JUDGMENT : 1. These two arbitration applications have been preferred under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Hereinafter to be referred to as the “Act of 1996”) for appointment of arbitrator. 2. Factual Matrix The respondent company wanted to establish steel plant, for which a power plant as well as oxygen plant was to be constructed for captive consumption. Two separate agreements dated 28th July, 2010 and 27th December, 2010 have been entered into between the parties to these arbitration applications for the captive power plant and the oxygen plant respectively. These two agreements are at Annexure 1 series to the memo of Arbitration Application No. 14 of 2015, which contain arbitration clause. Separate work orders have also been issued by the respondent to the applicant for captive power plant. These three are numbered as under: (a) 430000883 (b) 4300001145 (c) 4300003617 The aforesaid three work orders were for Rs. 6179800/-, Rs. 29863725/- and Rs.60446753.02 paise and it is alleged by this applicant that with respect to the aforesaid three work orders there is a dispute of Rs. 2,9476074.25/- for which a Notice dated 17th June, 2015 under Section 21 of the Act of 1996 was given by this applicant to the respondent (Annexure 8 to the memo of Arbitration Application No. 14 of 2015). All the annexures mentioned in this judgment pertains to Arbitration Application No. 14 of 2015. It also appears that the nature of work for the first work contract was “WRAPPING COATING JOBS FOR PIPELINES” as per annexure A-2 series to the counter affidavit filed by the respondent. Similarly, for another work contract the nature of the work was “FABRICATION OF MS PIPE BENDS REDUCERS” and so far as third work contract is concerned, the nature of the work offered by the respondents to the applicant was “FABRICATION AND ERECTION OF CPP”. It appears from the facts of the cases that some work was readily executed by this applicant in the said three work orders. Arbitration Clauses in the work orders are slightly different from the arbitration clause in the agreements. In the agreements, which are dated 28th July, 2016 and 27th December, 2010, both the parties were empowered to appoint their own arbitrators and thereafter, these two arbitrators were to appoint the third arbitrator, whereas, as per the work orders the sole arbitrator was to be appointed by the respondent. In the agreements, which are dated 28th July, 2016 and 27th December, 2010, both the parties were empowered to appoint their own arbitrators and thereafter, these two arbitrators were to appoint the third arbitrator, whereas, as per the work orders the sole arbitrator was to be appointed by the respondent. There are several letters written by this applicant raising demand of money as they have executed the work as per aforesaid three work orders, right from 12th December, 2013 to 27th March, 2015 and thereafter, Notice was given on 17th June, 2015 (Annexure 8) for appointment of arbitrator. On 4th July, 2015, reply was given by the respondent and sole arbitrator was appointed by the respondent on 16th October, 2015 as per the arbitration clause contained in the aforesaid three work orders. The said arbitrator is retired Hon'ble Mr. Justice Pranab Kr. Chattopadhyay, who is a reitred Judge of the Hon'ble Calcutta High Court. On 5th December, 2015 objection was raised by this applicant before the learned arbitrator. Objection was raised about the appointment of the learned arbitrator and his jurisdiction. The learned Arbitrator has given a date of hearing on 14th November, 2015, which was not attended by this applicant. Further, date was given on 28th November, 2015. On this date also the applicant did not remain present before the learned arbitrator and ultimately, on 15th December, 2015 further objection was raised by this applicant about appointment of the arbitrator and his jurisdiction. The learned arbitrator has decided the application which was more in the form of objection under Section 16 of the Act of 1996. This order can be challenged under Section 34 of the Act of 1996. No such application has been preferred by this applicant and present arbitration applications have been preferred for appointment of the learned arbitrator under Section 11(6) of the Act of 1996. 3. Arguments canvassed by counsel for the applicant: Counsel appearing for the applicant submitted that agreements have been entered into between this applicant and the respondent on 28th July, 2010 and 27th December, 2010 for construction, installation, erection and fabrication etc. work for captive power plant as well as for oxygen plant. These two agreements are at Annexure 1 series to the memo of the Arbitration Application No.14 of 2015. work for captive power plant as well as for oxygen plant. These two agreements are at Annexure 1 series to the memo of the Arbitration Application No.14 of 2015. As per these two agreements, both the parties are at liberty to appoint their own arbitrator and thereafter, two arbitrators so nominated shall jointly nominate the third presiding arbitrator. As the respondent has appointed its own arbitrator as a sole arbitrator, present application has been preferred for appointment of the arbitrator as per the agreement. It is submitted by the counsel for the applicant that work orders issued by the respondents are in continuity with the aforesaid two agreements. There is no separate existence of work orders in absence of original of aforesaid two agreements and hence, as per the arbitration clause in the agreements both the parties can nominate their own arbitrator and the nominated arbitrators will jointly appoint the third presiding arbitrator. Counsel appearing for the applicant has relied upon decisions rendered by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in following cases: (a)WALTER BAU AG. LEGAL SUCCESSOR, OF THE ORIGINAL CONTRACTOR, DYCKERHOFF vs. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF GREATER MUMBAI AND ANOTHER reported in (2015) 3 SCC 800 Paragraph 10 (b)ASHAPURA MINE-CHEM LIMITED reported in (2015) 8 SCC 193 Paragraph 15. On the basis of the aforesaid judgments, it is submitted that even if the arbitrator has been appointed unilaterally by the respondent, this court has all power, authority and jurisdiction to appoint an arbitrator under Section 11(6) of the Act of 1996. It is submitted by counsel appearing for the applicant that despite the Notice given by this applicant dated 17th June, 2015, respondent has not nominated its arbitrator and now after this applicant has preferred this application, the right of nomination of the arbitrator by the respondent no more remains in existence and hence also this court has all power, jurisdiction and authority to appoint learned arbitrator under the Act of 1996. 4. 4. Arguments canvassed by counsel appearing for the respondents:- Counsel appearing for the respondent submitted that the whole dispute between the parties has arisen neither out of the agreement dated 28th July, 2010 nor the agreement dated 27th December, 2010, but, the dispute has arisen because of work orders and once work orders have been accepted by this applicant without any objection, the arbitration clause mentioned in the work orders is bound to be operated and as per arbitration clause in the work orders respondent has the power to appoint sole arbitrator. The respondent has never misused this power by appointing an employee of this respondent, but, retired Hon'ble Justice Pranab Kumar Chattopadhyay has been appointed as the arbitrator. It is submitted by counsel for the respondent that objection was also raised under section 16 of the Act of 1996 by this applicant before the learned Arbitrator on 5th December, 2015 and the order has also been passed by the learned arbitrator on 5th February, 2016 which can be challenged under Section 34 of the Act of 1996, but, no such application has been preferred by this applicant, hence these arbitration applications may not be entertained by this court. To substantiate this contention, counsel appearing for the respondent relied upon the decision rendered in ANTRIX CORPORATION LIMITED Versus DEVAS MULTIMEDIA PRIVATE LIMITED reported in (2014) 11 SCC 560 , paragraph No. 33 and 34. Counsel appearing for the respondent further submitted that the work orders are absolutely separate and distinct. The nature of the work and the total amount payable for execution of the work as well as terms and conditions have also been mentioned in work orders. There is no link between three work orders for captive power plant and four work orders for oxygen plant with the agreements dated 28th July, 2010 and 27th December, 2010. To substantiate this contention counsel appearing for the respondent relied upon the following decisions: (a) CHATURBHUJ VITHALDAS JASANI v. MORESHWAR PARASHRAM AND OTHERS reported in AIR (1954)SC 236 in paragraph No. 9 (b)UNION OF INDIA v. MADDALA THANTHAIAH reported in AIR 1966 SC 1724 in paragraph No. 15-16. It is further submitted by counsel for the respondent that never any objection was raised while accepting the work orders. On the contrary, the work orders have been partly executed by this applicant. It is further submitted by counsel for the respondent that never any objection was raised while accepting the work orders. On the contrary, the work orders have been partly executed by this applicant. Even in the Notice issued by this applicant under Section 21 of the Act of 1996 for appointment of arbitrator, which is dated 17th June, 2015 (Annexure 8), consistently this applicant had referred to the work orders, dispute arising from the work orders, non-payment for the work orders and nature of the work executed by the appellant arising out of work orders. It is submitted by counsel appearing for the respondent that applicant cannot partly accept the work orders and at the same time raise dispute with respect to the arbitration clause in the work orders. Once the work orders are accepted without any objection, all the terms and conditions mentioned in the work orders are binding upon the applicant. Work orders are separate and distinct agreements, which contain arbitration clauses and respondents have acted on those arbitration clauses mentioned in the work orders which permits the respondent to appoint sole arbitrator. Nonetheless, if a dispute is to be raised by the applicant about the jurisdiction of the arbitrator, there is an in-built mechanism in the Act of 1996, especially under Section 16 thereof and if any order is passed under Section 16 of the Act of 1996 by the learned Arbitrator, there is also a mechanism to challenge the same under Section 34 thereof. Thus, it is submitted by the counsel for the respondent that appointment of arbitrator by the respondent is absolutely in consonance with the clauses of the work orders. To substantiate this contention the counsel for the respondent has relied upon the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M/s. NEW BIHAR BIRI LEAVES CO. AND OTHERS versus STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS, NATHALAL DOSHI AND OTHERS versus STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS, AMRITAMOY GHATAK alias GHATA versus STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND OTHERS, HARSHAD KUMAR NATWARLAL DALAL AND OTHERS versus STATE OF BIHAR and SHANKAR PRASAD BHAGAT AND ANOTHER versus STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS reported in (1981) 1 SCC 537 , paragraph 14 as well as LARSEN AND TOUBRO LIMITED versus MOHAN LAL HARBANS LAL BHAYANA reported in (2015) 2 SCC 461 . In view of these submissions, it is argued out by counsel for the respondent that these arbitration applications may not be entertained by this court. 5. REASONS:- Having heard counsel appearing for both sides and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, we see no reason to entertain these arbitration applications mainly for the following facts and reasons: (I)Respondent wanted to start a steel manufacturing unit for which a power plant as well as an oxygen manufacturing plant was to be established for captive consumption. Two agreements were entered into on 28th July, 2010 and 27th December, 2010 between the respondent and the applicant for installation of captive power plant and oxygen plant. These two agreements are at Annexure 1 series to the Arbitration Application No. 14 of 2015. (II)These two agreements contain arbitration clause, which permits parties to the agreement to nominate their arbitrator so that both the nominated arbitrators can further nominate the presiding arbitrator. (III)It further appears from the facts of the case that different work orders have been issued for different type of work and their details are given as under: Sr. No. No. of the work order Nature of the work Amount 1. 433000088 WRAPPING COATING JOBS FOR PIPELINES Rs.6179800/- 2. 4300001145 FABRICATION OF MS PIPE BENDS REDUCERS Rs.29863725/- 3. 4300003617 FABRICATION AND ERECTION OF CPP Rs.60446753=02 paise 4. 430000509 Comprehensive pipe line installation-details of sub service tax has also been given Rs.206812500=01paise 5. 4300001253 Aluminium welding Rs.20929425/- 6. 4300002357 Insulation coating air gas pipe line Rs.4943840/- 7. 4300003035 Rectification of oxygen pipeline The details of this work has also been given Rs.11,156,353=62 paise All the aforesaid work orders have been accepted by this applicant without any objection. Part of the work offered under the work orders has also been executed. These work orders contain several terms and conditions with respect to the nature of the work to be carried out by this applicant, viz. Payment Terms, Termination clause, Defect Liability clause, Responsibility for Completeness clause, Safety Compliances, Insurance-Labour law clause, Inspection clause, Confidentiality of the Information clause, Forced Labour clause as well as Arbitration clause. These work orders contain several terms and conditions with respect to the nature of the work to be carried out by this applicant, viz. Payment Terms, Termination clause, Defect Liability clause, Responsibility for Completeness clause, Safety Compliances, Insurance-Labour law clause, Inspection clause, Confidentiality of the Information clause, Forced Labour clause as well as Arbitration clause. Arbitration Clause mentioned in the aforesaid work orders reads as under: “ARBITRATION: All disputes and/or questions which may arise at any time between the Service Provider and ESL in relation to al or connection with or concerning or touching and/or touching the construction of this contract or the rights & liability of the parties their to or the interpretation of the terms & conditions contained herein or the claims and liabilities or the transaction of the parties in connection with this contract shall be referred to the arbitration of a Sole Arbitrator to be appointed by ESL. Such arbitration preceding shall be held in accordance with and/or shall be governed by the provision of the summery procedure and shall not be required to have reason in support of the award.” In view of the aforesaid arbitration clause, respondent has appointed the sole arbitrator, who is Hon'ble Mr. Justice Pranab Kr. Chattopadhyay, retired Judge of Hon'ble Calcutta High Court on 16th October, 2015. (IV)As per Arbitration Clause in the agreement dated 28th July, 2010 and 27th December, 2010, there is a slight variation. The arbitration clause in these two agreements reads as under: “Applicable Law and Arbitration The agreement shall be construed and governed in accordance with Indian Law. Courts in India as mentioned under Civil Jurisdiction hereinafter shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all matters arising out of the Contract, provided however those arbitration proceedings shall be exclusively governed by the Arbitration clause of the Contract. Any or all disputes between parties i.e. Employer and Contractor, arising in relation to the contract during its operation and/or after its closure/termination should be, at first, sorted out amicable with mutual discussions. If a dispute and/or difference is not settled within fifteen (15) days, the Parties shall notify their respective Chief Executive (or equivalent) who shall use their best endeavour to meet and settle the dispute within fifteen (15) days of being notified. If a dispute and/or difference is not settled within fifteen (15) days, the Parties shall notify their respective Chief Executive (or equivalent) who shall use their best endeavour to meet and settle the dispute within fifteen (15) days of being notified. In the event of the Parties failing to resolve any dispute amicably, the same shall be referred to Arbitration in accordance with the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 of Government of India and subsequent amendments thereof. Each party shall be entitled to nominate an Arbitrator and the two arbitrators so nominated shall jointly nominate a third presiding Arbitrator. The three Arbitrators shall form the arbitral tribunal (the “Tribunal”). The Tribunal shall give a reasoned award within sixty (60) days from the date of constitution of the Tribunal. The arbitration award shall be final and binding on both the parties and that the cost of arbitration shall be borne by the loosing party.” (Emphasis supplied) (V)Thus, there is one type of arbitration clause in the aforesaid two agreements and another type of arbitration clause in seven different work orders. This difference between the arbitration clauses has given birth to the present arbitration application. Looking to the work orders, as stated hereinabove, which are annexed as Annexure A -2 series and A-3 series to the counter affidavit filed by the respondent in Arbitration Application No. 14 of 2015, it appears that they are separate and distinct contracts. Work of separate and different nature has been offered by the respondent and also accepted by this applicant. Never any objection has been raised by the applicant about any term or condition of the work orders. Readily and willingly even the part of the work has been executed by this applicant under the aforesaid work orders and now dispute has been raised about the payment of money for the work done under the aforesaid seven work orders. The appointment of the sole arbitrator by the respondent cannot be said to be patently illegal or ex facie illegal or ostensibly without any agreement. (VI)This court is neither concerned with as to which arbitration clause is more favourable to the applicant nor with the choice of the arbitration clause out of the aforesaid two. Suffice it will be for this court to decide as to whether appointment of the sole arbitrator by the respondent is prima facie valid or not. (VI)This court is neither concerned with as to which arbitration clause is more favourable to the applicant nor with the choice of the arbitration clause out of the aforesaid two. Suffice it will be for this court to decide as to whether appointment of the sole arbitrator by the respondent is prima facie valid or not. A dispute can always be raised by this applicant about jurisdiction of the arbitrator under the Act of 1996 and if any order is passed under Section 16 of the Act of 1996 on the objection raised by the applicant, further remedy is also been provided under Section 34 thereof. Looking to the work orders and looking to the terms and conditions of the work orders and arbitration clause contained in the work orders, prima facie, respondents can appoint sole arbitrator, who has already been appointed and this applicant has also raised objection initially vide letter dated 5th November, 2015 and later on vide detailed objection dated 15th December, 2015, which have been appreciated by the learned arbitrator vide order 5th February, 2015. Said order is at Annexure A 4 to the counter affidavit filed by the respondents, which can also be challenged under Section 34 of the Act of 1996. (VII)It has been held by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in ANTRIX CORPORATION LIMITED VERSUS DEVAS MULTIMEDIA PRIVATE LIMITED reported in (2014) 11 SCC 560 in paragraph No. 33 and 34 as under: “33. Sub-section (6) of Section 11 of the 1996 Act, quite categorically provides that where the parties fail to act in terms of a procedure agreed upon by them, the provisions of sub-section (6) may be invoked by any of the parties. Where in terms of the agreement, the arbitration clause has already been invoked by one of the parties thereto under the ICC Rules, the provisions of sub-section (6) cannot be invoked again, and, in case the other party is dissatisfied or aggrieved by the appointment of an arbitrator in terms of the agreement; his/its remedy would be by way of a petition under Section 13, and, thereafter, under Section 34 of the 1996 Act. 34. The law is well settled that where an arbitrator had already been appointed and intimation thereof had been conveyed to the other party, a separate application for appointment of an arbitrator is not maintainable. 34. The law is well settled that where an arbitrator had already been appointed and intimation thereof had been conveyed to the other party, a separate application for appointment of an arbitrator is not maintainable. Once the power has been exercised under the arbitration agreement, there is no power left to, once again, refer the same disputes to arbitration under Section 11 of the 1996 Act, unless the order closing the proceedings is subsequently set aside. In Som Datt Builders (P) Ltd. v. State of Punjab, the Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court held, and we agree with the finding, that when the Arbitral Tribunal is already seized of the disputes between the parties to the arbitration agreement, constitution of another Arbitral Tribunal in respect of those same issues which are already pending before the Arbitral Tribunal for adjudication, would be without jurisdiction.” (Emphasis supplied.) (VIII)It has been held by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in CHATURBHUJ VITHALDAS JASANI V. MORESHWAR PARASHRAM AND OTHERS reported in AIR (1954)SC 236 in paragraph No. 9 as under: “9. We do not intend to analyse these letters in detail here. It is enough to say that in our opinion no binding engagement can be spelt out of them except to this extent: Moolji Sicka and Company undertook to seel to the canteen contractors only through the Canteen Stores and not direct and undertook to pay a commission on all sales. This, in our opinion, constituted a continuing arrangement under which the Canteen Stores, i.e., the Government, would be entitled to the commission on all orders placed and accepted in accordance with the arrangement; and in fact the Canteen Stores did obtain a sum of Rs. 7,500 in satisfaction of a claim of this kind. This money was paid long before the dates which are crucial here but the settlement illustrates that there was an arrangement of that nature and that it was a continuing one. In our opinion it continued in being even after that and the mere fact that there was no occasion for any claim subsequent to the settlement does not indicate that it was no longer alive. But except for this, the letters merely set out the terms on which the parties were ready to do business with each other if and when orders were placed and executed. But except for this, the letters merely set out the terms on which the parties were ready to do business with each other if and when orders were placed and executed. As soon as an order was placed and accepted a contract arose. It is true this contract would be governed by the terms set out in the letters but until an order was placed and accepted there was no contract. Also, each separate order and acceptance constituted a different and distinct contract:........” (Emphasis supplied.) (IX)It has been held by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in UNION OF INDIA v. MADDALA THANTHAIAH reported in AIR 1966 SC 1724 in paragraph No. 15-16 as under: “15. We are, therefore, of the view that the condition mentioned in the note to Paragraph 2 of the tender or in the letter dated February 16, 1948, refers to a right in the appellant to cancel the agreement for such supply of jaggery about which no formal order had been placed by the Deputy General Manager with the respondent and does not apply to such supplies of jaggery about which a formal order had been placed specifying definite amount of jaggery to be supplied and the definite date or definite short period for its actual delivery. Once the order is placed for such supply on such dates, that order amounts to a binding contract making it incumbent on the respondent to supply jaggery in accordance with the terms of the order and also making it incumbent ion the Deputy General Manager to accept the jaggery delivered in pursuance of that order. 16.We may refer to what was said by this Court in Chatturbhuj Vithaldas v. Moreshwar Parashram, AIR 1954 SC 236 at p. 238, in connection with an arrangement arrived at between the Central Government and a firm of Bidi manufacturers, Moolji Sickka and Company. The arrangement under which the firm was to sell and the Government was to buy from the firm from time to time two brands of bidis manufactured by it. The contention raised before the Court was that this arrangement amounted to a contract for the supply of goods within the meaning of that section. The contract was said to be embodied in four letters. The contention raised before the Court was that this arrangement amounted to a contract for the supply of goods within the meaning of that section. The contract was said to be embodied in four letters. This Court said: “But except for this the letters merely set out the terms on which the parties were ready to do business with each other if and when orders were placed and executed. As soon as an order was placed and accepted a contract arose. It is true this contract would be governed by the term set out in the letters but until an order was placed and accepted there was no contract.”(Emphasis supplied) On the basis of the aforesaid decisions, it is submitted by the counsel for the respondents that the work orders which have been issued by the respondents for separate, distinct and clearly demarcated work to be executed by the applicant with several clauses have been readily accepted by this applicant. They are separate contracts altogether. Partly the work has also been executed by this applicant and even Notice under Section 21 of the Act of 1996 sent by this applicant refers consistently to the payment in accordance with work orders and hence arbitration clause contained in this work orders has been made operative and hence also it cannot be said that prima-facie or ostensibly the appointment of the sole arbitrator is illegal. Power, jurisdiction and authority of the arbitrator can always be challenged before the learned arbitrator under the Act of 1996 and if any order is passed by the learned arbitrator, there is further inbuilt mechanism under Section 34 thereof. (X)It has been held by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in LARSEN AND TOUBRO LIMITED versus MOHAN LAL HARBANS LAL BHAYANA reported in (2015) 2 SCC 461 in paragraph No. 15 as under: “While narrating the aforesaid events, we have also commented on the effects of the three supplementary agreements and impact thereof on Clause 25. It is too obvious, from the reading of the relevant clauses in the supplementary agreements, that there could not have been any arbitration between the appellant and the respondent, at this stage. Clause 25 of the original agreement has undergone material change. The modalities of raising arbitration are completely novated. It is too obvious, from the reading of the relevant clauses in the supplementary agreements, that there could not have been any arbitration between the appellant and the respondent, at this stage. Clause 25 of the original agreement has undergone material change. The modalities of raising arbitration are completely novated. As per the modified understanding between the parties, which is so eloquently recorded in writing, in the first instance, the claims of the respondent are to be takenup by the appellant with SCOPE. For pressing those claims and in order to ensure their proper adjudication, the respondent is supposed to assist and cooperate with the appellant in pursuing the arbitration. In that sense, at this stage, the appellant and the respondent are on one side who have to put up a joint fight with SCOPE. It is only after the award is rendered in the arbitration between the appellant and SCOPE and something remains, which may qualify as a dispute between the appellant and the respondent, that there can be an arbitration in respect of those disputes between these two parties. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the High Court is not correct in holding that Clause 25 of the original agreement in unamended form holds the field. In fact, even the respondent knew fully well that the said clause had been drastically altered by supplementary agreements. It is for this reason that in Prayer (a) of the application under Section 11 of the Act filed by the respondent, it has itself acknowledged this change by mentioning that the arbitrator be appointed in terms of Clause 25 of the contract agreement dated 3-3-1988 “as modified by supplementary agreements dated 31-1-1990 and 6-2-1995”. What, however, is lost sight of by the respondent in the process, is that the modification in Clause 25 did not permit the respondent to move this kind of application for appointment of arbitrator between the parties, at that stage.” (Emphasis supplied) In view of the aforesaid decision, it is submitted by counsel for the respondents that the work orders, which are separate and distinct from the agreements upon which this applicant is relying upon, even if treated as a continuation of the earlier agreement then also there is no breach of the arbitration clause of the contract. As the work orders have been accepted by this applicant, the terms of the arbitration clause contained in these work orders have to be accepted. (XI)It has been held by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in M/S. NEW BIHAR BIRI LEAVES CO. AND OTHERS VERSUS STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS, reported in (1981) 1 SCC 537 , in paragraph 48 as under: 48. It is fundamental principle of general application that if a person of his own accord, accepts a contract on certain terms and works out the contract, he cannot be allowed to adhere to an abide by some of the terms of the contract which proved advantageous to him and repudiate the other terms of the same contract which might be disadvantageous to him. The maxim is qui approbat nbon reportat (one who approbates cannot reprobate). This principle, though originally borrowed from Scots Law,is now firmly embodied in English Common Law. According to it, a party to an instrument or transaction cannot take advantage of one part of a document or transaction and reject the rest. That is to say, no party can accept and reject the same instrument or tansaction (Per Scrutton, L.J. Verschures Creameries Ltd. v. Hull & Netherlands Steamship Co.; see Douglas Menzies v. Umphelby; see also Strouid's Judicial Dictionary, Vol. I, Page 169, 3rd Edn.). (Emphasis supplied) In view of the aforesaid decision, it is submitted by counsel for the respondent that once work orders have been accepted without any objection and a part of the work has also been executed, the applicant cannot say that the arbitration clause contained in the work order is not binding with respect to the dispute raised about payment. This applicant cannot approbate and reprobate at the same time. One who approbates cannot reprobate. (XIV)It further appears from the Notice dated 17thJune, 2015 (Annexure 8) issued by this applicant that there is consistent reference to the work orders. There is a consistent allegation about the breach of the work orders and non-payment of the consideration with respect to the work orders. These work orders have several clauses including the arbitration clause and as per the said arbitration clause sole arbitrator has been appointed, who has also started hearing the matter. There is a consistent allegation about the breach of the work orders and non-payment of the consideration with respect to the work orders. These work orders have several clauses including the arbitration clause and as per the said arbitration clause sole arbitrator has been appointed, who has also started hearing the matter. Arbitration has already commenced and even an order has also been passed by this arbitrator upon an application filed by this applicant under the Act of 1996 and hence, these arbitration applications for appointment of arbitrator are not tenable at law. (XV)Counsel for the applicant has relied upon the decision rendered in WALTER BAU AG. LEGAL SUCCESSOR, OF THE ORIGINAL CONTRACTOR, DYCKERHOFF vs. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF GREATER MUMBAI AND ANOTHER reported in (2015) 3 SCC 800 Paragraph 10 and ASHAPURA MINE-CHEM LIMITED reported in (2015) 8 SCC 193 Paragraph 15. None of these judgments are helpful to the applicant mainly for the following reasons in the facts of the present case. (a)The applicant has worked under the aforesaid seven work orders. (b)By these seven work orders, work of separate and distinct nature has been offered to the applicant to be carried out on specific terms and conditions. (c)This offer of work of the specific nature to be executed with separate distinct terms and conditions has been accepted by this applicant (d)Thus, seven work orders have been issued with their own terms and conditions. Even the cost of work to be executed has also been mentioned separately. (e)Never any objection has been raised by this applicant with respect to the nature of work carried out by him or for the cost much less for the terms and conditions. Thus, the work orders have been accepted, as they were. Now, conveniently dispute cannot be raised for only one term or one condition of aforesaid work orders, which is the arbitration clause. (f)This applicant cannot aprobate and reprobate at a time. Even the Notice issued by the applicant under Section 21 of the Act of 1996 dated 17th June, 2015 (Annexure 8 to the Arbitration Application No. 14 of 2015) has several times and consistently referred to breach of work orders and the claim of the consideration is also under aforesaid seven work orders. (g)In the facts of the present case, it cannot be said that respondents have appointed sole arbitrator without any authority. (g)In the facts of the present case, it cannot be said that respondents have appointed sole arbitrator without any authority. Prima-facie and ostensibly and looking to the arbitration clause in the work orders, it appears that there is no illegality committed by the respondents in appointing the sole arbitrator. Nonetheless, this court is not deciding as to which of the arbtiration clause is in favour of the applicant. Power, jurisdiction and authority of the arbitrator can always be challenged by this applicant under the Act of 1996. (h)Such objection has also been raised by the applicant vide their letter dated 5th November, 2015 and a detailed objection was raised on 15th December, 2015 before the learned Arbitrator who has also brushed aside this objection vide a detailed speaking order dated 5th February, 2016 which can be challenged under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 and no application under Section 34 has been preferred by this applicant. Aforesaid crucial facts of the present case make the present case different from the facts of the cases upon which applicant is relying upon and hence, aforesaid two decisions which are relied upon by the applicant are of no help to the applicant. 6. As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid facts, reasons and judicial pronouncements, there is no substance in these arbitration applications and the same are, therefore, dismissed. 7. Interim order passed by this Court on 19th February, 2016 stands vacated (passed in Arbitration Application No. 14 of 2015). I.A. No.997 of 2016, I.A. No.2214 of 2016, I.A. No. 2215 of 2016, I.A. No. 3247 of 2016 (in Arbitration Application No. 14 of 2015) 8. All the four interlocutory applications are dismissed in view of the final order passed in these arbitration applications.