JUDGMENT & ORDER : Mr. Sanjeev Prakash Sharma, J. 1. Petitioner, by way of this writ petition, has assailed the award dated 17/06/1997 passed by the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal, Ajmer (hereinafter referred as ‘Labour Court’). 2. The State Government vide reference dated 12/11/1991 referred the matter to the Labour Court to answer the question as to whether the action of the Principal, Mayo College, Ajmer in terminating services of the workman Shri Sajjan Singh (petitioner herein) on 01/11/1980 is legal and justified and if not, what relief the workman is entitled to be granted ? 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner was initially appointed on daily wages basis as a Chokidar (Class IV) in May, 1980 by submitting an application dated 20/05/1980 to the respondent-college through its Principal who marked on the said application and verbally told the petitioner to start work in the Mayo College as the Principal, Mayo College was the Secretary of the Mayo College General Council which controlled both i.e. the Mayo College as well as the Mayur School. It was submitted that the services of the petitioner were discontinued by verbal termination order on 01/11/1980. The same was allegedly done on account of not vacating the house allotted to the petitioner’s elder brother Madan Singh who had gone abroad. It was submitted that the petitioner was also residing in the same quarter along with family of his elder brother. The respondent No. 2 also instituted a civil suit for vacating the petitioner from the said quarter and he raised an industrial dispute vide application dated 26/12/1989 challenging his oral termination. The Conciliation Officer submitted failure report and the petitioner submitted a statement of claim before the Labour Court. The Labour Court allowed the petitioner to implead respondent No. 3- Mayur School also as party. The respondents got two witnesses examined on their behalf. It was submitted that the Labour Court has failed to examine the case in its true perspective and has proceeded in a cursory manner and has read the evidence of the witnesses in a perverse and unjustified fashion. The respondents got two witnesses examined on their behalf. It was submitted that the Labour Court has failed to examine the case in its true perspective and has proceeded in a cursory manner and has read the evidence of the witnesses in a perverse and unjustified fashion. The Labour Court has given a finding that the petitioner could not prove his appointment as Chokidar in Mayur School on permanent basis and has treated application of the petitioner dated 20/05/1980 as an appointment order whereas the petitioner has nowhere claimed that the letter dated 20/05/1980 was an appointment letter. The letter dated 20/05/1980 was merely an application submitted by him for seeking appointment and the same was marked to the PA to Mayur School. The reasons submitted by the petitioner of termination were also not looked into and the allegation of malice alleged by the petitioner was also not looked into. The fact that Mayur School and Mayo College are sister educational institutions and the Secretary, Mayo College himself was defending the case and was presenting the case on behalf of Mayo Society were all overlooked and thus the award is vitiated in law and ought to be set aside. 4. Learned counsel for the respondents, while supporting the award, has raised certain legal objections. It is submitted that even if this Court reaches to the conclusion that the Labour Court has not examined the claim of the petitioner in its true perspective, the relief could not have been granted to the petitioner in view of his raising the dispute after a long delay. It is submitted that the work of the petitioner was confined to the period from 20/05/1980 to 01/11/1980 and it has also come on record that thereafter regular selection was conducted where the petitioner also participated but could not be selected as a Chokidar. It is further submitted that several years have gone by and even the writ petition is pending since 1998 and after about 19 years of the pendency of the writ petition and as many as 37 years form the date of termination, the relief of reinstatement otherwise cannot be granted to the petitioner. It is further submitted that several years have gone by and even the writ petition is pending since 1998 and after about 19 years of the pendency of the writ petition and as many as 37 years form the date of termination, the relief of reinstatement otherwise cannot be granted to the petitioner. Counsel for the respondents has relied upon the judgments passed by the Apex Court in the case of M/s. Shalimar Works Limited v. Their Workmen: AIR 1959(SC) 1217 where the Apex Court has nonsuited the workmen on the ground of four years of delay; in the case of The Nedungadi Bank Ltd. v. K.P. Madhavankutty and others: AIR 2000 (SC) 839 where the Apex Court non-suited the workmen on the ground of seven years of delay and in the case of Prabhakar v. Joint Director, Sericulture Department and another : (2015) 15 SCC 1 where the delay has been considered as material. 5. This Court has considered the submissions made by counsel for the parties. Admittedly, much water has flown down the river since the so-called termination of the petitioner from the post of Chokidar has taken place. In the case of Prabhakar v. Joint Director, Sericulture Department and another (supra), the Apex Court has observed as under:- “38. It is now a well-recognised principle of jurisprudence that a right not exercised for a long time is non-existent. Even when there is no limitation period prescribed by any statute relating to certain proceedings, in such cases courts have coined the doctrine of laches and delays as well as doctrine of acquiescence and non-suited the litigants who approached the Court belatedly without any justifiable explanation for bringing the action after unreasonable delay. Doctrine of laches is in fact an application of maxim of equity “delay defeats equities”. 39. This principle is applied in those cases where discretionary orders of the court are claimed, such as specific performance, permanent or temporary injunction, appointment of Receiver, etc. These principles are also applied in the writ petitions filed under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution of India. In such cases, courts can still refuse relief where the delay on the petitioner’s part has prejudiced the respondent even though the petitioner might have come to court within the period prescribed by the Limitation Act.” 6. These principles are also applied in the writ petitions filed under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution of India. In such cases, courts can still refuse relief where the delay on the petitioner’s part has prejudiced the respondent even though the petitioner might have come to court within the period prescribed by the Limitation Act.” 6. In view of what has been discussed herein above, this Court does not find it appropriate to examine the validity/legality of the termination order after a period of 37 years and it would be thus fit to give quietus to the litigation and non-suit the petitioner-workman for reinstatement or other relief though for reasons other than what the Labour Court has given in its award dated 17/06/1997. 7. Accordingly, taking into consideration that the termination order was passed in the year 1980 and the petitioner had only worked for few months in the year 1980 and the reference was made in the year 1991, the writ petition is dismissed on the ground of delay and latches.