JUDGMENT : B.P. DHARMADHIKARI, J. 1. Heard finally by issuing Rule and making it returnable forthwith with consent. 2. The learned Advocate for the petitioners claims reinstatement because of the protection granted to employment by the Full Bench Judgment of this Court in the case of Arun S/o Vishwanath Sonone vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, reported in 2015 (1) Mh.L.J. 457 . The services of the petitioners have been terminated on 31.07.2003, after invalidation of their caste claim. 3. Both the petitioners were appointed by the identical order of appointment dated 30.03.2000 on probation for period of three months. Appointment order, vide Clause (5), incorporates a condition that obliges the petitioners to submit caste validity certificate before completion of period of probation. Clause (5) stipulates that, in default, their service would be terminated without assigning any reason. 4. It appears that Writ Petition No. 1832 of 2002 was filed before this Court for expeditious consideration of pending caste claims and this Court on 01.10.2002 directed the Scrutiny Committee to decide the caste claims within three months. Thereafter, their caste claims have been invalidated on 21.10.2002. These orders of invalidation were questioned in Writ Petition Nos. 661 of 2003 and 662 of 2003 by the petitioners. On 24.04.2003 and 18.07.2003, these petitions have been dismissed by the different Benches. 5. It appears that the termination orders issued thereafter on 31.07.2003 were questioned before this Court. The petitioner no. 1 filed Writ Petition No. 6258 of 2006 and therein the order has been passed after hearing the petitioner as also the Government Pleader holding that there was no merit in the arguments seeking protection of employment. It is not in dispute before us that by identical order the Writ Petition filed by petitioner No. 2-Randeep Dhakate was also dismissed. Thus, refusal of this Court in 2009 to extend the protection in employment attained the finality and was not questioned. 6. The Full Bench has delivered the judgment on 22.12.2014 and protected the employment in certain contingencies. On the basis of this Full Bench judgment and invoking the protection granted therein the present petition has been filed on 23.03.2016 i.e. about two years after the adjudication by the Full Bench. 7. It appears that the petitioners have made representation to their employer pointing out the said judgment and claimed reinstatement. 8. On the basis of this Full Bench judgment and invoking the protection granted therein the present petition has been filed on 23.03.2016 i.e. about two years after the adjudication by the Full Bench. 7. It appears that the petitioners have made representation to their employer pointing out the said judgment and claimed reinstatement. 8. Learned Advocate Shri Narnaware for the petitioners has placed reliance about the Full Bench judgment, mentioned supra, particularly paragraph 76 therein to urge that there the Full Bench has found that the principles of res judicata are not attracted in such circumstances. He is also placing reliance upon the orders dated 11.08.2015 passed in Writ Petition No. 1793 of 2015 accepting that Writ Petition as Review Petition in Writ Petition No. 5430 of 2011 and judgment delivered in that Writ Petition on 01.09.2015. He submits that all these judgments show that the concept of res judicata is not attracted in these facts. 9. The learned Assistant Government Pleader appearing for respondent no. 2 and learned Advocate Shri Jaiswal appearing for respondent no. 1 are strongly opposing the arguments of the learned Advocate for the petitioners. They point out that this Court has not entertained the Writ Petition for claiming protection in employment and what has been looked into was a Review Petition. 10. Learned Advocate Shri Jaiswal for respondent no. 1 has placed reliance upon the recent judgment delivered by Hon’ble apex Court in the case of B.H. Khawas vs. Union of India and Others, reported in (2016) 8 SCC 715 , to urge that even otherwise in the light of this later judgment delivered by the Hon’ble apex Court, as the appointments of the petitioners had not attained finality there is no question of extending them the benefit of protection. 11. Here, perusal of appointment order reveals that both the petitioners were appointed as clerk on probation for period of three months. The petitioners have continued beyond it. As such, it follows that their appointment had become final. Clause (5) of the appointment order required them to submit the caste validity and the appointment was contingent upon the submission of that validity. It could have been brought to an end in default by cancelling it. It, therefore, cannot be said that the appointment otherwise had not become final. 12. Clause (5) of the appointment order required them to submit the caste validity and the appointment was contingent upon the submission of that validity. It could have been brought to an end in default by cancelling it. It, therefore, cannot be said that the appointment otherwise had not become final. 12. However, here, the petitioners approached this Court earlier and questioning the orders of invalidation passed by the Scrutiny Committee and failed in that challenge. Their termination has come subsequent to this adjudication and that termination was then questioned by them and while dismissing that Writ Petition this Court has specifically looked into their arguments seeking protection. The order dated 12.01.2009 delivered in Writ Petition No. 6258 of 2006, produced for our perusal, clearly shows that the Court has recorded a specific finding and rejected the request for protection. Reasons for such rejection are not material here. Only relevant fact is there is an adjudication by this Court. 13. Full Bench judgment of this Court in paragraph 76 noted that the question of res judicata including the constructive res judicata, may involve adjudication of facts and law both. Merely because a petition was filed claiming the relief of protection and that was either withdrawn or dismissed by the Court, that by itself would not follow that the subsequent petition claiming the same relief would be barred by the principle of res judicata. These observations, therefore, cannot be construed to imply that the concept of res judicata is never attracted when the relief of protection is sought after Full Bench judgment. We, therefore, have heard learned Advocate for the petitioners on this aspect and there is no effort to demonstrate as to why the earlier adjudication by this Court refusing protection should not be treated a res judicata. Only contention has been that the concept or principle of res judicata is not relevant at all. 14. The orders passed by the Hon’ble the Chief Justice (the then) in Division Bench on 11.08.2015 in Writ Petition No. 1793 of 2015 show that there the Division Bench found it not possible to entertain a Writ Petition seeking relief of protection. It, therefore, permitted conversion of that Writ Petition into an application for review and that Writ Petition thereafter was registered as Misc. Civil Application No. 881 of 2015. It, therefore, permitted conversion of that Writ Petition into an application for review and that Writ Petition thereafter was registered as Misc. Civil Application No. 881 of 2015. Thus, the prayer for review of judgment delivered in Writ Petition No. 5430 of 2011 was allowed to be filed by that Division Bench. Thus, the Hon’ble Division Bench obliviated the need of examining the applicability of res judicata. Ultimately on 01.09.2015 while passing orders on Misc. Civil Application No. 881 of 2015, the benefit of protection has been given to the review applicant Kailash who was the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 5430 of 2011. These developments, therefore, instead of supporting the contentions of the petitioners militate with it. 15. At this stage, learned Advocate Shri Narnaware for the petitioners prayed that the present petition may be treated as a review application in a writ petition which was disposed of in the year 2009. 16. Learned Advocate Shri Jaiswal for respondent no. 1 as also the learned Assistant Government Pleader are strongly opposing the prayer made by the learned Advocate for the petitioners. They submit that huge time has lapsed. Reentry into employment after such delay may create other problems. 17. We find merit in their submissions. Here, considering the time lapsed, we are not inclined to permit the petitioners to convert this Writ Petition as a review petition. Accordingly, we find that because of the principle of res judicata, request made by learned Advocate for the petitioners for protection in employment and therefore the consequential reinstatement, cannot be looked into. 18. Rule discharged. Writ Petition is, thus, dismissed. No costs.