ORDER : Ravi Malimath, J. The case of the petitioner is that it is a Charitable Trust established with the object of providing relief to the poor for the purpose of education, medical relief, advancement of any need of public utility etc. On coming into force of the amended Karnataka Land Reforms Act, the petitioner submitted a declaration in terms of Section 66 of Karnataka Land Reforms Act by filing Form No.11 by submitting a declaration with regard to the lands held by it. During the course of the proceedings an endorsement was issued by the Tribunal in order to hold proceedings determining the excess land held by the petitioner. In the interregnum, Preliminary and Final notifications were issued for acquisition of certain lands of the petitioner. In the pending proceedings the petitioner-Trust had filed an application for dropping of the proceedings on the ground that the lands in question were non-agricultural. They had already been informed about the acquisition and, therefore, nothing requires to be considered by the Land Tribunal. The Land Tribunal passed an order rejecting the objections of the petitioner and proceeded to hear the matter. This was sought to be challenged by the petitioner in writ petition No.46184 of 2001. By the order dated 25-10-2005 the learned single Judge was of the view that, whether the land in question is a land as defined under the Karnataka Land Reforms Act is a question to be decided by the Land Tribunal. Therefore, the writ petition was dismissed. The Tribunal was directed to proceed with the matter and dispose of the application filed by the petitioner under Section 66 of the Act, as expeditiously as possible. Thereafter the matter was taken up for consideration by the Tribunal. In the interregnum, a report was also called for by the Tribunal. The report was also placed for consideration. Thereafter the Tribunal passed an order dated 12-1-2010. The same was challenged by the petitioner in Writ Petition No.4311 of 2010 on the ground that an adequate opportunity was not granted to the petitioner. By the order dated 24-3-2014 the order of the Tribunal was set aside and the matter was remanded for a fresh enquiry. Thereafter, the impugned order is passed by the Tribunal declaring excess land held by the petitioner. 2. Sri. By the order dated 24-3-2014 the order of the Tribunal was set aside and the matter was remanded for a fresh enquiry. Thereafter, the impugned order is passed by the Tribunal declaring excess land held by the petitioner. 2. Sri. Uday Holla, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner's counsel, contends that the order of the Tribunal is erroneous and liable to be set aside. That when this Court specifically ordered that the nature of the land is to be determined by the Tribunal, the same has not been done. In terms of the order of the Tribunal, a report was called for from the Tahsildar. It was submitted on 28-7-2015. That the report was not properly considered by the Tribunal. The Tribunal considered the earlier report and, therefore, non-considering of the report dated 28-7-2015, has led to miscarriage of justice. Therefore, he pleads that if the report is considered, the petitioner would not be entitled to surrender any land. 3. On the other hand, Sri Madhusudhan R. Naik, learned Advocate General, appearing for the respondent-State disputes the same. He submits that the direction issued by this Court was to consider the plea of the petitioner as to whether the land in question is a land as defined under the Karnataka Land Reforms Act. The same has been duly considered by the Tribunal. That it has also considered the report dated 31-3-2001. That the litigation is going on for quiete sometime. Notwithstanding the same, all material has been considered by the Tribunal. Therefore, he pleads that the writ petitions be dismissed. 4. Heard learned counsels. The Tribunal has recorded a finding with regard to the nature of the lands. It framed questions for consideration before it. Firstly, as to whether the provisions of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act 1961, is applicable in respect of the lands owned by the respondents? Secondly, whether the lands in question fell in the category as defined under Section 2(A)(1B) of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act. Thirdly, whether the respondents are having any excess land within the meaning of this Act? 5. I have considered the impugned order at length. The contentions of the petitioners herein have been referred to by the Tribunal. The Tribunal also referred to the survey report dated 28-7-2015. Thirdly, whether the respondents are having any excess land within the meaning of this Act? 5. I have considered the impugned order at length. The contentions of the petitioners herein have been referred to by the Tribunal. The Tribunal also referred to the survey report dated 28-7-2015. A perusal of the survey report would indicate, as to how it has considered the land of the petitioner, approximately to an extent of about 403 acres. There is a narration with regard to the extent and the manner in which the land exists, namely, temple land, acquisition by the BDA etc., and other relevant factors. 6. However, the Tribunal does not consider the contents of the survey report dated 28-7-2015. The report submitted by the Special Tahsildar dated 31-3-2001 has been considered by the Tribunal in extenso. In considering the said report, the Tribunal was of the view that the petitioner holds excess land of 265 acres and 24 guntas. However, a reading of the order of the Tribunal does not indicate that the report dated 28-7-2015 has been considered. Notwithstanding the earlier report of the Tahsildar dated 31-3-2001, once again a report was called for by the authority. The report has been prepared in detail. When a report has been called for, necessarily the authority would have to bestow its attention to the contents of the report and thereafter to arrive at a conclusion. A reading of the order of the Tribunal does not indicate application of mind to the survey report dated 28-7-2015. In my considered view, the survey report would have a bearing on the merits of the order of the Tribunal. Therefore, it is only just and necessary that the Tribunal reconsiders the matter afresh in the light of the report dated 28-7-2015. 7. The contention of the learned Advocate General is that non-consideration of the report dated 28-7-2015 cannot be fatal to the order of the Tribunal. That the Tribunal having relied upon the earlier report, it is not necessary for the Tribunal to once again look into the subsequent survey report, since the report could not have explained the possession and the nature of the land as it existed as on 1-3-1974. Therefore, it was not relevant to consider the said report. 8. I am of the considered view that it was for the Tribunal to record such a finding. Therefore, it was not relevant to consider the said report. 8. I am of the considered view that it was for the Tribunal to record such a finding. Such a finding could have been recorded, only by considering the report. It was for the Tribunal to decide as to whether the contents of the report requires to be accepted or not. The argument to the effect that the report need not have been looked into, therefore cannot be accepted. Consequently, the petitions are allowed. The order of the Tribunal dated 22-9-2015 passed in L.R.F. C.R. No.2099 of 1974-1975 vide Annexure-A is set aside. The Tribunal to consider the report, dated 28-7-2015 also and thereafter to record a finding with regard to the nature, the extent of the lands, possession, etc. It is clarified that there is no opinion expressed, so far as the other issues that have been determined by the Tribunal. In view of the pendency of the dispute for a long period of time, the petitioner to appear before the Tribunal on 22nd May, 2017. The Tribunal to consider the contentions of the petitioner referable to the survey report dated 28-7-2015 in terms of the aforesaid directions. The petitioner's counsel submits that they would conclude the arguments not later than a week from that date. The Tribunal to pass fresh orders within a period of two weeks thereafter. Petitions disposed of accordingly.