JUDGMENT : 1. The order appealed against is one passed on an application under Chapter XIIIA of the Rules on the Original Side of this Court. By such order, the defendant has been given unconditional leave to defend the suit. 2. The claim in the suit is in respect of an immovable property at Park Street. According to the appellant, the appeal may be regarded as one under the Commercial Courts, Commercial Division and Commercial Appellate Division of High Courts Act, 2015 since the specified value of the immovable property in question would exceed a sum of Rs.1 crore. As to the maintainability of the appeal, the appellant claims that the order impugned has to be regarded as a “decision” within the meaning of Section 13 of the Act of 2015; or, at any rate, if such Act of 2015 does not apply to this appeal, as a judgment within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, 1865. 3. The Act of 2015 does not and cannot apply to this case as the order impugned was passed on a date prior to the Commercial Division being notified in this Court under the said statute. Section 13 of the Act of 2015 provides for appeals in the following words, “Any person aggrieved by the decision of the Commercial Court or Commercial Division of a High Court may appeal to the Commercial Appellate Division of that High Court within a period of 60 days from the date of judgment or order, as the case may be : …” 4. Thus, it is only if the order impugned is passed by a Commercial Court or a Commercial Division that a Commercial Appellate Division may entertain an appeal. There is no provision in the Act of 2015 for entertaining any other appeal by the Commercial Appellate Division. 5. The appellant, however, has referred to Section 12 of the Act of 2015 and the determination of specified value there under with reference to an appeal, in addition to a suit and an application. Whatever may be the purpose for determining the specified value of an appeal, nothing in Section 12 can add to the authority granted to the Commercial Appellate Division under Section 13 of the Act. Whatever may be the purpose for determining the specified value of an appeal, nothing in Section 12 can add to the authority granted to the Commercial Appellate Division under Section 13 of the Act. Section 12 and the determination of specified value there under in respect of an appeal may be relevant for the purpose of court-fees or the like; but an appeal to a Commercial Appellate Division under the said Act of 2015 may only be received from orders passed by the Commercial Court or the Commercial Division and from no other. Indeed, it would be evident from Section 15 of the said Act of 2015 that only pending cases in the High Court of specified value have stood transferred to the Commercial Division of this High Court pursuant to the notification issued for setting up the Commercial Division. That some appeals may have been included in the list before the Commercial Appellate Division on the inaugural day, may have been an aberration or a departmental error; but it cannot be said that merely by virtue of some old appeals mistakenly appearing as commercial appeals in the list on September 18, 2017 that appeals from orders passed in matters which have subsequently to be considered as commercial disputes will be maintainable before the Commercial Appellate Division under the said Act of 2015. 6. As to the order impugned being appellable, the appellant places a judgment reported at 30 CWN 706. According to the appellant, no reasons were indicated by the Division Bench as to why an appeal would not lie from an order declining summary judgment under Chapter XIIIA of the Rules on the Original Side of this Court. To our mind, the reason appears to be this: that the plaintiff in such a scenario does not lose the right to seek the reliefs at the trial; such an order merely postpones the time of the plaintiff obtaining the relief, if the plaintiff is so entitled. 7. The appellant next relies on the celebrated judgment of Shah Babulal Khimji reported at (1981) 4 SCC 8 and places paragraphs 80 to 83 and 120 from the report. 7. The appellant next relies on the celebrated judgment of Shah Babulal Khimji reported at (1981) 4 SCC 8 and places paragraphs 80 to 83 and 120 from the report. The appellant emphasises that it is not only the nature of the order that would help in determining whether the order ought to be considered as a judgment within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, but the object of the statute would also have to be looked into in such regard. The appellant exhorts that Chapter XIIIA was introduced into the Rules on the Original Side of this Court since Calcutta was once the hub of commercial activities in the country and it was desired that commercial matters get priority, much like the 2015 Act has now sought to recognise. The appellant suggests that if a plaintiff is entitled to immediate relief, the postponement of the consideration as to whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief sought would be inconvenient to the plaintiff and, keeping the object of the provision in mind, render such order amenable to an appeal. 8. According to the appellant, Chapter XIIIA of the Rules on the Original Side of this Court is somewhat different from Order XXXVII of the Code covering summary judgments. Apart from Chapter XIIIA of the Rules on the Original Side of this Court also including immovable properties within its fold, according to the appellant, the emphasis in proceedings under Chapter XIIIA is on the defendant being able to establish a defence or the likelihood of success at the trial; whereas under Order XXXVII Rule 3 of the Code, leave to defend may not be refused to a defendant unless the Court is satisfied that the facts disclosed by the defendant do not indicate that he has a substantial defence to raise. 9. The appellant has also placed a judgment reported at (2004) 9 SCC 512 for the recognition at paragraph 132 thereof that a party should not be unnecessarily harassed in a suit. Though the reference in the judgment was to the harassment upon an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code being rejected, the appellant seems to suggest that similar prejudice is suffered by a plaintiff who is asked to undergo a time-consuming and protracted trial to obtain the reliefs that he demonstrates that he is entitled to at the outset. 10. 10. The appellant has also fairly referred to an unreported Division Bench judgment of this Court rendered on August 22, 2017 in APD No.86 of 2017. However, since the appeal in such unreported judgment arose from a condition imposed while granting leave to defend, and such order is regarded to be appellable in this Court, such judgment may not have any direct relevance in the present context. 11. The appellant seeks to make a distinction between the orders which are appellable by their very nature and orders which may be appellable because of the failure of the Court to exercise a jurisdiction vested in by law or some other jurisdictional error. 12. If one were to refer to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, it would be evident that the appellate provisions only provide for the generic natures of orders which would be appellable. Though the word “judgment” in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent has been interpreted to apply to situations where there may be jurisdictional errors or failure by the first Court to discharge a duty vested in it by law, the order impugned herein is not of such character that it may be regarded as one where the Judge refused to exercise any jurisdiction that was vested in him by law. 13. The appellant instituted the suit for recovery of possession of the immovable property pursuant to a notice issued under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. In the affidavit used by the defendant to the Chapter XIIIA application, it was alleged that there was a subsequent oral agreement which required the appellant to not seek possession of the tenanted premises for a period of nine years after 2012. An unregistered document of August 13, 2012 was also appended to the defendant’s affidavit in support of its assertion. 14. Notwithstanding the relevant document being unregistered, the Court took a possible view that some modicum of defence had been disclosed and the defendant was entitled to unconditionally defend the suit. In such a scenario it cannot be said that the Court dismissed the application under Chapter XIIIA of the Rules on the Original Side without taking relevant considerations into account or in an arbitrary manner. There was an element of discretion available to the Court. The exercise of the discretion does not appear to be perverse. In such a scenario it cannot be said that the Court dismissed the application under Chapter XIIIA of the Rules on the Original Side without taking relevant considerations into account or in an arbitrary manner. There was an element of discretion available to the Court. The exercise of the discretion does not appear to be perverse. The order does not appear to suffer from the kind of jurisdictional error that the appellant suggests for the very nature of the order to make it appellable notwithstanding the genre of the order not being otherwise amenable to an appeal. 15. Since the order impugned merely postpones the appellant’s right to seek and obtain the relief sought and nothing has been decided finally thereby, the order impugned cannot be regarded as a judgment within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. As a consequence, the appeal fails as not maintainable. 16. APO No. 406 of 2017 and GA No. 2886 of 2017 are dismissed with costs assessed at 1000 GM.