JUDGMENT AND ORDER : 1. Heard Mr. N. Dhar, learned counsel for the appellants, Mr. B.K. Jain, learned counsel for the respondent No. 3 and Mr. B.K. Purkayastha, learned counsel for the respondents No. 1 and 2. 2. One Sirajul Haque Choudhury, the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants/plaintiffs preferred title suit No. 297/1982 against the present respondents as the defendants for declaration of the right, title and interest of the plaintiffs, confirmation of possession and for perpetual injunction over the suit land described in the plaint. 3. The case of the plaintiff who, was substituted by his legal heirs as appellants, in brief is that late Khan Bahadur Abdul Mazid Choudhury and Khan Saheb Abdul Karim Choudhury had maliki right in equal share over the land described in the schedule of the plaint along with other land on the contiguous east of the scheduled land comprising a total area of 3 Powa 4 Jasti 8 Pon and 9 Gondas. Out of the said area of land, Khan Bahadur Abdul Mazid Choudhury and Khan Saheb Abdul Karim Choudhury granted lease of 2 Powa and 6 Jasti of land from its eastern part to the owner of Bhagawan Talkies, a cinema hall, for limited purpose on which the said cinema hall was standing and the remaining part on the western side including suit land, measuring an area of 5 Jasti 8 Pons and 19 Gondas remained in exclusive possession of the owners late Khan Bahadur Abdul Mazid Choudhury and Khan Saheb Abdul Karim Choudhury. Subsequently, by amicable partition between the two owners western half of the above stated 5 Jasti 8 Pon and 19 Gondas of land i.e. the suit land fell in the share of Khan Saheb Abdul Karim Choudhury and the eastern half fell in the share of Khan Bahadur Abdul Mazid Choudhury. Thus, Abdul Karim Choudhury acquired 19 annas title over the suit land and due to the implementation of the State Acquisition of Zamindary Act, 1951, Abdul Karim Choudhury acquired the status of land holder in respect of suit land and had been maintaining possession over the same. 4. The plaintiff, (the predecessor-in-interest of the present appellants) was the grand-son of late Abdul Karim Choudhury.
4. The plaintiff, (the predecessor-in-interest of the present appellants) was the grand-son of late Abdul Karim Choudhury. During the life time of Abdul Karim Choudhury, he gifted the suit land along with other land to the plaintiff and delivered khas possession and accordingly, the plaintiff became the absolute owner of the suit land and maintained possession over the same. The cinema hall, namely, Bhagawan Talkies was subsequently purchased by the defendants/respondents in the first part of 1962 and thereafter the defendant/respondent No. 2 approached Abdul Karim Choudhury for granting him lease of 50% share of the above stated land of 2 Powa and 6 Jasti over which the cinema hall was established. Late Abdul Karim Choudhury, granted lease to the defendant/respondent No. 2 in respect of his share i.e. 1 Powa 3 Jasti of land situated on the contiguous east of the remaining part of 5 Jasti 8 Pons and 19 Gondas of land including the suit land which remained outside the lease settlement. 5. The defendants/respondents have no right, title over the suit land nor were, they ever in possession of the suit land. They were attempting to dispossess the plaintiff from the suit land. Hence, the suit was filed for the reliefs as referred hereinabove. 6. By way of an amendment, the relief of recovery of khas possession of the suit land by evicting the defendants/respondents along with the standing structures was introduced after striking out the prayer portion of confirmation of possession. 7. The defendants/respondents contested the suit by filing the written statement. The defendants/respondents specifically took the plea that the plaintiff had no right, title and interest over the suit land and the gift was void in law and on the basis of the said gift no right, title and interest can be said to be vested on the plaintiff and as such the suit is liable to be dismissed. The defendants/respondents pleaded that the defendant/respondent No. 1 purchased the cinema hall previously known as Bhagawan Talkies together with the leasehold right of the land measuring 2 Powas 6 Jasti in an auction sale held by the court of Sub-ordinate Judge at Silchar which was confirmed on 07.05.1962. The delivery of possession was also through the court. The said land was joint and undivided property of late Abdul Karim Choudhury and Abdul Mazid Choudhury Wakf Estate.
The delivery of possession was also through the court. The said land was joint and undivided property of late Abdul Karim Choudhury and Abdul Mazid Choudhury Wakf Estate. The defendant/ respondent No. 2 took lease of 50% of the auction purchased land of 1 Powa 3 Jasti from late Abdul Karim Choudhury on 18.03.1962 for himself and for the respondent/defendant No. 1. Remaining 50% of the said auction purchased land was taken settlement by the defendants/respondents in terms of the registered Solenama from the Wakf Estate. By the said solenama, further area of 3 Jasti 2 Pons and 12½ Gondas of land was also taken on lease from Abdul Mazid Choudhury and the defendants/respondents also occupied and possessed further area of 3 Jasti 2 Pons and 12½ Gondas of land which comprised of an undivided area and acquired the right by prescription over the said area. The defendants/respondents were also granted khatian by the Government in recognition of the ownership and possession over the suit land and other land. In the year 1964, the right, title and interest of the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiff, Abdul Mazid Choudhury and Abdul Karim Choudhury Wakf Estate Zamindary, other than the land owned and possessed by the defendants/respondents were acquired under the Acquisition of the Zamindary Act, 1951 and as such the plaintiff cannot have right, title and interest as the estate acquired was free from encumbrances and there was no conveyable interest which could be transferred to the plaintiff. In the additional written statement, the defendants/ respondents denied the alleged dispossession of the plaintiff from the suit land during the pendency of the suit in the middle part of 1983. It was specifically pleaded that the suit land was never under the possession of the plaintiff. 8. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial court framed the following issues:- 1. Is there any cause of action for the suit? 2. Whether the plaintiff has got right, title, interest and possession over the suit land? 3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get relief as prayed for? Additional issues:- 4. Is the suit barred by limitation? 5. Is the suit bad for defect of parties? 6. Is the plaintiff entitled recover to khas possession of the suit land by evicting the defendants there from? 9. In support of the case of the plaintiff/appellants, 2 (two) witnesses were examined.
Additional issues:- 4. Is the suit barred by limitation? 5. Is the suit bad for defect of parties? 6. Is the plaintiff entitled recover to khas possession of the suit land by evicting the defendants there from? 9. In support of the case of the plaintiff/appellants, 2 (two) witnesses were examined. However, the plaintiff did not grace the witness box in order to support his claim. On the other hand, the defendants/respondents examined 3 (three) witnesses. The learned trial court vide its judgment and decree dated 15.03.1993 dismissed the suit. 10. The learned trial court while taking up the issue No. 2 held that the evidence of the PW-1 (Sakib Ahmed Choudhury) deposed that the alleged gift was oral one. The defendants/respondents challenged the alleged gift as void in law and on the basis of the said gift no right, title and interest had accrued on the plaintiff. The learned trial court discussed the 3 (three) essentials of a gift as per Section 149 of Mullah’s Principles of Mahomedan Law and came to the finding that plaintiff did not examine himself to prove the said 3 (three) essentials of a Mahomedan gift. It was also held that there must be some acceptance of the gift by the done, expressed or implied, and there was no evidence to show, where and how declaration of alleged gift was made. Acceptance of the oral gift must be proved which may be expressed or implied. Donee must establish that the gift was accepted by him. Evidence of PW-1 was not sufficient to prove delivery of possession of the suit land by Abdul Karim Choudhury, the donor, to the plaintiff, who is the donee. By examining the burden of proof, the learned trial court held the same is upon the plaintiff who, did not appear before the court as a witness. The PW-1 is an employee of the plaintiff and the court cannot come to a conclusive finding as to the validity of the alleged gift. It was held that the said PW-1 was not present at the relevant time of making the alleged gift. 11. While considering the case of the defendants/respondents, the learned trial court took note of the various exhibits including the records of DP Case of 1963-64 marked as Exhibits A to Z. The said exhibits were admitted in evidence without any objection.
11. While considering the case of the defendants/respondents, the learned trial court took note of the various exhibits including the records of DP Case of 1963-64 marked as Exhibits A to Z. The said exhibits were admitted in evidence without any objection. It was also taken note of by the learned trial court, that there was no averment in the plaint as to when partition took place between Abdul Karim Choudhury and Abdul Mazid Choudhury. The PW-1 admited in his evidence that there was no document to show the fact of partition as stated in the plaint. The PW-1 deposed that the suit land is covered under Dag No. 4827. He admitted in his evidence that a new dag No. 4827/6846 was created out of dag No. 4827 but he could not say on which boundary of the cinema hall the said land covered by dag No. 4827 falls. The learned trial court also took note of Exhibit F, an application filed by Abdul Karim Choudhury and the plaintiff, against the SDO, PWD, Karimganj in respect of Dag No. 4827 claiming their share of land to be recorded as their khas but after the death of Abdul Karim Choudhury, the matter was not pursued by his successors. Exhibit N reveals that the defendants/respondents were found in possession of the land equal to the area settled by Abdul Mazid Choudhury with the defendants/respondents and finally relying on Exhibit F, the learned trial court came to the conclusion that the claim made by the plaintiff over dag No. 4827 falls within the land of the PWD as road side land. 12. The learned trial court accepted the final khatian recorded in the name of defendant/ respondent No. 2 in respect of Dag No. 4828, Exhibit L the final khatian recorded in the name of defendant/respondent No. 1 in respect of Dag No. 4828 and Exhibit M, the final khatian recorded in the name of defendant/respondent No. 1 in respect of Dag No. 4827/6846. Accordingly, the learned trial court held the said issue No. 2 against the sole plaintiff/appellants (his legal heirs) by disbelieving the act of dispossession of the plaintiff by the defendants/respondents. It was also held by the learned trial court that the plaintiff/appellants failed to prove the title by way of the said gift. Accordingly, the learned trial court dismissed the suit of the plaintiff/appellants. 13.
It was also held by the learned trial court that the plaintiff/appellants failed to prove the title by way of the said gift. Accordingly, the learned trial court dismissed the suit of the plaintiff/appellants. 13. Being aggrieved, the present appellants preferred Title Appeal No. 21/1993 in the court of Adhoc Additional District Judge at Karimganj. The learned first appellate court after hearing both the parties also dismissed the Title Appeal No. 21/1993 vide judgment and decree dated 13.05.2003. Thereafter, the present second appeal was preferred by the legal heirs of plaintiff which was admitted on 18.09.2006 on the following substantial question of law:- 1. Whether the courts below were justified in holding that the evidence of attorney was not acceptable in respect of the declaration of oral gift and delivery of possession? 14. Mr. Dhar, learned counsel for the appellants, submits that the learned first appellate court failed to discuss each and every issue so framed by the learned trial court and straightway upheld the findings of the learned trial court. It is submitted that had the rest of the issues been decided properly, in such a situation, there was every possibility of reversal of the findings of the learned trial court. Mr. Dhar referred to the Exhibit 2 which is the evidence of the predecessor-in-interest of the defendants/respondents who deposed in Title Suit No. 230/1979, filed by the said predecessor-in-interest in which the predecessor-in- interest of the present appellants was not a party. Referring to the said deposition of Sukhamoy Singh, the predecessor-in-interest of the defendants/respondents, Mr. Dhar took this court to the cross examination of the said evidence. He submits from the said cross examination that the said witness deposed that he was unaware if any land belonging to the predecessor-in-interest of original plaintiff is situated on the western side of the auction purchased land. It is also submitted that the said witness was unaware if there was any land covered by Dag No. 4827 within the settled area of land. It is also submitted that Abdul Mazid Choudhury filed a suit against Radhika Ranjan Das for eviction and a decree was obtained by Abdul Mazid Choudhury.
It is also submitted that the said witness was unaware if there was any land covered by Dag No. 4827 within the settled area of land. It is also submitted that Abdul Mazid Choudhury filed a suit against Radhika Ranjan Das for eviction and a decree was obtained by Abdul Mazid Choudhury. As against the said decree, Kumar Kanti Singha, the present respondent/defendant No. 1, filed a suit in the year 1962 in the court of Sub-Judge, Silchar for setting aside the said decree in favour of Abdul Mazid Choudhury and the said suit was decreed on compromise. The said compromise consisted of the lands in addition to the land of the Wakf estate. It is also further stated that out of the said land a portion was given to the PWD authority. Accordingly, Mr. Dhar submits that the defendants/ respondents are unaware of the land which is situated on the western side belonging to the Wakf estate and they have no land on the western side of the cinema hall as the same was already delivered to the PWD. In such a situation, the claim of the defendants that the plaintiff is not the owner of the land, cannot be considered at all. 15. Mr. Dhar further argues that the PW-1 is the ‘Naib’ who is involved in all the official acts and deeds of the properties under the plaintiffs/appellants. He is the best person to know about the gift so carried out, inasmuch as, all the official works pertaining to the Zamindar i.e. the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiff/appellants. Merely as the plaintiff himself did not come to the witness box to depose in support of his case, cannot be a ground to disbelieve the gift so pleaded in the plaint. It is also submitted that the learned trial court has a duty cast upon it while scrutinising the plaint, to point out the omission and insisted on its rectification. This argument is made by the learned counsel against the finding of the courts below that there was no averment in the pleading with regard to the date and time on which the oral gift took place and in whose presence. In order to consider a plea in any pleading, the whole plaint/pleading is to be taken into consideration together with the true spirit behind the plea taken in the pleading.
In order to consider a plea in any pleading, the whole plaint/pleading is to be taken into consideration together with the true spirit behind the plea taken in the pleading. It is also submitted that the learned first appellate court ought to have decided all the issues because it is the mandate of the Hon’ble Apex Court to discuss each and every issue so discussed by the learned trial court in order to scrutinise the findings of the learned trial court. Having not done so, there is mistake on the part of the learned first appellate court in rejecting evidence of the PW-1, more specifically, with regard to the gift so alleged in the plaint. 16. Mr. Dhar, learned counsel for the appellants, relies on the following cases:- (1) Pratibha Singh and Another vs. Shanti Devi Prasad and Another, (2003) 2 SCC 330 (2) Sitaramacharya vs. Gururajacharya, AIR 1997 SC 806 (3) Santosh Hazari vs. Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179 (4) Syed Dastagir vs. T.R. Gopalakrishna Setty, AIR 1999 SC 3029 (1) (5) Avadh Kishore Dass vs. Ram Gopal and Others, AIR 1979 SC 861 17. Relying the ratio (2003) 2 SCC 330 (supra), Mr. Dhar submits that the learned courts below held that there was no pleading with regard to the requisite ingredients of an oral gift including the date, place and in whose presence the same took place. The learned courts below, more specifically, the trial court had a duty cast upon to point out the omission to the plaintiff and insisted on its rectification. Relying the ratio of AIR 1997 SC 806 (supra), Mr. Dhar referred to the cross examination as apparent from Exhibit-2 wherein the predecessor-in-interest of the defendants/respondents clearly admitted that some portion of his land was taken by the PWD, which ought to have been treated as the evidence against the defendants/respondents in support of the fact that some portion of their land was taken by the PWD, following which there was an encroachment by the defendants/respondents thereby dispossessing the plaintiff/appellants in order to reclaim the land so taken by the PWD. Mr.
Mr. Dhar relying the ratio of the decision reported in (2001) 3 SCC 179 (supra), submits that the learned first appellate court ought to have discussed all the issues so framed in the suit as a duty was cast upon the learned first appellate court to that effect and non-compliance of the said ratio has caused prejudice to the plaintiff/appellants. Mr. Dhar further submits that the learned courts below failed to appreciate the pleadings of the plaint in its proper perspective to gather the true spirit behind the plea taken by the plaintiff/ appellants in their plaint. Non-construing the pleadings had caused prejudice to the plaintiff/appellants. 18. For the aforesaid reasons, the learned courts below failed to gather the actual dispute between the parties and simply disbelieved the plea of oral gift adduced by the PW-1, who is a Naib (employee) of the estate of the plaintiff/appellants under the Zamidari system. Thus, Mr. Dhar submits that the substantial question of law so formulated is to be answered in the affirmative favouring the plaintiff/appellants. 19. Mr. BK Jain, learned counsel for the respondent No. 3, submits that admittedly the possession of the suit land is with the defendants/respondents. In such a situation, in order to get the relief of recovery of possession by the plaintiff/appellants, heavy burden is cast upon them to prove the title vested on them to show the paramount title on the basis of which they are entitled for the recovery of possession by ejecting the defendants/ respondents. There is deficiency in the pleadings in order to substantiate the claim of the plaintiff/appellants with regard to the oral gift. The fact of an oral gift under the Mahomedan Law is to be proved by leading cogent evidence of the requisite 3 (three) essential ingredients referred to by the courts below. As per the pleadings, there is no mention that in presence of the PW-1, Naib, the said oral gift took place. Even if it is assumed that the said PW-1 was the constituted agent of the sole plaintiff, then also his evidence supporting the fact of oral gift cannot be accepted by the courts below until and unless the same is pleaded specifically in order to have its evidentiary value. Relying on the case of Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani and Others vs. IndusInd Bank Ltd. and Others, (2005) 2 SCC 217 , Mr.
Relying on the case of Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani and Others vs. IndusInd Bank Ltd. and Others, (2005) 2 SCC 217 , Mr. Jain submits that the PW-1 is authorised to depose with respect to the acts he carried out in pursuance of the authority given to him. But that does not mean that the said PW-1 can depose the facts which are supposed to be within the knowledge of the plaintiff himself. Accordingly, no such material piece of evidence supporting the gift is on record, thereby giving the plaintiff the status of land holder with respect to the suit land from which it can be inferred to that effect. Until and unless the plaintiff himself comes to the witness box and supports his claims made in his pleadings, no oral gift can be presumed in his favour. Accordingly, Mr. Jain submits that there is no illegality in passing the judgment against the plaintiff/appellants by the courts below. 20. Mr. B.K. Purkayastha, learned counsel for the respondents No. 1 and 2, supporting the submissions of Mr. Jain, learned counsel for the respondent No. 3, submits that in a suit for declaration of title and possession, the burden is always on the plaintiff to establish his case irrespective of whether the defendants prove their case or not. In support of the said submission, Mr. Purkayastha relies on the case of Union of India and Others vs. Vasavi Cooperative Housing Society Limited and Others, (2014) 2 SCC 269 . Finally, he submits that the second appeal is liable to be dismissed. 21. Considered the submissions of both the learned counsels for the parties to the appeal. Perused the judgments passed by the learned courts below. Before entering into the scrutiny of the findings of the learned trial court, the point for determination by the first appellate court has been rightly picked up considering the dispute between the parties to the suit and the submissions of the learned counsels before it. Thereafter, the first appellate court bringing into the reference of various issues, more specifically, the issues No. 2, 3 and 6 at first, examined the pleadings of the parties to the suit and entered into the evidence adduced by the parties to the suit.
Thereafter, the first appellate court bringing into the reference of various issues, more specifically, the issues No. 2, 3 and 6 at first, examined the pleadings of the parties to the suit and entered into the evidence adduced by the parties to the suit. From the examination of the pleadings made in the plaint, the learned first appellate court observed that there was no specific pleading with regard to the manner in which the oral gift took place and in whose presence, and thereafter upheld the findings of the learned trial court. 22. In order to decide the substantial question of law, this court entered into the pleadings, examined it and came to the conclusion that nowhere in the pleading in the plaint there is mention of the presence of Sakib Ahmed Choudhury (Naib, PW-1) at the time of the oral gift, which allegedly took place so far the suit land is concerned. Thus, it can be inferred that the 3 (three) essential ingredients to form a valid gift as referred to by the learned courts below is presumed to be within the knowledge of the plaintiff himself, but none others. The said fact of gift is a special fact known to the plaintiff only. Under Section 103 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the burden of proof as to any particular fact, lies on that person who wishes the court to believe in its existence unless it is provided by any law that the proof of that fact shall lie on any particular person. The oral gift so pleaded and on the strength of which the plaintiff/appellants prayed for the relief is an affair between the donor, Abdul Karim Choudhury and the donee i.e. the plaintiff and the persons who witnessed the said gift. As already stated, the presence of PW-1 was never pleaded at the time of the said oral gift, nor names of any other persons are also pleaded who witnessed the said gift. In such a situation, the burden lies upon the plaintiff himself to come to the witness box to support his claim including that particular fact of gift. 23. Behind such backdrop, the evidence of PW-1 is examined. In his deposition, he deposed that he was working as a Naib under the plaintiff and looking after the properties of the plaintiff.
In such a situation, the burden lies upon the plaintiff himself to come to the witness box to support his claim including that particular fact of gift. 23. Behind such backdrop, the evidence of PW-1 is examined. In his deposition, he deposed that he was working as a Naib under the plaintiff and looking after the properties of the plaintiff. As per the direction of the plaintiff, he came to depose on behalf of the plaintiff. In his cross examination, he denied the suggestion that he had no deed of power of attorney. But he failed to produce or exhibit any such deed of power of attorney. He even failed to depose over which Dag number the cinema hall was settled. He even failed to say whether the plaintiff had any claim beyond the land covered under Dag No. 4827. However, he admitted that there was no mention about the date, year on which, plot of land was gifted to the plaintiff by Abdul Karim Choudhury. 24. Perused the Exhibit-A, the order sheet of DP Case No. 19/1964 of Karimganj town. From the order dated 06.10.1966 in DP objection No. 19 under Section 119 of the Sylhet Tenancy Act of Karimganj town, it is apparent that Abdul Karim Choudhury filed an objection claiming that his share of land be recorded as his khas one. From the said finding it can be concluded that at least during the life time of Abdul Karim Choudhury, he never gifted the same to anyone, not to speak of the plaintiff, inasmuch as, it is also recorded therein that on his death his claim was not pursued by his successors. This piece of evidence clearly shows that no gift was carried out by Abdul Karim Choudhury during his life time nor his successors, including the plaintiff/appellants pursued the said matter claiming the said share to be the gifted one to the said plaintiff. 25. Considering the aforesaid piece of evidence it can be concluded at least that the claim of the plaintiff over the suit land to be gifted to him is not tenable. In (2005) 2 SCC 217 (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court held as follows:- “13. Order 3 Rules 1 and 2 CPC empower the holder of power of attorney to “act” on behalf of the principal.
In (2005) 2 SCC 217 (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court held as follows:- “13. Order 3 Rules 1 and 2 CPC empower the holder of power of attorney to “act” on behalf of the principal. In our view the word “acts” employed in Order 3 Rules 1 and 2 CPC confines only to in respect of “acts” done by the power-of-attorney holder in exercise of power granted by the instrument. The term “acts” would not include deposing in place and instead of the principal. In other words, if the power-of-attorney holder has rendered some “acts” in pursuance of power of attorney, he may depose for the principal in respect of such acts, but he cannot depose for the principal for the acts done by the principal and not by him. Similarly, he cannot depose for the principal in respect of the matter of which only the principal can have a personal knowledge and in respect of which the principal is entitled to be cross examined. 18. The aforesaid judgment was quoted with approval in the case of Ram Prasad vs. Hari Narain, AIR 1998 Raj 185 . It was held that the word “acts” used in Rule 2 of Order 3 CPC does not include the act of power-of-attorney holder to appear as a witness on behalf of a party. Power-of-attorney holder of a party can appear only as a witness in his personal capacity and whatever knowledge he has about the case he can state on oath but he cannot appear as a witness on behalf of the party in the capacity of that party. If the plaintiff is unable to appear in the court, a commission for recording his evidence may be issued under the relevant provisions of CPC.” 26. From the ratio of the said decision it can be concluded that an attorney holder cannot depose for the principal in respect of the matter of which only the principal can have a personal knowledge and in respect of which the principal is entitled to be examined. It is also held that the word ‘acts’ used in Rule 2 of Order 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not include the act of power of attorney holder to appear as a witness on behalf of a party.
It is also held that the word ‘acts’ used in Rule 2 of Order 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not include the act of power of attorney holder to appear as a witness on behalf of a party. Considering the said view of the Hon’ble Apex Court, the learned courts below had rightly rejected the evidence of the PW-1 to the fact that his principal i.e. the plaintiff was gifted with the suit land by Abdul Karim Choudhury. 27. Coming to the submission of Mr. Dhar that there was an admission by the predecessor- in-interest of the defendants/respondents No. 1 and 2 that a portion of his land was taken by the PWD and the ratio of the decision, AIR 1997 SC 806 (supra) relied on by Mr. Dhar, it is held that the said admission is not conclusive proof of the facts admitted, but they do raise an estoppel and shifted the burden of proof on to the person making them or his representative in interest and unless shown or explained to be wrong, they are the efficacious proof of the facts admitted. But the same is of no help to the plaintiff/appellants, inasmuch as, if the ratio held in the case reported in (2014) 2 SCC 269 (supra) wherein it was held that in a suit for declaration of title, the burden always lies on the plaintiff to make out and establish a clear case for granting such a declaration and the weakness, if any, of the case set up by the defendants would not be a ground to grant relief to the plaintiff. 28. So, in the case in hand, the plaintiff has failed to prove his title over the suit land on the basis of the gift so alleged. There is an admission on the part of the predecessor-in-interest of defendants/respondents No. 1 and 2 that out of the portion of his land some land was taken by the PWD. But that itself cannot strengthen the case of the plaintiff even if, he has failed to prove his title over the suit land. 29. Under the said circumstances, the substantial question of law is decided against the appellants inasmuch as the courts below were justified in discarding the evidence of the PW-1. The submission of Mr.
But that itself cannot strengthen the case of the plaintiff even if, he has failed to prove his title over the suit land. 29. Under the said circumstances, the substantial question of law is decided against the appellants inasmuch as the courts below were justified in discarding the evidence of the PW-1. The submission of Mr. Dhar that the learned first appellate court failed to discuss all the issues also cannot be considered inasmuch as from the judgment of the learned first appellate court it reflects its conscious application of mind and the findings recorded are supported by reasons on all the major issues. Accordingly, the said submission cannot be considered. Thus, the present second appeal is dismissed. 30. Send down the lower court records. No order as to costs.