JUDGMENT : ARIJIT BANERJEE, J. 1. This contempt application has been filed for alleged violation of a judgment and order dated 4 June, 2015 whereby WP No. 829 of 2013 (Derby Sales Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. State of West Bengal and Ors.) was disposed of. The operative portion of the said order of which violation is alleged reads as follows:- "In view of the aforesaid, this court directs the respondent authorities to hand over vacant and peaceful possession of the said property being premises No. 7/1A, Hazra Road, Kolkata 700019 to the petitioner no. 1 within four weeks from date. In the event the respondent authorities fail to comply with this order the petitioners will be at liberty to approach the Commissioner of Police as also the officer-in-charge of the Bhawanipore Police Station for the purpose of implementing this order and obtaining vacant and peaceful possession of the said property by removing the occupants therefrom. If so approached, the Commissioner of Police and the Officer-in-Charge of the Bhawanipore Police Station will render all necessary assistance and extend all cooperation to the petitioners for the purpose of implementing this order." 2. The petitioners allege that the aforesaid order was not complied with by the respondent authorities inasmuch as vacant and peaceful possession of premises No. 7/1A, Hazra Road, Calcutta-7000019 has not been made over to the petitioners within four weeks from the date of the order or at all. They further allege that the Police Authorities have also violated the order by not rendering all necessary assistance and extending cooperation to the petitioners for the purpose of implementing the order. 3. Mr. Abhrajit Mitra, learned Sr. Counsel appearing for the petitioners referred to a letter dated 29 June, 2015 addressed to the Officer-in-Charge, Bhawanipore Police Station by the petitioner company and a letter dated 1 July, 2015 addressed to the Commissioner of Police, Calcutta by the petitioner company regarding implementation of the order dated 4 June, 2015. Learned Counsel also referred to a letter dated 7 July, 2015 addressed to amongst others, Municipal Commissioner, KMC which was a notice of contempt for noncompliance of the order dated 4 June, 2015. Learned Counsel finally referred to a letter dated 24 June, 2015 written by the First Land Acquisition Collector, Kolkata to the Commissioner, KMC calling upon the latter to comply with the order dated 4 June, 2015. Learned Counsel finally referred to a letter dated 24 June, 2015 written by the First Land Acquisition Collector, Kolkata to the Commissioner, KMC calling upon the latter to comply with the order dated 4 June, 2015. He submitted that the respondent authorities have acted in wilful violation of the order dated 4 June, 2015 and accordingly should be committed for contempt. 4. It is not in dispute that vacant and peaceful possession of the said property has not been handed over to the petitioner no. 1. 5. Mr. Ashok Banerjee, Learned Sr. Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent no. 3, in his usual fairness, admitted that the order has not been complied with. He submitted that an appeal was preferred from the said order which was dismissed by the Hon'ble Division Bench. However, he submitted that the effect of preferring an appeal from an order is that the order loses the character of finality. In this connection Mr. Banerjee referred to a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Satyanarayan Prosad Gooptu v. Diana Engineering Company, (1950) 55 CWN 509. He relied on the observation of the Division Bench at page 514 of the reported judgment which reads as follows:- "…….once the appeal was preferred from the order that order lost its finality. A decision liable to appeal may be 'final' until the appeal is preferred. But once the appeal is filed the decision loses its character of 'finality' and what was once res judicata becomes res sub judice, that is, a matter under judicial enquiry. The appeal destroys the finality of the decision, the decree of the lower court is superseded by the decree of the Appellate Court. In other words, once an appeal is filed from a decree or order in a matter, it becomes a pending matter……………………" 6. Learned Sr. Counsel then submitted that once the appeal court decided the appeal on merits, the order of the trial Judge merged with the order of the appeal court. Hence, a contempt application for alleged violation of the Trial Judge's order would not lie. 7. The third submission of Mr. Banerjee and on which he laid maximum emphasis was that there has been no intentional disobedience to the said order on the part of the respondent no. 3. Hence, a contempt application for alleged violation of the Trial Judge's order would not lie. 7. The third submission of Mr. Banerjee and on which he laid maximum emphasis was that there has been no intentional disobedience to the said order on the part of the respondent no. 3. He referred to the judgment and order of the Hon'ble Division Bench and submitted that even the Division Bench recognised that the Kolkata Municipal Corporation has some right in respect of the premises in question which can be enforced before an appropriate forum. KMC has filed a civil suit in the Alipore Court as also an injunction application for interim relief. Hence, there is no intentional violation of the said order. He submitted that there is no pleading in the contempt petition that non-compliance with the said order is intentional and unless noncompliance with an order is intentional, it does not amount to contempt of Court. 8. Mr. Banerjee further submitted that 21 conservancy staff of KMC along with their families are housed in the property in question. To throw them out of the property would create a law and order problem. Hence, the KMC has not been able to comply with the said order. On the other hand, KMC has filed legal proceedings to establish its right in respect of the said property and presently a civil suit being TS 1606 of 2016 filed by KMC is pending in the Alipore Court wherein the KMC has claimed a decree of declaration that it is a tenant of the property in question and permanent injunction restraining the petitioners herein from making any attempt to dispossess KMC from the property in question. The substance of Mr. Banerjee's submission was that the non-compliance with the said order on the part of the KMC was not deliberate. 9. Mr. Banerjee relied on a decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Tapan Kumar Mukherjee v. Heromoni Mondal, (1991) 1 SCC 397 . In that case the High Court had held the appellant to be guilty of contempt and had imposed a fine on him. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the facts of the case held that it could not be concluded beyond all doubt that the appellant had acted wilfully in not complying with the High Court's order. In that case the High Court had held the appellant to be guilty of contempt and had imposed a fine on him. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the facts of the case held that it could not be concluded beyond all doubt that the appellant had acted wilfully in not complying with the High Court's order. Hence, the appellant should be given the benefit of doubt in the circumstances of the case. Accordingly, the High Court's order holding the appellant guilty of contempt was set aside. Reliance was also placed by Mr. Banerjee on a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kapildeo Prasad Sah v. State of Bihar, (1999) 7 SCC 569 , in support of his submission that a petitioner who complains of breach of the Court's order must allege deliberate or contumacious disobedience to the Court's order. According to Mr. Banerjee there is no such allegation in the contempt petition. Mr. Banerjee also relied on the decision in the case of Niaz Mohammad v. State of Haryana, (1994) 6 SCC 332 , in support of his contention that before a person can be punished for contempt the court must hold that the disobedience to the Court's order on his part was 'wilful and intentional' (emphasis is mine). At paragraph 9 of the judgment the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as follows: 9. section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act23 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') defines "Civil Contempt" to mean "wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ, or other process of a court...". Where the contempt consists in failure to comply with or carry out an order of the court made in favour of the party, it is a civil contempt. The person or persons in whose favour such order or direction has been made can move the Court for initiating proceeding for contempt against the alleged contemner, with a view to enforce the right flowing from the order or direction in question. But such a proceeding is not like an execution proceeding under CPC. The party in whose favour an order has been passed, is entitled to the benefit of such order. But such a proceeding is not like an execution proceeding under CPC. The party in whose favour an order has been passed, is entitled to the benefit of such order. The Court while considering the issue as to whether the alleged contemner should be punished for not having complied and carried out the direction of the Court, has to take into consideration all facts and circumstances of a particular case. That is why the framers of the Act while defining civil contempt, have said that it must be wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court. Before a contemner is punished for noncompliance of the direction of a court the Court must not only be satisfied about the disobedience of any judgment, decree, direction or writ but should also be satisfied that such disobedience was wilful and intentional. The Civil Court while executing a decree against the judgment debtor is not concerned and bothered whether the disobedience to any judgment, or decree, was wilful. Once a decree has been passed it is the duty of the court to execute the decree whatever may be consequences thereof. But while examining the grievance of the person who has invoked the jurisdiction of the Court to initiate the proceeding for contempt for disobedience of its order, before any such contemner is held guilty and punished, the Court has to record a finding that such disobedience was wilful and intentional. If from the circumstances of a particular case, brought to the notice of the court, the Court is satisfied that although there has been a disobedience but such disobedience is the result of some compelling circumstances which it was not possible for the contemner to comply with the order, the Court may not punish the alleged contemner." 10. Learned Advocate General assisted by Mr. Amitesh Banerjee, Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent nos. 4 and 5 submitted that there is no violation of the order dated 4 June, 2015 on the part of the said respondents. He produced a copy of a letter dated 18 August, 2015 written by the respondent no. 5 to the petitioner company requesting the petitioners to give a written intimation to the respondent no. 5 as to the possible date and time when the Police should render assistance for implementing the order dated 4 June, 2015. He produced a copy of a letter dated 18 August, 2015 written by the respondent no. 5 to the petitioner company requesting the petitioners to give a written intimation to the respondent no. 5 as to the possible date and time when the Police should render assistance for implementing the order dated 4 June, 2015. Learned Advocate General also brought to my notice copy of a letter dated 15 July, 2015 sent by the Commissioner of Police, Kolkata, being the respondent no. 4 herein, to the Municipal Commissioner, KMC requesting the latter to take immediate appropriate action and ensure compliance with the order passed by this Court. 11. Learned Advocate General submitted that the order dated 4 June, 2015 imposes an obligation primarily on the KMC to vacate the premises in question and hand over peaceful possession thereof to the petitioner company. In the event KMC does not do so and the petitioners approach the Police authorities, assistance should be rendered by the Police to implement the order and the Police are ready, willing and prepared to do so. The petitioners have to show that necessary assistance has not been rendered by the Police, which the petitioners have failed to do. He further submitted that no direction on the Police is warranted on a contempt petition. If the Police have failed to render assistance, the Writ Court should be approached for Police inaction. He submitted that there is no wilful disobedience to this Court's order by the Police Authorities. 12. Learned Advocate General relied on a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Jhareswar Prasad Paul v. Tarak Nath Ganguly, (2002) 5 SCC 352 , and in particular paragraph 11 thereof, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as follows:- "11. The purpose of contempt jurisdiction is to uphold the majesty and dignity of the courts of law. Since the respect and authority commanded by the courts of law are the greatest guarantee to an ordinary citizen and the democratic fabric of society will suffer if respect for the judiciary is undermined. The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 has been introduced under the statute for the purpose of securing the feeling of confidence of the people in general for true and proper administration of justice in the country. The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 has been introduced under the statute for the purpose of securing the feeling of confidence of the people in general for true and proper administration of justice in the country. The power to punish for contempt of courts is a special power vested under the Constitution in the courts of record and also under the statute. The power is special and needs to be exercised with care and caution. It should be used sparingly by the courts on being satisfied regarding the true effect of contemptuous conduct. It is to be kept in mind that the court exercising the jurisdiction to punish for contempt does not function as an original or appellate court for determination of the disputes between the parties. The contempt jurisdiction should be confined to the question whether there has been any deliberate disobedience of the order of the court and if the conduct of the party who is alleged to have committed such disobedience is contumacious. The court exercising contempt jurisdiction is not entitled to enter into questions which have not been dealt with and decided in the judgment or order, violation of which is alleged by the applicant. The court has to consider the direction issued in the judgment or order and not to consider the question as to what the judgment or order should have contained. At the cost of repetition be it stated here that the court exercising contempt jurisdiction is primarily concerned with the question of contumacious conduct of the party, which alleged to have committed deliberate default in complying with the directions in the judgment or order. If the judgment or order does not contain any specific direction regarding a matter or if there is any ambiguity in the directions issued therein then it will be better to direct the parties to approach the court which disposed of the matter for clarification of the order instead of the court exercising contempt jurisdiction taking upon itself the power to decide the original proceeding in a manner not dealt with by the court passing the judgment or order. If this limitation is borne in mind then criticisms which are sometimes levelled against the courts exercising contempt of court jurisdiction "that it has exceeded its powers in granting substantive relief and issuing a direction regarding the same without proper adjudication of the dispute" in its entirety can be avoided. This will also avoid multiplicity of proceedings because the party which is prejudicially affected by the judgment or order passed in the contempt proceeding and granting relief and issuing fresh directions is likely to challenge that order and that may give rise to another round of litigation arising from a proceeding which is intended to maintain the majesty and image of courts." 13. Finally Learned Advocate General relied on a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sudhir Vasudeva, Chairman and Managing Director, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v. M. George Ravishekaran, (2014) 3 SCC 373 , and in particular paragraph 19 of the judgment which reads as follows:- "19. The power vested in the High Courts as well as this Court to punish for contempt is a special and rare power available both under the Constitution as well as the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. It is a drastic power which, if misdirected, could even curb the liberty of the individual charged with commission of contempt. The very nature of the power casts a sacred duty on the Courts to exercise the same with the greatest of care and caution. This is also necessary as, more often than not, adjudication of a contempt plea involves a process of self-determination of the sweep, meaning and effect of the order in respect of which disobedience is alleged. The courts must not, therefore, travel beyond the four corners of the order which is alleged to have been flouted or enter into questions that have not been dealt with or decided in the judgment or the order violation of which is alleged. Only such directions which are explicit in a judgment or order or are plainly self-evident ought to be taken into account for the purpose of consideration as to whether there has been any disobedience or wilful violation of the same. Decided issues cannot be reopened; nor can the plea of equities be considered. Only such directions which are explicit in a judgment or order or are plainly self-evident ought to be taken into account for the purpose of consideration as to whether there has been any disobedience or wilful violation of the same. Decided issues cannot be reopened; nor can the plea of equities be considered. The courts must also ensure that while considering a contempt plea the power available to the court in other corrective jurisdictions like review or appeal is not trenched upon. No order or direction supplemental to what has been already expressed should be issued by the court while exercising jurisdiction in the domain of the contempt law; such an exercise is more appropriate in other jurisdictions vested in the Court, as noticed above. The above principles would appear to be the cumulative outcome of the precedents cited at the Bar, namely, Jhareswar Prasad Paul v. Tarak Nath Ganguly, (2002) 5 SCC 352 , V. M. Manohar Prasad v. N. Ratnam Raju, (2004) 13 SCC 610 , Bihar Finance Service House Construction Coop. Society Ltd. v. Gautam Goswami, (2008) 5 SCC 339 , and Union of India v. Subedar Devassy PV, (2006) 1 SCC 613 ." 14. Before I express my views, I should note that an application has been filed by nine persons describing themselves as Mazdurs of the KMC for intervening in the contempt application. Mr. Pramit Kumar Ray, learned Sr. Counsel, appearing for the said applicants has contended that the applicants and their families along with twelve other Mazdurs and their families who are similarly placed shall be the persons who will be really affected if the order dated 4 June, 2015 is implemented. He submitted that these families have been residing in the said property under permission of KMC for rendering prompt and timely civic services to the people of different Boroughs of the KMC. Learned Counsel submitted that since the applicants will be parties affected if this court's order is implemented, they should be added as parties in this contempt application. 15. First I shall deal with the intervention application. Contempt is a matter exclusively between the court and the alleged contemnor. The petitioner's job is to draw the Court's attention to an alleged violation of the Court's order by the alleged contemnor. Strictly speaking, the petitioner's role ends there. 15. First I shall deal with the intervention application. Contempt is a matter exclusively between the court and the alleged contemnor. The petitioner's job is to draw the Court's attention to an alleged violation of the Court's order by the alleged contemnor. Strictly speaking, the petitioner's role ends there. It is up to the court to come to a decision on the basis of the materials on record whether or not the alleged contemnor has wilfully violated the order in question. There is absolutely no scope for a third party to intervene in a contempt application. If the third party feels that he will be prejudiced or adversely affected by implementation of the order of which violation is alleged in the contempt application, his remedy is to apply for recall or review of the order or challenge the order in a higher forum. 16. In Sri Nalini Ranjan Das v. Sri Anup Singh, (1990) 2 CLJ 190, a Division Bench of this Court held that the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 or the Rules framed thereunder by this Court do not provide for intervention by third parties. The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure as to addition of parties do not apply to a contempt proceeding which is entirely a matter between the Court and the alleged contemnor. The Division Bench observed that the presence of interveners in a given situation may lead to the generation of heat as well as arming for and against the alleged contemnors with lethal weapons which would make the Court involved more than what is necessary in exercise of its jurisdiction under the Contempt of Courts Act. 17. Relying on the aforesaid Division Bench decision a Learned Single Judge of this Court dismissed the application for intervention in a contempt proceeding in the case of Tandon Brothers v. Rajesh Pandey, (2008) 2 CHN 253 . 18. In view of the aforesaid, I have no hesitation in holding that the intervention application filed by the conservancy staff of the KMC is not maintainable. Accordingly GA 2666 of 2016 is dismissed. 19. Now I take up the contempt application. 20. I have not appreciated as to why the Chief Secy., Land and Land Reforms Department and the First Land Acquisition Collector, Calcutta have been impleaded as alleged contemnors. Accordingly GA 2666 of 2016 is dismissed. 19. Now I take up the contempt application. 20. I have not appreciated as to why the Chief Secy., Land and Land Reforms Department and the First Land Acquisition Collector, Calcutta have been impleaded as alleged contemnors. It is true that the order dated 4 June, 2015 directed 'the respondent authorities to handover vacant and peaceful possession of the said property'. But the direction is to be read in the factual context of the case. The property in question is in the possession of the KMC. Hence, the direction was on the KMC and has to be understood as such. There could be no question of directing the Chief Secy., Land and Land Reforms Department or the First Land Acquisition Collector, Calcutta to deliver vacant and peaceful possession of the property since they were not in possession of the property. Hence, the question of the respondent nos. 1 and 2 violating the order in question does not arise. The contempt application is dismissed as against the respondent nos. 1 and 2. 21. I am also unable to hold the respondent nos. 4 and 5 to be guilty of contempt. For holding that a person has committed contempt and more specifically civil contempt, it has to be shown that there has been wilful disobedience to the order of the court. Power to punish for contempt is to be resorted to when there is clear and deliberate violation of the Court's order. The disobedience or violation has to be wilful. In other words, a clear intention to violate the order on the part of the alleged contemnor must be decipherable. There must be an element of fault or mens rea. It must be a deliberate act of violating the order of Court with a bad motive or purpose. The court does not sentence a contemnor with any spirit of revenge but to uphold the majesty or dignity of the courts of law, since image of such majesty in the minds of the people cannot be allowed to be distorted. It must be a deliberate act of violating the order of Court with a bad motive or purpose. The court does not sentence a contemnor with any spirit of revenge but to uphold the majesty or dignity of the courts of law, since image of such majesty in the minds of the people cannot be allowed to be distorted. As observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Mrityunjoy Das v. Sayed Hasibur Rahaman, AIR 2001 SC 1293 , respect and authority commanded by courts of law are the greatest guarantee to an ordinary citizen and the entire democratic fabric of the society will crumbled down if the respect for the judiciary is undermined. 22. In the present case, the primary direction was on the KMC authorities to vacate the property in question. If the KMC did not do so, the petitioner was granted liberty to approach the Police authorities for the purpose of implementing the order and the Police authorities were directed to render all necessary assistance and cooperation to the petitioners for the purpose of implementing the order. I have already noted that both the respondent nos. 4 and 5 have written letters evincing their intention of rendering assistance to the petitioners for the purpose of implementation of the order in question. Learned Advocate General has also submitted in no uncertain terms that the respondent nos. 4 and 5 are ready and willing to extend all cooperation for carrying out the order in question. Under those circumstances, I am of the opinion that there is no wilful violation or disobedience of the order of the Court dated 4 June, 2015 on the part of the respondent nos. 4 and 5. This contempt proceeding is closed as against the respondent nos. 4 and 5. 23. In so far as the respondent no. 3 is concerned, it is an admitted fact that the KMC has not carried out the order dated 4 June, 2015. As a Principal Officer and being at the helm of affairs of the KMC the respondent no. 3 must take the responsibility. Violation of the order of this Court by the respondent no. 3 is not in dispute. The question is whether such violation is wilful? 24. Learned Sr. Counsel for the respondent no. 3 submitted that there is no intentional violation of the order. 3 must take the responsibility. Violation of the order of this Court by the respondent no. 3 is not in dispute. The question is whether such violation is wilful? 24. Learned Sr. Counsel for the respondent no. 3 submitted that there is no intentional violation of the order. He further submitted that there is no pleading in the contempt application that the noncompliance with the order is wilful. This is factually incorrect. In paragraph 11 of the contempt petition the petitioners have pleaded wilful, deliberate and contumacious violation of the order dated 4 June, 2015. Learned Counsel further submitted that it is practically impossible for KMC to dislodge its conservancy staff who are in occupation of the said property. I am unable to appreciate this submission. The conservancy staff and their families are residing in the said premises being permitted to do so by the KMC. They have no independent right to occupy the said premises. They have been put in occupation of the said premises by KMC and it is the obligation of the KMC to have the said premises vacated and to handover vacant and peaceful possession thereof to the petitioner company. The KMC cannot be allowed to urge that the occupants are not willing to vacate the premises. It is the KMC which is in possession of the said premises through its conservancy staff. The court cannot do charity with the property of others. Once it has been held that the petitioners are entitled to get vacant possession of the said premises, the KMC authorities are bound and obliged to deliver such possession to the petitioner company. Although not a fundamental right, the right to property is a valuable constitutional right of citizens of India as enshrined under Article 300A of the Constitution. 25. The submission made on behalf of KMC that it has filed a civil suit in Alipore Court for a declaration of its right, title and interest in respect of the said property and that so long such suit is not decided, the KMC should not be required to deliver possession of the property to the petitioners, also does not impress me. KMC has not been able to obtain any interim order protecting their alleged right in respect of the said premises. A suit, as is well-known, is a long drawn process. KMC has not been able to obtain any interim order protecting their alleged right in respect of the said premises. A suit, as is well-known, is a long drawn process. It will be unfair and unjust if the petitioners have to wait to obtain vacant possession of the said premises until the final decision in the suit. Needless to say, if KMC succeeds in the suit, it will naturally regain possession of the said premises. However, in the meantime, the order of this court must be obeyed in its right spirit. 26. I am unable to accept the submission of Mr. Banerjee, Learned Sr. Counsel appearing for KMC that there is no wilful violation of this Court's order dated 4 June, 2015. A clear intention not to obey the said order is manifest and decipherable in the conduct of the KMC. Lame and frivolous excuses are being advanced on its behalf for not implementing the said order. I am unable to accept that it is not possible for KMC to carry out the said order and provide alternative accommodation to the aforesaid conservancy staff. I can see a deliberate intention on the part of the KMC to obstruct implementation of the said order. 27. In view of the aforesaid, I hold that with full knowledge of the order dated 4 June, 2015, the KMC, which is represented by the respondent no. 3 in this proceeding has wilfully violated the order. Hence, there will be a Rule in terms of prayer (a) of the contempt petition as against the respondent no. 3. The Rule is returnable 8 weeks hence. 28. The next question is whether I should stop by issuing a Rule or should pass further orders for implementation of the order dated 4 June, 2015. In course of argument it was submitted on behalf of the respondents that on a contempt application no substantive or consequential orders can be passed. I am unable to accept such submission. Although the court exercises special jurisdiction under the Contempt of Courts Act, the inherent power of the Court to do complete justice between the parties is not abrogated or abridged. It is well-settled that a contemnor ought not to be permitted to enjoy and/or retain the fruits of his contempt. In Delhi Development Authority v. Skipper Construction Co. Although the court exercises special jurisdiction under the Contempt of Courts Act, the inherent power of the Court to do complete justice between the parties is not abrogated or abridged. It is well-settled that a contemnor ought not to be permitted to enjoy and/or retain the fruits of his contempt. In Delhi Development Authority v. Skipper Construction Co. (P) Ltd., (1996) 4 SCC 622 , the Hon'ble Apex Court, at paragraph 17 of the reported judgment, observed as follows:- "In Mohd. Idris v. R. J. Babuji, (1985) 1 SCR 598 , this court held clearly that undergoing the punishment for contempt does not mean that the court is not entitled to give appropriate directions for remedying and rectifying the things done in violation of its orders. The petitioners therein had given an undertaking to the Bombay High Court. They acted in breach of it. A learned Single Judge held them guilty of contempt and imposed a sentence of one month's imprisonment. In addition thereto, the learned Single Judge made appropriate directions to remedy the breach of undertaking. It was contended before this court that the learned Judge was not justified in giving the aforesaid directions to in addition to punishing the petitioners for contempt of court. The argument was rejected holding that 'the Single Judge was quite right in giving appropriate directions to close the breach (of undertaking)." 29. In Clarke v. Chadburn, (1985) 1 All. E. R. 211, Sir Robert Megarry V-C observed as follows:- "I need not cite authority for the proposition that it is of high importance that orders of this court should be obeyed. Wilful disobedience to an order of the court is punishable as a contempt of court, and I feel no doubt that such obedience may property be described as being illegal. If by such disobedience the persons enjoined claim that they have validly effected some charge in the rights and liabilities of others, I cannot see why it should be said that although they are liable to penalties for contempt of court for doing what they did, nevertheless those acts were validly done. Of course, if an act is done, it is not undone merely by pointing out that it was done in breach in law. if a meeting is held in breach of an injunction, it cannot be said that the meeting has not been held. Of course, if an act is done, it is not undone merely by pointing out that it was done in breach in law. if a meeting is held in breach of an injunction, it cannot be said that the meeting has not been held. But the legal consequences of what has been done in breach of the law may plainly be very much affected by the illegality. It seems to me on principle that those who defy a prohibition ought not to be able to claim that the fruits of their defiance are good, and not tainted by the illegality that produced them. 30. In Century Flour Mills Ltd. v. S. Suppiah & Ors., AIR 1975 Madras 270, a Full Bench of Madras High Court held that where an act is done in violation of an order of stay or injunction, it is the duty of the Court, as a policy, to set the wrong right and not allow the perpetuation of wrong-doing. The inherent power of the Court, is not only available in such a case, but it is bound to be exercised to undo the wrong in the interest of justice. A similar view has been taken by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Sujit Pal v. Prabir Kumar Sun, AIR 1986 Calcutta 220. In that case, the defendant forcibly dispossessed the plaintiff in violation of the order of injunction and had taken possession of the property in question. The Court directed restoration of possession to the plaintiff with the aid of Police. The Court observed that no technicality can prevent the Court from doing justice in exercise of its inherent powers. 31. In Devendra v. The Commissioner, Corporation of Madras, (2001) 2 MLJ 10 , the Madras High Court observed that the contemnor ought not to be permitted to escape liability for his acts of contempt. The court can issue appropriate direction to remedy and rectify the things done in violation of its order in addition to punishing the contemnor for contempt. 32. In Safauddin Ahmed v. Sakti Priya Chatterjee, 2012 (1) CHN (Cal) 400, a Division Bench of this court observed that a proceeding in civil contempt is not only for taking the contemnor to task appropriately but to see that the order passed by the Court is implemented. 33. 32. In Safauddin Ahmed v. Sakti Priya Chatterjee, 2012 (1) CHN (Cal) 400, a Division Bench of this court observed that a proceeding in civil contempt is not only for taking the contemnor to task appropriately but to see that the order passed by the Court is implemented. 33. In State of Orissa v. Aswini Kumar Baliar Singh, (2006) 6 SCC 759 , the Hon'ble Apex Court at paragraph 8 of the judgment observed that the High Court may, in a given case, issue appropriate direction, although no penal action is taken against the contemnors. But even in respect thereof, a finding would be required to be arrived at to the effect that the contemnors have disobeyed the order of the Court. Only when such a finding is arrived at, the Court may in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction put the parties to the same position as if its order had not been violated. 34. In Dr. Subhas Chandra Pratihar v. Mrs. Leena Chakraborty, 1995 CRI. L. J. 707, this Court observed as follows:- "In view of the contempt alleged, the petitioner had prayed the court, during the hearing, for passing appropriate direction upon the contemnor for compliance with the aforesaid relevant order dated 10 January 1992 and for passing such necessary penal orders against her, as the court may deem fit and proper. A question naturally arises as to whether the contempt proceedings in contemnor could only be punished or let off, and whether there is any other way out. The point may somewhat differently be posed as to whether any consequential relief could be given on a contempt application. A Division Bench of this court in Dulal Chandra Bhar v. Sukumar Banerjee, AIR 1958 Calcutta 474, has held that in a civil contempt when the party in whose interest the order was made moved the court for action to be taken in contempt against the contemnor with a view to enforcement of his right, the proceeding is only a form of execution. Another Division Bench of this court in Saibal Kumar Gupta v. B K. Sen, AIR 1959 Calcutta 106, has held that when an order made for the benefit of a party is disregarded or violation and the court enforces the order by punishing the delinquent for contempt, it is said that such proceedings is a form of execution. The Supreme Court in Md. The Supreme Court in Md. Idris v. Rustam Jehangir Bapuji, AIR 1984 SC 1826 , has held that a single Judge of the High Court was justified in giving appropriate direction in addition to punishing the party for contempt of Court. The High Court can, accordingly, pass direction on contempt application for implementation of its order. The Supreme Court in Noorali Babul Thanewala v. Sh. KMM Setty, AIR 1990 SC 464 , has clearly held that in a contempt application arising out of a civil proceeding the court is competent to issue necessary further and consequential direction for enforcing the order. The aforesaid decisions had been followed by a learned Single Judge of this court in Hindustan Lever Sramik Karmachari Congress v. Ashis Chakraborty, (1991) 1 CLJ 502. There is nothing to depart from the aforesaid decisions. That being so, there could clearly be no mistaking that in a contempt application the court is competent to issue necessary further and consequential directions for enforcing its order. In the nature of the matter, I, accordingly, direct the contemnor Mrs. Leena Chakraborty to comply with the orders dated 25 March, 1991 and 10 January, 1992 passed in the relevant Writ Application, being CO No. 3386 (W) of 1991, within two months from this date. I further direct her to cancel or withdraw the order of suspension dated 19th August, 1994 passed on the petitioner to give effect to the aforesaid orders passed by the court on the said writ application. This order shall not, however, debar the contemnor to initiate Departmental Proceedings against the petitioner hereafter on specific article/s of charge, if there be any, and from suspending him during the pendency of the Departmental Proceedings, if so required for the purpose of proceeding with the same. But the petitioner shall not be suspended without initiating any Departmental Proceedings against him on specific article/s of charge, and before complying with the aforesaid orders of this court dated 25th March, 1991 and 10th January, 1992. If the petitioner feels aggrieved against any such Departmental Proceedings, it would also be open to him to seek appropriate redress before the appropriate forum, as the law permits." 35. Thus, the law appears to be well-settled. The court has sufficient power to pass an order on a contempt application for closing the breach. If the petitioner feels aggrieved against any such Departmental Proceedings, it would also be open to him to seek appropriate redress before the appropriate forum, as the law permits." 35. Thus, the law appears to be well-settled. The court has sufficient power to pass an order on a contempt application for closing the breach. The court cannot and should not rest by passing a punitive order against the contemnor. It is the duty of the Court to see that its order is implemented and the contemnor does not enjoy the benefits he has derived by violating the court's order. If this is not done, the entire process of law and justice shall become a farce. 36. In view of the aforesaid, I direct the respondent nos. 4 and 5 to implement the order dated 4 June, 2015 passed by this Court by obtaining vacant and peaceful possession of the premises in question and handing over peaceful and vacant possession of the said premises to the petitioner company. However, the respondent no. 5 shall first serve a notice on the occupants of the said premises requiring them to vacate the premises within 4 weeks from the date of the notice. If the occupants of the said property do not vacate the premises within 4 weeks after service of the notice, the respondent nos. 4 and 5 shall recover possession of the said premises by removing the occupants therefrom in the best possible manner they may deem fit and proper. After recovery of vacant possession of the said premises, the said respondents will hand over the same to the petitioner company. The entire exercise shall be completed within a period of 8 weeks from date. Although I have full sympathy for the occupants of the said premises, the Court cannot do charity with other people's property. Sympathy cannot be a ground or justification for subverting the natural course of law and justice. I can only hope that KMC arranges for alterative accommodation for the occupants of the said premises who according to KMC are its conservancy staff and their families. 37. Before concluding I should record that on 30 November, 2016 it was brought to my knowledge that the Hon'ble Appeal Court had passed an order dated 23 November, 2016 to the effect that no steps for execution shall be taken for a period of four weeks. 37. Before concluding I should record that on 30 November, 2016 it was brought to my knowledge that the Hon'ble Appeal Court had passed an order dated 23 November, 2016 to the effect that no steps for execution shall be taken for a period of four weeks. Accordingly, I had directed the contempt application to go out of list with liberty to mention. On 10.01.2017 the matter appeared in the list and I was informed that there is no extension of the order of stay of execution. Hence, I have passed this order. 38. This contempt proceeding thus stands closed as against the respondent nos. 1, 2, 4 and 5. In so far as the respondent no. 3 is concerned, the Rule issued is returnable after 8 weeks. 39. Urgent certified photocopy of this judgment and order, if applied for, be given to the parties upon compliance of necessary formalities. Application allowed.