ORDER : Rakesh Kumar, J. 1. The petitioner, has invoked writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, for the following reliefs:-- (i) To quash the resolution bearing Memo No. 1469 dated 6.2.2008 whereby and whereunder Appeal preferred by the petitioner against the punishment order dated 2.4.2007 has been rejected in a most mechanical manner without applying independent judicial mind as well as without hearing the delinquent officer and is not sustainable in the eye of law and said order is cryptic one. (ii) To quash the resolution bearing Memo No. 3573 dated 2.4.2007 issued under the signature of Sri Rajendra Prasad, Under Secretary to the Govt., Personnel and Administrative Reforms Department, Govt., of Bihar, Patna whereby and whereunder after conclusion of departmental proceeding initiated against the petitioner in terms of Rule 55 of Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930 two punishments namely (i) Censure for the year (1994-95), and (ii) stoppage of two increments with cumulative effect has been imposed against the petitioner by the disciplinary authority without considering the defence submitted by the petitioner in complete violation of principle of natural justice as well as norms settled for departmental proceeding." Short fact of the case is that the petitioner while was posted as Sub-Divisional Officer, Samastipur vide letter No. 3048 dated 22.4.2000 was asked to file his show cause in respect of charges as incorporated in Vide letter dated 22nd April, 2000 the petitioner was asked to file his reply in respect of eight charges allegedly committed by him during the year 1993-94. Regarding the aforesaid charge the District Magistrate, Kaimur-Bhabhua had recommended for initiation of departmental proceeding. Petitioner, thereafter submitted his reply denying the charges leveled against him and prayed for his exoneration. However, in the year 2002 the Government of Bihar resolved to initiate regular departmental proceeding under Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930 (hereafter referred to as "CCA. Rules, 1930") for the aforesaid eight charges, which are as follows:-- (I) That in the year 1993 while the petitioner was posted as Chakbandi Officer, Chand/Chainpur and Incharge Anchaladhikari, Bhabua, Dy. Collector, Record Room was unauthorizedly absent during that period without the prior permission of the Collector. The then Collector directed the then S.D.O., Bhabua to give warning to the petitioner that he will not leave the headquarter without prior permission of the Collector. Collector, Record Room was unauthorizedly absent during that period without the prior permission of the Collector. The then Collector directed the then S.D.O., Bhabua to give warning to the petitioner that he will not leave the headquarter without prior permission of the Collector. (II) That the petitioner was deputed as Magistrate-in-charge by the order of S.D.O., Bhabua to conduct peaceful Intermediate Examination, 1993 at Bhupesh Gupta College, Bhabua but he did not perform his duty nor gave satisfactory explanation asked by S.D.O., Bhabua, so the petitioner was found prima facie guilty for disobeying the order of Higher officials. (III) That when the petitioner was in additional charge of Circle Officer, Bhabua the Public Account Committee of Bihar Vidhan Sabha blamed the petitioner that he had disposed of several mutation cases after handing over charges. Charge against him is proved in Mutation Case No. 1150/93-94 that he had mutated the name in post dated and sent record after 25 days of his handing over charges to his successor. (IV) That the petitioner had misused the power in the matter of Integrated Rural Development Program in not timely forwarding petition to the bank concerned and kept them pending. The petitioner sent the selected beneficier's petition to the concerned bank with a comment that "after payment of rent of session 1993-94 the petition should be accepted". These allegations were personally enquired by the then D.M. and after the allegations were found against him true, he commented that the petitioner has put a new method in collecting rent and if this will be done by all the circle officers then this scheme shall be closed. (V) That the petitioner has ignored the order of the then D.M. i.e. not to give public dealing works to Yogendra Ram, Karamchari after revoking the suspension of the said Karamchari but the petitioner ignoring the order of the D.M., gave contract work to the said Karamchari for construction of room near Patel Chauk, Bhabua and gave Rs. 56,587/- as an advance. In spite of this the petitioner gave the said karamchari the charges of mutation, supply and another important works. When this matter was noticed by the Collector, then the Collector cancelled the order of the petitioner vide letter No. 322/Establishment dated 22.3.1994. This allegation is proved against the petitioner. 56,587/- as an advance. In spite of this the petitioner gave the said karamchari the charges of mutation, supply and another important works. When this matter was noticed by the Collector, then the Collector cancelled the order of the petitioner vide letter No. 322/Establishment dated 22.3.1994. This allegation is proved against the petitioner. (VI) That without obtaining sanction from District Administration in July 1994 the petitioner made one Deeleep Singh, Muharrir of Chakbandi Office, Chainpur, Incharge of Mutation, supply, settlement, encroachment and homestead work in Bhabua Anchal. When the new Anchaladhikari joined in Bhabua in August 1994 and after knowledge of irregularities done by the petitioner then he removed Deeleep Singh from Anchal works. Prima facie this allegation is proved against the petitioner. (VII) That the petitioner was given planning for construction of school building in Village-Pokhara under Bhabua Anchal. The M.L.A. Shri Vijay Shankar Pandey made allegation against the petitioner that he knowingly and intentionally was not allowing the work to be completed. He intentionally misleaded the M.L.A. that there is no way for going in the village. Explanation was asked by District Administration vide letter No. 1246 dated 10.4.1994. After explanation was received from the petitioner the then Collector ordered the petitioner to complete the said works till 15.6.1994, but he had not completed the works in time. Hence the allegation against the petitioner has been proved. (VIII) That without prior permission of District Magistrate the petitioner appointed one Anwar Alam, IVth Grade employee as contractor for making 20 shops which was going to be constructed with the help of public. The said work was not to be allotted to a IVth Grade employee which was against law. Even after objection by beneficiaries and Administration the petitioner had not changed Anwar Alam. Later on advance money was recovered from him." 2. By the said resolution Departmental Enquiry Commissioner, Personnel and Administrative Reforms Department was appointed as the Conducting Officer and the District Magistrate, Kaimur-Bhabhua was asked to suggest name of a senior officer for being appointed as Presenting Officer. The petitioner by the said resolution was asked to file his reply in his defence within fifteen days. In compliance with the said resolution dated 24.9.2002 the petitioner again submitted his written defence explaining his innocence regarding each charges and prayed for exonerating him. The petitioner by the said resolution was asked to file his reply in his defence within fifteen days. In compliance with the said resolution dated 24.9.2002 the petitioner again submitted his written defence explaining his innocence regarding each charges and prayed for exonerating him. The petitioner has pleaded in the writ petition that the Departmental Enquiry Commissioner had noticed several irregularities in the initiation of departmental proceedings. Even there were defects in the memo of charge, and thereafter, the Conducting Officer had asked the Administrative Department to remove the defects for initiation of departmental proceeding and thereafter, the petitioner was asked to appear for preliminary enquiry on 14.6.2004. The petitioner thereafter filed supplementary written defence before the Departmental Enquiry Commissioner vide his letter dated 24.8.2004 (Annexure-"8" to the writ petition) and he also requested for granting him permission to orally present his remaining defence before the Enquiry Officer. Finally, the Enquiry Officer in its report found charge Nos. 5, 6 and 8 as proved, charge Nos. 2 and 4 were found partly proved and charge Nos. 1, 3, 7 were not found proved. After receipt of enquiry report the disciplinary authority communicating enquiry report to the delinquent/petitioner asked for his second show cause. Subsequently, vide letter No. 10867 dated 27th October, 2006 (Annexure-"11" series) the disciplinary authority partly differing with the enquiry report in respect of charge No. 3 asked for explanation from the petitioner, which according to the petitioner was replied vide letter dated 9.11.2006. Thereafter, the disciplinary authority by the impugned order i.e. the order contained in memo No. 3573 dated 2.4.2007 imposed two punishments under Rule 55 of the CCA. Rules, 1930, namely (i) censure for the year 1994-95, 'and (ii) stoppage of two increments with cumulative effect (Annexure-"2" to the writ petition). The petitioner, aggrieved with the order of punishment in the departmental proceeding filed an Appeal under Rule 32(4) of the Bihar Government Servants (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 2005. However, since the punishment order was imposed with the approval of Hon'ble the Chief Minister, the Appeal preferred by the petitioner was placed before the Cabinet and the Appeal was rejected by the Cabinet and said order was communicated vide Government Resolution No. 1469 dated 6th February, 2008 (Annexure-"1" to the writ petition). However, since the punishment order was imposed with the approval of Hon'ble the Chief Minister, the Appeal preferred by the petitioner was placed before the Cabinet and the Appeal was rejected by the Cabinet and said order was communicated vide Government Resolution No. 1469 dated 6th February, 2008 (Annexure-"1" to the writ petition). In the present writ petition the petitioner has assailed both the orders i.e. the order contained in Annexure-"2" to the writ petition (i.e. the order of punishment) and order of rejection of his Appeal (Annexure-"1" to the writ petition). 3. Sri Satish Chandra Jha No. 3, learned counsel for the petitioner has assailed both the orders primarily on the ground that the charges for which the petitioner was proceeded were state, since the charges were in relation to the period from 1993-95 while the petitioner was posted at Kaimur as Deputy Collector and holding different important charges. He remained at Kaimur up to the month of May, 1995 and from Kaimur (Bhabhua) he was transferred as Circle Officer, Bagha-2, West Champaran, Bettiah vide notification dated 30.6.1995 and in the year 2000 itself i.e. after more than five years, for the first time the petitioner was asked to file his show cause regarding the charges mentioned/enclosed with the letter dated 22nd April, 2000 (Annexure-"3" to the writ petition). He submits that after receipt of communication dated 22nd April, 2000 the petitioner gave his detail reply and requested for his exoneration from the proceeding. Again, the Government did not take any step. After two years thereafter the Government vide memo No. 7828 dated 24th September, 2002 resolved to initiate departmental proceeding against the petitioner under Rule 55 of the CCA. Rules, 1930. According to learned counsel for the petitioner the proceeding for alleged misconduct, which had occurred mainly in the year 1993-94 there was no reason for the Government to initiate proceeding against petitioner. It has been argued that the departmental proceeding was initiated with malice. According to him, the punishment order is required to be set aside mainly on the ground that allegations were state allegations. He has emphatically argued that the departmental proceeding initiated under Rule 55 of the CCA. It has been argued that the departmental proceeding was initiated with malice. According to him, the punishment order is required to be set aside mainly on the ground that allegations were state allegations. He has emphatically argued that the departmental proceeding initiated under Rule 55 of the CCA. Rules, 1930 was farce one since before the Conducting Officer the Department had not produced any witness to prove the charge against the petitioner nor any documents were got exhibited to establish any of the charges against the petitioner. According to learned counsel for the petitioner in a departmental proceeding initiated for major punishment it was mandatorily required to adopt full-fledged regular departmental enquiry with proof of charge by documentary as well as oral evidence. Learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to Annexure-"9" to the writ petition i.e. letter sent by the Departmental Enquiry Commissioner to the Secretary, Personnel and Administrative Reforms Department dated 11.11.2005 whereby the Departmental. Enquiry Commissioner had communicated its enquiry report in three copies containing forty two pages. He submits that on perusal of the enquiry report it is evident that in support of proof of charge the Department had not produced any witness nor any document was got exhibited to prove charges against the petitioner. He submits that in a departmental proceeding relating to major punishment absence of examination of any witness is sufficient to establish that such enquiry was non est and on such enquiry report no order of punishment can be imposed. To strengthen his submission Sri Satish Chandra Jha No. 3, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed heavy reliance on a Single Bench judgment of this Court reported in 2000 (3) PLJR 10 (Kumar Upendra Singh Parimar vs. Bihar State Co-operative Land Development Bank Ltd. & Ors.). He has specifically referred to paragraph No. 19 of the said judgment, which is quoted hereinbelow':-- "19. Therefore, in the facts of this case, this Court is constrained to hold that by not producing any evidence in support of its case, the respondent authorities have failed to prove the charges against the delinquent employee. Where charges have not been proved the enquiry report loses all its importance and the punishment imposed on the petitioner cannot be sustained. When a person is thrown out of employment, it must be on the basis of a procedure which is reasonable, just and fair. Where charges have not been proved the enquiry report loses all its importance and the punishment imposed on the petitioner cannot be sustained. When a person is thrown out of employment, it must be on the basis of a procedure which is reasonable, just and fair. [See O.K. Jadav vs. J.M.A. Industries Ltd., reported in (1993) 3 SCC 259 : 1994 (2) PLJR (SC) 55]." 4. Sri Jha has further argued that enquiry report, though is not sustainable in the eye of law, suggests that the Departmental Enquiry Commissioner had not found charge Nos. 1, 3 and 7 proved but the disciplinary authority vide letter No. 10867 dated 27th October, 2006 had asked the petitioner to file his reply on the point of his disagreement with charge No. 3 (exoneration by Departmental Enquiry Commissioner). He submits that it is true that disciplinary authority is well competent to differ with the enquiry report but while differing with the enquiry report it is mandatorily required on the part of the disciplinary authority to assign specific reason for differing with the enquiry report. By way of referring to the letter dated 27th October, 2006 (Annexure-"11" series to the writ petition) he submits that the disciplinary authority has not at all discussed about the reason for differing with the report of the Conducting Officer so far charge No. 3 is concerned. However, in a perfunctory manner the disciplinary authority asked the petitioner to submit his show cause in respect of charge No. 3. According to him, the petitioner had categorically explained that there was no substance in respect of charge No. 3 and Enquiry Officer had rightly exonerated him in respect of charge No. 3. However, the disciplinary authority while passing order of punishment has not at all taken note of his show cause to his charge No. 3 or his detail reply to the 2nd show cause notice. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the order of punishment i.e. Annexure-"2" to the writ petition besides on other grounds is also liable to be set aside since the order of punishment is completely a non-speaking order. He submits that the disciplinary authority has not at all assigned any reason for imposing punishment and according to him, if a punishment order is passed without assigning any reason, such order is liable to be set aside. He submits that the disciplinary authority has not at all assigned any reason for imposing punishment and according to him, if a punishment order is passed without assigning any reason, such order is liable to be set aside. In support of his submission he has placed reliance on (2009) 4 SCC 240 , Chairman, Disciplinary Authority, Rani Lakshmi Bai Kshetriya Gramin Bank vs. Jagdish Sharan Varshney and Others 2016 (1) PLJR 518 Binod Kumar Gupta vs. The State of Bihar through the Commissioner-cum-Secretary, Water Resources Department & Ors. Sri Jha, learned counsel for the petitioner has further argued that on perusal of Annexure-"3" to the writ petition i.e. letter No. 3048 dated 22nd April, 2000 whereby petitioner was asked to file his show cause in respect of eight charges it is evident that the recommendation for initiation of departmental proceeding in respect of eight charges was itself malicious and pre-determined. He submits that in respect of charges for which the petitioner was to be proceeded, the recommending authority i.e. the District Magistrate, Kaimur-Bhabhua has not only observed that there was prima facie charge against the petitioner but also in the recommendation it was considered as if all the eight charges were established and proved against the petitioner. He submits that if while asking the petitioner to file his show cause, the Department had already decided and held that charges were proved, there was no reason for asking the petitioner to file show-cause. According to learned, counsel for the petitioner all the charges were predetermined and as such, initiation of departmental proceeding was farce one. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also tried to persuade the court that charges were vague. It has further been argued that the mistake which was committed by the disciplinary authority i.e. assigning no reason, was reiterated by the Appellate Authority and the Appellate Authority has also not assigned any reason in rejection of his Appeal. According to learned counsel for the petitioner both the orders i.e. order of punishment as well as the order passed by the Appellate Authority are liable to be set aside. 5. Sri Rakesh Prabhat, learned AC to SC No. 21 opposing the prayer of the petitioner submits that charges for which petitioner was proceeded were serious in nature. According to learned counsel for the petitioner both the orders i.e. order of punishment as well as the order passed by the Appellate Authority are liable to be set aside. 5. Sri Rakesh Prabhat, learned AC to SC No. 21 opposing the prayer of the petitioner submits that charges for which petitioner was proceeded were serious in nature. However, according to him, the disciplinary authority had taken lenient view in the matter and instead of imposing harsh punishment, only punishment order was passed regarding censure for the year 1994-95 and stoppage of two increments with cumulative effect. He submits that charge No. 3 was very serious one, which was in relation to passing order of mutation even twenty-five days after he had handed over charge to his successor. By way of referring to the facts disclosed in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent Nos. 2 to 4 and counter affidavit of respondent No. 5, learned State Counsel has argued that in the departmental proceeding no infirmity was committed and according to learned State Counsel, in absence of any apparent defect in decision taking process, the order of punishment on merit may not be interfered with and the writ petition is fit to be rejected. 6. Besides hearing learned counsel for the parties, I have perused the materials available on record. Fact remains that the Government finally had resolved to initiate departmental proceeding against the petitioner under Rule 55 of the CCA. Rules, 1930 vide memo No. 7828 dated 24th September, 2002 (Annexure-"4" to the writ petition) for charges relating to misconduct committed by the petitioner during period of his posting in the district of Kaimur-Bhabhua. The petitioner is a member of Bihar Administrative Service. Though departmental proceeding was finally initiated in the year 2002, nothing has been indicated either in the counter affidavit or in the departmental proceeding in respect of reason for initiating departmental proceeding after such a long time of alleged misconduct. It is true that only on the ground of delay in initiation of departmental proceeding the punishment order may not be interfered with, but in the present case it has been noticed that serious irregularities were committed in the departmental proceeding against the petitioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner has rightly argued that in a departmental proceeding for serious misconduct oral evidence was necessary. Learned counsel for the petitioner has rightly argued that in a departmental proceeding for serious misconduct oral evidence was necessary. However, on going through the enquiry report, of course it was not required for this Court to examine it while exercising power of judicial review, but on going through the report it is evident that none of the witnesses were examined from the Department side to prove any charges against the petitioner. The issue regarding non-examination of witnesses in a departmental proceeding for serious charge has already been set at rest by a Bench of this Court in Kumar Upendra Singh Parimar case (supra). In the said case one of the main reasons for interference with the punishment order was that no witness was examined to prove charge against the delinquent. It would be better to quote paragraph Nos. 9 and 10 of Kumar Upendra Singh Parimar case (supra), which are as follows:-- "9. Out of these three points, on one point there is no factual dispute that in the enquiry no witnesses were examined by the department nor any documents on the basis of which enquiry report is prepared were either introduced or proved. The charges against the petitioner were allegedly proved only on the basis of the replies given by the petitioner to the charge-sheet and on the basis of the documents on record. 10. It is an admitted position that in holding the enquiry the respondent Bank were following the State Government rules. Those rules are set out below:-- "55. Without prejudice to the provisions of the Public Servants 'Inquiries Act, 1860, no order of dismissal, removal, compulsory retirement or reduction shall be passed on a member of a Service (other than an order based on facts which have led to his conviction in a criminal court or by a Court Martial) unless he has been informed in writing of the grounds on which it is proposed to take action and has been afforded an adequate opportunity of defending himself. The grounds on which it is proposed to take action shall be reduced to the form of a definite charge or charges which shall be communicated to the person charged together with a statement of the allegations on which each charge is based and of any other circumstances which it is proposed to take into consideration in passing orders on the case. He shall be required, within a reasonable time, to put in a written statement of his defence and to state whether he desires to be heard in person. If he so desires or if the authority concerned so direct an oral enquiry shall be held. At that inquiry oral evidence shall be heard as to such of the allegations as are not admitted, and the person charged shall be entitled to cross-examine the witnesses, to give evidence in person and to have such witnesses called, as he may wish, provided that the officer, conducting the inquiry may, for special and sufficient reasons to be recorded in writing, refuse to call a witness. The proceedings shall contain a sufficient record of the evidence and a statement of the findings and the grounds thereof." (underlined for emphasis)" 7. Similarly, this Court has already incorporated paragraph No. 9 of Kumar Upendra Singh Parimar case (supra) in this order. Nothing has been indicated as to what was the reason for non-examination of any witness to establish charge against the petitioner. In a departmental proceeding for serious charges particularly in view of Rule 55 of the CCA. Rules, 1930 it was mandatorily required to examine oral witness. In the present case in specific term the petitioner vide his letter No. 3855 dated 24.8.2004 (Annexure-"8" to the wit petition) had requested the Departmental Enquiry Commissioner to allow him to produce oral evidence besides submitting his supplementary written defence before the Departmental Enquiry Commissioner however in prove of establishing charge no witness was examined in the proceeding. Accordingly, in view of non-prove of any of the charges by any of the witnesses on behalf of the Department, there was no occasion for holding that the charges were proved against the petitioner by the Conducting Officer and on this score alone the order of punishment is liable to be set aside. Accordingly, in view of non-prove of any of the charges by any of the witnesses on behalf of the Department, there was no occasion for holding that the charges were proved against the petitioner by the Conducting Officer and on this score alone the order of punishment is liable to be set aside. So far submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that order of punishment i.e. Annexure-"2" is required to be interfered with on the ground of it being non-speaking, this Court is in agreement with the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner, but before proceeding further it would be appropriate to quote the order of the disciplinary authority i.e. Annexure-"2" to the writ petition, as follows:-- ^^fcgkj ljdkj] dkfeZd ,oa iz'kklfud lq/kkj foHkkxA ldaYi iVuk&15] fnukad 2-4-07 Jh jktsUnz jke] fo-iz-ls-] dksfV Øekad&988@99] 458@04] rRdkyhu vapy vf/kdkjh] HkHkqvk izHkkjh mi&lekgRrkZ vfHkyss[kkdkj ds fo:) vukf/kd`r :i ls vodk'k ij jgus] mPpkf/kdkfj;ksa ds vkns'k dh vogsyuk djus] vapykf/kdkjh] HkHkqvk dk izHkkj nsus ds ckn Hkh nkf[ky [kkfjt okn dk fu"iknu djus] lesfdr xzkeh.k fodkl dk;ZØe ds varxZr p;fur vkosndksa ds vkosnuksa dks vuko';d :i ls yfEcr j[kus] ftyk inkf/kdkjh ds funsZ'k ds foijhr jktLo deZpkjh ls ifCyd fofyax lac/kh dk;Z ysus] fcuk ftyk iz'kklu dh Lohd`fr ds pdcanh dk;kZy;] pSuiqj ds eqgfjj dks vius dk;kZy; esa vapy] cankscLrh bR;kfn dk;ksZ dk izHkkjh cuk;s tkus] Hkou&fuekZ.k lac/kh ;kstukvksa esa vfu;ferrk cjrs tkus] fcuk ftyk inkf/kdkjh dh Lohd`fr ds tu lg;ksx ls cuus okyh nqdkuksa ds vfHkdRrkZ cuk;s tkus ls lacf/kr ftyk inkf/kdkjh] HkHkqvk }kjk izfrosfnr xEaHkhj vksjksiksa ds fy, flfoy lsok ¼oxhZdj.k] fu;=a.k ,oa vihy½ fu;ekoyh] 1930 ds fu;e 55 ds rgr Jh jke ds fo:) foHkkxh; dk;Zokgh lapkfyr dh xbZ ftlesa lapkyu inkf/kdkjh foHkkxh; tkWp vk;qDr] fcgkj] iVuk fu;qDr FksA 2- lapkyu inkf/kdkjh ds tkWp izfrosnu ,oa earO;] vkjksfir inkf/kdkjh ds Li"Vhdj.k@vH;kosnu ,oa lqlaxr dkxtkrksa ds lE;d~ leh{kksijkar Jh jke ds fo:) prqFkZoxhZ; deZpkjh dks ;kstuk dk vfHkdRrkZ cukus] ftyk inkf/kdkjh ds }kjk eukgh ds ckotwn pdcanh dk;kZy;] pSuiqj esa eqgfjj ls jktLo dk;Z djkus lac/kh vkjksi] izekf.kr ik;s x;s gS rFkk vkns'k dh vogsyuk ,oa Li"Vhdj.k ugha nsus] izHkkjh vapykf/kdkjh ds :i esa izHkkj R;kxus ds ckn Hkh nkf[ky [kkfjtokn dk fu"iknu djus] xzkeh.k fodkl dk;ZØe lac/kh vkosnu i=ks ij dkjokbZ ds Øe esa v|ru yxku jlhn dh ekax djus ls lacf/kr vkjksi va'kr% izekf.kr ik;s x;s gSA vr,o mi;qZDr izekf.kr vkjksiksa ds fy, ljdkj ds vkns'kkuqlkj Jh jke dks fuEukafdr n.M+ lalwfpr fd;k tkrk gS %& 1- fuUnu dh ltk & o"kZ 1994&95 2- lap;kRed izHkko ls nks osru o`f) dh jksdA vkns'k %& vkns'k fn;k tkrk gS fd bl ladYi dks fcgkj jkti= ds vlk/kkj.k vad esa izdkf'kr fd;k tk; rFkk bldh izfr Jh jktsUnz jke] fo-iz-ls- ,oa vU; lacf/kr dks nh tk;A fcgkj jkT;iky ds vkns'k ls jktsUnz izlkn ljdkj ds voj lfpo Kkikad&2@lh- 3&30163@97 dkŒ 3573@iVuk&15] fnukad 2-4-07 Ikzfrfyfi %& v/kh{kd] jktdh; eqnz.kky;] xqytkjckx izsl] iVuk dks fcgkj jkti= ds vxys vlk/kkj.k vad esa izdk'kukFkZ izsf"krA /kesUnz@& Kkikad&3373 ljdkj ds voj lfpo iVuk&15] fnukad 2-4-07 Ikzfrfyfi %& egkys[kkdkj] fcgkj iVuk@foŸr oS;fDrd nkok fu/kkZj.k dks"kakx foHkkx] iVuk@vk;qDr] iVuk ize.My] iVuk@ftyk inkf/kdkjh] HkHkqvk@vk;qDr] njHkaxk ize.My] njHkaxk@ftyk inkf/kdkjh] njHkaxk@dks"kkxkj inkf/kdkjh] njHkaxk@Jh jktsUnz jke] fc-iz-ls- fo'ks"k Hkw&vtZu inkf/kdkjh] dks'kh ;kstuk] njHkaxk@dkfeZd ,oa iz'kklfud lq/kkj foHkkx] iz'kk[kk&12] 14 pkfj=h dks"kkax rFkk iz'kk[kk&2 dks 10- vfrfjDr izfr;kW lfgr lwpukFkZ izf"krA 2- ftykf/kdkjh] njHkaxk ls vuqjks/k gS fd Jh jke dks ladYi dh rkfeyk djkdj rkfey izfrosnu foHkkx dks miyC/k djk nsA 3- izHkkjh inkf/kdkjh] pkfj=h dks"kkax ls vuqjks/k gS fd ltk dh izfof"V d`i;k lqfuf'pr fd;k tk;A ljdkj ds voj lfpoA^^ 8. On perusal of the order of punishment dated 2.4.2007 which is quoted hereinabove, there is no reason to come to the conclusion that the disciplinary authority save and except noticing charges alleged against the petitioner has not bothered to disclose his mind in its order for imposing punishment against the petitioner. Nothing has been indicated as to how he has come to the conclusion that petitioner had committed misconduct or how charges were proved against the petitioner. In the order impugned besides referring/succinctly the charges and provisions of the CCA. Rules, 1930 nothing has been indicated by the disciplinary authority. In sum and substance, the order impugned is completely non-speaking and not sustainable in the eye of a law. Similarly, the order on Appeal of the petitioner i.e. Annexure-"1" is also non-speaking. It is true that in case of affirmance with the enquiry report there is no requirement for assigning detailed reason for passing punishment order, but fact remains that the disciplinary authority is required to succinctly indicate the reasons for imposing punishment. In absence of any such succinct reason it would be difficult to examine the said order while exercising power of judicial review by this Court. Since the order is non-speaking it would be difficult to draw an inference as to what was occurring in the mind of the disciplinary authority while imposing punishment against the petitioner. Even the charges which were the basis for recommending departmental proceeding against the petitioner vide Annexure-"3" to the writ petition, it is evident that the recommending authority had already given his opinion that all the eight charges were proved against the petitioner. In no event before conducting enquiry or giving any opportunity of hearing the authorities concerned were authorized to record its opinion regarding prove of charge. In the proceeding against the petitioner there is other serious defect i.e. difference of opinion of the disciplinary authority with charge No. 3 for which the petitioner was exonerated by the Departmental Enquiry Commissioner. In its report the disciplinary authority though vide letter No. 10867 dated 27th October, 2006 had asked for second show cause notice in respect of charge No. 3 for which Departmental Enquiry Commissioner had exonerated the petitioner. In its report the disciplinary authority though vide letter No. 10867 dated 27th October, 2006 had asked for second show cause notice in respect of charge No. 3 for which Departmental Enquiry Commissioner had exonerated the petitioner. On perusal of the said letter (Annexure-"11" series) it is evident that the disciplinary authority has not assigned specific reason or he had dealt with the report of the Enquiry Officer in respect of charge No. 3 for which he had exonerated the petitioner. In a departmental proceeding though the disciplinary authority is competent to differ with the enquiry report, while differing with the enquiry report it has already been held that while differing specific reason is required to be assigned whereas, the disciplinary authority in its letter dated 27th October, 2006 has not given any specific reason for differing with the enquiry report in respect of charge No. 3. He has not at all discussed anything about the recommendation by the Departmental Enquiry Commissioner in respect of charge No. 3 save and except the fact that he has tried to justify regarding the reasons for his difference of opinion. 9. In view of facts and circumstances as has been discussed hereinabove, both the orders i.e. order of punishment as well as order of Appellate Authority are required to be set aside primarily on the ground that such orders are completely non-speaking and assign no reason. Besides this, since while conducting enquiry, which was initiated under Rule 55 of the CCA. Rules, 1930 absence of any oral evidence as noticed in Kumar Upendra Singh Parimar case (supra) was itself violative and against the principle of natural justice and as such, both the orders are hereby set aside. Accordingly, the order contained in memo No. 3573 dated 2.4.2007 (Annexure-"2" to the writ petition) and resolution of the Government contained in memo No. 3373 dated 2.4.2007 (Annexure-"2" to the writ petition) whereby punishment was passed against the petitioner and resolution of the Government contained in memo No. 1469 dated 6th February, 2008 (Annexure-"1" to the writ petition) are hereby set aside and the writ petition stands allowed with all consequential benefits.