JUDGMENT : Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. In all these writ petitions common issues are involved and therefore they have been heard together. 3. By the impugned orders of the same date 27th August, 2016 in respective S.A.R Cases in all these writ petitions, the Respondent-Land Reforms Deputy Collector, Chas, Bokaro has directed restoration of land indicated therein in favour of Khatiyani Raiyat. The text and context of all the impugned orders are also the same. 4. For the convenience sake, facts as have been pleaded in W.P.(C) No. 6084 of 2016 by the rival parties are being noticed hereinafter. At the same time, a Chart containing details of individual writ petitioners; initial date of transfer from Khatiyani Raiyat through registered sale deed; registered sale deed numbers and dates on which petitioners' family purchased the land; Sub Plot numbers; total area transferred (in decimal); area acquired for N.H-23 (in decimal) and area for which restoration in S.A.R Case in individual cases have been sought for are also indicated hereinafter. The lands in question are situated at Village-Marafari, Thana no. 169, Khata no. 23, Plot no. 4807, Circle-Chas, Bokaro. In all cases, the land in question is situated at Village Marafari, Thana No. 169, Khata No. 23, Plot No. 4807, Circle Chas, District Bokaro Sl. No. Case No. Party Name Initial date of transfer from Khatiyani Raiyat through registered Sale deed Registered Sale Deed No. & date through which the Petitoners' family purchased the land Sub Plot Total Area Transferred (In Decimal) Area Acquired for NH 23 (In Decimal) Area for restoration in SAR Case No. 01. WPC No. 6084 of 2016 Pradeep Kr. Roy & Ors. Sale deed no. 3777 dated 29.06.1965 Sale Deed No. 11857 dated 09.12.1981 19 01 01 01 in SAR Case no. 47/201516 02. WPC No. 6085 of 2016 Aarif Hussain. Sale deed no. 5639 dated 10.12.1965 Three Sale Deed No. 4997, 4998 & 4999 dated 21.07.1992 11 2.5 0.025 0.025 in SAR Case no. 36/201516 03. WPC No. 6086 of 2016 Dinesh Singh Sale deed no. 5627 dated 10.12.1965 and 4336 dated 28.12.1961 Sale Deed No. 10488 dated 23.03.1971, Sale Deed Nos. 6080, 4807, 6081, 6082, 6083 all dated 02.11.1966 17 15 0.015 0.015 in SAR Case no. 45/201516 04. WPC No. 6100 of 2016 Meera Devi Sale deed no. 36/201516 03. WPC No. 6086 of 2016 Dinesh Singh Sale deed no. 5627 dated 10.12.1965 and 4336 dated 28.12.1961 Sale Deed No. 10488 dated 23.03.1971, Sale Deed Nos. 6080, 4807, 6081, 6082, 6083 all dated 02.11.1966 17 15 0.015 0.015 in SAR Case no. 45/201516 04. WPC No. 6100 of 2016 Meera Devi Sale deed no. 5422 dated 17.11.1965 Sale Deed No. 4863 dated 19.08.2014 from her mother Phulwa Devi 05 7 01 1 in SAR Case no. 32/201516 05. WPC No. 6111 of 2016 Ramadhar Koiri Sale deed no. 2041 dated 21.03.1966 Sale Deed No. 420 & 421 dated 18.01.1968 13A 12 0.015 0.015 in SAR Case no. 40/201516 06. WPC No. 6114 of 2016 Rameshwar Sao Sale deed no. 3777 dated 29.06.1965 Sale Deed No. 24364 dated 03.01.1971 14 6 0.015 0.015 in SAR Case no. 42/201516 07. WPC No. 6115 of 2016 Shanti Devi Sale deed no. 5422 dated 17.11.1965 Sale Deed No. 5322 dated 19.08.2014 from her husband namely Sri Shambhu Lal Barnwal 4 7 0.01 0.01 in SAR Case no. 31/201516 08. WPC No. 6123 of 2016 Arjun Pd. Verma Sale deed no. 5423 dated 17.11.1965 Sale Deed No. 11094 dated 19.12.1983 13 B 12 0.0175 0.0175 in SAR Case no. 41/201516 09. WPC No. 6126 of 2016 Leela Devi Sale deed no. 1038 dated 14.04.1972 Gift Deed dated 17.06.1994 from her mother namely Shanti Devi 8 2.75 0.0225 0.0225 in SAR Case no. 35/201516 10. WPC No. 6130 of 2016 Jairam Gupta Sale deed no. 5422 dated 17.11.1965 Sale Deed No. 13856 dated 30.12.1982 7 3.50 01 01 in SAR Case no. 34/201516 11. WPC No. 6134 of 2016 Devanti Devi Sale deed no. 5422 dated 17.11.1965 Sale Deed No. 3539 & 5638 dated 13.09.1998 & 11.12.2000 2 6.50 0.025 0.025 in SAR Case no. 29/201516 12. WPC No. 6135 of 2016 Md. Siddique Ansari Sale deed no. 5639 dated 10.12.1965 Sale Deed No. 11857 dated 09.12.1981 11 24 0.025 0.025 in SAR Case no. 36/201516 13. WPC No. 6140 of 2016 Haffijuddin Ansari Sale deed no. 5639 dated 10.12.1965 Sale Deed No. 11857 dated 09.12.1981 12 24 0.025 0.025 in SAR Case no. 39/201516 14. WPC No. 6141 of 2016 Mohmood Alam Sale deed no. 5639 dated 10.12.1965 Sale Deed No. 11857 dated 09.12.1981 10 24 01 01 in SAR Case no. 37/201516 15. WPC No. 6151 of 2016 Vijay Kr. 5639 dated 10.12.1965 Sale Deed No. 11857 dated 09.12.1981 12 24 0.025 0.025 in SAR Case no. 39/201516 14. WPC No. 6141 of 2016 Mohmood Alam Sale deed no. 5639 dated 10.12.1965 Sale Deed No. 11857 dated 09.12.1981 10 24 01 01 in SAR Case no. 37/201516 15. WPC No. 6151 of 2016 Vijay Kr. Gupta Sale deed no. 5422 dated 17.11.1965 Sale Deed No. 13855 dated 30.12.1982 6 8.50 0.015 0.015 in SAR Case no. 33/201516 16. WPC No. 6186 of 2016 Ajay Kr. Gupta Sale deed no. 3777 dated 29.06.1965 Sale Deed No. 25358, 25359, 25360 & 25361 dated 03.11.1971 15 6 0.015 0.015 in SAR Case no. 43/201516 5. In the chronology of facts, it is relevant to first mention about the important dates and events in the acquisition proceedings initiated by the National Highways Authority of India through the competent authority, Respondent-Land Acquisition Officer, Bokaro was notified as the competent authority for acquisition of land for widening of National Highway-23. Notification (Annexure-3 dated 17th July, 2013) under Section 3-A(1) of National Highways Act, 1956 was published in the Gazette of India for conveying the intention of acquisition of land for widening of National Highway-23 from 0.000 Km. to 48.485 Km. (ITI More, Chas to Charangi Section) making it 4 Lane from 2 Lane road. On 10th August 2013, notification under Section 3-A(1) of the Act, 1956 was published in two local Newspapers, namely, 'Dainik Bhaskar' and 'Hindustan' in terms of Section 3-A (3) of the Act, 1956. Statutory objections were invited in terms of Section 3-C of the Act. After completion of the procedure under Section 3-A to 3-C on 14th March, 2014 notification under Section 3-D(1) of the Act of 1956 was published in the Gazette of India for acquisition of land. On 3rd June, 2014, notification under Section 3-D(1) was published in daily Newspaper namely 'Prabhat Khabar' for acquisition of land situate at Plot no. 4870 at Village Marafari. It is undisputed state of fact that respondent no. 10, who claims herself to be the dispossessed Raiyat never made any objection to the acquisition proceeding till the issuance of notification dated 14th March, 2014 and its publication on 3rd June, 2014 in terms of Section 3-D (1) of the Act. 6. 4870 at Village Marafari. It is undisputed state of fact that respondent no. 10, who claims herself to be the dispossessed Raiyat never made any objection to the acquisition proceeding till the issuance of notification dated 14th March, 2014 and its publication on 3rd June, 2014 in terms of Section 3-D (1) of the Act. 6. Impugned order shows that proceedings for inquiry in terms of Section 46(34) of Chhotanagpur Tenancy Act were initiated in respective S.A.R cases on the direction of Additional Collector, Bokaro contained in letter no. 1044 dated 10th June, 2015. The notices were served upon the respondent no. 10 as well as the petitioners. Respondent no. 10 placed her claim on the land in question and alleged that she is entitled to Government compensation in lieu of land. Petitioners contended that they are lawful purchasers of these pieces of land through their vendors who were Non-schedule Tribe persons and have remained in possession for more than 12 years. They pleaded adverse possession and questioned the maintainability of proceedings itself on behalf of State Authorities. It was contended on behalf of State that the transfer was in contravention of provisions of Section 46 1(a) of C.N.T Act as no prior permission of Deputy Commissioner was obtained. The Deputy Commissioner could suo motu initiate such proceeding for land restoration. The Land Reform Deputy Collector, Chas, Bokaro considered the submission of the parties and also took into account the inquiry report of Circle Officer, Chas, Bokaro as also the letter no. 1520 dated 3rd August, 2016. He found that the lands belonged to Adivasi Khatian and the names of Raiyats (1) Kunjal Manjhi; (2) Biriya Manjhi son of Kishna Manjhi and (3) Manjhia Manjhi were shown. The Respondent-L.R.D.C, Chas has, however, observed that respondent no. 10, Mainuaa Manjhiyan @ Maina Devi has failed to show clear relationship with 'Khatian' recorded Raiyat. In these circumstances, he held the possession of the petitioner as illegal and directed restoration of land to the recorded Raiyat. 7. It is also an undisputed state of fact that notice under Section 46(3-4) under the C.N.T. Act, 1908 were served on the petitioner on 13th June, 2015. In these circumstances, he held the possession of the petitioner as illegal and directed restoration of land to the recorded Raiyat. 7. It is also an undisputed state of fact that notice under Section 46(3-4) under the C.N.T. Act, 1908 were served on the petitioner on 13th June, 2015. It is pleaded by the petitioners relying upon Annexure-6 report of Circle Officer, Chas, Bokaro addressed to Land Reforms Deputy Collector, Bokaro through letter dated 21st June, 2014 that Khatiyani Raiyat were found to be dispossessed from the lands in question for more than 40 years. On 27th June, 2015, the amount of compensation under Section 3-G of the Act was deposited with the competent authority by N.H.A.I for disbursement amongst beneficiaries. As per respondent no. 10 a representation was made on 26th March, 2015 before Land Acquisition Officer, Bokaro in respect of acquisition of land situate at Plot no. 4807/19, Khata no. 23, Mouza-Maraphari for 4 Laning of National Highway-33, Annexure-2 to their counter affidavit. 8. The respondent no. 10, in her counter-affidavit, has taken the stand that the writ petition is not maintainable on account of availability of alternative statutory remedy against the impugned order passed by S.A.R Court. The Chhotanagpur Tenancy Act is enacted to safeguard the interest of downtrodden classes such as Scheduled Tribes. According to the respondent, land measuring 3.78 acres situated at Plot no. 4807, Mouza-Marafari no. 16, Khata no. 23 originally belonged to Kunjal Manjhi, Biria Manjhi, Majhia Manjhi. She further states that Manjhia Manjhi left behind him certain legal heirs and one Bihari Manjhi. She is the daughter of Sarkar Manjhi, who is descendant from Bihari Manjhi. Respondent no. 10 has questioned the conveyance of property claimed by petitioners as forged and in contravention of statutory provisions of Section 46 of C.N.T Act. She has supported the impugned order and pleaded restoration of land. 9. According to the petitioners, upon issuance of notification dated 14th March, 2014 under Section 3-D(1) of the Act, 1956 and its publication thereafter in daily Newspaper on 3rd June, 2014, the land vested in the Central Government free from all encumbrances. The proceedings initiated under Section 46(3-4) of the Act, 1908 was not maintainable. The lands which vested in the Central Government would not be made subject matter of restoration. National Highway Authorities of India Ltd. was never impleaded in the restoration proceeding. Respondent no. The proceedings initiated under Section 46(3-4) of the Act, 1908 was not maintainable. The lands which vested in the Central Government would not be made subject matter of restoration. National Highway Authorities of India Ltd. was never impleaded in the restoration proceeding. Respondent no. 10 never made any objection during the course of acquisition proceedings till the land stood vested in the Central Government. The L.R.D.C, Chas did not even take into account the report of Circle Officer dated 21st June, 2015, which clearly showed dispossession of the land from the khatiyani Raiyat for more than 40 years. As per Chart containing the necessary details and extracted hereinabove, the conveyance of the land from the original khatiyani Raiyat had taken place sometime in the years 1961, 1965/1966 and 1972 in the individual cases. These petitioners have purchased the lands from their immediate vendors. Reliance is placed on the judgment in the case of Situ Sahu and others Vs. State of Jharkhand & others reported in 2004 (4) JCR 211 (SC) : (2004) 8 SCC 340 Paragraph no. 11 thereof to support their submission that the words “at any time” used in Section 71-A is evidence of the legislative intent to give sufficient flexibility to the Deputy Commissioner to implement the socio-economic policy of the Act of 1908 to prevent inroads upon the rights of the ignorant, illiterate and backward citizens, but the power cannot be exercised after unreasonable delay. It is further contended by referring to the provisions of Section 46 (4-A)(a) first proviso that no such application can be entertained by Deputy Commissioner unless it is filed by occupancy-tenant within a period of 12 years from the date of transfer of his holding or any portion thereof. The proceedings initiated in the year 201516 to restore possession of land to the dispossessed Raiyat is therefore barred by delay of more than 40 to 50 years as the conveyance took place in most of the cases in the year 1961, 1965 and in 1966; 1972 in few cases. None of these jurisdictional issues were considered by L.R.D.C, Chas while passing a cryptic and non-speaking order directing restoration of land. Provisions of Section 46 ((4-A)(c) and its proviso were also not taken into account as substantial structure had been erected much prior in point of time on the plot in question. None of these jurisdictional issues were considered by L.R.D.C, Chas while passing a cryptic and non-speaking order directing restoration of land. Provisions of Section 46 ((4-A)(c) and its proviso were also not taken into account as substantial structure had been erected much prior in point of time on the plot in question. The proceedings were therefore not maintainable in the eye of law at all. The impugned order has resulted in a peculiar situation where restoration has been directed when the land stood vested free from all encumbrances in favour of the Central Government. The respondent no. 10 therefore can not maintain the proceeding under Section 46 (3 & 4) or under Section 71A of the Act of 1908 nor can claim any compensation in terms of Section 3-H of the Act of 1956. The notification under Section 3-D(1) also treats the petitioners as the awardees/beneficiaries of the acquisition. Therefore there cannot be any lawful objection to the disbursement of compensation in favour of the petitioner. 10. Learned counsel for the National Highway Authorities of India Ltd. has filed their counter affidavit. The entire chronology of facts narrated in the foregoing paragraphs relating to acquisition proceedings and the issuance of notification under Section 3-A to 3-D have been dealt with. It is categorically submitted on behalf of the Respondent-NHAI that respondent no. 10 neither availed the opportunity to visit the office of competent authority to inspect the land plans and other details nor filed any objection under Section 3-C of the Act, 1956 to place all documents showing her right, title and interest for the lands under acquisition. The competent authority disposed of objections made before him and sent the report to the Central Government. N.H.A.I submitted a draft of 3-D Gazette Notification to the competent authority, Bokaro vide letter no. 1449 dated 2nd September, 2013 for authentication which was duly authenticated on 17th December, 2013 (Annexure-C). N.H.A.I in its affidavit categorically admit that Gazette Notification under Section 3-D was issued vide S.O No. 812(E) dated 14th March, 2014 towards acquisition of land from 0.000 Km. to 48.485 Km in the District of Bokaro. On Publication of declaration under Section 3-D(1), the Raiyati land has vested absolutely in the Central Government free from all encumbrances including Village-Marafari, Thana No. 169, Khata No. 23, Plot No. 4807/19, area 0.01 Acre and as referred to in the impugned orders in respective petitions. to 48.485 Km in the District of Bokaro. On Publication of declaration under Section 3-D(1), the Raiyati land has vested absolutely in the Central Government free from all encumbrances including Village-Marafari, Thana No. 169, Khata No. 23, Plot No. 4807/19, area 0.01 Acre and as referred to in the impugned orders in respective petitions. The amount of compensation has also been deposited against the 3-G award before the competent authority for disbursement amongst the beneficiaries. Photo copy of award is annexed as Annexure-D. 11. Learned counsel for the State has taken this Court to the provisions of C.N.T Act, 1908. Counter affidavit has also been filed on behalf of Respondent-State. It is contended that the impugned order dated 27th August, 2016 passed in S.A.R Cases by L.R.D.C is quite legal and valid. If the land belongs to Scheduled Tribe, simple changing of property from one hand to another in violation of the provisions of C.N.T Act, cannot confer any right, title and interest in favour of the petitioners. The said land has been illegally transferred from tribal to non-tribal person without permission of Deputy Commissioner. Mutation of any such land is only for fiscal purposes and does not confer any right, title and interest of the party over the property. Any construction made by the petitioner over the land in question would not make it legal. The Respondent-State has admitted the issuance of notification dated 14th March, 2014 and its publication in Daily Newspaper on 3rd June, 2014 under Section 3-D(1) of the Act of 1956. According to them, the process of payment of compensation has been started after acquisition of land. 12. Learned counsel for the State however has not been able to countenance the legal issues involved in the matter due to vesting of land in question in the Central Government on issuance of 3-D(1) notification. Learned counsel for the State submits that it is up to the respondent no 10 to raise her claim before the competent authority in the matter of disbursement of awarded amount. 13. Learned counsel for the respondents have also taken the plea of availability of alternative remedy of appeal against the impugned order under Section 215 of CNT Act. 14. Considered the submission of learned counsel for the parties in some detail, relevant materials facts pleaded and perused the impugned order. 13. Learned counsel for the respondents have also taken the plea of availability of alternative remedy of appeal against the impugned order under Section 215 of CNT Act. 14. Considered the submission of learned counsel for the parties in some detail, relevant materials facts pleaded and perused the impugned order. Ordinarily, the remedy of an aggrieved person against a proceeding arising under Section 46(3-4) or under Section 71-A of the C.N.T Act lies in the statutory appeal under the Act itself . However, the present facts and the statutory events during the course of acquisition proceedings go to show that vital questions going to the root of jurisdiction of S.A.R authority in initiating such a proceeding has arisen. Acquisition proceedings have culminated in the vesting of land in question on 14th March, 2014/3rd June, 2014 in favour of Central Government in terms of Section 3-D (1) of the Act of 1956, which is quoted hereunder: “3-D. Declaration of acquisition.- (1) Where no objection under sub-section (1) of section 3-C has been made to the competent authority within the period specified therein or where the competent authority has disallowed the objection under sub-section (2) of that section, the competent authority shall, as soon as may be, submit a report accordingly to the Central Government and on receipt of such report, the Central Government shall declare, by notification in the Official Gazette, that the land should be acquired for the purpose or purposes mentioned in sub-section (1) of section 3-A.” (2) On the publication of the declaration under sub-section (1), the land shall vest absolutely in the Central Government free from all encumbrances. (3) Where in respect of any land, a notification has been published under sub-section (1) of Section 3-A for its acquisition but no declaration under sub-section (1) has been published within a period of one year from the date of publication of that notification, the said notification shall cease to have any effect; Provided that in computing the said period of one year, the period or periods during which any action or proceedings to be taken in pursuance of the notification issued under sub-section (1) of section 3-A is stayed by an order of a Court, shall be excluded. (4) A declaration made by the Central Government under sub-section (1) shall not be called in question in any Court or by any other authority. 15. (4) A declaration made by the Central Government under sub-section (1) shall not be called in question in any Court or by any other authority. 15. As per section 3-D(2), the land shall vest absolutely in the Central Government on publication of declaration under sub-section (1) free from all encumbrances. A declaration made by Central Government under sub-section (1) shall not be called in question in any court or by any other authority as per sub-section 4 on a declaration made by the Central Government. The process of vesting under the provisions of National Highways Act, 1956 is therefore complete and not dependent upon taking over of possession. This is evident from reading of Section 3-E, 3-F, 3-G and 3-H in a combined manner. The relevant sections are also quoted hereunder: “3-E. Power to take possession.-(1) where any land has vested in the Central Government under sub-section (2) of section 3-D, and the amount determined by the competent authority under section 3-G with respect to such land has been deposited under sub-section (1) of section 3-H, with the competent authority by the Central Government, the competent authority may by notice in writing direct the owner as well as any other person who may be in possession of such land to surrender or deliver possession thereof to the competent authority or any person duly authorized by it in this behalf within sixty days of the service of the notice. (2) If any person refuses or fails to comply with any direction made under sub-section (1), the competent authority shall apply (a) in the case of any land situated in any area falling within the metropolitan area, to the Commissioner of Police; (b) in case of any land situated in any area other than the area referred to in clause (a), to the Collector of a District, and such Commissioner or Collector, as the case may be, shall enforce the surrender of the land, to the competent authority or to the person duly authorized by it. 3-F. Right to enter into the land where land has vested in the Central Government-Where the land has vested in the Central Government under section 3-D, it shall be lawful for any person authorized by the Central Government in this behalf, to enter and do other act necessary upon the land for carrying out the building, maintenance, management or operation of a national highway or a part thereof, of any other work connection therewith. 3-G. Determination of amount payable as compensator.- (1) Where any land is acquired under this Act, there shall be paid an amount which shall be determined by an order of the competent authority. (2) Where the right of user or any right in the nature of an easement on, any land is acquired under this Act, there shall be paid an amount to the owner and any other person whose right of enjoyment in that land has been affected in any manner whatsoever by reason of such acquisition an amount calculated at ten per cent of the amount determined under sub-section (1), for that land. (3) Before proceeding to determine the amount under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), the competent authority shall give a public notice published in two local newspapers, on of which will be in a vernacular language inviting claims from all persons interested in the land to be acquired (4) Such notice shall state the particulars of the land and shall require all persons interested in such land to appear in person or by an agent or by a legal practitioner referred to in sub-section (2) of section 3-C, before the competent authority, at a time and place and to state the nature of their respective interest in such land. (5) If the amount determined by the competent authority under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) is not acceptable to either of the parties, the amount shall, on an application by either of the parties, be determined by the arbitrator to be appointed by the Central Government. (6) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996) shall apply to every arbitration under this Act. (6) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996) shall apply to every arbitration under this Act. (7) The competent authority or the arbitrator while determining the amount under sub-section (1) or sub-section (5), as the case may be, shall take into consideration.- (a) the market value of the land on the date of publication of the notification under section 3-A; (b) the damage, if any, sustained by the person interested at the time of taking possession of the land, by reason of the serving of such land from other land; (c) the damage, if any, sustained by the person interested at the time of taking possession of the land, by reason of the acquisition injuriously affecting his other immovable property in any manner, of his earning; (d) if, in consequence of the acquisition of the land, the person interested in compelled to change his residence or place of business, the reasonable expenses, if any, incidental to such change. 3-H. Deposit and payment of amount.-(1) The amount determined under section 3-G shall be deposited by the Central Government in such manner as may be laid down by rules made in this behalf by that Government, with the competent authority before taking possession of the land. (2) As soon as may be after the amount has been deposited under sub-section (1), the competent authority shall on behalf of the Central Government pay the amount to the person or persons entitled thereto. (3) Where several persons claim to be interested in the amount deposited under sub-section (1), the competent authority shall determine the persons who in its opinion are entitled to receive the amount payable to each of them. (4) If any dispute arises as to the apportionment of the amount or any part thereof or to any person to whom the same or any part thereof is payable, the competent authority shall refer the dispute to the decision of the principal civil Court of original jurisdiction within the limits of whose jurisdiction the land is situated. (5) Where the amount determined under section 3-G by the arbitrator is in excess of the amount determined by the competent authority, the arbitrator may award interest at nine per cent. per annum on such excess amount from the date of taking possession under section 3-D till the date of the actual deposit thereof. (5) Where the amount determined under section 3-G by the arbitrator is in excess of the amount determined by the competent authority, the arbitrator may award interest at nine per cent. per annum on such excess amount from the date of taking possession under section 3-D till the date of the actual deposit thereof. (6) Where the amount determined by the arbitrator is in excess of the amount determined by the competent authority, the excess amount together with interest, if any, awarded under sub-section (5) shall be deposited by the Central Government in such manner as may be laid down by rules made in this behalf by that Government, with the competent authority and the provisions of sub-sections (2) to (4) shall apply to such deposit. 16. In terms of Section 3-E where a land has vested in the Central Government under sub-section (2) of section 3-D, and the amount determined by the competent authority under section 3-G with respect to such land has been deposited under sub-section (1) of section 3-H with the competent authority by the Central Government, the competent authority may by notice in writing direct the owner as well as any other person who may be in possession of such land to surrender or deliver possession thereof to the competent authority or any person duly authorized by it in this behalf within sixty days of the service of notice. On failure to do so the competent authority shall apply to the Commissioner of police if the areas falls under Metropolitan area or to the Collector of a district if the land is situated in any other area and such Commissioner or Collector as the case may be, shall enforce the surrender of the land to the competent authority or to the person duly authorized by it. 17. It is also true that once the vesting is complete no party can seek restoration of land. It would be proper to refer to the opinion of Hon'ble Supreme Court on this point rendered in the case of V. Chandrasekaran and another Vs. Administrative Officer and others reported in (2012) 12 SCC 133 , paragraphs 25 and 26, are quoted hereunder: “25. It would be proper to refer to the opinion of Hon'ble Supreme Court on this point rendered in the case of V. Chandrasekaran and another Vs. Administrative Officer and others reported in (2012) 12 SCC 133 , paragraphs 25 and 26, are quoted hereunder: “25. It is a settled legal proposition, that once the land is vested in the State, free from all encumbrances, it cannot be divested and proceedings under the Act would not lapse, even if an award is not made within the statutorily stipulated period. [Vide Awadh Bihari Yadav v. State of Bihar; U.P. Jal Nigam v. Kalra Properties (P) Ltd., Allahabad Development Authority v. Nasiruzzaman, M. Ramalinga Thevar v. State of T.N. and Govt. of A.P. v. Syed Akbar.] 26. The said land, once acquired, cannot be restored to the tenure-holders/persons interested, even if it is not used for the purpose for which it was so acquired, or for any other purpose either. The proceedings cannot be withdrawn/abandoned under the provisions of Section 48 of the Act, or under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, once the possession of the land has been taken and the land vests in the State, free from all encumbrances. (Vide State of M.P. v. Vishnu Prasad Sharma, Lt. Governor of H.P. v. Avinash Sharma, Satendra Prasad Jain v. State of U.P., Rajasthan Housing Board v. Shri Kishan and Dedicated Freight Corridor Corpn. of India v. Subodh Singh.) 18. The meaning of expression vesting has been dealt with by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Hari Ram with analogous cases reported in (2013) 4 SCC 280 paragraphs 25 to 28, are quoted hereunder: “25. The word “vest” or “vesting” has different meanings. Legal Glossary, published by the Official Language (Legislative) Commission, 1970 Edn. at p. 302: “Vest.—(1) To give a person a legally fixed, immediate right or personal or future enjoyment of (an estate), to grant, endow, clothe with a particular authority, right of property, (2) To become legally vested; (TP Act) Vesting order.—An order under statutory authority whereby property is transferred to and vested, without conveyance in some person or persons;” 26. Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Edn.), 1990 at p. 1563: “Vested.—Fixed; accrued; settled; absolute; complete. Having the character or given the rights of absolute ownership; not contingent; not subject to be defeated by a condition precedent. Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Edn.), 1990 at p. 1563: “Vested.—Fixed; accrued; settled; absolute; complete. Having the character or given the rights of absolute ownership; not contingent; not subject to be defeated by a condition precedent. Rights are ‘vested’ when right to enjoyment present or prospective, has become property of some particular person or persons as present interest; mere expectancy of future benefits, or contingent interest in property founded on anticipated continuance of existing laws, does not continue ‘vested right’. Vaughn v. Nadel. See also Accrue; Vest, and specific types of vested interests, infra.” 27. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, of the English Language unabridged, Vol. III S to Z at p. 2547 defines the word “vest” as follows: “‘vest’ vest … To place or give into the possession or discretion of some person or authority [the regulation of the waterways … to give to a person a legally fixed immediate right of present or future enjoyment of (as an estate) (a deed that vests a title estate in the grantee and a remainder in his children) (b) to grant, endow, or clothe with a particular authority right or property … to put (a person) in possession of land by the feudal ceremony of investiture … to become legally vested (normally) title to real property vests in the holder of a property executed deed.]” 28. “Vest”/“vested”, therefore, may or may not include “transfer of possession”, the meaning of which depends on the context in which it has been placed and the interpretation of various other related provisions.” 19. It is clear from the opinion of Hon'ble Supreme Court that vesting may or may not include transfer of possession, the meaning of which depends on the context, in which it has been placed and the interpretation of various related provisions. 20. In the context of Urban Land/Ceiling and Regulation (Repeal) Act, 1999, the expressions used under Section 10 was that the land shall be deemed to have vested in the State Government free from all encumbrances with effect from the date so specified. In the context of present legislation under consideration i.e. National Highway Authority Act, 1956, the expression used under Section 3-D(2) is unambiguous i.e. “ The land shall vest absolutely in the Central Government free from all encumbrances.” 21. In the context of present legislation under consideration i.e. National Highway Authority Act, 1956, the expression used under Section 3-D(2) is unambiguous i.e. “ The land shall vest absolutely in the Central Government free from all encumbrances.” 21. Therefore, the event of taking over of possession would not be of any significance so far as vesting of land in the Central Government is concerned, under the Act 1956. In that case, the SAR proceedings before L.R.D.C at the behest of Additional Collector, Chas through letter no. 1044 dated 10th June, 2015 was not maintainable in the eye of law. This Court, however, is consciously not making any observations as to the other grounds urged on issues of fact such as delay in invocation of such proceeding. It would be not out of place to observe that L.R.D.C, Chas has not shown any application of mind to all such related and germane aspect of the matter in controversy. Respondent no. 10 admittedly never objected to the acquisition proceeding on issuance of Section 3-A or 3-C notifications. Respondent no. 10 cannot also take the plea of lack of service of notice of acquisition proceedings. Section 3-D notification describes not only the pieces of land acquired but also the beneficiaries. 22. In this regard, it would be profitable to quote the opinion of Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in A.I.R 2011 SC 922, paragraphs 21 to 21.3. “21. The acquiring authority need not prove actual notice of the proposal to acquire under section 4(1) of the Act, to the person challenging the acquisition. As the purpose of publication of public notice provided in section 4(1) of the Act is to give notice of the proposal of acquisition to the persons concerned, such notice can also be by way of implied notice or constructive notice. For this purpose, we may refer to the difference between actual, implied and constructive notices. 21.1. When notice is directly served upon a party in a formal manner or when it is received personally by him, there is actual notice. 21.2. If from the facts it can be inferred that a party knew about the subject matter of the notice, knowledge is imputed by implied notice. 21.1. When notice is directly served upon a party in a formal manner or when it is received personally by him, there is actual notice. 21.2. If from the facts it can be inferred that a party knew about the subject matter of the notice, knowledge is imputed by implied notice. For example, if the purpose of the notice is to require a party to appear before an authority on a particular date, even though such a notice is not personally served on him, if the person appears before the authority on that date or participates in the subsequent proceedings, then the person can be said to have implied notice. 21.3. Notice arising by presumption of law from the existence of certain specified facts and circumstances is constructive or deemed notice. For example, any person purchasing or obtaining a transfer of an immovable property is deemed to have notice of all transactions relating to such property effected by registered instruments till the date of his acquisition. Or, where the statute provides for publication of the notification relating to a proposed acquisition of lands in the Gazette and newspapers and by causing public notice of the substance of the notification at convenient places in the locality, but does not provide for actual direct notice, then such provision provides for constructive notice; and on fulfillment of those requirements, all persons interested in the lands proposed for acquisition are deemed to have notice of the proposal regarding acquisition.” 23. As is evident from the reading of extracted passage, notice arising by presumption of law from the existence of certain specified facts and circumstances is constructive or deemed notice. For example, any person purchasing or obtaining a transfer of an immovable property is deemed to have notice of all transactions relating to such property effected by registered instruments till the date of his acquisition. Or, where the statute provides for publication of notification relating to a proposed acquisition of lands in the Gazette and newspaper and by causing public notice of the substance of the notification at convenient places in the locality, but does not provide for actual direct notice, then such provision provides for constructing notice; and on fulfillment of those requirements, all persons interested in the lands proposed for acquisition are deemed to have notice of the proposal regarding acquisition. 24. 24. As an upshot of the aforesaid discussion, it is clear that the impugned proceedings for restoration of land were not maintainable after vesting of land in favour of Central Government on issuance of notification under section 3-D(1) of Act of 1956. The impugned orders therefore cannot be sustained in the eye of law and are accordingly quashed. The amount of compensation has been deposited before the competent authority in terms of Section 3-H of the Act of 1956. Counsel for the National Highways Authority of India has also informed that widening of National Highway-23 is in progress except the stretch of land involved in the present matters. On compliance of statutory requirements laid down under Section 3-D read with Section 3-H it is open for the National Highways Authority of India to take steps for taking over possession in terms of Section 3-E of the Act. This court however consciously refrains from observing anything more on the plea of the respondent no. 10 to take objection before the competent authority in terms of Section 3-H of the Act of 1946. It is open for the competent authority to deal with any objection in accordance with law. 25. Writ petitions are accordingly allowed in the aforesaid manner and to the extent indicated hereinabove. 26. Interim orders, if any stands vacated. Pending I.As are closed.