JUDGMENT : A.J. Shastri, J. 1. The appellant - State has filed the present criminal appeal under Section 378 of the Cr.P.C. against the judgment and order, dated 9.5.2006, passed in Sessions Case No. 299/2003, 310/2003 and 12/2004, by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 3, Ahmedabad City whereby, the trial court has been pleased to acquit the respondents accused from the charges for which they have been tried. 2. The facts leading to the rise of prosecution case is that complainant - Pratapsinh Sardarsinh Dabhi lodged the complaint before Gomtipur Police Station being I-C.R. No. 213 of 2002 for the offences punishable under Sections 143, 147, 149, 307, 333 and 225 of the Indian Penal Code as well as Section 135 of the Bombay Police Act. As per the case of the prosecution, the complainant was serving at the relevant point of time at Shaherkotda Police Station since about two years as an Unarmed Head Constable in Surveillance Squad. It is further case of prosecution that Dy. Commissioner of Police, Zone-III, had issued directions to arrest all the accused persons who are absconding within the territorial limits of Shaherkotda Police Station and in response thereto, one person named as Balvirsinh Laayaksinh Tomar an accused of I-C.R. No. 37 of 1997, who was absconding, was to be arrested. The complainant, in turn, in response to the said instructions, along with other police constables Sohansinh and Amratbhai, who received the information about the accused person and went for patrolling at around 19.45 hours and while they were passing near Saraspur Char Rasta, they received an information about accused Balvirsinh Tomar, who had come in Pavan Trading Company, Sahajanand Complex, near Everest Char Rasta on his Yamaha Motorcycle bearing No. GJ-1-BS-5135. On the basis of this information, the complainant along with constables spotted him but, since the accused person was trying to run away from the place of incident, inspite of the fact the complainant and prosecution witnesses had caught the accused person. However, on account of shouting was made by him, another co-accused persons Pavan Vijaypal and Tino @ Gurkho Nepali and other three persons came to the spot of incident and inflicted stones injuries to the complainant and prosecution witnesses.
However, on account of shouting was made by him, another co-accused persons Pavan Vijaypal and Tino @ Gurkho Nepali and other three persons came to the spot of incident and inflicted stones injuries to the complainant and prosecution witnesses. On account of this attempt made by other co-accused, Balvirsinh ran away from the spot and this episode was immediately informed by the complainant to the Police Inspector Shri A.N. Jadeja and after arrival, the complainant along with other prosecution witnesses were taken to Sharda Hospital for treatment and later on, a complaint came to be filed before the Gomtipur Police Station as is within the territorial limits of Gomtipur Police Station. 2.1 The said complaint was registered as complaint being I-C.R. No. 213 of 2002. The investigating officer pursuant to the registration of offence, carried out the investigation, recorded the statements of witnesses, drawn the necessary panchnama, recovered the muddamal and after collecting sufficient material against the respondents accused, a charge-sheet came to be filed before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Ahmedabad. It appears from the record that prosecution had to file 3 separate charge-sheets as intermittently the accused persons were nabbed and as a result of which, different case numbers of the same incident appeared to have been given. Since the offence alleged was triable by the court of sessions, the learned Metropolitan Magistrate in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 209 of the Cr.P.C. was pleased to commit the case to sessions which, later on, registered as Sessions Case Nos. 299/2003, 310/2003 and 12.2004 respectively. Since the three sessions cases are arising out of the very same FIR as referred to above, same were clubbed together and common evidence was recorded by treating Sessions Case No. 299 of 2003 as a lead matter. 2.2 Pursuant to the committal of the case in the aforesaid manner, a charge came to be framed vide Exh. 6 in common with respect to all the three cases and the plea was recorded of the respondents accused. After having denied the offence being committed by the respondents accused, the case was put up for further adjudication.
2.2 Pursuant to the committal of the case in the aforesaid manner, a charge came to be framed vide Exh. 6 in common with respect to all the three cases and the plea was recorded of the respondents accused. After having denied the offence being committed by the respondents accused, the case was put up for further adjudication. The prosecution with a view to prove the case against the respondents accused has led oral as well as documentary evidence and as many as 13 witnesses have been examined and in addition thereto, as many as 20 documentary evidence was led before the court for proving the case against the respondents accused and the same is in the following terms. Sr. No. Witness Name Exh.
Sr. No. Witness Name Exh. No. 1 PW-1 Rameshbhai Chhotabhai Patel 16 2 PW-2 Rakeshbhai Rameshbhai Vaseta 22 3 PW-3 Nazirkhan Habibkhan Pathan 23 4 PW-4 Pratapsinh Sardarsinh Dabhi 29 5 PW-5 Sohansinh Harisinh 32 6 PW-6 Salimkhan Abdulhamidkhan Pathan 36 7 PW-7 Amrutbhai Maljibhai 38 8 PW-8 Dr.Sesil Denial Parmar 39 9 PW-9 Atulbhai Premjibhai Parmar 46 10 PW-10 Rajnikant Vrajlal Chavada 47 11 PW-11 Jensinh Atusinh Thakore 48 12 PW-12 Siddikbhai Bijalbhai Juneja 50 13 PW-13 Virsinh Kalubhai Ambaliar, PI 51 Evidence led by prosecution 1 Panchnama of place of offence 17 2 Panch Slips of muddamal articles 18-21 3 Panchnama of recovery of clothes of complainant and witnesses 24 4 Panch Slips of muddamal articles 25-28 5 Complaint 30 6 Panchnama of physical condition of accused Suresh @ Tina as also the Panchnama of recovery of clothes 37 7 Medical certificate of Pratapsinh 40 8 Original case papers of treatment of Pratapsinh 41 9 Original case papers of treatment of Sohansinh 42 10 Medical certificate of Sohansinh 43 11 Medical certificate of Amratsinh 44 12 Original case papers of treatment of Amratsinh 45 13 Report of In-charge officer 49 14 Panchnama of house of accused Balvir and Pavan 52 15 Ravangi Nondh 53 16 FSL receipt 54 17 Forwarding letter of FSL 55 18 FSL report 56 19 Serological report 57 20 True copy of CR No.23037/06 58 2.3 After leading the aforesaid evidence, a closure pursis was given by the prosecution and subsequent thereto, further statements have also been recorded of respondents accused under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. The respondents accused have denied the offence being committed, the case was put up for trial for final adjudication wherein, the trial court framed the issues. After close scrutiny of entire evidence and after perusal of the documentary evidence, the trial court was pleased to pass the judgment and order whereby, in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 235(1) of the Cr.P.C., the respondents accused came to be acquitted in respect of offences for which they have been tried and it is this judgment and order is made the subject matter of present criminal appeal.
2.4 This appeal came to be entertained by this Court in the month of July, 2008 and thereafter, R & P came to be called for and in the aforesaid background, the present criminal appeal is taken up for final hearing by this Court. 3. Mr. L.R. Poojari, learned APP for the appellant- State has vehemently contended that the trial court has committed a serious error in exercising the jurisdiction inasmuch as the evidence led before the trial court has not been appreciated in proper perspective. It has also been contended by learned APP that though some of the witnesses turned hostile but, there were enough evidence in the form of ocular evidence by injured witnesses which ought not to have ignored. Learned APP has further contended that simply because there was a lapse on the part of Investigating Officer to produce warrant and the necessary orders in the form of instruction, the case cannot be disbelieved and that error committed by the trial court is gross which requires interference by this Court. 3.1 Learned APP has further contended that prosecution has examined as many as 13 witnesses and the testimony of those witnesses clearly establishing the guilt of the respondents accused and therefore, when this ocular evidence is clearly establishing the role of each of the accused persons, it cannot be said that the prosecution has not proved the case beyond the reasonable doubt and while evaluating the evidence of this testimony, a serious error is committed by the trial court which requires interference by this Court in exercise of appellate jurisdiction. Learned APP has also contended that apart from the fact that injured witnesses have clearly supported the case of the prosecution, however, in addition thereto the medical evidence and the necessary panchanamas which have been led before the trial court have suggested clearly that the respondents accused are guilty of offence for which they have been tried. It has also been contended by learned APP that while passing the impugned judgment and order, the reasons which are assigned by the trial court are based upon mere inferences and without any substantiation and therefore, when the order suffers from the vice of non-application of mind and lack of cogent evidence, the same requires to be interfered with. Mr.
It has also been contended by learned APP that while passing the impugned judgment and order, the reasons which are assigned by the trial court are based upon mere inferences and without any substantiation and therefore, when the order suffers from the vice of non-application of mind and lack of cogent evidence, the same requires to be interfered with. Mr. Poojari, learned APP has further contended that the medical evidence is also supporting the ocular evidence and is in complete co-relation with the testimony of witnesses, who became injured during the course of commission of crime as alleged and therefore, when medical evidence and the ocular evidence are in conformity with each other, there is hardly any justifiable reason for the trial court to raise any doubt and establish that the case is proved beyond reasonable doubt and therefore, upon entire analysis of the evidence on record clearly indicates that a laconic order is passed by the trial court which requires interference by this Court. Mr. Poojari, learned APP has further submitted that appellate jurisdiction is wide enough and there are decisions whereby, if the material witnesses have not been appreciated in proper perspective and the finding arrived at is perverse then, certainly, in appellate jurisdiction an order of acquittal can be interfered with and therefore, by submitting this learned APP has ultimately requested the Court to allow the appeal by setting aside the impugned order passed by the trial court. No other submissions are made by learned APP. 4. To oppose the stand taken by learned APP, Mr. Manraj Barot, learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos. 1 to 4 and Mr. Ashish M. Dagli, learned counsel for respondent No. 5 have vehemently contended that no error of jurisdiction of any nature is committed and on the contrary, proper evaluation is made of the material on record. Learned counsel have categorically submitted that independent witnesses who have been examined have not supported the case of prosecution and rest of the witnesses were the interested witnesses and therefore, the trial court has rightly exercised the jurisdiction by giving benefit of doubt to the respondents accused.
Learned counsel have categorically submitted that independent witnesses who have been examined have not supported the case of prosecution and rest of the witnesses were the interested witnesses and therefore, the trial court has rightly exercised the jurisdiction by giving benefit of doubt to the respondents accused. Learned counsel have further contended that adequate reasons are assigned by the trial court while coming to the conclusion about innocence of the respondents accused and therefore, when comprehensive analysis is undertaken by the trial court, it cannot be said that any legal infirmity is remained in the judgment and order and therefore, requested the Court not to interfere with the impugned judgment and order. It has also been contended by learned counsel for the respondents that the trial court has rightly disbelieved the case of prosecution inasmuch as the material evidence has not been produced before the trial court which can suggest that there was a clear authority for the complainant and other police constable to nab the accused persons. On the contrary, a case is falsely made out against the respondents accused simply because one of the accused persons was having registration of offence in past and in the background of these facts, the trial court has considered every evidence which has been led by the prosecution and ultimately, arrived at the just conclusion. Learned counsel have further contended that the trial court has examined the evidence as a whole minutely and has categorically come to the conclusion that conduct on the part of complainant in not referring the incident in question to an appropriate police authority and lodging the complaint before the police station having jurisdiction despite the fact that complainant being police officer has rightly raised a suspicion about the case of prosecution.
In addition thereto, the trial court has rightly come to the conclusion as contended by learned counsel that the entire conduct of taking the complaint by Shri Thakore is raising serious doubt and in addition thereto, history which was required to be given has not spelt out any specific role or names of the respondents accused and therefore, when these infirmities touching to the root of the controversy are left out in the case of prosecution, the trial court is thoroughly justified in raising doubt about the case of prosecution and rightly come to the conclusion that benefit of doubt is required to be given to the respondents accused. It has also been observed, as contended by learned counsel, by the trial court that independent witnesses who have been examined at Exh. 46 and Exh. 47 have completely not supported the case of prosecution and therefore, when independent witnesses have chosen not to support the case of prosecution, there is hardly any material cogent enough to justify the plea of the State that prosecution has proved the case beyond reasonable doubt and therefore, when this detailed analysis is undertaken by the trial court while passing the impugned order, it is not open for the State to contend that case has been proved beyond the reasonable doubt and therefore, there is no justifiable reason to dislodge the findings which have been arrived at by the trial court and ultimately by contending this, learned counsel has requested the Court not to allow such acquittal order to be disturbed in exercise of appellate jurisdiction. 5. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties and having gone through the material on record and having independently assessed the evidence and compared the same with the conclusion arrived at by the trial court, following circumstances are not possible to be unnoticed. 5.1 The trial court has categorically observed from the entire analysis that three independent witnesses appear to have been examined by the prosecution to prove the case beyond the reasonable doubt. The PW-9 - Atulbhai Premjibhai Patel, who is examined at Exh. 46, who is carrying out his business near very spot where the occurrence took place and PW-10 Rajnikant Vrajlal Chavada, who is examined at Exh. 47 is also eye witness to the incident in question. PW-3 - Nazirkhan Habibkhan Pathan, who is examined at Exh.
The PW-9 - Atulbhai Premjibhai Patel, who is examined at Exh. 46, who is carrying out his business near very spot where the occurrence took place and PW-10 Rajnikant Vrajlal Chavada, who is examined at Exh. 47 is also eye witness to the incident in question. PW-3 - Nazirkhan Habibkhan Pathan, who is examined at Exh. 23, whose independent testimony is not supporting the case of prosecution as has been indicated by the trial court upon evaluation of the said version. 5.2 A further fact is also noticed by the trial court on appreciation of evidence is that a complaint appears to have been filed at a police station different than the police station having jurisdiction and this conduct on the part of complainant that he himself is a police personnel has been taken note of by the trial court. It has also been observed by the trial court upon appreciation of evidence that when these persons were taken to the hospital for treatment, before Dr. Parmar, who was examined at Exh. 39, the history was not given by these police officers and no names have been referred to though the same were aware and this fact has also been weighed with the trial court to grant benefit of doubt. It has also been observed from the evidence on record that the Investigation Officer, who has examined scene of offence, no statements have been record of the related persons of nearby vicinity nor such persons have been examined as a witness to the incident and in addition thereto, from the scene of offence, no incriminating material is recovered by the Investigating Officer and this fact has also taken a serious note of by the trial court while coming to the conclusion. 5.3 From the further evidence, the trial court has found from the deposition of PW-13 - Virsinh Kalubhai Ambaliar, who is examined at Exh. 51, who is the Investigating Officer that a list of wanted accused persons which was instructed to act upon in which name of Balvirsinh Tomar as absconding person is not referred to and no record about the same is produced by the prosecution.
51, who is the Investigating Officer that a list of wanted accused persons which was instructed to act upon in which name of Balvirsinh Tomar as absconding person is not referred to and no record about the same is produced by the prosecution. It has also been observed by the trial court that appropriate warrant whether was available with the complainant or not, is also not cogently explained nor it has been produced by way of evidence and therefore, these infirmities which have been left over in the course of trial, the trial court appears to have taken note of the same seriously and has come to the conclusion granting benefit of doubt to the respondents accused. It has also been observed that the complaint could have been filed before the appropriate police station and by giving zero number, the same could have been sent to Gomtipur Police Station which fact has been observed, has not been done though the complainant was himself a police officer and therefore, this comprehensive analysis of evidence on record has led the trial court to come to the conclusion that the case has not been proved by the prosecution beyond the reasonable doubt. 6. The independent analysis of evidence is suggesting that there seem to be no cogent material to connect the respondents accused beyond reasonable doubt and therefore, this analysis has been undertaken in consonance with the conclusion arrived at by the trial court which indicates that the reasons assigned by the trial court appearing to be not perverse which may justify the guilt of the respondents accused. The entire circumstance appears to have been examined in detail by the trial court and by assigning cogent reasons, the judgment and order came to be passed which requires no interference more particularly when the Court is dealing with an appeal against the order of acquittal. 7.
The entire circumstance appears to have been examined in detail by the trial court and by assigning cogent reasons, the judgment and order came to be passed which requires no interference more particularly when the Court is dealing with an appeal against the order of acquittal. 7. While coming to this conclusion, we have also considered the well recognized proposition of law propounded by catena of decisions that even if possible view is emerging then also, in the absence of any cogent corroboration or perversity or legal infirmity, the conclusion of acquittal arrived at by the trial court cannot be disturbed and this is because of the fact that the trial court had an advantage of not only analyzing the evidence as a whole but, has also advantage of seeing the demeanor of witnesses and therefore, such kind of conclusion in the absence of any perversity normally cannot be interfered with. The following propositions laid down by the decisions delivered by the Apex Court which we worth to take note of and reproduce hereinafter. 7.1 In the decision delivered by the Supreme Court in case of Sureshkumar v. State of Haryana, reported in (2013) 16 SCC 353 , it was observed that if two views are possible, the High Court should hold in favour of the accused and should not interfere with an order of acquittal. The relevant observations of the decision are reflected in Para.55, 56 and 57 which read as under : "55. The second contention is that the High Court ought not to have interfered in the acquittal by the Trial Court. It was submitted that if two views are possible, the High Court should lean in favour of the accused and should not interfere with an acquittal. 56. A few years ago, the law on the subject was culled out from a large number of decisions and summed up in Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P., (2008) 10 SCC 450 : (AIR 2009 SC (Supp) 1318 : 2008 AIR SCW 6598) as follows: "1. The appellate court may review the evidence in appeals against acquittal under Sections 378 and 386 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. Its power of reviewing evidence is wide and the appellate court can re-appreciate the entire evidence on record. It can review the trial court's conclusion with respect to both facts and law. 2.
The appellate court may review the evidence in appeals against acquittal under Sections 378 and 386 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. Its power of reviewing evidence is wide and the appellate court can re-appreciate the entire evidence on record. It can review the trial court's conclusion with respect to both facts and law. 2. The accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. The accused possessed this presumption when he was before the trial court. The trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. 3. Due or proper weight and consideration must be given to the trial court's decision. This is especially true when a witness' credibility is at issue. It is not enough for the High Court to take a different view of the evidence. There must also be substantial and compelling reasons for holding that the trial court was wrong. In light of the above, the High Court and other appellate courts should follow the well-settled principles crystallized by number of judgments if it is going to overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal: 1. The appellate court may only overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal if it has "very substantial and compelling reasons" for doing so. A number of instances arise in which the appellate court would have "very substantial and compelling reasons" to discard the trial court's decision. "Very substantial and compelling reasons" exist when: i. The trial court's conclusion with regard to the facts is palpably wrong; ii. The trial court's decision was based on an erroneous view of law; iii. The trial court's judgment is likely to result in "grave miscarriage of justice"; iv. The entire approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal; v. The trial court's judgment was manifestly unjust and unreasonable; vi. The trial court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declarations/report of the ballistic expert, etc. vii. This list is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive." 57.
The trial court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declarations/report of the ballistic expert, etc. vii. This list is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive." 57. Learned counsel for Suresh Kumar referred to S. Anil Kumar v. State of Karnataka, (2013) 7 SCC 219 : (2013 AIR SCW 6180) particularly paragraph 14 of the Report wherein reliance was placed on Rohtash v. State of Haryana, (2012) 6 SCC 589 : ( AIR 2012 SC 2297 : 2012 AIR SCW 3318) to conclude that it is "only in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances and where the judgment in appeal is found to be perverse, can the High Court interfere with the order of acquittal." In Rohtash it was further observed: "The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference. (Vide State of Rajasthan v. Talevar, (2011) 11 SCC 666 : ( AIR 2011 SC 2271 : 2011 AIR SCW 3889) Govindaraju v. State (2012) 4 SCC 722 : ( AIR 2012 SC 1292 : 2012 AIR SCW 1994). 7.2 In yet another decision in the case of Ramaiah @ Rama v. State of Karnataka, 2014(9) SCC 365 , it has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced and the one favourable to the accused has been taken by the trial court, it should not be disturbed as observed in paragraph Nos. 30 and 31. 7.3 In the case of Upendra Pradhan v. State of Orissa, 2015(5) Scale 634 , it has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court that when there are two views culled out from the perusal of evidence and application of law, the view which favours the accused should be taken. Paragraph No. 10 of the said decision reads thus: "10. Taking the First question for consideration, we are of the view that in case there are two views which can be culled out from the perusal of evidence and application of law, the view which favours the accused should be taken. It has been recognized as a human right by this Court.
Taking the First question for consideration, we are of the view that in case there are two views which can be culled out from the perusal of evidence and application of law, the view which favours the accused should be taken. It has been recognized as a human right by this Court. In Narendra Singh and another v. State of M.P., (2004) 10 SCC 699 : ( AIR 2004 SC 3249 ), this Court has recognized presumption of innocence as a human right and has gone on to say that: "30. It is now well settled that benefit of doubt belonged to the accused. It is further trite that suspicion, however grave may be, cannot take place of a proof. It is equally well settled that there is a long distance between 'may be' and 'must be'. 31. It is also well known that even in a case where a plea of alibi is raised, the burden of proof remains on the prosecution. Presumption of innocence is a human right. Such presumption gets stronger when a judgment of acquittal is passed. This Court in a number of decisions has set out the legal principle for reversing the judgment of acquittal by a Higher Court (see Dhanna v. State of M.P., Mahabir Singh v. State of Haryana and Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P.) which had not been adhered to by the High Court. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 33. We, thus, having regard to the post-mortem report, are of the opinion that the cause of death of Bimla Bai although is shrouded in mystery but benefit thereof must go to the appellants as in the event of there being two possible views, the one supporting the accused should be upheld." 7.4 The decision taken by the Apex Court in the case of V. Sejappa v. State, reported in 2016 AIR (SC) 2045, wherein the apex Court in paragraph No. 21 observed thus: "21. If the evaluation of the evidence and the findings recorded by the trial court does not suffer from any illegality or perversity and the grounds on which the trial court has based its conclusion are reasonable and plausible, the High Court should not disturb the order of acquittal if another view is possible.
If the evaluation of the evidence and the findings recorded by the trial court does not suffer from any illegality or perversity and the grounds on which the trial court has based its conclusion are reasonable and plausible, the High Court should not disturb the order of acquittal if another view is possible. Merely because the appellate court on re- appreciation and re-evaluation of the evidence is inclined to take a different view, interference with the judgment of acquittal is not justified if the view taken by the trial court is a possible view. In State through Inspector of Police, A.P. v. K. Narasimhachary (2005) 8 SCC 364 , this Court reiterated the well settled principle that if two views are possible, the appellate court should not interfere with the acquittal by the lower court and that only where the material on record leads to an inescapable conclusion of guilt of the accused, the judgment of acquittal will call for interference by the appellate court. The same view was reiterated in T. Subramanian v. State of T.N. (2006) 1 SCC 401 ." 8. The aforesaid analysis of the evidence on record in co-relation with the reasons assigned by the trial court and keeping in mind the law laid down by the Apex Court in the aforesaid decisions on exercise of appellate jurisdiction, we see no legal infirmity or perversity reflecting from the judgment and order passed by the trial court which can be said to have resulted into miscarriage of justice and therefore, keeping all these circumstances in mind, we are of the considered opinion that no other view is possible than what has been taken by the trial court and even if another view is possible in that case also, since the trial court was having an opportunity to see the demeanor of the witnesses and therefore, the finding which has been arrived at is not possible to be interfered with in an appellate jurisdiction and therefore, we are of the considered opinion that there appears to be no merit in the contention raised by the appellant - State and the appeal filed by the State being merit-less deserves to be dismissed. 9. The present appeal is accordingly dismissed. The judgment and order, dated 9.5.2006, passed in Sessions Case Nos.
9. The present appeal is accordingly dismissed. The judgment and order, dated 9.5.2006, passed in Sessions Case Nos. 299/2003, 310/2003 and 12/2004, by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 3, Ahmedabad City, is hereby confirmed. Bail bonds shall stand discharged. Record and Proceedings be sent back to the trial Court concerned, forthwith.