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2017 DIGILAW 807 (ORI)

Kumar Barik (since dead) through L. Rs. v. Banshidhar Lenka

2017-07-28

A.K.RATH

body2017
JUDGMENT : Dr. A.K.Rath, J Defendants are the appellants against a reversing judgment. 2. Respondent as plaintiff instituted O.S. No.32 of 1979-I in the court of the learned Subordinate Judge, Bhubaneswar for specific performance of contract, declaration that the sale deed executed by defendant no.1 in favour of defendant no.2 to 4 are illegal and void, recovery of possession and in the alternative for a decree of Rs.8000/-with PI&FI. Case of the plaintiff is that defendant no.1 is the owner of the suit schedule land. To press his legal necessity, defendant no.1 entered into an agreement on 29.3.1976 with the plaintiff for sale of the land for a consideration of Rs.10,000/-. He received an amount of Rs.8000/-towards part consideration and delivered possession. It was agreed between the parties that defendant no.1 would receive the balance consideration of Rs.2000/-and execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff within four months. The plaintiff was ready and willing to perform part of the contract. He approached defendant no.1 on different occasions to execute the sale deed, but later avoided on false pretext. Subsequently defendant nos.2 to 4 in connivance with defendant no.1 obtained three nominal sale deeds in their favour in respect of the suit land knowing fully well about the existence of the agreement. The transfer of the land having made during pendency of the suit, the same is hit by lis pendens. 3. Defendant no.1 filed a written statement denying the assertions made in the plaint. The case of the defendant no.1 is that he is a resident of Cuttack town. He along with one Lokanath Mohanty had jointly acquired about two acres of land in mouza-Pandara. They were in possession of their respective shares pursuant to an amicable partition. One Siba Parida of Palasuni purchased some land from Lokanath Mohanty. He approached defendant no.1 in the year 1975 to sell away his share to him. Defendant no.1 did not agree. As he was in need of money for marriage of his daughter, he sold the suit land to defendant nos.2 to 4 by means of three sale deeds on 2.1.1982 for a valid consideration and delivered possession. It was further pleaded that Siba Parida having failed in his attempt to purchase the land might have created a forged agreement in connivance with the plaintiff to grab the property. It was further pleaded that Siba Parida having failed in his attempt to purchase the land might have created a forged agreement in connivance with the plaintiff to grab the property. Defendants 2 to 4 pleaded, inter alia, that defendant no.1 executed three sale deeds in their favour for a consideration and delivered possession. They are the bona fide purchasers for value of the suit schedule property. They did not have the knowledge of the agreement to sell. 4. On the inter se pleadings of the parties, learned trial court struck eight issues. Both the parties led evidence, both oral and documentary, in support of their cases. Learned trial court came to hold that the stamp paper of the agreement vide Ext.2 was not purchased by defendant no.1 as the number written on the reverse side appeared to be discrepant. He was residing at Cuttack not at Palasuni. Thus the plaintiff had no occasion to come to his contact, expressed his intention to purchase the suit schedule land and entered into an agreement with defendant no.1. Defendant no.1 was residing at Cuttack has been established in Misc. Case No.327 of 1982 filed under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC. The same will operate as res judicata. Defendant no.1 being an illiterate person, onus lies on the plaintiff to prove that he had executed the agreement after understanding the contents thereof. No certificate to that effect has been appended by the scribe at the buttom of the agreement. Plaintiff has failed to prove that he paid consideration amount of Rs.8000/-out of Rs.10000/-at the time of execution of the agreement. P.W.5-plaintiff deposed that he paid the part consideration amount in one instalment, but in Misc. Case No.327 of 1982, he deposed that the said amount was paid in two instalments. The area of the suit land has been wrongly recorded in the agreement. Valuation of the suit land is grossly low. The original ROR Ext.3 was never handed over to the plaintiff by D.W.4, the other co-sharer along with defendant no.1. But on the other hand the ROR was handed over to one Siba Parida, who had falsely created the agreement. Held so it dismissed the suit. Assailing the judgment and decree, plaintiff filed Title Appeal No.81/7 of 1990/89 in the court of learned 2nd Addl. District Judge, Bhubaneswar. But on the other hand the ROR was handed over to one Siba Parida, who had falsely created the agreement. Held so it dismissed the suit. Assailing the judgment and decree, plaintiff filed Title Appeal No.81/7 of 1990/89 in the court of learned 2nd Addl. District Judge, Bhubaneswar. Learned lower appellate court framed two additional issues, set aside the judgment and decree of the learned trial court and remanded the suit to the learned trial court for disposal on the available materials on record. Against the said judgment, defendant no.1 preferred Misc. Appeal No.524 of 1996 before this Court. This Court set aside the judgment of the learned lower appellate court and directed the learned lower appellate court to dispose of the appeal in accordance with law. After remand, learned lower appellate court came to hold that the finding in the restoration case is not binding on the parties in the suit. There is no scope to come to a conclusion that the stamp paper Ext.1 was not purchased by the plaintiff. Defendant no.1 having not taken the ground in his written statement that he was suffering from cataract, his refusal to identify his signature when confronted amounts to admission of the document. A part consideration was paid. The plaintiff is in possession of the suit land. The plaint is in conformity with the legal requirements. Defendants 2 to 4 are not bona fide purchasers. Held so, learned lower appellate court allowed the appeal. It is apt to state here that during pendency of the second appeal, appellant no.1 died, whereafter his legal representatives have been brought on record. 5. The second appeal was admitted on 15.3.1999 on the substantial questions of law enumerated in Ground Nos.(A) to (H). In course of hearing, Mr. R.K. Mohanty, learned Senior Advocate for the appellants, submitted that substantial questions of law have not been properly formulated. He urged that the following substantial questions of law need determination in the appeal. Accordingly, the following substantial questions of law have been framed. “1. Whether the learned lower appellate court is justified in decreeing a suit for specific performance of contract, when due execution of the Ext.2 has not been proved ? 2. He urged that the following substantial questions of law need determination in the appeal. Accordingly, the following substantial questions of law have been framed. “1. Whether the learned lower appellate court is justified in decreeing a suit for specific performance of contract, when due execution of the Ext.2 has not been proved ? 2. Whether the learned lower appellate court is justified in accepting the evidence of P.W.4 in part, which supports the plaintiff and rejecting that part which supports the defendants, after coming to a conclusion that he is unreliable ? 3. Whether the finding arrived at in the proceeding under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC arising out of the suit to the effect that the defendants never resided at Palasuni, Bhubaneswar, but were residents of Cuttack can operate as res judicata in the suit ? 4. Whether the learned lower appellate court is justified in decreeing the suit in the absence of readiness and willingness of the plaintiff to perform his part of the contract in the pleadings and evidence ? 5. Whether the subsequent transfer in favour of defendant nos.2 to 4 are protected under Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act, since they are transferees for value and without notice of the original contract ?” 6. Heard Mr. R.K Mohanty, learned Senior Advocate for the appellants and Mr. S.P. Mishra, learned Senior Advocate for the respondents. 7. Mr. Mohanty, learned Senior Advocate for the appellants, submitted that grant of relief of specific performance of contract is an equitable relief and the jurisdiction to grant such a decree is discretionary. The court is not bound to grant such relief merely because it is lawful to do so. The plaintiff is guilty of fraudulently manipulating court proceeding for getting relief. He has not approached the court with clean hands. In the restoration case, there is a finding that the plaintiff had falsely portrayed defendant No.1 to be a resident of Palasuni and got the service of summons sufficient against him. The principle of res judicata not only applies in subsequent proceeding, but also at different stages of the same proceeding. Therefore, when the very basis of the plaintiff’s claim is doubtful and tainted with fraud, the equitable relief of specific performance should not be granted in his favour. He further submitted that the learned lower appellate court has come to a conclusion that defendant no.1 was not illiterate. Therefore, when the very basis of the plaintiff’s claim is doubtful and tainted with fraud, the equitable relief of specific performance should not be granted in his favour. He further submitted that the learned lower appellate court has come to a conclusion that defendant no.1 was not illiterate. But literacy is not the legal requirement. Literate or not literate, validity can be attached to a document only, if it has been signed after the signatories understood the contents of the same. The scribe-P.W.3, attesting witness-P.W.4 and the plaintiff-P.W.5 deposed that the defendant no.1 signed the agreement after going through the document, but there is no iota of evidence that the parties put the signature after understanding the contents of the same. There is also no endorsement to this effect in the agreement. Admission of defendant no.1 of his signature on the document cannot ipso facto be proof of his admission of the contents in the document. The plaintiff has failed to lead any evidence that he reminded defendant no.1 by registered post time and again to perform his part of contract. Defendant no.1 has specifically denied the same in his written statement and has not been cross-examined on this count. The mandatory requirements prescribed in Appendix-A Forms 47 and 48 are conspicuously absent in the pleadings of the plaintiff which becomes fatal in a suit for specific performance of contract. The learned lower appellate court has failed to consider the provisions of Sec. 19 of the Specific Relief Act which bars the enforcement of a contract against a transferee, who has paid his money in good faith and without notice of the original contract. The plaintiff in his amended plaint stated that defendant nos.2 to 4 after coming to know of the execution of his sale deed through court had purchased the land for which they had knowledge of the existing contract. He further submitted that the acceptance of the plea of the plaintiff by the lower appellate court is completely an error on record. The plaintiff had fraudulently made summons sufficient in Bhubaneswar address though defendant no.1 was staying at Cuttack and obtained ex parte decree initially. The transfers in favour of defendant nos.2 to 4 were effected on 2.1.1982 and the suit was restored on 10.5.1982. It can only be inferred that defendant nos.2 to 4 had no notice of the agreement. The plaintiff had fraudulently made summons sufficient in Bhubaneswar address though defendant no.1 was staying at Cuttack and obtained ex parte decree initially. The transfers in favour of defendant nos.2 to 4 were effected on 2.1.1982 and the suit was restored on 10.5.1982. It can only be inferred that defendant nos.2 to 4 had no notice of the agreement. He further submitted that the cardinal principles of readiness and willingness in a suit for specific performance of contract are absent in the instant case. To buttress his submissions, he relied on the decisions of the apex Court in the case of Y.B. Patil and others v. Y.L. Patil, AIR 1977 SC 392 , Prahlad Singh v. Col. Sukhdev Singh, AIR 1987 SC 1145 , Abdul Khader Rowther v. P.K. Sara Bai and others, AIR 1990 SC 682 and the decision of this Court in the case of Baruna Giri and others v. Rajakishore Giri and others, AIR 1983 Orissa 107. 8. Per contra, Mr. Mishra, learned Senior Advocate for the respondent, submitted that plaintiff has proved due execution of the agreement-Ext.2, passing of consideration amount and delivery of possession. The learned lower appellate court has given a clear and cogent finding with regard to due execution, purchase of stamp paper by defendant no.1, passing of consideration money and possession of the plaintiff. The stamp vendor P.W.1 deposed that defendant no.1 had purchased the stamp paper and proved the signature and also proved the number of stamp papers. The scribe P.W.3 in his deposition proved the due execution of the agreement. The attesting witness P.W.4 proved the due execution of agreement. The plaintiff P.W.5 in his deposition has stated that the contents of the documents were read over and explained to defendant no.1 by the scribe. Defendant no.1 went through the same and after understanding the contents thereof put his signature. Thereafter, the witness had signed on the same. The witness in his evidence stated that on the date of execution of the agreement, the plaintiff had received the part amount of Rs.8000/-. P.W.5 deposed that he is in possession of the suit land from the date of the agreement. He further contended that in a suit for specific performance of contract it is to be found out as to whether the contract is valid and whether the plaintiff was/is ready and willing to perform part of his contract. P.W.5 deposed that he is in possession of the suit land from the date of the agreement. He further contended that in a suit for specific performance of contract it is to be found out as to whether the contract is valid and whether the plaintiff was/is ready and willing to perform part of his contract. The same was not the subject-matter in the misc. case filed under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC to set aside the ex parte decree. The finding rendered in an interlocutory application will not operate as res judicata. He further contended that the plaintiff is ready and willing to perform part of his contract, but the defendants refused to perform the part of the contract. The same is sufficient compliance of Sec.16(c) of the Specific Relief Act. Forms 47 and 48 in Appendix-A CPC prescribes the forms in a suit for specific performance of contract. Those forms provide for specific pleadings of readiness and willingness and demand for performance and its refusal. Order 6 Rule 3 CPC provides that compliance of forms as nearby as may be will be sufficient. The forms could only be read along with Order 6 Rule 3 CPC and not word by word. Compliance of the forms is not what is absolutely necessary in the pleading, though it is desirable in order to enable the courts to arrive at the truth and do justice. The words “readiness and willingness” cannot be treated as a straitjacket formula. Compliance need only be substantial to the satisfaction of the court. It need be only to the spirit and substance and not to the letter and form. Procedural law is intended to facilitate and not to obstruct the course of substantive justice. The plaintiff was put in possession of the land pursuant to the agreement to sell. In spite of repeated demands, defendant no.1 did not execute the sale deed. Thus it cannot be said that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform the part of his contract. Learned lower appellate court rendered a finding that the defendants 2 to 4 are not bona fide purchaser of value. Defendant no.1 intended to avoid execution of the sale deed on the ground of defective eye sight. However, he executed the sale deeds during that period. The evidence of defendant no.1 is not trustworthy. Learned lower appellate court rendered a finding that the defendants 2 to 4 are not bona fide purchaser of value. Defendant no.1 intended to avoid execution of the sale deed on the ground of defective eye sight. However, he executed the sale deeds during that period. The evidence of defendant no.1 is not trustworthy. He relied on the decision of the Kerala High Court in the case of Krishnan Kesavan and others v. Kochukunju Karunakaran, AIR 1988 Kerala 107. 9. The suit was decreed ex parte. Thereafter, defendant no.1 filed an application 9 Rule 13 CPC to set aside the ex parte decree on the ground that summons was not served on him. A plea was taken that by suppressing the summons plaintiff had obtained the decree. The same was found favour with by the learned trial court. The ex parte decree was set aside. Against the said order, the plaintiff filed Civil Revision No.522 of 1983 before this Court. The revision was dismissed. There is no quarrel over the proposition of law that the res judicata operates at different stages in the same proceeding. In the instant case, the judgment and decree was set aside. The defendant filed a written statement and contested the suit. Order 9 Rule 13 CPC provides setting aside ex parte decree against defendant. Scope of proceeding under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC is extremely limited to ascertain as to whether the summons was not duly served on the defendant or that he was prevented by sufficient cause for appearing when the suit was called on for hearing. If a finding is rendered by the court that the plaintiff played fraud for which summons was not duly served, in such an eventuality the court shall set aside ex parte decree and shall appoint a day for proceeding with the suit. The same is not a ground to non suit the plaintiff. The decision relied on by Mr. Mohanty in the case of Y.B. Patil (supra) is distinguishable on facts. 10. Much reliance has been placed upon Form Nos.47 and 48 of Appendix-A CPC that the plaint did not contain the requisite allegation that the plaintiff is ready and willing to perform his part of contract in terms of Form 47 and 48 which was necessary to obtain a decree for specific performance of contract. 10. Much reliance has been placed upon Form Nos.47 and 48 of Appendix-A CPC that the plaint did not contain the requisite allegation that the plaintiff is ready and willing to perform his part of contract in terms of Form 47 and 48 which was necessary to obtain a decree for specific performance of contract. In the instant case, the plaint contains material facts of readiness and willingness of the plaintiff to perform his part of contract. The plaintiff also led evidence that he was although ready and willing to perform part of his contract. 11. In Ramesh Chandra v. Chuni Lal AIR 1971 SC 1238 , the apex Court held that readiness and willingness cannot be treated as a strait-jacket formula. Those have to be determined from the entirety of facts and circumstances relevant to the intention and conduct of the party concerned. Taking a cue from the same, the Kerala High Court in the case of Krishnan Kesavan (supra) held that Forms 47 and 48 in Appendix-A to the Code prescribe the forms in specific performance suits. Those forms provide for specific pleadings of readiness and willingness and demand for performance and its refusal. But Order 6 Rule 3 says that compliance of forms as nearly as may be will be sufficient. The forms could only be read along with Order 6 Rule 3 and not word by word. Compliance of the forms is not what is absolutely necessary in the pleadings though it is always desirable in order to enable the courts to arrive at the truth and do justice. This Court is in complete agreement with the view taken by the Kerala High Court in the case of Krishnan Kesavan (supra). In Abdul Khader Rowther (supra), the plaintiff brought a suit for specific performance of covenant for reconveyance. His plaint did not contain the requisite allegation that he is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract in terms of Forms 47 and 48, which was necessary to obtain a decree for specific performance. The apex Court held that the equitable remedy recognized by the Specific Relief Act could not be had on the basis of such pleadings and evidence. But then in the present case there is pleading as well as evidence with regard to readiness and willingness of the plaintiff to perform his part of contract. The apex Court held that the equitable remedy recognized by the Specific Relief Act could not be had on the basis of such pleadings and evidence. But then in the present case there is pleading as well as evidence with regard to readiness and willingness of the plaintiff to perform his part of contract. Thus the said decision is distinguishable on facts. 12. Placing reliance placed on the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Baruna Giri (supra), Mr. Mohanty, learned Senior Advocate submitted that the plaintiff has not sent a draft notice along with the sale deed before institution of the suit. But then, the apex Court in Raj Kishore Giri and others v. Purendra Giri and others, 1997 (I) OLR (SC) 1 set aside the judgment of this Court in the case of Baruna Giri (supra). Thus Baruna Giri is no longer good law. 13. It was further contended that defendant no.1 is an illiterate and he had not executed the agreement to sell vide Ext.2. When defendant no.1 was confronted with agreement to sell vide Ext.2, he deposed that he was suffering from cataract for the last 15 to 16 years. He had not taken any plea in the written statement. Curiously he had filed a written statement on 16.11.1985 and verified the same. He had also executed three sale deeds on 2.1.1982 in favour of defendants 2 to 4. Learned lower appellate court, on an analysis of the evidence on record as well as pleadings came to hold that if the defendant no.1 was suffering from the cataract since 15 to 16 years, he must be suffering from the same since 1954 or 1955. He had filed a written statement in the year 1985. No such plea was taken in the written statement. He had avoided to answer in positive or in negative with regard to the signature appearing in Ext.2/a and 2/b. It came to the conclusion that defendant no.1 after understanding the contents of Ext.2 has signed thereon. 14. Learned lower appellate court recorded a finding that the sale deeds vide Ext.A/1, B/1 and D/1 had been executed during pendency of the suit. No possession has been delivered to them. Placing reliance on the evidence of D.W.6 it held that defendant nos.2 to 5 are not the bona fide purchaser of value. 14. Learned lower appellate court recorded a finding that the sale deeds vide Ext.A/1, B/1 and D/1 had been executed during pendency of the suit. No possession has been delivered to them. Placing reliance on the evidence of D.W.6 it held that defendant nos.2 to 5 are not the bona fide purchaser of value. Learned lower appellate court further held that neither the scribe of the sale deeds nor attesting witness had been examined by the defendants. Defendant no.1 could not say the boundary of the land sold to defendants 2 to 5, valuation of the stamp paper, amount spend in execution of the sale deeds and the person who purchased the stamp paper. Defendant no.1 had executed the agreement to sell vide Ext.2 in favour of the plaintiff. He has received a part consideration of Rs.8000/-. The possession of the suit land was delivered to the plaintiff. There is sufficient compliance of Forms 47 and 48 in Appendix-A CPC. There is no perversity or illegality in the finding of the court below. The substantial questions of law are answered accordingly. 15. In the wake of the aforesaid, the appeal, sans merit, is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.