitted that the relief is directed against the BCCL in relation to status of properties as a public premises. Even if the relief is granted, assumingly, in favour of plaintiff, it would be no way determine the ownership of the plaintiff vis-a-vis any other party which may be an inter se dispute between them. At the fag end of proceeding, therefore, such impleadment was wholly uncalled for. 11. Considered the submission of learned counsel for the parties and the relevant material facts pleaded and gone through the impugned order. On a broad conspectus of the facts which have been narrated in the foregoing paragraphs, this Court is also of the opinion that plaintiff by way of instant suit has not sought any declaration of its own right, title, interest and possession over the suit properties. They have sought a declaration to the effect that Schedule' A' & 'B' premises are not public premises and have not vested in defendant no. 1-B.C.C.L. Therefore, proceedings under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 could not lie against the plaintiff. Surprisingly interveners, if were aggrieved by any acts of defendant no.1-B.C.C.L in treating the schedule properties as public premises and had independent cause of action to seek any such declaration never sought any such declaration. If the interveners had a cause of action with the plaintiff or the proforma respondents over claim of ownership, title or possession in respect of Schedule' B' properties they could pursue it in an independent suit subject to all permissible limitation in law. If the interveners had a cause of action with the plaintiff or the proforma respondents over claim of ownership, title or possession in respect of Schedule' B' properties they could pursue it in an independent suit subject to all permissible limitation in law. Even otherwise, declaration in the nature sought for, in the instant suit could in no manner bind the interveners, if they are not parties in the instant suit. At the fag end of the proceedings in 2010 in a suit instituted in 1999, impleadment sought for by the interveners was wholly unnecessary and unjustified. Learned Trial Court however seems to have been guided by inter se claim of interveners vis-a-vis, the plaintiff or proforma respondents over the subject matter of the suit property in directing their impleadment at that stage. However as has been observed hereinabove, interveners if had an independent cause of action against the plaintiffs/proforma respondents in respect of title, ownership and possession over the Schedule' B' property they would not be denied such claim by any declaration made in the instant suit. The impleadment of interveners would also unnecessary prolong the suit and delay the conclusion of trial. 12. In the case of Kasturi Vs. Iyyamperumal and others reported in (2005) 6 SCC 733 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under: “16. That apart, from a plain reading of the expression used in sub-rule (2), Order1 Rule 10 C.P.C “all the questions involved in the suit” it is abundantly clear that the legislature clearly meant that the controversies raised as between the parties to the litigation must be gone into only, that is to say, controversies with regard to the right which is set up and the relief claimed on one side and denied on the other and not the controversies which may arise between the plaintiff-appellant and the defendants inter se or questions between the parties to the suit and a third party. In our view, therefore, the court cannot allow adjudication of collateral matters so as to convert a suit for specific performance of contract for sale into a complicated suit for title between the plaintiff-appellant on one hand and Respondents 2 and 3 and Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 on the other.” 13. In the case of Mumbai International Airport Private Ltd. Vs. In the case of Mumbai International Airport Private Ltd. Vs. Regency Convention Centre and Hotels Private Limited and others reported in (2010) 7 SCC 417 , Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the principles governing impleadment of parties under Order 1 Rule 10(2) of Code of Civil Procedure has held as follows at paras: “13. The general rule in regard to impleadment of parties is that the plaintiff in a suit, being dominus litis, may choose the persons against whom he wishes to litigate and cannot be compelled to sue a person against whom he does not seek any relief. Consequently, a person who is not a party has no right to be impleaded against the wishes of the plaintiff. But that general rule is subject to the provisions of Order 1 Rule 10(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure ('the Code”, for short), which provides for impleadment of proper or necessary parties. The said sub-rule is extracted below: “10.(2) Court may strike out or add parties. The court may at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the court to be just, order that the name of any party improperly joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, be struck out, and that the name of any person who ought to have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the court may be necessary in order to enable the court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added.” 14. The said provision makes it clear that a court may, at any stage of the proceedings (inducing suits for specific performance), either upon or even without any application, and on such terms as may appear to it to be just, direct that any of the following persons may be added as a party: (a) any person who ought to have been joined as plaintiff or defendant, but not added; or (b) any person whose presence before the court may be necessary in order to enable the court to effectively and completely adjudicate upon and settle the questions involved in the suit. In short, the court is given the discretion to add as a party, any person who is found to be a necessary party or proper party. 15. In short, the court is given the discretion to add as a party, any person who is found to be a necessary party or proper party. 15. A “necessary party” is a person who ought to have been joined as a party and in whose absence no effective decree could be passed at all by the court. If a “necessary party” is not impleaded, the suit itself is liable to be dismissed. A “proper party” is a party who, though not a necessary party, is a person whose presence would enable the court to completely, effectively and adequately adjudicate upon all matters in dispute in the suit, though he need not be a person in favour of or against whom the decree is to be made. If a person is not found to be a proper or necessary party, the court has no jurisdiction to implead him, against the wishes of the plaintiff. 14. Hon'ble Supreme Court also gave some illustrations regarding exercise of discretion under sub-rule and went on to hold at para-25 as under: 25. In other words, the court has the discretion to either to allow or reject an application of a person claiming to be a proper party, depending upon the facts and circumstances and no person has a right to insist that he should be impleaded as a party, merely because he is a proper party. 15. In view of the principles of law governing the impleadment of parties under Order 1 Rule 10(2) of Code of Civil Procedure, this Court is also of the considered opinion, in totality of the aforesaid facts and circumstances and the reasons discussed hereinabove that the impugned order deserves to be set aside. Accordingly, it is quashed. Consequently, writ petition is allowed. 16. Interim order dated 4.1.2011 stands vacated.