JUDGMENT : SAMBUDDHA CHAKRABARTI, J. "For where justice is destroyed by injustice, and truth by falsehood, while the judges there look on, they are destroyed". "When justice is destroyed, it destroys; when justice is protected, it protects. Therefore justice must not be destroyed, or justice destroyed may kill us." Manusmriti, VIII, 14 and 15. W. Doniger and Brian K. Smith (Tr. and ed.) The Laws of Manu, (Penguin Books India, 2000), p. 153. "When it is impossible to act up to the precepts of Sacred Law, it becomes necessary to adopt a method founded on reasoning, because custom decides everything and overrules the sacred law." Naradasmriti, Introduction, 40 (F. Max Muller (ed.) and Julius Jolly (tr.), - The Sacred Books of the East: The Minor Law-Books, (Delhi, 2011), p. 15. 2. The petitioner challenges the validity of two termination letters being dated October 31, 2016 and November 10, 2016 respectively jointly annexed to the writ petition as Annexure P-1, and prays for a direction upon the respondents to allow him to join the service as a security guard of the respondent No. 1, and for other reliefs. 3. The case of the petitioner is that he was appointed as a contractual employee of the Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd., i.e., respondent No. 1. On or about November 17, 2016, he received an envelope containing two termination letters as mentioned above from which he came to learn that his service had been terminated by the Senior Manager, Operations, i.e. respondent No. 2 on October 31, 2016 and consequently, M/s. Rajesh Kumar Verma Security Agency, i.e., respondent No. 4 has also terminated his service by the second letter dated November 10, 2016. 4. The petitioner claims that he, like many others, were all contractual workers working under different security agencies and were employed by different government undertakings. Right from the very start of his career he had been working in the respondent No. 1 Corporation. It has been a long standing grievance of the petitioner and the others similarly circumstanced as he that there had been discrimination between the regular and contractual employees which culminated in filing of a writ petition in the year 2001 which was disposed of by an order, dated June 12, 2003. 5. Pursuant to the said order a tripartite agreement was arrived at amongst the respondent No. 1, Swastik Security and Allied Services and another Union. 5. Pursuant to the said order a tripartite agreement was arrived at amongst the respondent No. 1, Swastik Security and Allied Services and another Union. It was decided that the said security service would not retrench the security guards except grounds of misconduct, superannuation and medical grounds. 6. After receiving the letters of termination, the union to which he belongs, forwarded a detailed representation to the respondents with a prayer to recall the impugned termination letter and allow the petitioner to join his duty. It is the stand of the petitioner that his service could be terminated only if one of the three grounds mentioned in the tripartite agreement was satisfied. In his case none of them. 7. In spite of the representation and the subsequent demand of justice he was not allowed to join his duties with effect from December 1, 2016. This has compelled him to approach this Court. 8. The writ petition was contested by the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 by filing an affidavit-in-opposition. The answering respondents have taken a preliminary objection about the maintainability of the writ petition that the petitioner had not exhausted the alternative remedy available under the Industrial Disputes Act and, therefore, the same should not be entertained by the High Court. It is one of the objections of the respondents that whenever a writ petition is filed for enforcement of a right flowing from any statutory enactment and wherever there is a specific forum provided for the same, High Court should decline to entertain the writ petition. A next point of objection taken by the respondents was that the petitioner was appointed by the respondent No. 4 as such there was no employer and employee relationship between them. As such, the petitioner does not have any locus to file the petition against the answering respondents. 9. In response to the allegation made by the petitioner that there was a tripartite agreement arrived at in consequence of the order passed by this Court the respondents stated that he was not a party to the said petition and, therefore, could not claim any advantage to the same and even if it is admitted that any terms of the said agreement was violated, the grievance of the petitioner could not be entertained by the High Court while exercising judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. With regard to the merits of the writ petition, it has been the specific case of the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 that contractors engaged their own contract workmen and the answering respondents have absolutely no voice in the selection, appointment, supervision, working conditions and/or termination of the said contract labourers. The concerned contractors depute their supervisors who supervise the jobs and give instructions to these contract workmen in line with the job description required to be carried out under the contract. The contractors are required to comply with the statutory provisions under various laws applicable to them. 10. Pursuant to an office memorandum used by the Government of India, the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 had awarded a contract to the respondent No. 4 on April 6, 2016 for providing the security service at Mourigram TOP. For that the respondent No. 4 deployed four security guards, including the petitioner at the said establishment. 11. Since the establishment at Mourigram TOP is a hospitality location due to administrative reasons lesser number of security guards at the said location was required. The respondent No. 2 being the location-in-charge advised the security contractor to supply only two security guards. Pursuant to the said the respondent No. 4 discontinued the service of two contract security guards, including the petitioner. 12. It has been the stand of the answering respondents that the petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent No. 2 as he did not issue any communication directly to the petitioner. Since the respondent No. 4 had engaged the petitioner only for execution of the jobs under the contract upon reduction of manpower requirement the respondent No. 4 discontinued the service of the petitioner. It has, however, been admitted that while writing the letter to the respondent No. 4, the respondent No. 2 could not communicate in proper words the objective of the answering respondents to him for reduction of two contract security guards and inadvertently he mentioned the names of the two contract security guards. The management of the answering respondents has sensitized the respondent No. 2 to be careful in future while making such communications. The answering respondents have no personal complaints against the petitioner. The management of the answering respondents has sensitized the respondent No. 2 to be careful in future while making such communications. The answering respondents have no personal complaints against the petitioner. Even otherwise also the respondent No. 2 has no authority to terminate the service of even the permanent workmen of the answering respondents which lies with the officers of the rank of General Manager in the capacity of disciplinary authority. Thus, the question of termination of service of the contract security guard by the respondent No. 2 does not arise. 13. It has been stated that the tripartite agreement dated March 4, 2003, has no legal force as two of the parties out of the three are no more in existence. An alternative case made out by the respondents is that even if the answering respondents had violated the terms of the said agreement any grievance about the same cannot be entertained by the High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The respondents have also questioned the locus standi of the Union to make the representation. The affidavit specifically says that the communication made by the respondent No. 2 inadvertently mentioned the names of the two security guards though the same was not his intention. The answering respondents have reiterated that it is the choice of the contractor whom he wishes to engage under the contract and the respondents do not maintain any record whether any security guard who had been engaged by the previous contractor has been engaged by the subsequent contractor also. The respondents have prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. 14. The petitioner has filed an affidavit-in-reply to the affidavit-in-opposition of the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 denying the allegations of the said respondents and reiterating the stand of the petitioner in the writ petition itself. It is not necessary for the present purpose to deal in details with the averments in the affidavit-in-reply. Suffice, however, it to say that the petitioner has taken a very specific point that the termination letter dated October 31, 2016, clearly indicates that the subject matter of the said communication was the termination of the two security staff and it was decided that two security staff shall be terminated, the petitioner being one of them. If the answering respondents had no say in the service condition of the petitioner they should not have issued such a letter. If the answering respondents had no say in the service condition of the petitioner they should not have issued such a letter. The petitioner has alleged that the respondents have deliberately misinterpreted the letter dated October 31, 2016. 15. The respondent No. 4 appeared only on January 12, 2017, when the direction for affidavits was passed. Thereafter, it did not appear and also did not file any affidavit-in-opposition. Although the petitioner had filed an affidavit-in-reply to the affidavit-in-opposition affirmed by the respondent No. 4 since no such affidavit-in-opposition was filed in Court, the same need not be taken into consideration. 16. I have considered the objections taken by the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 in their affidavit-in-opposition to the maintainability of the writ petition. However, when this matter was moved as a listed motion the respondents did not take any specific objection to the same and even if it is permissible for a respondent to take such a point at any stage of the proceeding, it will not be in the interest of justice to dismiss the writ petition at the final hearing of the proceeding. Had the respondents taken such a plea the Court might have considered it as a preliminary issue. It may, however, be noted that but for taking the point in the affidavit-in-opposition, Mr. Chowdhury the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 did not take up this point in course of making his submissions to the Court. He concentrated on the merits of the case. 17. The short question that falls for consideration in the present writ petition is whether the petitioner is entitled to any relief for the letter of termination issued by the respondent No. 4. For Mr. Chowdhury, the defence was very obvious and largely predictable to the case made out by the petitioner that he was not terminated pursuant to the communication from the respondent No. 2, Mr. Chowdhury submitted that there was nothing binding the respondent No. 4 to act in terms of the said communication from the respondent No. 2. Even if a wrong communication was made by the respondent No. 2, the respondent No. 4 was not required to follow the same. He could have, if he wanted to seek any clarification referred the matter to the respondent No. 2. Even if a wrong communication was made by the respondent No. 2, the respondent No. 4 was not required to follow the same. He could have, if he wanted to seek any clarification referred the matter to the respondent No. 2. Without taking resort to this more cautious step, the respondent No. 4 had terminated the service of the petitioner. But for that the respondents Corporation cannot be connected to the process of termination. 18. Before the merit of the submission of the Corporation is considered, it is necessary to mention that in course of hearing, on May 18, 2017 the Court had requested Mr. Chowdhury to explore if the respondents Nos. 1 to 3 were willing to pay any compensation to the petitioner for the admittedly mistaken communication made by them. On June 23, 2017 when the matter was next taken up, Mr. Chowdhury submitted that he had had a talk with his client and they had rejected the proposal. It is clarified that the Court did not make any proposal, far from it. It was only seeking a clarification whether any such compensation was within their contemplation. 19. Transcending the strict legalistic view taken by the respondents there is something more underlying at the core of it which is willy-nilly attracted in the present case. A cardinal aspect of the matter has a disturbing impact. Even if the legalistic stand taken by the respondents Corporation is in the ultimate analysis found to be valid, should it be proper for the Court to leave the matter that when the legalism of the stand taken wholly ignores positive shreds of a distinct moral fiber, not to be easily brushed aside by making an artificial dichotomy between their respective areas of operation? 20. Since this aspect of the matter was broached by the Court, Mr. Chowdhury wanted to dissuade the Court from approaching the issue with the ethical angularities, by relying on the case of Ramchandra Bhagat v. State of Jharkhand, reported in (2010) 13 SCC 780 . There the disagreement between law and morality per se was brought into the fore obviously to lay down the course of action to be followed. 21. Mr. Chowdhury wanted to dissuade the Court from approaching the issue with the ethical angularities, by relying on the case of Ramchandra Bhagat v. State of Jharkhand, reported in (2010) 13 SCC 780 . There the disagreement between law and morality per se was brought into the fore obviously to lay down the course of action to be followed. 21. Mr. Chowdhury has taken me through certain portions of the judgment where an anecdote concerning Sir Thomas More was recorded that he turned down the request of his daughter to get a man arrested only because he had broken the law of God. More answered that in such a case God may arrest him. "I arrest a man only if he has broken a law of parliament," was his answer. 22. The underlying message of the anecdote is loud and clear. Another learned Judge while accepting the position that law and morality might stand on a different footing and though they are inextricably linked agreed that a legal decision cannot be based purely on morality. 23. While the points raised by Mr. Chowdhury are far too well-settled, particularly, in the development of post-Positivist legal process in the West, there may still be circumstances and situations justifying revisiting the issue at least in the limited context of this particular case. Such requirement of a revisit is fundamentally warranted by the very different directions and purposes that law and morality seek to achieve. A former professor of Harvard University brought out their respective areas of operations incisively and in her wonted perspicacity: "Law, in short, is social, objective and coercive; morals are individual, subjective and voluntary. The first deals with men in gross, in generalities; the latter seeks the personal and particular. The law, lastly, is more modest in its demands, insisting only on abstention from what is forbidden, while morality demands the willing fulfillment of positive duties. In law an agent may act for us; to be moral, we must carry out our responsibilities ourselves. Either because it is in its "essence" limited, or as a matter of psychological fact, law cannot make us good Samaritans." [Judith N. Shklar - Legalism: Law, Morals and Political Trials (Harvard, 1986, First Indian Reprint, 2012), p. 44] 24. In law an agent may act for us; to be moral, we must carry out our responsibilities ourselves. Either because it is in its "essence" limited, or as a matter of psychological fact, law cannot make us good Samaritans." [Judith N. Shklar - Legalism: Law, Morals and Political Trials (Harvard, 1986, First Indian Reprint, 2012), p. 44] 24. Howsoever the respondents might seek to establish that the termination of the petitioner has nothing to do with the communication made by the respondent No. 2 it is undeniably obvious and obviously undeniable that the concerned letter must have had a big role to play in the decision making process of the respondent No. 4. The stand taken by the respondents that the concerned establishment was a hospitality location and, therefore, the requirement of a lesser number of security staff was advised, was only part of the communication. The letter of the respondent No. 2 did not stop at that. It did mention the names of two security personnel whose services were not required. Moreover, this was mentioned to be a decision taken by the top management of the concerned Corporation. 25. If the case, as sought to be made out by the respondents, that there was no employer and employee relationship between the petitioner and the respondent No. 1 or who shall be engaged by the contractor is not within the control or even not a look out of the respondent Corporation is to be accepted, the respondents are further required to answer why the two names were specifically mentioned in the communication. Mentioning two names of the security personnel belies an effort to establish an idyllic and dignified aloofness from the whole process. 26. The argument that the security contractor was not required to follow the directive of the principal employer is more a legal one than practically feasible. Regard being had to the common course of human conduct, particularly, in view of the prevailing norm in the realm of employment through contract labour, it can never be expected that when a specific directive is received from the principal employer intimating that the services of two persons by name are not necessary, the contractor would dare flouting it. So also must be his disinclination to prove himself impetuous in not seeking a clarification for the direction. So also must be his disinclination to prove himself impetuous in not seeking a clarification for the direction. More often than not he is not seen treading risky path of either annoying the principal employer or even incurring his displeasure. His business interest dictates him to avoid such a course of action. 27. Thus a contractor is not expected to disobey the instruction of a principal employer. For him, it is a choice between sacrificing a contract labourer and the principal employer. Faced with such a situation his choice is practically reduced to the obvious. And he did exactly the same. 28. Moreover, by admitting in the affidavit that the concerned official was not correct in mentioning the two names, the respondent No. 1 Corporation has practically admitted its fault. After such an admission, I am afraid, they should not be allowed to morally deny any obligation for its outcome, including the subsequent suffering of the petitioner. 29. It, however, has to be reckoned that fixing the moral obligation of the respondent No. 1 Corporation and deciding the remedy for the same are two entirely different exercises. The petitioner submitted that till the conclusion of the hearing of the writ petition the contractor did not give him any employment. The obvious and the most expected plea of the Corporation that there was no bar upon the contractor to engage the petitioner in any other establishment nor is there any employer and employee relationship between it and the petitioner may not really be a very ethical stand wholly repudiating the claim of the petitioner. For a contractor immediately securing an alternative employment may be easier said than done. That the directive of the Corporation to terminate the engagement of the petitioner did play a very crucial role upon the decision of the contractor should be taken to be beyond doubt. Therefore it should not morally disown the same taking shelter behind the legalism. 30. This is a case where the stand taken by the Corporation is at variance with the moral dictates. Even if one accepts all the submissions of Mr. Chowdhury, one is equally compelled to recognize that at least for some period, but for the communication made by the Corporation, the petitioner would not have been out of employment. 30. This is a case where the stand taken by the Corporation is at variance with the moral dictates. Even if one accepts all the submissions of Mr. Chowdhury, one is equally compelled to recognize that at least for some period, but for the communication made by the Corporation, the petitioner would not have been out of employment. I do not direct the Corporation to make good the financial loss of the petitioner for the whole period he remains out of employment, but at least for a very tiny period the Corporation should be, warranted by the moral compulsion arising out of the situation such as this, be directed to make good the loss suffered by the petitioner. I consider a period of three months should be sufficient for which the Corporation may be directed to compensate the petitioner's financial loss. 31. I, therefore, direct the respondent No. 1 Corporation to pay Rs. 50,000/- to the petitioner within a period of four weeks from the date of communication of the order towards making good the loss caused by an impetuous communication on behalf of the respondent No. 1 Corporation. 32. With the direction as above, the writ petition is disposed of. 33. There shall be no order as to the costs. 34. Urgent Photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, be supplied to the parties on priority basis upon compliance of all requisite formalities. Later After I dictated the judgment in Court, Mr. Kundu, the learned Advocate for the respondents Nos. 1 to 3 prays for stay of the operation of the order. I have considered the prayer. For the reasons discussed above in details this is not a fit case for the grant of the stay of the order. The prayer is heard, considered and rejected.