ORDER : These writ petitions have been filed by tourist bus operators for quashing of the Government Order bearing No.SARE/140/SAEPA-2011, Bengaluru dated 05.08.2015 whereunder appropriate Government of Karnataka has opined that modification of the schemes proposed under the notifications dated 25.10.2002, 27.05.2003 & 09.03.2017 are not required to be modified and as such, has dropped the proposed modifications and are referred to as “first set of writ petitions.”. The Stage Carriage Permit Holders who were granted permits by the State Transport Authority, being aggrieved by the orders passed by the said Authority rejecting the applications for renewal of the permits preferred appeals before the Karnataka State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Bangalore and on dismissal of the appeals by the Tribunal on the ground that the Division Bench of this Court had held that such permit holders are not exempted operators within the meaning of the respective schemes have approached this Court in the writ petitions which is referred to as “second set of writ petitions”. Since common questions would arise for consideration in these writ petitions, they are taken up together and disposed of by this common order. For the purposes of convenience, they are classified and tabulated hereunder: Writ petitions whereunder notification dated 05.08.2015 is under challenge. (FIRST SET) 1. W.P.Nos.49713-720/2015 2. W.P.Nos.33818-822/2015 & 33823-825/2015 & 34039/2015 3. W.P.Nos.34522-533/2015 4. W.P.Nos.34666-670/2015 & 34672-676/2015 5. W.P.Nos.34831-835/2015 6. W.P.Nos.35014-026/2015 7. W.P.Nos.35822-825/2015 8. W.P.Nos.35869-871/2015 9. W.P.Nos.36177-181/2015 & 36182-184/2015 10. W.P.Nos.36186-189/2015 11. W.P.No.36225/2015 12. W.P.Nos.36226-227/2015 13. W.P.No.36383/2015 14. W.P.Nos.36511-515/2015 & 36516/2015 15. W.P.Nos.36528-533/2015 16. W.P.Nos.36667-671/2015 & 36672-676/2015 17. W.P.Nos.36683-684/2015 18. W.P.Nos.36685-688/2015 19. W.P.Nos.36770-774/2015 & 36776-780/2015 20. W.P.No.36793/2015 21. W.P.No.36795/2015 22. W.P.Nos.37015-019/2015 & 37020-021/2015 23. W.P.Nos.37026-035/2015 24. W.P.Nos.37055-079/2015 25. W.P.Nos.37080-084/2015 & 37085-089/2015 26. W.P.Nos.37255-259/2015 & 37260-261/2015 27. W.P.Nos.37263-267/2015 & 37268-270/2015 28. W.P.Nos.37419-423/2015 & 37424-427/2015 & 37583-592/2015 29. W.P.No.37428/2015 30. W.P.No.37429/2015 31. W.P.Nos.37431-436/2015 32. W.P.No.37440/2015 33. W.P.No.37445/2015 34. W.P.No.37447/2015 35. W.P.No.37451/2015 36. W.P.No.37455/2015 37. W.P.No.37456/2015 38. W.P.Nos.37551-552/2015 & 37725/2015 39. W.P.No.37577/2015 40. W.P.No.37578/2015 41. W.P.No.37664/2015 42. W.P.Nos.37711-713/2015 43. W.P.Nos.37714-715/2015 44. W.P.No.37746/2015 45. W.P.Nos.37747/2015 & 37945/2015 46. W.P.No.37931/2015 47. W.P.No.37932/2015 48. W.P.No.37976/2015 49. W.P.Nos.38042-044/2015 50. W.P.Nos.38051-052/2015 51. W.P.No.38053/2015 52. W.P.No.38054-057/2015 53. W.P.Nos.38247-259/2015 54. W.P.Nos.38260-264/2015 & 38265-269/2015 55. W.P.Nos.38270-271/2015 56. W.P.Nos.38272-273/2015 57. W.P.Nos.38341-352/2015 58. W.P.No.38354/2015 59. W.P.Nos.38360-362/2015 60. W.P.No.38386/2015 61. W.P.Nos.38478-502/2015 62. W.P.Nos.38528-530/2015 63. W.P.Nos.38546-548/2015 64. W.P.Nos.38790-808/2015 65. W.P.Nos.38809-812/2015 66. W.P.Nos.38813-815/2015 67. W.P.Nos.38836-837/2015 68. W.P.Nos.38899/2015 & 38900-901/2015 & 38952-953/2015 69. W.P.No.38903/2015 70. W.P.Nos.38904-923/2015 71. W.P.Nos.38924-925/2015 72. W.P.Nos.38927-949/2015 & 38950-951/2015 & 42696-706/2015 73. W.P.Nos.38984-986/2015 74. W.P.Nos.39131-142/2015 75. W.P.Nos.39232-238/2015 76. W.P.No.38053/2015 52. W.P.No.38054-057/2015 53. W.P.Nos.38247-259/2015 54. W.P.Nos.38260-264/2015 & 38265-269/2015 55. W.P.Nos.38270-271/2015 56. W.P.Nos.38272-273/2015 57. W.P.Nos.38341-352/2015 58. W.P.No.38354/2015 59. W.P.Nos.38360-362/2015 60. W.P.No.38386/2015 61. W.P.Nos.38478-502/2015 62. W.P.Nos.38528-530/2015 63. W.P.Nos.38546-548/2015 64. W.P.Nos.38790-808/2015 65. W.P.Nos.38809-812/2015 66. W.P.Nos.38813-815/2015 67. W.P.Nos.38836-837/2015 68. W.P.Nos.38899/2015 & 38900-901/2015 & 38952-953/2015 69. W.P.No.38903/2015 70. W.P.Nos.38904-923/2015 71. W.P.Nos.38924-925/2015 72. W.P.Nos.38927-949/2015 & 38950-951/2015 & 42696-706/2015 73. W.P.Nos.38984-986/2015 74. W.P.Nos.39131-142/2015 75. W.P.Nos.39232-238/2015 76. W.P.Nos.39343-347/2015 & 39348-351/2015 77. W.P.Nos.39354-358/2015 & 39359-363/2015 78. W.P.Nos.39364-368/2015 & 39369-373/2015 79. W.P.Nos.39639-642/2015 80. W.P.No.39643/2015 81. W.P.Nos.39842-843/2015 82. W.P.Nos.39844-848/2015 83. W.P.Nos.40107-123/2015 84. W.P.Nos.40124-130/2015 85. W.P.Nos.40148-152/2015 & 40153-154/2015 86. W.P.Nos.40155-167/2015 87. W.P.No.40213/2015 88. W.P.Nos.40265-269/2015 89. W.P.Nos.40270-274/2015 & 40275-279/2015 90. W.P.Nos.40281-339/2015 91. W.P.Nos.40340-354/2015 92. W.P.Nos.40355-365/2015 & 40572-576/2015 & 40577-581/2015 93. W.P.Nos.40367-368/2015 94. W.P.Nos.40369-371/2015 95. W.P.Nos.40417-40431/2015 96. W.P.Nos.40496-500/2015 97. W.P.Nos.40904-918/2015 98. W.P.Nos.40954-955/2015 99. W.P.Nos.40956-976/2015 100. W.P.Nos.41016-017/2015 101. W.P.Nos.41055-080/2015 102. W.P.No.41082/2015 103. W.P.Nos.41115-117/2015 104. W.P.Nos.41138-139/2015 105. W.P.No.41141/2015 106. W.P.No.41233/2015 107. W.P.Nos.41330-340/2015 108. W.P.Nos.41482-505/2015 109. W.P.Nos.41523-524/2015 110. W.P.No.41614/2015 111. W.P.Nos.41615-617/2015 112. W.P.Nos.41856-860/2015 & 42035-039/2015 & 42040-042/2015 & 42043-047/2015 113. W.P.Nos.41876-888/2015 114. W.P.No.41893/2015 115. W.P.Nos.41894-898/2015 116. W.P.Nos.42398-399/2015 117. W.P.Nos.42517-521/2015 & 42522-524/2015 118. W.P.Nos.42625-629/2015 & 43118-43119/2015 & 43122/2015 119. W.P.Nos.42719-723/2015 & 42724-728/2015 a/w 34265-279/2015 120. W.P.Nos.42794-815/2015 121. W.P.Nos.42901-902/2015 122. W.P.Nos.42999-43009/2015 123. W.P.Nos.43107-43111/2015 & 43112/2015 124. W.P.Nos.43178-179/2015 125. W.P.Nos.43219-223/2015 & 43224/2015 126. W.P.Nos.43467-469/2015 & 45171/2015 127. W.P.Nos.43607-608/2015 128. W.P.Nos.43846-850/2015 & 43851/2015 129. W.P.Nos.43909-916/2015 130. W.P.Nos.43924-926/2015 131. W.P.Nos.44539-543/2015 & 44544/2015 132. W.P.Nos.44566-570/2015 133. W.P.Nos.45088-092/2015 134. W.P.Nos.45550-554/2015 & 45555/2015 135. W.P.No.45753/2015 136. W.P.Nos.45902-904/2015 137. W.P.Nos.46975-977/2015 138. W.P.Nos.47006-009/2015 139. W.P.Nos.47253-254/2015 140. W.P.Nos.47369-371/2015 141. W.P.No.47464/2015 142. W.P.Nos.47606-607/2015 143. W.P.No.47608/2015 144. W.P.Nos.49463-464/2015 145. W.P.Nos.49743-747/2015 & 49748-751/2015 146. W.P.Nos.50170-173/2015 147. W.P.No.50411/2015 148. W.P.Nos.50457-458/2015 149. W.P.Nos.50460-472/2015 150. W.P.No.50531/2015 151. W.P.Nos.50534-535/2015 152. W.P.No.51742/2015 153. W.P.Nos.52182-183/2015 154. W.P.Nos.52787/2015 & 52788-791/15 & 52792-794/2015 155. W.P.Nos.52922-924/2015 156. W.P.Nos.53163-165/2015 157. W.P.Nos.53204-207/2015 & 54555-561/2015 158. W.P.No.54233/2015 159. W.P.Nos.54756-759/2015 160. W.P.Nos.54761-765/2015 & 54766-767/2015 161. W.P.Nos.54879-881/2015 162. W.P.Nos.56055-059/2015 & 56060-064/2015 163. W.P.No.56885/2015 164. W.P.Nos.57343-347/2015 & 57348-349/2015 165. W.P.Nos.57481-491/2015 166. W.P.Nos.57492-494/2015 167. W.P.No.59372/2015 168. W.P.No.59773/2015 169. W.P.Nos.119-122/2016 170. W.P.Nos.325-327/2016 171. W.P.Nos.922-923/2016 172. W.P.Nos.1671-1675/2016 & 1676-1677/2016 173. W.P.Nos.1916-1917/2016 174. W.P.No.2145/2016 175. W.P.Nos.2204/2016 & 2205-2208/2016 & 2209/2016 176. W.P.No.2211/2016 177. W.P.No.3064/2016 178. W.P.No.3413/2016 179. W.P.Nos.3629-3633/2016 & 3634-3635/2016 181. W.P.No.5302/2016 182. W.P.Nos.6193-6194/2016 183. W.P.Nos.7250-7260/2016 184. W.P.No.7435/2016 185. W.P.No.7532/2016 186. W.P.Nos.7616-7617/2016 187. W.P.No.9047/2016 188. W.P.No.9077/2016 189. W.P.No.9145/2016 190. W.P.Nos.9254-9255/2016 191. W.P.No.9342/2016 192. W.P.Nos.9357-9359/2016 193. W.P.Nos.9943-9947/2016 & 9950-52/2016 194. W.P.No.9969/2016 195. W.P.Nos.9970-9971/2016 196. W.P.Nos.19590-591/2016 197. W.P.Nos.30412-30448/2016 198. W.P.No.35351/2016 199. W.P.No.33024/2016 200. W.P.No.37273/2016 201. W.P.Nos.34265-279/2015 202. W.P.Nos.34728/2015 & 35649/2015 203. W.P.Nos.30637-644/2016 & 30647-651/2016 204. W.P.No.3064/2016 178. W.P.No.3413/2016 179. W.P.Nos.3629-3633/2016 & 3634-3635/2016 181. W.P.No.5302/2016 182. W.P.Nos.6193-6194/2016 183. W.P.Nos.7250-7260/2016 184. W.P.No.7435/2016 185. W.P.No.7532/2016 186. W.P.Nos.7616-7617/2016 187. W.P.No.9047/2016 188. W.P.No.9077/2016 189. W.P.No.9145/2016 190. W.P.Nos.9254-9255/2016 191. W.P.No.9342/2016 192. W.P.Nos.9357-9359/2016 193. W.P.Nos.9943-9947/2016 & 9950-52/2016 194. W.P.No.9969/2016 195. W.P.Nos.9970-9971/2016 196. W.P.Nos.19590-591/2016 197. W.P.Nos.30412-30448/2016 198. W.P.No.35351/2016 199. W.P.No.33024/2016 200. W.P.No.37273/2016 201. W.P.Nos.34265-279/2015 202. W.P.Nos.34728/2015 & 35649/2015 203. W.P.Nos.30637-644/2016 & 30647-651/2016 204. W.P.No.8606/2017 Writ petitions whereunder Karnataka State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Bangalore orders are under challenge : (SECOND SET) 1. W.P.Nos.117-118/2015 2. W.P.Nos.27986-990/2012 & 27991-27993/2012 3. W.P.No.33837/2015 4. W.P.Nos.74-75/2015 5. W.P.No.28047/2015 6. W.P.No.28807/2015 7. W.P.No.28887/2015 8. W.P.Nos.29614-615/2015 9. W.P.No.32417/2015 10. W.P.No.32501/2015 11. W.P.No.33150/2015 12. W.P.No.33151/2015 13. W.P.Nos.33262-263/2015 14. W.P.Nos.33268-269/2015 15. W.P.No.33270/2015 16. W.P.Nos.33271-272/2015 17. W.P.Nos.33834-835/2015 18. W.P.No.33836/2015 19. W.P.No.46698/2015 20. W.P.Nos.52472-753/2015 21. W.P.Nos.54805-808/2015 22. W.P.Nos.59047/2015 & 59378/2016 23. W.P.No.123/2016 24. W.P.No.191/2016 25. W.P.Nos.2704-2705/2016 26. W.P.Nos.2804-2805/2016 27. W.P.Nos.2806-2807/2016 28. W.P.Nos.3807-3808/2016 29. W.P.Nos.3830-3831/2016 30. W.P.No.4210/2016 31. W.P.No.4284/2016 32. W.P.Nos.5451-5455/2016 33. W.P.No.5516/2016 34. W.P.No.5518/2016 35. W.P.Nos.5593-5594/2016 36. W.P.No.6195/2016 37. W.P.No.6486/2016 38. W.P.No.6765/2016 39. W.P.No.6766/2016 40. W.P.Nos.6769/2016 & 7341-7342/2016 41. W.P.No.6773/2016 42. W.P.Nos.8241-8244/2016 43. W.P.No.8415/2016 44. W.P.Nos.8514-8515/2016 45. W.P.No.8990/2016 46. W.P.Nos.9231-9235/2016 47. W.P.Nos.9285-9286/2016 48. W.P.Nos.9305-9308/2016 49. W.P.Nos.9603-9604/2016 50. W.P.Nos.9662-9663/2016 51. W.P.Nos.9727-9728/2016 52. W.P.No.9741/2016 53. W.P.No.9912/2016 54. W.P.Nos.10252-10253/2016 55. W.P.No.10254/2016 56. W.P.No.10256/2016 57. W.P.No.10267/2016 58. W.P.No.10429/2016 59. W.P.No.10442/2016 60. W.P.No.10701/2016 61. W.P.Nos.10813-814/2016 62. W.P.No.13201/2016 63. W.P.Nos.19432-435/2016 64. W.P.Nos.22654-661/2016 65. W.P.No.23186/2016 66. W.P.Nos.24721-722/2016 67. W.P.No.25489/2016 68. W.P.No.26615/2016 69. W.P.Nos.28647-648/2016 70. W.P.Nos.28649-653/2016 & 28654-655/2016 71. W.P.No.29681/2016 72. W.P.No.30450/2016 73. W.P.No.58692/2016 74. W.P.Nos.18565-18566/2016 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: 2. In exercise of the power vested under Section 68D of MV Act, 1939 State Government approved certain schemes during 1960, 1961, 1968 and on various other dates which are known and called as “BTS scheme, Bellary Scheme, Kolar Scheme, Mysore Scheme etc.” so as to create monopoly in favour of State Transport undertakings in respect of the routes notified thereunder. One such scheme which known as ‘BTS Scheme’ was published on 16.01.1961 in relation to the area comprising Bangalore City Corporation Limits including the adjacent mofussil / areas. The said scheme was under challenge before this Court, whereunder it was held that the scheme does not prohibit mofussil services going beyond the notified area. Full Bench of this Court in KSRTC vs ASHRAFULLA KHAN in W.A.No.403/1988 held it was permissible to traverse on the notified routes/area which fall within village and town limits as a matter of necessity. The said scheme was under challenge before this Court, whereunder it was held that the scheme does not prohibit mofussil services going beyond the notified area. Full Bench of this Court in KSRTC vs ASHRAFULLA KHAN in W.A.No.403/1988 held it was permissible to traverse on the notified routes/area which fall within village and town limits as a matter of necessity. This view came to be reversed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of KSRTC vs ASHRAFULLA KHAN reported in AIR 2002 SC 629 . Several schemes like Bellary Scheme, Kolar Scheme, Bangalore and Kanakapura Plans – Mysore Scheme and BTS Scheme, which were in operation in the State of Karnataka was sought to be modified to the extent that the operation of the services by permit holders who have been granted permits to ply the services on interstate routes, inter-district routes and intra-district routes as morefully specified in the proposed modified notifications. The Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred to as ‘Corporation’) had filed objections urging various grounds for opposing the said draft Modification Schemes contending interalia that there is no need or necessity for modifying the Schemes or for regularizing the illegal permits that have been granted contrary to the Scheme and modification of the Schemes cannot be done except in case of requirement of public interest. However, by overruling the objections raised by Corporation, notifications dated 07.11.2003, 24.07.2003, and 31.05.2007 came to be issued. 3. Said modification / notifications issued by the State Government came to be questioned by the Corporation in W.P.Nos.4030/2004 (Bellary Scheme), 6616/2004 (Kolar Scheme), 158/2008 (Bangalore & BTS Schemes) and W.P.No.9590/2004 (relating to MM Hills vehicles). Division Bench of this Court by order dated 21.04.2011 allowed the said writ petition and set aside the notification dated 31.05.2007 and matter was remitted to the State Government to pass fresh orders in accordance with law within a period of three months from the date of receipt of copy of the order. The writ petitions filed by the private operators came to be dismissed by confirming the order passed by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal whereunder the permits granted in favour of the writ petitioners therein had been cancelled. The writ petitions filed by the private operators came to be dismissed by confirming the order passed by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal whereunder the permits granted in favour of the writ petitioners therein had been cancelled. However, the Division Bench permitted the petitioners in W.P.No.16990/2006 and connected matters to operate their vehicles, if they are holding permits which were valid as on the said date and if they are authorized to run the vehicles for a period of three (3) months from the date of the order. 4. The private operators approached the Hon’ble Apex Court against the order setting aside the notification dated 31.05.2007 in SLP No.20539-561/2011 and connected cases. The Hon’ble Apex Court by order dated 18.12.2014 dismissed the Special Leave Petitions and directed the State Government to hear the objections, consider and decide the same in accordance with law by a reasoned order within three (3) months and in the light of direction issued by Apex Court directing the State Government to hear the objections of the Corporation and also the plea of discrimination raised by few operators, by considering and deciding the same in accordance with law, a notification dated 07.02.2015 came to be issued by the State Government. Under the notification dated 19.02.2015 hearing date was fixed as 07.03.2015 at 11.00 a.m. so as to hear the objections / suggestions already received to the draft notifications and notices were duly issued. Under the said notification dated 07.02.2015 Additional Chief Secretary, Rural Development and Panchayat Raj Department, Government of Karnataka came to be authorized to hear the objections/suggestions received in respect of draft notifications dated 25.10.2002 (Bellary scheme), 27.05.2003 (Kolar scheme) and 09.03.2007 (Mysore/ Bangalore/ BTS/ Kanakapura schemes). Thereafter, hearing was held on 07.03.2015 and after hearing the parties and their representatives, the hearing authority concluded and recommended to the State Government as under: (i) “The necessity for the modification of the approved scheme contained in the draft notification is not established. As discussed above while there is general agreement that the approved scheme has to be modified in view of lapse of time, the modification should have specific particulars of the nature of the services proposed to be rendered, the area or the routes proposed to be covered, the overlapping portions proposed to be exempted and other relevant particulars respecting thereto as required under Section 99(1) of the M.V.Act, 1988. (ii) All the permits issued on the notified routes or overlapping them after the date of the original draft/final notification of the original scheme are illegal. (iii) Firstly, there would be discrimination as against applicants who applied for permits but were rejected while others on the same footing were granted if such grantees were saved. The existence of such cases have been referred to during the arguments. Secondly, fixing any cut off date is discriminatory against some operators who may have got their permits after the cut-off date. Saving operators who have got permits before the cut-off date would discriminate against operators who got permits after the cut-off dates. Therefore all the three notifications are discriminatory because they specify certain cut-off dates. (iv) In view of the above, further proceedings on these draft notifications referred to in para 9 above may be dropped.” Pursuant to the same, the State Government has passed the impugned Government Order dated 05.08.2015 dropping the notifications dated 25.10.2002, 27.05.2003 and 09.03.2007. 5. In the meanwhile, some of the stage carriage permit holders who had unsuccessfully urged before various forums for restoring the permits and seeking renewal of their permits which had been rejected by the jurisdictional Regional Transport Authorities (for short RTAs) had approached the Tribunal by filing appeals under Section 89(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short ‘MV Act’) and Tribunal by orders passed in the respective appeals as noticed in the tabular column formulated hereinabove under the second set of category, dismissed the appeals on the ground that earlier order passed by the Tribunal in various revision petitions had attained finality and the revision petitions filed by the Corporation challenging the renewal of permits granted in favour of the second category of writ petitioners came to be set aside on the ground that such permits have been granted without conducting joint route survey and the Hon’ble Apex Court in B.A. Lingareddy’s case had rejected the contention of the permit holders. 6. Thus, two sets of writ petitions have been filed challenging the validity and legality of the G.O. dated 05.08.2015 and the orders passed by the Tribunal dismissing the appeals of the bus operators and allowing the revision petitions filed by the Corporation by raising common grounds and questions of law. Hence, all these writ petitions are taken up together for consideration and disposed off by this common order. 7. Hence, all these writ petitions are taken up together for consideration and disposed off by this common order. 7. I have heard the arguments of Sriyuths S. Vijayashankar, learned Senior Advocate, Sriyuths BRS Gupta, C.V. Kumar, Siddananjaiah, C.M.S. Sharief, M.E. Nagesh, B.R. Shailendra, H.B. Nagaraja, Srikanth, Ananda Shetty, A, A.S.Prasanna Kumar, R. Lokesh, C. Narasimhachar, B.G. Raghuram, learned Advocates appearing for petitioners and Sri Ashok Haranahalli, learned Senior Advocate appearing for Corporation, Sri Adithya Sondhi, learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the State, Sriyuths Puttige R. Ramesh, Prakash Shetty, M.S. Harish Kumar, B. Palakshaiah, Hareesh Bhandary T., learned Advocates appearing for the respondents / Corporations. CONTENTIONS RAISED BY THE PETITIONERS: 8. Sri S. Vijaya Shankar, learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of Sriyuths M.E. Nagesh, Anand Shetty and Rajashekhar, learned Advocates would contend that the scheme itself is a law under Article 13 (2) of the Constitution of India and the body which made said scheme alone has power to amend or rescind and contends that provisions governing the said issue will have to be construed strictly. He would submit that the rule making authority being the Minister would be the appropriate authority to amend the rule and if it authorizes the Secretary, it is excessive delegation and Secretaries cannot be the Government. He draws the attention of the Court to Section 2(60)(b) of the General Clauses Act which indicates the definition of ‘State Government’. By drawing the attention of the Court to Rule 5, 7, 10 and 30 of Allocation of Business Rules as contemplated under Article 166(3) of the Constitution of India, to contend that it is only the Minister who is entitled to hear, decide and dispose of the objections and to substantiate said proposition, he relies upon the judgment in the case of GULLAPALLI NAGESWARA RAO AND OTHERS vs. ANDHRA PRADESH STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND OTHERS reported in AIR 1959 SC 308 . He would also contend that when a judicial act is done, the person who hears alone should pass the order as it would falll within the four corners of the ‘judicial act’ as held by the Apex Court in the case of GULLAPALLI NAGESWARA RAO referred to supra and relies upon paragraph 24 of the said judgment. He would contend that State is a juristic person and it is not the Secretary. He would contend that State is a juristic person and it is not the Secretary. He would refer to Section 102 of MV Act to contend that it prescribes the procedure to be adopted by State Government either while canceling or modifying a scheme and there is no power given by the statute under Section 107 of the MV Act to formulate Rules either delegating or otherwise and under Section 102 there cannot be any delegation and State Government alone will have to adjudicate. He would also draw the attention of the Court that hearing authority has relied upon the judgment of the learned Single Judge passed on 06.01.2011 in W.P.No.6507/2008 without considering the order passed in W.A.No.1408/2011 dated 08.06.2011 whereunder the order of the learned Single Judge came to be set aside. This fact itself would indicate that there has been total non-application of mind by the hearing authority. He would rely upon the following judgments: (i) (2003)3 SCC 472 CHIEF CONSERVATOR OF FORESTS, GOVT. OF A.P. Vs. COLLECTOR AND ORS. (ii) AIR 1992 SC 443 APSRTC vs P.V.RAMAMOHAN CHOWDHARY 9. Sri BRS Gupta, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner would contend that if Government finds that in order to provide an efficient and well coordinated transport services to the traveling public it would be entitled to modify the scheme so as to permit a private operator to ply his vehicle on such routes and in any case, it is always permissible for the legislature to amend the law by providing private operators to run transport services on such route or routes and on payment of adequate royalty to the State Government. He would submit that for this precise reason, the State Government modified the scheme as contemplated under Section 102 namely, Kolar Scheme by granting exemption up to 2003 namely, those permits which were in operation as on 2003. He would submit that likewise, Bellary Scheme, Bangalore, Mysore BTS, Kanakapura and Shimoga Schemes and other schemes were also modified to save those permits which were granted as on 2007. He would contend that earlier to the proposed modification of the schemes, there were modifications and the Corporation has not questioned the same and only the exemptions under the dropped notifications which were granted by the State Government subsequent to the judgment of the Apex Court in ASHRAFULLA’s case Corporation has questioned the modifications before the Division Bench. He would contend that earlier to the proposed modification of the schemes, there were modifications and the Corporation has not questioned the same and only the exemptions under the dropped notifications which were granted by the State Government subsequent to the judgment of the Apex Court in ASHRAFULLA’s case Corporation has questioned the modifications before the Division Bench. He would contend that Division Bench of this Court only on the ground that while modifying the scheme, State Government has not assigned reasons and it is not a speaking order had set aside the order of exemption pertaining to those schemes and had remitted the matter back to the State Government for re-consideration and this was questioned by private operators before the Apex Court in the case of B.A. LINGAREDDY ETC. vs KSTA and batch matters and the Apex Court on 25.07.2011 had granted an interim stay of the judgment of the Division Bench, by virtue of which, the State Transport Authority’s had renewed the permits of petitioners and similarly placed persons and subject to LINGAREDDY judgment. He would draw the attention of this Court to the judgment of LINGAREDDY’s case whereunder Apex Court has given a direction to the State Government to pass a speaking order and pray for this Court to take note of paragraphs 38 & 39 of said judgment. He would also submit that some of the permits granted were illegally cancelled since it was beyond the cut-off date and the very fixation of cut-off date is discriminatory as it would create monopoly in favour of private operators who are operating the vehicles as on the cut-off dates. He submits that State Government can reconsider the objections of the petitioners and similarly placed transport operators and pass a reasoned order by which exercise no prejudice will be caused to the State or the Corporation. He would draw the attention of the Court to the notification dated 07.02.2015 whereunder the State Government has authorized the Additional Chief Secretary, Rural Development and Panchayat Raj Department, Government of Karnataka to hear the objections/suggestions and he has not been empowered to take decision. He would submit that he has been only authorized to hear the objections and place it with his recommendations to the State Government for the State Government to pass appropriate orders. He would submit that he has been only authorized to hear the objections and place it with his recommendations to the State Government for the State Government to pass appropriate orders. He would submit that hearing authority has heard the matter and recommended to the State Government, which in turn, has passed the impugned order and thereby the authority which heard the matter has not passed the order and relies upon judgment of Apex Court in the case of RASID JAVED vs STATE OF U.P. reported in (2010)7 SCC 781 . He would also contend that though operators had raised several contentions, the hearing authority in fact had made recommendation to the State Government for either taking the existing buses on lease from the operators as was done earlier or to bring a detailed modification proposal as required under Section 99 in case of services of permit holders are necessary in public interest to be saved and yet the State Government without examining the viability of these recommendations, has by one line order, dropped further proceedings pursuant to the draft notifications. He would also submit that pursuant to the draft notifications, permits were granted in favour of the operators and they have been operating as such and these permits are required to be saved. He would also contend that the State Government while drafting the scheme had not passed a speaking order and this mistake which was pointed out by the Division Bench and had returned back to the Government to pass a reasoned order, had not yielded any positive result and the recommendations made by hearing authority in paragraph 103 of the impugned order is contrary to the directions issued by the Apex Court. He would also contend that recommendation made by the hearing authority is itself beyond the scope and as such, he prays for quashing of the impugned order. 10. It is contended by Sri C.V. Kumar, learned Advocate appearing for petitioners that the State Government alone has to take a decision and at any time, if it considers in the public interest to modify any approved scheme, the State Government will have to pass an order by modifying the scheme under Section 102 of MV Act. 10. It is contended by Sri C.V. Kumar, learned Advocate appearing for petitioners that the State Government alone has to take a decision and at any time, if it considers in the public interest to modify any approved scheme, the State Government will have to pass an order by modifying the scheme under Section 102 of MV Act. He would submit that the State Government had earlier modified the existing scheme by issuance of notification dated 31.05.2007 with the sole idea of saving the permits granted by the Transport Authorities and the permits so granted was never challenged or questioned by the STUs and as such, the permit granted in favour of the operators cannot be termed as illegal. He would contend that only when the decision came to be rendered in ASHRAFULLA KHAN’s case in the year 2002, the permits granted by the authorities became vulnerable for attack by the STUs and they started objecting to the renewal of the permits on the ground that such permits are illegal. He would submit that an exercise has to be undertaken by the State Government to address the defect pointed out in the earlier proceedings of modification which was the reason to set aside the modifications and those defects are persisting or existing even in the order dated 05.08.2015 and he would draw the attention of the Court to the said order where the hearing authority itself has held that ‘saving operators who have got permits before the cut-off date would discriminate against operators who have got permits after the cut-off dates’. 11. Sri Siddananjaiah, learned Advocate appearing for petitioners would draw the attention of the Court to the BTS scheme and particularly, clause (1) contending that scheme was approved in relation to the Bangalore City Corporation and as per clause (d) the exemption is given to the operators plying in rural areas. 12. Per contra, the learned Advocates appearing for the State and the Corporation led by Sri. Adithya Sondhi, learned Addl. Advocate General and Sri. Ashok Haranahalli, Senior Counsel have contended that Rule 5 provides for such delegation and in exercise of such power the State Government had authorized the Addl. Chief Secretary to hear the objections and as such there is no error committed by the respondent in passing the impugned order. Adithya Sondhi, learned Addl. Advocate General and Sri. Ashok Haranahalli, Senior Counsel have contended that Rule 5 provides for such delegation and in exercise of such power the State Government had authorized the Addl. Chief Secretary to hear the objections and as such there is no error committed by the respondent in passing the impugned order. It is also contended that under general power vested under Section 107(1) the State Government is empowered to make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect of this Chapter and by virtue of the same Rules have been introduced and Rule 5 specifically provides for consideration of objections by three persons namely, (1) the Minister in-charge of transport; and (2) where the Minister in-charge of transport is appointed as Chairman of the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation, (3) the Minister in charge of law and parliamentary affairs or the Secretary to Government, Transport Department authorized by the Minister concerned would be the authority to hear the objections under Section 100 of the Act. 13. Sri. P.R. Ramesh, learned counsel appearing for the respondent / Corporation has contended that petitioners have been operating their services based on illegal permits, inasmuch as, the Schemes prohibited grant of permits to private operators, yet the authorities granted the permits on misrepresentation. Though the State Government started regularizing the permits and was intending to bring about modification in the existing scheme, the last of the modifications had been challenged by the Corporation which came to be accepted by the Division Bench and matter was remitted to the Government so as to pass fresh orders in accordance with law and now by virtue of the impugned Government Order the State Government has arrived at a conclusion that there is no need for modification in the Scheme. He would elaborate his submission by contending that a right vested to the petitioners is flowing from Chapter V of the MV Act which infringes the right of Corporation vested under Chapter VI of the MV Act and in such circumstances the right of a private operator has to yield to that of the Corporation or State Transport undertaking. He would also contend that no private operator has a right to compel the Government to either modify or not to modify the Scheme and it is the pleasure of the Government to undertake such exercise. He would also contend that no private operator has a right to compel the Government to either modify or not to modify the Scheme and it is the pleasure of the Government to undertake such exercise. He would draw the attention of the Court to the judgments of ADARSHA’s case - AIR 1986 SC 319 and ASHRAFULLA’s case – AIR 2002 SC 629 , whereunder at paragraph 13 and 28 the emphasis is laid not on the right of private operators to continue to operate their services but on eliminating the inconvenience, as far as possible, to the passengers. He would submit that hearing can be effective only if the hearing authority sums up as to what he has heard, so as to enable the authority passing the order. He would also submit that Section 102 of the MV Act does not require that while exercising the power should pass a speaking order. He contends that parliament has conferred certain privileges on a State Transport undertaking and it should be presumed that Corporation is best suited to meet the situation. He would also draw the attention of the Court to the additional affidavit of the Corporation filed on 13.06.2016 outlining the capability to run the buses where private operators are operating and the sufficiency to replace the operation of the private operators, so as to mitigate the inconvenience to the traveling public and contends that Act I of 2016 brought about by the State Government enables the private operators also to operate the services for one year though on the basis of temporary permit. On these grounds, he seeks for rejection of the writ petitions and prays for upholding the validity of the impugned Government Order dated 05.08.2015 and the orders passed by the Transport Appellate Tribunal. 14. Sri Ashok Haranahalli, learned Senior Counsel appearing for KSRTC would draw the attention of the Court to the original records of the State Government to contend that on the basis of the report of the hearing authority, the decision is taken by the Cabinet and the acceptance by the Cabinet in single process of decision making has to be read together. He would contend that it is not a case where Cabinet has taken a different decision that of the Secretary, but on the other hand, the recommendation made by hearing authority was accepted by the Cabinet by virtue of ultimate power vesting with the Cabinet. He would submit that if the State intends to take a decision to drop the process of modifying the scheme, then there is no need to hear. He would also submit that there is already an integrated scheme formed under Section 100 and by issuing illegal permits, it would frustrate the scheme itself and the scheme which gives monopoly to the STU over the areas, then the STUs alone would be entitled to operate. Hence, he contends that the State cannot regularize an unauthorized or illegal permit. He would contend that permits were given to the operators on account of interpretation of intersection being given by Hon’ble Apex Court in ASHRAFULLA KHAN’s case and if the scheme itself saves certain class of permits, the STUs cannot have objection. He would submit that the State cannot under the guise of modification of the scheme destroy the original scheme itself and save the permits which have been granted contrary to the scheme. As to whether a permit granted is saved under the scheme is an issue which requires to be examined by the authorities and not through modification of the scheme. He would draw the attention of the Court to the notification dated 31.05.2007 questioned by KSRTC which has now been sent back to the State Government to clarify which provided that notwithstanding the fact that there is notified area, if an operator is plying the buses as on 09.03.2007 would be entitled to operate. Thus, the modification that was provided was that there was complete exclusion in the earlier scheme and yet notwithstanding such exclusion, the operators continue to operate by obtaining permits and this was sought to be saved under the modification. Hence, the Government was examining as to whether there is any need to modify the scheme so as to provide saving the permits which have been issued contrary to the scheme. Hence, the Government was examining as to whether there is any need to modify the scheme so as to provide saving the permits which have been issued contrary to the scheme. He would contend that once there is a notified scheme, authorities are prohibited from issuing permits and contrary to the scheme and yet they went on issuing permits and such illegal permits was sought to be saved by modifying the scheme and hence, the hearing authority has recommended to the State Government for dropping the proposal to modify the existing scheme, which does not call for interference. He would also submit that the STUs have been consistently taking a stand before all the forums that it is ready with all infrastructure to provide efficient transport services to the commuting public in respect of the notified schemes and he draws the attention of the Court to the affidavit of the KSRTC Official filed undertaking thereunder to operate in all areas and the readiness to purchase additional buses and even otherwise, if the STUs failed to operate on the notified routes, the Government can step in to modify the scheme. Hence, he contends that there is no need to safeguard the operators and as such, he contends that even in the event of Government Order dated 05.08.2015 being held as contrary to the scheme of Act, even then, there would be no necessity to give protection to the operators and it is for the State Government to examine such claims on case to case basis. Hence, he prays for dismissal of the writ petitions. DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS: 15. Facts on hand would indicate that Kolar Scheme, Bellary Scheme, Mysore, Bangalore, BTS and Kanakapura Schemes was sought to be modified by notifications dated 07.11.2003, 24.07.2003 and 31.05.2007 respectively by the State Government in exercise of the power vested under Section 102 of the MV Act on the ground that existing operators who were plying about 1500 buses and carrying 1.5 lakh passengers and those permits are required to be saved, as otherwise, grave inconvenience would be caused to the travelling public. The Corporation filed its objections to the proposed modification of the schemes contending that it is providing efficient, adequate, economical and properly coordinated transport services to the commuting passengers. However, by overruling the objections, final notification came to be issued on 31.05.2007, which was duly published in the Gazette on 04.06.2007. The Corporation filed its objections to the proposed modification of the schemes contending that it is providing efficient, adequate, economical and properly coordinated transport services to the commuting passengers. However, by overruling the objections, final notification came to be issued on 31.05.2007, which was duly published in the Gazette on 04.06.2007. On the ground that objections filed by the Corporation, not having been considered by the State Government by following the procedure prescribed under Section 102 of MV Act, the proposed modification of the schemes as per the notification dated 31.05.2007 which had been issued by the State Government came to be questioned before this Court in W.P.No.158/2008 and connected matters. The proposal to modify the schemes was defended by the State and so also the private operators. The Division Bench by its order dated 21.04.2011 held that first respondent namely, Minister for Home, Law and Parliamentary Affairs had held the proceedings without hearing the objections filed by the Corporation and the operators and as such, there has been non-application of mind to the objections filed by the Corporation. Hence, the impugned notification dated 31.05.2007 came to be set aside and matter came to be remitted back to the first respondent – State Government to pass fresh orders in accordance with law. The operative portion of the direction issued by the Division Bench reads as under: “The matter is remitted to the first respondent – State Government to pass fresh orders in accordance with law, within a period of three months from the date of receipt of copy of this order or production of certified copy of this order whichever is earlier, after affording sufficient opportunity of hearing to the petitioner – Corporation and other private operators and after considering the objections filed by them in accordance with law.” By way of succour to existing permit holders or in other words by way of interim arrangement, Division Bench permitted the private operators to operate their vehicles for a period of three months from the date of order if they were holding permits which are valid as on the said date. Writ Petitions which had been filed by the operators against the orders of the Transport Appellate Tribunal cancelling the permits granted in their favour also came to be dismissed and as already noticed herein above, they were permitted to operate their vehicles for a period of three months from the date of order. The liberty so granted by the Division Bench reads as under: “(c) Writ Petition No.16990/2006 and connected matters are dismissed confirming the order passed by the KSTAT. However, the petitioners are permitted to operate their vehicles, if they are holding permits which are valid as on today and if they are authorized to run the vehicles otherwise for a period of three months from today. It is made clear that no further extension of time will be granted to the private operators.” Likewise, the notifications dated 07.11.2003 and 24.07.2003 issued by the State Government modifying the Kolar and Bellary Schemes respectively, were also set aside by the Division Bench by order dated 21.04.2011 and the matter came to be remitted back to the first respondent – State Government as had been ordered in W.P.No.158/2008 and connected matters. 16. These orders of the Division Bench came to be challenged by some of the operators in Civil Appeal Nos.11690-11712/2014 and connected matters. During the pendency of Civil Appeals, interim order of stay came to be granted by the Apex Court and as such, permits issued to the private operators were renewed from time to time by the State Transport Authorities. Hon’ble Apex Court by judgment dated 18.12.2004 dismissed all the Special Leave Petitions and Civil Appeals issued certain directions and for purposes of immediate reference, they are extracted herein below: “38. It was also submitted on behalf of one of the operators that as some of the permits granted were illegally cancelled, fixation of the cut off date and validating the permits held on the cut off dates would be discriminatory as that would create monopoly in favour of the incumbent private operators who were operating their vehicles on the cut off date. 39. It was submitted on behalf of KSRTC that it was at the behest of the private operators that the exercise of modification had been undertaken by the State Government. 40. 39. It was submitted on behalf of KSRTC that it was at the behest of the private operators that the exercise of modification had been undertaken by the State Government. 40. We refrain to dilate upon the various aforesaid aspects as these were required to be considered by the State Government when such objections had been taken before it by KSRTC. It was necessary to consider, inter alia, the objections raised by the KSRTC as to the necessity of modification, legality of the permits which were granted and the plea of discrimination so raised by other operators including the observation made above by this Court in KSRTC v Ashrafulla Khan (supra). 41. Resultantly, the appeals being bereft of merits are hereby dismissed. Let State Government hear the objections, consider and decide the same in accordance with law by a reasoned order within 3 months. In the intervening period, the arrangement as directed by the High Court in the impugned order to continue.” 17. The Hon’ble Apex Court in LINGAREDDY’s case while affirming the judgment of the Division Bench has held that modification of the scheme is a quasi judicial function and while modifying or cancelling the scheme, State Government is duty bound to consider the objections and has to assign reasons either to accept or reject them. It has been further held by the Apex Court that rule of reason is anti-thesis to arbitrariness in action and is a necessary concomitant of the principles of natural justice. On facts it came to be held that there is no consideration of the objections namely, both factual and legal objections raised by Corporation have not been considered by the State Government. It has been held by the Apex Court in LINGAREDDY’s case referred to supra as follows : 28. “It is apparent that there is no consideration of the objections except mentioning the arguments of the rival parties. Objections both factual and legal have not been considered much less reasons assigned to over rule them. Even in brief, reasons have not been assigned indicating how objections are disposed of. 29. Situation is worse in the orders modifying other schemes. “It is apparent that there is no consideration of the objections except mentioning the arguments of the rival parties. Objections both factual and legal have not been considered much less reasons assigned to over rule them. Even in brief, reasons have not been assigned indicating how objections are disposed of. 29. Situation is worse in the orders modifying other schemes. Thus, modification of the Schemes could not be said to be in accordance with the principles of natural justice in the absence of reasons so as to reach the conclusion that private operators are meeting the genuine demands of the public in excess of the service provided by the STOs., hence, it cannot be said to be sustainable.” The Hon’ble Apex Court, as noticed hereinabove, has directed the State Government to reconsider the matter by considering the objections raised by KSRTC, legality of the permits granted and the plea of discrimination so raised by other operators. 18. It is in the light of said direction issued by the Apex Court in LINGAREDDY’s case, the State Government issued a notification dated 07.02.2015 authorising the Additional Chief Secretary, Rural Development and Panchayat Raj Department to hear the objections/suggestions in respect of the draft notifications. A public notice dated 19.02.2015 (Annexure-D in W.P.Nos.34625-34679/2015) was issued by the “hearing authority” by fixing the hearing date as 07.03.2015. Accordingly, the matter was heard by the said hearing authority on 07.03.2015 and after considering the arguments advanced by all the concerned, following points came to be formulated for its consideration: (a) necessary of modification of the three approved schemes; (b) legality of permits which were granted to private operators; (c) plea of discrimination raised by other operators. On point No.(a) the hearing authority opined that the necessity for omnibus notification which does not have the relevant particulars as required by law, as proposed in the present form, is not established and such omnibus notification would frustrate and defeat the very purpose of introducing the original schemes. On point No.(a) the hearing authority opined that the necessity for omnibus notification which does not have the relevant particulars as required by law, as proposed in the present form, is not established and such omnibus notification would frustrate and defeat the very purpose of introducing the original schemes. On point No.(b) it came to be held that permits were obtained by the private operators under the shelter of the orders of the High Court and the Apex Court in B.A. LINGAREDDY’s case referred to supra after having noticed the ASHRAFULLA’s case referred to supra has held said law laid down is of retrospective operation and as such had concluded all permits issued after the date of the original notification on the notified routes which were overlapping the notified routes are not saved by subsequent final notification and as such, all permits are illegal permits ab initio. On point No.(c) namely, discrimination, it was held that all permits issued after the date of original draft scheme are illegal except those saved under interstate operations by later modifications and as such, all permits issued after the date of draft/final notification of the original schemes on the notified routes or overlapping the routes would be uniformly illegal, by following the dicta laid down by Hon’ble Apex court in LINGAREDDY’s case. The hearing authority as such, opined and concluded that a detailed modification proposal as required under Section 99 and on the lines of Shivamogga scheme notification, is required to be brought forward like in the case of permit holders whose services are necessary in public interest are to be saved and on these lines, the hearing authority concluded and made recommendation to the State Government as under: (i) “The necessity for the modification of the approved scheme contained in the draft notification is not established. As discussed above while there is general agreement that the approved scheme has to be modified in view of lapse of time, the modification should have specific particulars of the nature of the services proposed to be rendered, the area or the routes proposed to be covered, the overlapping portions proposed to be exempted and other relevant particulars respecting thereto as required under section 99(1) of the M.V.Act 1988. (ii) All the permits issued on the notified routes or overlapping them after the date of the original draft/final notification of the original scheme are illegal. (ii) All the permits issued on the notified routes or overlapping them after the date of the original draft/final notification of the original scheme are illegal. (iii) Firstly there would be discrimination as against applicants who applied for permits but were rejected while others on the same footing were granted if such grantees were saved. The existence of such cases have been referred to during the arguments. Secondly fixing any cut-off date is discriminatory against some operators who may have got their permits after the cut-off date. Saving operators who have got permits before the cut-off date would discriminate against operators who got permits after the cut-off dates. Therefore, all the three draft notifications are discriminatory because they specify certain cut-off dates. (iv) In view of the above, further proceedings on the three draft notification referred to in para 9 above may be dropped.” 19. As already noticed herein above, the learned Advocates appearing for the petitioners have strenuously contended that it is the hearing authority alone which ought to have decided and there cannot be any division by the hearing authority and the authority which passes the order, since it would be contrary to the concept of principles of natural justice. On the contrary, the learned Addl. Advocate General as well as learned Advocates appearing for the Corporation have sought to sustain such procedure adopted by contending that petitioners having participated in the proceedings conducted by the hearing authority and as such, they are now estopped from questioning his authority to hear and record; It is further contended that hearing authority had acted within the powers vested in him by the State Government as empowered under Rule 5 of State Transport Undertaking Rules, 1996 and delegatee has confined his activity to the powers invested to him under notification dated 7.2.2015 and has accordingly, heard and made the recommendations to the State Government; Rule 5 as amended provides for such delegation, which Rule has been enacted by virtue of the power vested in the State Government under Section 107 of MV Act. 20. In the light of the above contentions, it would be necessary and appropriate to notice the statutory provisions governing the power of the State Government for approving or modifying a scheme. 20. In the light of the above contentions, it would be necessary and appropriate to notice the statutory provisions governing the power of the State Government for approving or modifying a scheme. Same can be traced to Chapter-VI of the MV Act, 1988 and the relevant provisions which have bearing on the facts obtained in the instant case are extracted herein below: “99. Preparation and publication of proposal regarding road transport service of a State transport undertaking.—(1) Where any State Government is of opinion that for the purpose of providing an efficient, adequate, economical and properly co-ordinated road transport service, it is necessary in the public interest that road transport services in general or any particular class of such service in relation to any area or route or portion thereof should be run and operated by the State transport undertaking, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of other persons or otherwise, the State Government may formulate a proposal regarding a scheme giving particulars of the nature of the services proposed to be rendered, the area or route proposed to be covered and other relevant particulars respecting thereto and shall publish such proposal in the Official Gazette of the State formulating such proposal and in not less than one newspaper in the regional language circulating in the area or route proposed to be covered by such scheme and also in such other manner as the State Government formulating such proposal deem fit. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), when a proposal is published under that sub-section, then from the date of publication of such proposal, no permit shall be granted to any person, except a temporary permit during the pendency of the proposal and such temporary permit shall be valid only for a period of one year from the date of its issue or till the date of final publication of the scheme under section 100, whichever is earlier.] 100. Objection to the proposal.— (1) On the publication of any proposal regarding a scheme in the Official Gazette and in not less than one newspaper in the regional language circulating in the area or route which is to be covered by such proposal any person may, within thirty days from the date of its publication in the Official Gazette, file objections to it before the State Government. (2) The State Government may, after considering the objections and after giving an opportunity to the objector or his representatives and the representatives of the State transport undertaking to be heard in the matter, if they so desire, approve or modify such proposal. (3) The scheme relating to the proposal as approved or modified under sub-section (2) shall then be published in the Official Gazette by the State Government making such scheme and in not less than one newspaper in the regional language circulating in the area or route covered by such scheme and the same shall thereupon become final on the date of its publication in the Official Gazette and shall be called the approved scheme and the area or route to which it relates shall be called the notified area or notified route: Provided that no such scheme which relates to any inter-State route shall be deemed to be an approved scheme unless it has the previous approval of the Central Government. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, where a scheme is not published as an approved scheme under sub-section (3) in the Official Gazette within a period of one year from the date of publication of the proposal regarding the scheme in the Official Gazette under sub-section (1), the proposal shall be deemed to have lapsed. Explanation.—In computing the period of one year referred to in this sub-section, any period or periods during which the publication of the approved scheme under sub-section (3) was held up on account of any stay or injunction by the order of any Court shall be excluded. 101. Operation of additional services by a State transport undertaking in certain circumstances.— Notwithstanding anything contained in section 87, a State transport undertaking may, in the public interest operate additional services for the conveyance of the passengers on special occasions such as to and from fairs and religious gatherings: Provided that the State transport undertaking shall inform about the operation of such additional services to the concerned Transport Authority without delay. 102. 102. Cancellation or modification of scheme.— (1) The State Government may, at any time, if it considers necessary, in the public interest so to do, modify any approved scheme after giving— (i) the State transport undertaking; and (ii) any other person who, in the opinion of the State Government, is likely to be affected by the proposed modification, an opportunity of being heard in respect of the proposed modification. (2) The State Government shall publish any modification proposed under sub-section (1) in the Official Gazette and in one of the newspapers in the regional languages circulating in the area in which it is proposed to be covered by such modification, together with the date, not being less than thirty days from such publication in the Official Gazette, and the time and place at which any representation received in this behalf will be heard by the State Government. 103. Issue of permits to State transport undertakings.— (1) Where, in pursuance of an approved scheme, any State transport undertaking applies in such manner as may be prescribed by the State Government in this behalf for a stage carriage permit or a goods carriage permit or a contract carriage permit in respect of a notified area or notified route, the State Transport Authority in any case where the said area or route lies in more than one region and the Regional Transport Authority in any other case shall issue such permit to the State transport undertaking, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in Chapter V. (2) For the purpose of giving effect to the approved scheme in respect of a notified area or notified route, the State Transport Authority or, as the case may be, the Regional Transport Authority concerned may, by order,— (a) refuse to entertain any application for the grant or renewal of any other permit or reject any such application as may be pending; (b) cancel any existing permit; (c) modify the terms of any existing permit so as to— (i) render the permit ineffective beyond a specified date; (ii) reduce the number of vehicles authorised to be used under the permit; (iii) curtail the area or route covered by the permit in so far as such permit relates to the notified area or notified route. (3) For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that no appeal shall lie against any action taken, or order passed, by the State Transport Authority or any Regional Transport Authority under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2).” “107. Power of State Government to make rules:- (1) The State Government may make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of this Chapter. (2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such rules may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely ---- (a) the form in which any proposal regarding a scheme may be published under section 99; (b) the manner in which objections may be filed under sub-section (1) of section 100; (c) the manner in which objections may be considered and disposed of under sub-section (2) of section 100;” Section 99 of the MV Act empowers the State Government to formulate a proposal regarding a scheme for the purposes of providing an efficient, adequate, economical and properly coordinated road transport service, in relation to any area or route or portion thereof to be run and operated by the State Transport Undertaking either to the complete or partial exclusion of other persons or otherwise, by giving particulars of the nature of the services to be rendered, area or route proposed to be covered and other relevant particulars thereto by publishing in the Official Gazette and also in not less than one newspaper in the regional language circulating in the area and in such other manner the State Government deems fit. On publication of such proposal, no permit can be granted to any person except a temporary permit during the pendency of the proposal which would be valid for a period of one year from the date of its issue or till the date of final publication of the scheme under Section 100 whichever is earlier. On publication of any proposal regarding a scheme in the Official Gazette and in not less than one newspaper in the regional language circulating in the area can be objected to by any person by filing objections before the State Government to such proposal within 30 days from the date of its publication under Section 100(1). The State Government after considering the objections and after giving an opportunity of hearing to the objector or his representative, approve or modify such proposal under Section 100(2). The State Government after considering the objections and after giving an opportunity of hearing to the objector or his representative, approve or modify such proposal under Section 100(2). Sub-section (3) of Section 100 provides for publication of the approved or modified scheme in the Official Gazette and as per proviso, a scheme which relates to interstate route will have to receive the previous approval of the Central Government. After calling for objections to the proposed scheme, and examining the same, the scheme has to be published in accordance with the provisions of Section 100 of the Act. The scheme once published is law and it operates against everyone unless it is modified or cancelled by the State Government. The power to cancel or modify the scheme rests with the State Government under Section 102 of the Act. If a scheme is not published as an approved scheme under sub-section (3) in the Official Gazette, within a period of one year from the date of publication of the proposal regarding the scheme in the Official Gazette under sub-section (1), the proposal is deemed to have lapsed as per sub-section (4) of Section 100. Section 101 empowers the State Transport Undertaking to operate additional services for the conveyance of the passengers on special occasions, such as to and from fairs and religious gatherings, notwithstanding anything contained in Section 87. However, the State Transport Undertaking is required to inform the concerned Transport Authority about such operation of additional services without any delay. Section 102 of the Act enables or empower the State Government at any time to modify any approved scheme after giving the State Transport Undertaking and any other person who in the opinion of the State Government is likely to be affected by the proposed modification an opportunity of being heard in respect of the proposed modification. Thus, scheme of Section 102 would indicate that State Government is vested with power to cancel the scheme or modify the scheme. Section 107 of the Act empowers the State Government to make rules for the purposes of carrying into effect the provisions of the Act. A bare reading of sub-section (2) of Section 107 would indicate about such rules which would provide for the matters indicated in sub-clause (a) to (h). Section 107 of the Act empowers the State Government to make rules for the purposes of carrying into effect the provisions of the Act. A bare reading of sub-section (2) of Section 107 would indicate about such rules which would provide for the matters indicated in sub-clause (a) to (h). In these writ petitions clause (a) to (c) has been pressed into service by the learned Advocates appearing for the parties in support of their respective contentions which is already extracted here in above. 21. In the background of the statutory provisions as noticed herein above and in the light of direction issued by the Hon’ble Apex Court in LINGAREDDY’s case while affirming the order passed by the Division Bench of this Court in W.P.No.158/2008 and other connected matters on 21.04.2011 it has to be examined as to whether there is compliance of directions issued by Apex Court and the statutory provisions of MV Act governing the issue have been followed by the State Government in its letter and spirit. 22. The main ground of attack to the impugned order dated 05.08.2015 by the learned Advocates appearing for the petitioners is Section 102 of the MV Act enables the State Government at any time to modify any approved scheme and such power of modifying is to be exercised by the State Government itself and not by a delegatee. It is also contended that State Government has taken recourse to appoint its delegatee to hear the objections and a notification dated 07.02.2015 had been published authorizing Sri. Vijaya Bhaskar, Additional Chief Secretary, Rural Development and Panchayat Raj Department as the hearing authority by taking recourse to Rule 5 of Karnataka State Transport Undertaking Rules, 1996, and said Rule runs contrary to Section 107 of the Act and the power of the State Government to amend or modify an existing Scheme cannot be delegated and there is no power to make rules to delegate the power under Section 102 of the Act. It is also contended that Section 107 has authorized the State Government to make rules in respect of procedure to be followed by formulating a new scheme under Section 99 and 100 of the Act but it cannot be applied to the modification of the existing scheme. It is also contended that Section 107 has authorized the State Government to make rules in respect of procedure to be followed by formulating a new scheme under Section 99 and 100 of the Act but it cannot be applied to the modification of the existing scheme. It has also been contended that Section 107 authorises the State Government to make rules regarding procedure to be followed while exercising the power under Section 99 and 100 of the Act and not under Section 102 of the Act. Hence, it is contended that the Rule 5 of the Karnataka State Transport Undertaking Rules, 1996 is unconstitutional, null and void. 23. Per contra, learned Additional Advocate General and learned Advocates appearing on behalf of the Corporation defended the proceedings of the hearing authority by contending that Rule 5 of 1996 Rules provides for delegatee to hear the objections, which Rule has been made by virtue of power vested under Section107(1) of the MV Act and as such, it is contended that Rule 5 is intra-vires of the Act. 24. In the light of said rival contentions raised, it would be appropriate to extract Rule 5 of the Karnataka State Transport Undertaking Rules, 1996 as amended and it reads as under: “5. Consideration of objections— (1) The Minister in-charge of Transport or where the Minister in-charge of Transport is appointed as Chairman of any one or more Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation:- (a) any Minister from the Council of Ministers; or (b) the Additional Chief Secretary to Government; or (c) the Principal Secretary to Government or Secretary to Government of any Secretariat Department. authorized by the Minister in-charge of Transport shall be the authority to hear and decide the objections under Section 100. (2) The date, time and place of hearing shall be published at least two weeks before the date of hearing, in the Official Gazette and also in a Kannada daily newspaper having wide circulation in the area or route proposed to be covered by the proposal and such publication shall be sufficient notice to the parties.” 25. Section 100, 102 and 107 when read harmoniously, would indicate that under Sub-section (1) of Section 107 the State Government is empowered to make rules for the purposes of carrying into effect the provisions of Chapter VI. Section 100, 102 and 107 when read harmoniously, would indicate that under Sub-section (1) of Section 107 the State Government is empowered to make rules for the purposes of carrying into effect the provisions of Chapter VI. Sub-section (2) of Section 107 enables the State Government to make such rules which may provide for all or any of the matters as specified in clause (a) to (h), in particular and without prejudice to the foregoing power. Clause (a) of sub-section (2) of Section 107 enables the State Government to formulate the rules regarding the form in which any proposal regarding a scheme may be published under Section 99; and clause (b) provides for making Rules with regard to the manner in which objections can be filed under Sub-section (1) of Section 100 and clause (c) provides for the State Government to make Rules relating to the manner in which objections can be considered and disposed of under sub-section(2) of Section 100; and lastly, clause (d) provides for the State Government to make Rules as to the form in which any approved scheme may be published under sub-section (3) of Section 100. 26. When the above referred provisions are read in conjunction with Rule 5 (1), it would clearly indicate that the persons authorized thereunder would be empowered to hear and decide the objections under Section 100. Section 102 which enables the State Government at any time if it considers necessary in the public interest to modify any approved scheme is specifically excluded from the purview of Section 107 and Rule 5. If the intention of the Rule making authority was to empower the persons indicated under Rule 5 to hear the objections or opportunity of hearing is to be extended as contemplated under Section 102 , then the State Government would have empowered said authority to hear and decide the objections by specifically indicating as such in sub-rule (1) of Rule 5 and in the absence thereof, the State Government cannot be heard to contend that by virtue of Section 107 (1) of the Act read with Rule 5, it had authorized Sri. Vijaya Bhaskar, Additional Chief Secretary to hear the objections received under Section 102 of the Act and this power exercised by the State Government is without authority of law. 27. Vijaya Bhaskar, Additional Chief Secretary to hear the objections received under Section 102 of the Act and this power exercised by the State Government is without authority of law. 27. A plain reading of Section 107 of the Act would clearly indicate that the Parliament have excluded the power of the State Government to provide for making rule insofar as Section 102 of the Act is concerned and sub-section (2) of Section 107 provides for the State Government having power to make Rules in respect of the matters indicated under clause (a) to (h) of sub-section (2) of Section 107. A close look at Section 102 of the Act would make it manifestly clear that modification of the approved scheme may be done by the State Government in the public interest after giving opportunity of being heard in respect of proposed modification to the STU and any other person likely to be affected by the proposed modification. The modification proposed is required to be published in the Official Gazette and in one of the newspapers in the regional languages circulating in the concerned area as indicated in Section 102(2). 28. Petitioners have contended that hearing authority had not been authorized to decide the case and he was only authorized to hear the objections and not to decide or recommend, since the specific direction issued by the Hon’ble Apex Court in LINGAREDDY’s case was to the Government to decide the objections; hearing authority had no power to decide or to give final decision in the matter and a quasi judicial act when discharged by the Government it has to extend personal hearing to the objectors instead of entrusting the duty to a delegatee. Hon’ble Apex Court in case of GULLAPALLI NAGESHWARA RAO’s, AIR 1959 SC 308 case was examining the provisions of Section 68-C and 68-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 which is similar and in paramateria to Section 99 and 100 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and on examination as to whether the act of approving or rejecting the objections to a scheme proposed by the Government would fall within the province of “quasi judicial act”, has held that State Government order under Section 68-D is a judicial act and it has been held by the Apex Court to the following effect: “21. The aforesaid three decisions lay down that whether an administrative tribunal has a duty to act judicially should be gathered form the provisions of the particular statute and the rules made thereunder, and they clearly express the view that if an authority is called upon to decide respective rights of contesting parties or, to put it in other words, if there is a lis, ordinarily there will be a duty on the part of the said authority to act judicially. Applying the aforesaid test, let us scrutinize the provisions of Ss. 68-C and 68-D and the relevant rules made under the Act to ascertain whether under the said provisions the State Government performs a judicial act or an administrative one. Section 68-C may be divided into three parts: (i) The State Transport Undertaking should come to an opinion that it is necessary in public interest that the road transport service in general or any particular class of such service in relation to any area or route or portion thereof should be run or operated by the State Transport Undertaking, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of other persons or otherwise; (ii) it forms that opinion for the purpose of providing an efficient, adequate, economical and properly co-ordinated road transport service; and (iii) after it comes to that opinion, it prepares a scheme giving particulars of the nature of the services proposed to be rendered, area or route proposed to be covered and such other particulars respecting thereto as may be prescribed and causes it to be published in the Official Gazette. The section, therefore makes a clear distinction between the purpose for which a scheme is framed and the particulars of the scheme. To state it differently, though the purpose is to provide an efficient, adequate, economical and co-ordinated road transport service in public interest, the scheme proposed may affect individual rights such as the exclusion, complete or partial, of other persons or otherwise, from the business in any particular route or routes. Under S. 68-C, therefore, the State Transport Undertaking may propose a scheme affecting the proprietary rights of individual permit-holders doing transport business in a particular route or routes. The said proposal threatens the proprietary right of that individual or individuals. Under S. 68-C, therefore, the State Transport Undertaking may propose a scheme affecting the proprietary rights of individual permit-holders doing transport business in a particular route or routes. The said proposal threatens the proprietary right of that individual or individuals. Under S. 68-D read with Rules 8 and 10 made under the Act, any person affected by the aforesaid proposed scheme may file objections within the prescribed time before the Secretary of the Transport Department. Under the said provisions, the State Government is enjoined to approve or modify the scheme after holding an enquiry and after giving an opportunity to the objectors or their representatives and the representatives of the State Transport Undertaking, to be heard in the matter in person or through authorized representatives. Therefore, the proceeding prescribed is closely approximated to that obtaining in courts of justice. There are two parties to the dispute. The State Transport Undertaking, which is a statutory authority under the Act, threatens to infringe the rights of a citizen. The citizen may object to the scheme on public grounds or on personal grounds. He may oppose the scheme on the ground that it is not in the interest of the public or on the ground that the route which he is exploiting should be excluded from the scheme for various reasons. There is, therefore, a proposal and an opposition and the third party, the State Government is to decide that lis and prima facie it must do so judicially. The position is put beyond any doubt by the provision in the Act and the Rules which expressly require that the State Government must decide the dispute according to the procedure prescribed by the Act and the Rules framed thereunder viz., after considering the objections and after hearing both the parties. It therefore appears to us that this is an obvious case where the Act imposes a duty on the State Government to decide the act judicially in approving or modifying the scheme proposed by the Transport Undertaking.” 29. It therefore appears to us that this is an obvious case where the Act imposes a duty on the State Government to decide the act judicially in approving or modifying the scheme proposed by the Transport Undertaking.” 29. As could be seen from the impugned order, the hearing authority who was empowered to receive the objections and hear them as per the notice of enquiry dated 19.02.2015 has not merely heard the learned Advocates and the parties appearing before him but has also adjudicated by formulating his points for consideration as could be seen from paragraph 181 of his order and it reads as under: “181. In the light of the above direction, the following points arise for consideration: (a) Necessity of modification of the 3 approved schemes. (b) Legality of permits which were granted to private operators. (c) Plea of discrimination raised by other operators. After adjudicating the points, the hearing authority has also concluded and recommended as per the recommendations indicated in paragraph 203 and it reads as under: “203. After considering the above arguments and discussions, the hearing authority concluded and recommended that: (v) The necessity for the modification of the approved scheme contained in the draft notification is not established. As discussed above while there is general agreement that the approved scheme has to be modified in view of lapse of time, the modification should have specific particulars of the nature of the services proposed to be rendered, the area or the routes proposed to be covered, the overlapping portions proposed to be exempted and other relevant particulars respecting thereto as required under section 99(1) of the M.V.Act 1988. (vi) All the permits issued on the notified routes or overlapping them after the date of the original draft/final notification of the original scheme are illegal. (vii) Firstly there would be discrimination as against applicants who applied for permits but were rejected while others on the same footing were granted if such grantees were saved. The existence of such cases have been referred to during the arguments. Secondly fixing any cut-off date is discriminatory against some operators who may have got their permits after the cut-off date. Saving operators who have got permits before the cutoff date would discriminate against operators who got permits after the cut-off dates. Therefore, all the three draft notifications are discriminatory because they specify certain cut-off dates. Secondly fixing any cut-off date is discriminatory against some operators who may have got their permits after the cut-off date. Saving operators who have got permits before the cutoff date would discriminate against operators who got permits after the cut-off dates. Therefore, all the three draft notifications are discriminatory because they specify certain cut-off dates. (viii) In view of the above, further proceedings on the three draft notification referred to in para 9 above may be dropped.” (emphasis supplied by me) 30. The State Government which is required to act judicially as prescribed under Section 102 by applying its mind after examining the contentions of the parties and discussing the necessity of either accepting the proposed modification of the scheme or dropping of the schemes will have to be gathered from the impugned order itself so as to arrive at a conclusion there is semblance of application of mind on the part of the Government. In the instant case, the State Government has blindly accepted the proceedings of the hearing authority or in other words, it has accepted the recommendation of hearing authority by two line order and in the impugned order it has been ordered by Government as under: “After examination of the proceedings of the Hearing Authority the Government issues the following orders:” and in the operative portion, it has stated that “In the light of the facts and circumstances explained in the preamble, further proceedings on the draft Notifications viz., No. HTD 122 TMA 97 (P), dated 25.10.2002, No. HTD/75/TMA/2001 dated 27.05.2003 and No.TRD 280 TME 2004, dated 09.03.2007 are hereby dropped.” 31. The original records which has been made available by the learned Additional Advocate General has been perused by me and it would indicate that on Civil Appeal Nos.11690-11712/2014 (B.A. LINGAREDDY’s case) and connected matters came to be dismissed by Apex Court on 18.12.2014 affirming the orders of the Division Bench dated 21.04.2001, the file has been put up to the Hon’ble Transport Minister on 04.02.2015 by the Deputy Secretary and it would indicate that said authority has opined that Rule 5(1) provides for the authorities to hear and decide the objections under Section 102 of the M.V.Act, 1988 and accordingly the file has been put up for orders to be passed by the Transport Minister. Said note reads as under: “Hence, the file may be submitted to the Hon’ble Transport Minister for appointing any of the above authorities to hear and decide the objections under Section 102 of Indian Motor Vehicles Act 1988. Sd/- 4/2/15 (N. Srinivasa Murthy) Deputy Secretary Pursuant to the above, the file has been put up to the Additional Chief Secretary, Transport who in turn made a note to the following effect: “For orders on appointing any authority in 116 ‘A’ to hear the objections and pass orders.” Sd/- 4/2 ACS Transport Pursuant to the above note, Transport Minister has appointed Sri Vijaya Bhaskar, ACS, RDPR as hearing authority. It is thereafter notification dated 07.02.2015 – Annexure-G came to be issued. Pursuant to the same, the hearing authority issued a notice dated 19.02.2015 – Annexure-D fixing the date of hearing as 07.03.2015 and after having heard the matter, has forwarded his report on 17.03.2015 along with the conclusions arrived and recommendations made. 32. Thus, it can be seen from the aforestated facts that while entrusting the matter for hearing, the State Government was not only of the view that “hearing authority” should hear the objections but was also of the view that said hearing authority should decide the objections under Section 102 of the Act. It is the above referred Note-116 which swayed in the mind of the Transport Minister to appoint Sri Vijaya Bhaskar, ACS, RDPR not only for purposes of hearing the objections but also authorizing the hearing authority to decide the matter. As such, the hearing authority after hearing all the concerned has not only addressed the issues or points raised during the course of the arguments by the respective parties, but has also adjudicated the same by concluding his hearing and assigning the reasons as to why three draft notifications cannot be sustained. To worsen the situation, the hearing authority has recommended for further proceedings on the three draft notifications being dropped. 33. The said recommendation or the alleged proceedings of the hearing cannot be sustained for reasons more than one. Firstly, the hearing authority was only vested with the power to hear the objections and not decide the objections. To worsen the situation, the hearing authority has recommended for further proceedings on the three draft notifications being dropped. 33. The said recommendation or the alleged proceedings of the hearing cannot be sustained for reasons more than one. Firstly, the hearing authority was only vested with the power to hear the objections and not decide the objections. As could be seen from the proceedings, the hearing authority after having heard the objections of the parties, has recorded a finding with clear cut view as to why the objections to the dropping of the proceedings pursuant to the notification is required to be rejected. In other words, the hearing authority has stepped into the shoes of the deciding authority namely, the State Government and thereby usurped the power of the State Government or the deciding authority. It is the State Government alone which had to decide of either proceeding further with the three draft notifications or whether they are required to be dropped. The hearing authority had no role in this exercise which the State Government alone had to undertake. Thus, it has to be necessarily concluded that hearing authority has exceeded his jurisdiction vested in him under the notification dated 07.02.2015 – Annexure-G. Secondly, the hearing authority has relied upon the judgment of this Court rendered in W.P.No.6507/2008 to arrive at a conclusion that permits that were not validly original or were illegal and contrary to the statutory provisions cannot be saved by modification, though said decision has been set aside by the Division Bench of this Court on 08.06.2011 in W.A.No.1408/2011 whereunder it came to be held that examination of the rival claims of the parties on merits was beyond the scope of writ petition and same was not warranted in law and as such had set aside the finding of learned Single Judge. This would also indicate that hearing authority has proceeded at tangent or in other words, has taken into consideration an over-ruled judgment to form an opinion. 34. This would also indicate that hearing authority has proceeded at tangent or in other words, has taken into consideration an over-ruled judgment to form an opinion. 34. Rule 5 which has been very heavily relied upon by the State Government as well as by the Corporation to contend that said Rule empowers the State Government to appoint the hearing authority, when perused, would disclose that the power which is available to the State under the amended rule empowers the Minister incharge of Transport or where the Minister in-charge of Transport is appointed as Chairman of anyone or more State Road Transport Corporation to authorize either any Minister from the Council of Ministers or the Additional Chief Secretary to Government or the Principal Secretary to Government or Secretary to Government of any Secretariat Department to hear and decide the objections filed under Section 100. There is no whisper with regard to Section 102 found in Rule 5. To put it differently, there is no power to the Minister in-charge of Transport to authorize the persons or authorities indicated in clause (a) to (c) of sub-rule (1) to hear and decide objections received under Section 102 which relates to the cancellation or modification of a scheme. 35. For the reasons aforestated, it has to be necessarily held that the impugned order is contrary to Section 102 and Rule 5 of 1996 Rules. 36. The direction issued by the Apex Court in LINGAREDDY’s, AIR 2015 SC 767 case would clearly indicate there was no consideration of the objections and even reasons in brief had not been assigned for modifying the scheme. It was observed by the Apex Court as under: “28. It is apparent that there is no consideration of the objections except mentioning the arguments of the rival parties. Objections both factual and legal have not been considered much less reasons assigned to overrule them. Even in brief, reasons have not been assigned indicating how objections are disposed of. 29. Situation is worse in the orders modifying other schemes. It is apparent that there is no consideration of the objections except mentioning the arguments of the rival parties. Objections both factual and legal have not been considered much less reasons assigned to overrule them. Even in brief, reasons have not been assigned indicating how objections are disposed of. 29. Situation is worse in the orders modifying other schemes. Thus, modification of the Schemes could not be said to be in accordance with the principles of natural justice in the absence of reasons so as to reach the conclusion that private operators are meeting the genuine demands of the public in excess of the service provided by the STOs., hence, it cannot be said to be sustainable.” In conclusion it came to be held by the Apex Court as under: “41. Resultantly, xxxx dismissed. Let State Government hear the objections, consider and decide the same in accordance with law by a reasoned order within 3 months. In the xxxx to continue.” (emphasis supplied) 37. Thus, a positive direction had been issued to the “State Government” to consider the objections namely, objections raised by Corporation as to necessity of modification, legality of the permits which were granted to stage carriages and the plea of discrimination so raised by other operators. Thus, the word ‘consider’ acquires significance. It means, ‘to view attentively, to survey, examine, inspect(arch), to look attentively, to contemplate mentally, to think over, mediate on, give heat to, take note off, to think deliberately, bethink oneself, to reflect’ vide (shorter Oxford Dictionary). According to the words and phrases, - permanent edition Volume 8-A “to consider” means to think with care. It is also mentioned therein that to ‘consider’ means to fix the mind upon with a view to careful examination; to ponder; study; mediate upon; think or reflect with care. It is therefore, manifest that careful thinking or due application of the mind regarding examination of the objections filed by all the parties its examination by the State Government is sine qua non for passing the order to drop three proposed notifications. If there has been examination of the objections in said fashion and application of mind to the same, the order impugned would stand the test as otherwise, it would fail. 38. If there has been examination of the objections in said fashion and application of mind to the same, the order impugned would stand the test as otherwise, it would fail. 38. Now coming back to core issue as to whether the hearing of the objection by the State Government on the principle “He who hears, must decide” requires to be examined by this Court and the authoritative pronouncement of the Apex Court in the case of GULLAPALLI NAGESWARA RAO & OTHERS vs ANDHRA PRADESH STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND ANOTHER reported in AIR 1959 SC 308 . Hon’ble Apex Court in said case was examining the constitutional validity of amending Act namely, Act 100 of 1956 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 whereunder Chapter IV-A was inserted which provided for the State Transport undertaking running the business to the exclusion, complete or partial, of all other persons doing business in the State. In exercise of the power conferred by Section 68-C of the amending Act, State Transport undertaking of Andhra Pradesh Road Transport published a scheme for the purpose of providing transport service in the State of Andhra Pradesh and objections were invited and on receipt of the same individual notices came to be issued to the objectors and after affording opportunity to the objectors, their representatives, and the representative of the STU’s, the State Government found that the objections to the scheme were devoid of substance. On that finding, the State Government approved the scheme. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the background of the relevant Rules noticed that the procedure prescribed under the Rules was followed and the Secretary to Government in-charge of Transport Department who had heard the objections, prepared the notes, had placed the entire matter, with his notes before the Chief Minister, who in-turn had passed orders rejecting the objections and approved the scheme. In this background, it was held that divided responsibility is destructive of the concept judicial hearing and such a procedure defeats the object of personal hearing and if one person hears and another decides, then personal hearing becomes an empty formality since the act of hearing was a quasi judicial act. It is held: “18. On the aforesaid xxx to its secretary. Secondly, it is stated that a judicial hearing implies that the same person hears and gives the decision. It is held: “18. On the aforesaid xxx to its secretary. Secondly, it is stated that a judicial hearing implies that the same person hears and gives the decision. But in this case the hearing is given by the Secretary and the decision by the Chief Minister. Thirdly, xxx proposed scheme. 19. At the outset, it would be convenient to consider the question whether the State Government acts quasi-judicially in discharging its functions under S.68-C of the Act. The criteria to ascertain whether a particular act is a judicial act or an administrative one, have been laid down with clarity by Lord Justice Atkin in Rex v. Electricity Commissioners; Exparte London Electricity Joint Committee Co., xxx (A.I.R. 1950 SC 222). They laid down the following conditions: (a) the body of persons must have legal authority; (b) the authority should be given to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects and (c) they should have a duty to act judicially. In the last of the cases cited supra, Das J., as he then was, analysed the scope of the third condition thus at page 725 (of S C R): (at p. 260 of A I R): (i) xxx (j) that if a statutory authority has power to do any act which will prejudicially affect the subject, then, although there are not two parties apart from the authority proposing to do the act and the subject opposing it, the final determination of the authority will yet be a quasi-judicial act provided the authority is required by the statute to act judicially.” 21. The aforesaid three decisions lay down that whether an administrative tribunal has a duty to act judicially should be gathered form the provisions of the particular statute and the rules made thereunder, and they clearly express the view that if an authority is called upon to decide respective rights of contesting parties or, to put it in other words, if there is a lis, ordinarily there will be a duty on the part of the said authority to act judicially. Applying the aforesaid test, let us scrutinize the provisions of Ss. 68-C and 68-D and the relevant rules made under the Act to ascertain whether under the said provisions the State Government performs a judicial act or an administrative one. Applying the aforesaid test, let us scrutinize the provisions of Ss. 68-C and 68-D and the relevant rules made under the Act to ascertain whether under the said provisions the State Government performs a judicial act or an administrative one. Section 68-C may be divided into three parts: (i) The State Transport Undertaking should come to an opinion that it is necessary in public interest that the road transport service in general or any particular class of such service in relation to any area or route or portion thereof should be run or operated by the State Transport Undertaking, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of other persons or otherwise; (ii) it forms that opinion for the purpose of providing an efficient, adequate, economical and properly co-ordinated road transport service; and (iii) after it comes to that opinion, it prepares a scheme giving particulars of the nature of the services proposed to be rendered, area or route proposed to be covered and such other particulars respecting thereto as may be prescribed and causes it to be published in the Official Gazette. The section, therefore makes a clear distinction between the purpose for which a scheme is framed and the particulars of the scheme. To state it differently, though the purpose is to provide an efficient, adequate, economical and co-ordinated road transport service in public interest, the scheme proposed may affect individual rights such as the exclusion, complete or partial, of other persons or otherwise, from the business in any particular route or routes. Under S. 68-C, therefore, the State Transport Undertaking may propose a scheme affecting the proprietary rights of individual permit-holders doing transport business in a particular route or routes. The said proposal threatens the proprietary right of that individual or individuals. Under S. 68-D read with Rules 8 and 10 made under the Act, any person affected by the aforesaid proposed scheme may file objections within the prescribed time before the Secretary of the Transport Department. Under the said provisions, the State Government is enjoined to approve or modify the scheme after holding an enquiry and after giving an opportunity to the objectors or their representatives and the representatives of the State Transport Undertaking, to be heard in the matter in person or through authorized representatives. Therefore, the proceeding prescribed is closely approximated to that obtaining in courts of justice. There are two parties to the dispute. Therefore, the proceeding prescribed is closely approximated to that obtaining in courts of justice. There are two parties to the dispute. The State Transport Undertaking, which is a statutory authority under the Act, threatens to infringe the rights of a citizen. The citizen may object to the scheme on public grounds or on personal grounds. He may oppose the scheme on the ground that it is not in the interest of the public or on the ground that the route which he is exploiting should be excluded from the scheme for various reasons. There is, therefore, a proposal and an opposition and the third party, the State Government is to decide that lis and prima facie it must do so judicially. The position is put beyond any doubt by the provision in the Act and the Rules which expressly require that the State Government must decide the dispute according to the procedure prescribed by the Act and the Rules framed thereunder viz., after considering the objections and after hearing both the parties. It therefore appears to us that this is an obvious case where the Act imposes a duty on the State Government to decide the act judicially in approving or modifying the scheme proposed by the Transport Undertaking. “24. A comparison of the procedural steps under both the Acts brings out in bold relief the nature of the enquiries contemplated under the two statutes. There, there is no lis, no personal hearing and even the public enquiry contemplated by a third party is presumably confined to the question of statutory requirements, or at any rate was for eliciting further information for the Minister. Here, there is a clear dispute between the two parties. The dispute comprehends not only objections raised on public grounds, but also in vindication of private rights and-it is required to be decided by the State Government after giving a personal hearing and following the rules of judicial procedure. Though there may be some justification for holding, on the facts of the case before the House of Lords that that Act did not contemplate a judicial act-on that question we do not propose to express our opinion-there is absolutely none for holding in the present case that the Government is not performing a judicial act. Though there may be some justification for holding, on the facts of the case before the House of Lords that that Act did not contemplate a judicial act-on that question we do not propose to express our opinion-there is absolutely none for holding in the present case that the Government is not performing a judicial act. Robson in 'Justice and Administrative Law', commenting upon the aforesaid decision, makes the following observation at page 533: "It should have been obvious from a cursory glance at the New Towns Act that the rules of natural justice could not apply to the Minister's action in making an order, for the simple reason that the initiative lies wholly with him. His role is not to consider whether an order made by a local authority should be confirmed, nor does he have to determine a controversy between a public authority and private interests. The responsibility of seeing that the intention of Parliament is carried out is placed on him." The aforesaid observations explain the principle underlying that decision and that principle cannot have any application to the facts of this case. In ‘Principles of Administrative Law’ by Griffith and Street, the following comment is found on the aforesaid decision : After considering the provisions of S. 1 of the New Towns Act, 1946, the authors say- "Like the town-planning legislation, this differs from the Housing Acts in that the Minister is a party throughout. Further, the Minister is not statutorily required to consider the objections. It is obvious, as the statute itself states, that the creation of new towns is of national interest." At page 176, the authors proceed to state: Lord Thankerton did not analyse the meanings of “judicial” and “administrative” nor did he specify the particular factors which motivated his classification. It is permissible to conclude that he looked at the Act as a whole, applying a theory of interpretation similar to the rule in Heydon's Case 1584.3 Co Rep. It is permissible to conclude that he looked at the Act as a whole, applying a theory of interpretation similar to the rule in Heydon's Case 1584.3 Co Rep. 7a, 7b)." At page 178, they conclude thus: "It is submitted, however, that the thoroughness with which the Courts analysed the statutes in the Errington v. Minister of Health (1935-1 K B 249); Robinson V. Minister of Town and Country Planning, 1947-1 All E R 851; B. Johnsons and Co (Builders) Ltd v. Minister of Health (1947-2 All E R 395); Franklin Case, 1948 A C 87 and the emphasis which they have placed on the fact that their decisions have been based solely on the statute under consideration makes such an approach inevitable." It is therefore clear that Franklin's Case 1948 A C 87 is based upon the interpretation of the provisions of that Act and particularly on the ground that the object of the enquiry is to further inform the mind of the Minister and not to consider any issue between the Minister and the objectors. The decision in that case is not of any help to decide the present case, which turns upon the construction of the provisions of the Act. For the aforesaid reasons, we hold that the State Government's order under Section 68-D is a judicial act.” 39. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of RASID JAVED AND OTHERS VS. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ANOTHER reported in (2010) 7 SCC 781 – was examining the order of the State Government modifying the approved scheme under Section 102(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, and the scope of the hearing authority on behalf of the State Government to be construed as a delegatee and confining his activity within four corners of the powers vested to him or whether he has acted beyond the power given to him. It came to be held that a distinction must be maintained where the hearing authority is empowered by the State Government to hear objections and approve the proposed modification or modify the approved scheme and a case where the hearing authority is authorized to hear the objections / representations relating to the proposed modification to the approved scheme and it is limited to hearing only. It was held by the Apex Court to the following effect: “48. It was held by the Apex Court to the following effect: “48. A close look at Section 102 would make it manifestly clear that modification of the approved scheme may be done by the State Government in the public interest after giving opportunity of being heard in respect of proposed modification to the STU and the persons likely to be affected by the proposed modification. The modification proposed is required to be published in the Official Gazette and in one of the newspapers in the regional languages circulating in the concerned area under Section 102(2). 49. On behalf of the appellants, it was contended that in the proposed modification published in the Official Gazette on 16-4-1999, the authority to hear the objections/representations was given to Shri Zamiruddin, Special Secretary and Additional Legal Remembrancer and the said Hearing Authority after hearing the objections of the affected persons and the UPSRTC approved the proposed modification and rejected the objections received in this regard and the approval by the Hearing Authority of the proposed modification by his order dated 11-10-1999 is the approval of the State Government. 50. Is the order dated 11-10-1999 of the Hearing Authority approving the proposed modification published in the Official Gazette dated 16-4-1999, an order of the State Government modifying the approved Scheme of 1993 under Section 102(1) of the 1988 Act? The answer has to be in the negative because Shri Zamiruddin was given authority to hear the representations received by the State Government to the proposed modification but no authority was given to him to approve the proposed modification or modify the approved scheme. The Notification dated 16-4-1999 does not empower the Hearing Authority to approve or modify the scheme; he has only been empowered to hear the objections. 51. That a person who hears must decide and that divided responsibility is destructive of the concept of judicial hearing is too fundamental a proposition to be doubted. This settled principle has also been highlighted by this Court in Gullapalli Nageswara Rao but based on such principle the limited authority of hearing given to the Hearing Authority by the State Government cannot be treated as enlarged in its scope. A delegatee must confine his activity within four corners of the powers invested in him and if he has acted beyond that, his action cannot have any legal sanction unless ratified by the delegator.” 40. A delegatee must confine his activity within four corners of the powers invested in him and if he has acted beyond that, his action cannot have any legal sanction unless ratified by the delegator.” 40. As could be seen from RASID JAVED’s case, the delegatee namely, the hearing authority not only received the objections and heard the matter but also passed an order approving the notified proposed modification by rejecting the objections of UPSRTC and other objectors. In this background, it was held by the Apex Court that a delegatee must confine his activity within four corners of the powers vested in him and if he has acted beyond that, his action cannot have any legal sanction unless ratified by the delegator. As to whether the power could have been delegated by the State Government or not was not an issue in RASID JAVED’s case before Apex Court. In the instant case, facts obtained would disclose that on rejection of Civil Appeals in LINGAREDDY’s case by the Apex Court and confirming the order of the Division Bench dated 21.04.2011, the State Government issued notification on 07.02.2015 (Annexure-G in W.P.No.34265-79/2015), obviously in exercise of its power under Rule 5 of the Karnataka State Transport Undertaking Rules, 1996 framed by virtue of power vested under Section 107 (1) of MV Act, 1988 whereunder the State had authorised Sri Vijaya Bhaskar, Additional Chief Secretary, Rural Development and Panchayat Raj Department as the ‘hearing authority’. As already noticed herein above, Section 102 does not empower the State Government to delegate its power while considering objections to amend or modify an existing scheme. There is no power available to State Government to make rules to delegate its power exercisable under Section 102 of the Act. Section 107(2) of the Act authorises the State Government to make rules in respect of procedure to be followed while formulating new schemes as per Section 99 and 100 of the Act only. Even assuming that Section 107(1) empowers the State Government to make rules even in respect of matters covered under Section 102 of the Act and 1996 amended Rules when read closely, the irresistible conclusion which will have to be drawn would be that the said amended or substituted Rule is applicable only insofar as hearing and deciding the objections under Section 100 only and it does not extend to consideration of objections filed under Section 102. Thus, it has to be necessarily held that Rule 5 would be applicable only in respect of hearing and deciding objections to the proposal under Section 100 and it is not relatable to consideration of objections filed under Section 102. In fact, the Division Bench while disposing of W.P.No.158/2008 on 21.04.2011 has remitted the matter to the State Government to pass fresh orders in accordance with law. It is also stated at the Bar that in the first instance, when the draft notifications came to be considered and notification dated 31.05.2007 came to be issued, it was the State Government which had exercised the power without delegating its power to any authority and this would also disclose that the State Government was fully conscious of the fact that it did not have power under Section 102 to delegate it to another authority by taking recourse to Section 107(1) or the 1996 Rules to delegate its power. 41. From the foregoing discussions, it would emerge as under: (i) Under Section 102 of the MV Act, the State Government was required to hear the affected person in respect of proposed modification since State Government alone has the power to cancel or modify an approved scheme. (ii) The Karnataka State Transport Undertaking Rules, 1996 made in exercise of the power conferred under Section 107 would not expressly confer power on the State Government for considering of objections filed under Section 102 of the Act. Rule 5 provides for consideration of the objections filed under Section 100 only. (iii) The Rule making power available to the State Government under Section 107 (2) is confined to the form in which any proposal regarding a scheme may be published under Section 99; the manner in which objections may be filed under sub-section (1) of Section 100; the manner in which objections may be considered and disposed of under sub-section (2) of Section 100; the form in which any approved scheme may be published under sub-section (3) of Section 100; the manner in which an application under sub-section (1) of Section 103 can be made; the period within which owner may claim any article xxx sale of such article. (iv) Rule 4 provides for the manner of filing objections to the proposal published under Section 99 or modifications of the scheme under Section 102. (iv) Rule 4 provides for the manner of filing objections to the proposal published under Section 99 or modifications of the scheme under Section 102. Whereas, Rule 5 is confined for consideration of objections filed under Section 100 only and not objections filed under Section 102, even post-amendment of the Rules. (v) The hearing authority in the instant case as could be seen from the original records in general and particularly, the note of the Deputy Secretary dated 04.02.2015 would indicate the recommendation having been made to the Hon’ble Transport Minister for appointing any one of the authorities indicated therein “to hear and decide the objections under Section 102 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988”, which came to be concurred by the Government namely, the Transport Minister would clearly indicate that State Government had delegated the power vested in it under Section 102 to be decided by a delegated authority to hear and this is outside the scope of Section 102. (vi) Though it is contended by the State Government as well as the STUs that the authority who heard the matter was given the limited power of hearing, the impugned order would clearly indicate that hearing authority had formulated the points for adjudication and had accordingly, adjudicated the same and thereafter concluded and recommended to the State Government for dropping the notifications proposed to modify the schemes. (vii) The State Government has approved the conclusion and recommendation of the hearing authority without any application of mind. (viii) Rule 5 of the Karnataka State Transport Undertaking Rules, 1996 is applicable only insofar as hearing and deciding the objections under Section 100 and said Rule cannot be extended to Section 102 automatically or in other words, the substituted Rule 5(1) is to be read down as applicable or attracted for hearing and deciding the objections filed under Section 100 only. 42. For the reasons above stated, the impugned order dated 05.08.2015 cannot be sustained and as such, the State Government is directed to re-do the matter in accordance with the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 expeditiously, at any rate, within three months from the date of receipt of copy of this order. 43. 42. For the reasons above stated, the impugned order dated 05.08.2015 cannot be sustained and as such, the State Government is directed to re-do the matter in accordance with the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 expeditiously, at any rate, within three months from the date of receipt of copy of this order. 43. However, the incidental question which would arise for consideration is: “Whether the permit holders are to be allowed to operate during the interregnum period i.e., from the date on which the State Government would hear the objections and orders passed?” 44. The main thrust of argument on behalf of the operators is that they are operators of stage carriage services on the basis of permits granted by the Competent Transport Authorities and said permits have been renewed from time to time. In the light of the Full Bench Judgment rendered in the matter of KSRTC VS. ASHRAFULLA KHAN in W.A.No.403/1988 disposed of on 16.11.1988 by opining that the ‘BTS Scheme’ does not prohibit moffusil services going beyond the notified area or it is permissible to traverse on the notified routes / areas falling within village and town limits as necessity, transport authorities are said to have granted several permits to private operators on the alleged public interest. The Hon’ble Apex Court in KARNATAKA STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION vs. ASHRAFULLA KHAN reported in AIR 2002 SC 629 reversed the decision of the Full Bench and held that view taken by the High Court that where traversing on a notified route is necessary to continue journey on a non-notified route could be regarded as an intersection, is an erroneous view of law. “25. Merely because a private operator has to traverse on the line of a notified route for 5 km. or for 1.5 km. only is no ground to dispense with the mandate of law. Such an overlapping also cannot be sustained on the ground it relates to a small town. If such a view of law as propounded by the Full Bench is to be accepted, it is difficult to be applied where a notified route passes through bigger towns where involvement is of 10 to 20 km. within that town. 26. The view taken by the Full Bench that where traversing on a notified route is necessary to continue journey on a non-notified route could be regarded as an intersection is an erroneous view of law. within that town. 26. The view taken by the Full Bench that where traversing on a notified route is necessary to continue journey on a non-notified route could be regarded as an intersection is an erroneous view of law. The High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is required to enforce rule of law and not pass order of direction which is contrary to what has been injuncted by law. 27. For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the view that the view taken by the High Court was contrary to the law which stood settled by this Court in Adarsh Travels case (supra) and still holds the field and, therefore, it deserves to be set aside.” 45. In the light of the above finding recorded by the Apex Court holding that law which stood settled in Adarsh Travels’s case holds the field, it would be necessary and apt to notice the judgment of M/S ADARSHA TRAVELS BUS SERVICE AND ANOTHER VS. STATE OF U.P. AND OTHERS reported in AIR 1986 SC 319 whereunder it has been held that where a route is nationalized under Chapter VI-A of the Act (MV Act, 1939), Scheme totally prohibit private operators from plying stage carriages on route. It is also held that such private operator cannot ply on part of the route even with corridor restrictions. It has been held as under: “13. In Mysore State Road Transport Corporation vs. Mysore State Transport Appellate Tribunal, (1975) 1 SCR 615 : ( AIR 1974 SC 1940 ), all the earlier cases were noticed and it was held: “It is, therefore, apparent that where a private transport owner makes an application to operate on a route, which overlaps even a portion of the notified route i.e., where the part of the highway to be used by the private transport owner traverses on a line on the same highway on the notified route, then that application has to be considered only in the light of the scheme as notified. If any conditions are placed then those conditions have to be fulfilled and if there is a total prohibition then the application must be rejected…. If any conditions are placed then those conditions have to be fulfilled and if there is a total prohibition then the application must be rejected…. This Court has consistently taken the view that if there is prohibition to operate on a notified route or routes not licences can be granted to any private operator whose route traversed or overlapped any part or whole of that notified route. The intersection of the notified route may not, in our view, amount to traversing or overlapping the route because the prohibition imposed applied to a whole or part of the route on the highway on the same line of the route. An intersection cannot be said to be traversing the same line, as it cuts across it.” The learned judges expressly dissented from the decision of Beg and Chandrachud, JJ, in Mysore State Transport Corpn. vs. Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal, (1975) 1 SCR 493 and approved the decisions of the Court in Nilkanth Prasad’s case (supra) and Abdul Khader’s case (supra). We agree with the view taken by this Court in Mysore State Road Transport Corpn. Vs. Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal, (1975) 1 SCR 615 : ( AIR 1974 SC 1940 ) and dissent from the view taken in Mysore State Road Transport Corpn. Vs. Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal, (1975)1 SCR 493 . We however wish to introduce a note of caution. When preparing and publishing the scheme under S.68C and approving and modifying the scheme under S.68D care must be taken to protect, as far as possible, the interest of the traveling public who could in the past travel from one point to another without having to change from one service to another en route. This can always be done by appropriate clauses exempting operators already having permits over common sector from the scheme and by incorporating appropriate conditional clauses in the scheme to enable them to ply their vehicles over common sectors without picking up or setting down passengers on the common sectors. If such a course is not feasible the State Legislature may intervene and provide some other alternative as was done by the Uttar Pradesh Act No.27 or 76 by S.5 of which the competent authority could authorize the holder of a permit of a stage carriage to ply his stage carriage on a portion of a notified route subject to terms and conditions including payment of licence fee. There may be other methods of not inconveniencing through passengers but that is entirely a matter for the State Legislature, the State Government and the State Transport undertaking. But we do wish to emphasize that good and sufficient care must be taken to see that the traveling public is not to be needlessly inconvenienced.” 46. As to whether authorities can under the MV Act, 1988 can renew a permit granted under the repealed Act i.e., MV Act, 1939, came up for consideration before the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of GAJRAJ SINGH ETC. Vs. THE STATE TRANSPORT APPELLATE TRIBUNAL AND OTHERS reported in AIR 1997 SC 412 and it was held to the following effect: “62. Accordingly, we hold that the named transport operators whose permits were saved in the relevant scheme shall apply for permits under Section 70 and 71 and obtain permits afresh under Section 72 of the Act before the expiry of the period mentioned in the permit issued either under Section 47 or Section 48 or renewal under Section 58 or Section 68F(1D) of the Repealed Act. No third party/private operators are entitled to apply for permits on the same notified route or part thereof, nor are they entitled to compete with them for grant of permit, since the right of all other private operators to apply for and operate in the approved notified area, route or a part thereof, has been frozen. The right is reserved only in relation to the named operators and that too for specified permit, and none else. Along with the application under Section 70 filed for grant of permit under Section 72 or renewal under Section 81 made by the named holder of a specified permit in an approved scheme, he should enclose an authenticated copy of the approved scheme, the details of the route on which he was plying his stage carriage with corridor restrictions on over lapping routes. The RTA or STA, as the case may be, should verify the original scheme under which the named operator, whose specified permit was saved, whether he is entitled to ply the stage carriage in the approved scheme with the condition of the corridor restrictions on the notified scheme and if so to what extent. What is the duration of his right saved in the approved scheme? What is the duration of his right saved in the approved scheme? Whether he had plied his stage carriage on complying with the law in force? His right to permit under Section 72 or renewal under Section 81 cannot be higher than the original right saved in the approved scheme. The STU also should be heard in that behalf. On consideration of these and all other relevant facts in relation to grant of stage carriage permit or renewal thereof, the appropriate authority may grant or reject; in the later event, for reasons to be recorded in support of the rejection. The authorities should consider their applications in accordance with the law and the prescribed procedure and may grant new permits under Section 72 and later on before the expiry thereof, to renew it in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Sections 80 and 81, that too on compliance with law, until the scheme is duly modified or cancelled in accordance with law. We reiterate that this right is available exclusively to the named private operators and that too in respect of the specified permits and with same restrictions continued in the scheme and none else and no more.” 47. Thus, the harbinger of the petitioners – stage carriage operators claim as could be seen from the pleadings of the writ petitions is two fold; namely, (1) that permits granted in their favour is saved under the Scheme itself, and (2) even otherwise the State with an intention to save the permits and the greater implication it could have on the private operators had come up with the modification of the Schemes which has since been dropped under the G.O. dated 05.08.2015 which is now under consideration and as such, till a decision is taken thereunder no steps be taken to nullify the permits granted or a direction be issued to continue the permits so issued by renewing till such time the State Government decides the objection regarding modification of the scheme. 48. 48. As already noticed hereinabove, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Adarsha Travels’s case has held that whenever the State prepares and publishes the Scheme under Section 68C and approves or modify the Scheme under Section 68D (old Act) then in such instances care must be taken to protect as for as possible the interest of traveling public which can be done by incorporating appropriate clauses exempting operators already having permits over common sector from the Scheme and by incorporating appropriate conditional clauses in the Scheme to enable them to ply their vehicles over common sectors without picking up or setting down passengers of the common sectors. It has also been observed by the Apex Court that if in the facts obtained in each case the State Transport Undertaking may not be found not catering to the needs of the traveling public, it may modify the Scheme so as to permit private operators to ply vehicles on such route / routes. Thus, the emphasis is not for additional services but to cater to the requirement of the passenger so as to cause least inconvenience to the traveling public. Thus, no operator would have right to compel the State to either modify or not to modify a Scheme. 49. On the one hand the petitioners are claiming to be the valid permit holders and such permits are saved under the Scheme itself and some of the stage carriage operators are claiming that the permits granted by virtue of interim orders during the pendency of the consideration for modification of the Schemes they have been operating and as such, they should be permitted to continue to operate, is required to be examined in the light of aforestated position of law. 50. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of V. GOPI vs. RTA in W.A.No.1783/2006 disposed of on 04.01.2007 has held that any permit or licence can be treated as a valid one if the same is granted by the authority competent to do so. It has been further held by the Division Bench therein that Court had permitted the appellant to operate the services which was only a concession granted and same cannot be treated as a grant of permit or validation of the permit. Hence, it came to be held that appellant therein cannot seek for extension of benefit on this ground. 51. It has been further held by the Division Bench therein that Court had permitted the appellant to operate the services which was only a concession granted and same cannot be treated as a grant of permit or validation of the permit. Hence, it came to be held that appellant therein cannot seek for extension of benefit on this ground. 51. The twenty approved schemes by the State of Karnataka under Section 68-D of the MV Act, 1939 were saved under the MV Act, 1988. Chapter – VI of MV Act, 1988 which is in paramateria with Chapter – IVA of MV Act, 1939 which deals with special provisions relating to STUs and it overrides Chapter – V of MV Act, 1988. Section 102 of the MV Act provides for cancellation of modification of the scheme in the interest of public. Section 104 of MV Act, 1988 indicate that where the scheme is published, no permit should be granted to private operators except in accordance with the provisions of the scheme. Once a scheme is notified it prohibits private vehicles to operate except as permitted under the scheme. In fact, on publication of the scheme, private operators would not have any right to claim permit to operate their vehicles on the notified area, route or portion thereof except to the extent permitted under the scheme itself. If the scheme totally prohibits private operators from plying stage carriage service on notified route/area, private operator cannot ply on part of route even with corridor restrictions. Thus, it boils down to the fact as to whether the existing schemes which enable the STUs to operate and ply its vehicles in the route notified under the said scheme also enable the private operators to operate or in other words, whether such schemes would save any permit already in existence or not. 52. The authorities in their own manner and fashion have interpreted the law laid down by Apex Court in ASHRAFULLA KHAN’s case referred to supra and have been issuing the permits to the private stage carriage operators. This has been objected to by the STUs time and again. 52. The authorities in their own manner and fashion have interpreted the law laid down by Apex Court in ASHRAFULLA KHAN’s case referred to supra and have been issuing the permits to the private stage carriage operators. This has been objected to by the STUs time and again. The Division Bench while considering the plea of operators in this regard in W.P.NO.158/2008 and connected matters had noted that permits granted to stage carriages though had been cancelled by the appellate Tribunal, yet they have been operating their services on the strength of interim order passed by this Court. It was contended by the Stage Carriage Operators that in the event of Division Bench arriving at a conclusion that modification is not in accordance with law, they should be permitted to continue to operate their vehicles till further decision is taken by the State Government in accordance with law. The Division Bench in the light of the notification dated 31.05.2007 being set aside had opined as under: “14. So far as other writ petition Nos.16990/2006 and connected matters are concerned, in view of the submissions made by the petitioners in the said writ petitions, we hold that interest of justice would be met if they are permitted to operate their vehicles for a period of three months from today as to as to protect their interest as the Government is given three months time to pass orders afresh in accordance with law.” (emphasis supplied by me) 53. In the light of aforestated discussion, the authority hearing the objections will also be required to examine the legality of permits which were granted to private operators and whether such permits granted to private operators were against the observations made in ASHRAFULLA KHAN’s case and whether on ASHRAFULLA KHAN being rendered by the Apex Court, all such permits which were in existence as on that date would automatically become illegal permits and it would be against the scheme or not. The hearing authority having opined that permits granted to the operators were illegal permits, had relied upon the judgment of this Court rendered in W.P.NO.6507/2008 to hold that permits that were not originally valid or were illegal and contrary to the statutory provisions cannot be saved by modification. The hearing authority having opined that permits granted to the operators were illegal permits, had relied upon the judgment of this Court rendered in W.P.NO.6507/2008 to hold that permits that were not originally valid or were illegal and contrary to the statutory provisions cannot be saved by modification. However, the fact that the said judgment had been set aside by the Division Bench in W.A.No.1408/2011 on 08.06.2011 had been lost sight of by the hearing authority. As such, the said issue also requires to be examined by the hearing authority. 54. As could be seen from the records, the Transport Appellate Tribunal has affirmed the orders of the Regional Transport Authorities which had rejected the claim of the permit holders to continue the permits on the ground that orders of cancellation of permits had reached finality or in other words, operators would not fall within the exempted clause of the respective schemes. The said orders of Tribunal are also the subject matter of these proceedings in the second set of writ petitions. These writ petitioners have very heavily relied upon the order dated 18.12.2014 of the Hon’ble Apex Court whereunder the matter has been remitted back to the State Government and which has been the subject matter in the first set of writ petitions by contending that issue regarding cut-off dates was also required to be considered by the State Government under the impugned order dated 05.08.2015 and same having not been considered, it is also under challenge, as a ground to sustain these writ petitions namely, second set of writ petitions. 55. The State Government exercising the power conferred under Chapter – VI of the MV Act, 1988 as well as similar provisions that existed in the repealed Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 has issued several schemes of nationalization partly or totally prohibiting a private operator from obtaining a permit on the area or route exclusively reserved for operation of services by STU. These schemes prohibited grant of permits to private operators. These schemes prohibited grant of permits to private operators. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of KSRTC VS ASHRAFULLA KHAN AND OTHERS reported in AIR 2002 SC 629 has held that no permit can be granted to operate on a notified route or portion thereof if the scheme prohibits such operation by a private operator and the only exception is where a private operator holding permit on non-notified route has to intersect on a notified route and as such, it was held a small portion/portions falling within the limits of a town or a village on a nationalized route (notified route) are not to be treated as intersection of the notified route but as overlapping and therefore, it is not permissible to grant permit on the route. It has been held by the Apex Court “that view taken by the Full Bench that where traversing on a notified route is necessary to continue journey on a non-notified route could be regarded as an intersection is an erroneous view of law. The High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is required to enforce rule of law and not pass order or direction which is contrary to what has been injuncted by law.” In fact, the Apex Court has held in the case of H.C. NARAYANAPPA vs STATE OF MYSORE AND OTHERS reported in AIR 1960 SC 1073 that scheme is a law and the action of the State in framing a scheme excluding the private operator is immune from the attack as violative of fundamental rights. 56. It would also be apt and appropriate to notice at this juncture that Hon’ble Apex Court in ADARSHA TRAVEL BUS SERVICE vs STATE OF U.P. reported in AIR 1986 SC 319 as well as in the case of KSRTC vs ASHRAFULLA KHAN reported in AIR 2002 SC 629 has held that paramount consideration was not that of right of private operators to continue to operate their services but on eliminating the inconvenience as for as possible to the commuting passengers. Thus, it cannot be gain said by the private operators that a right is vested to them so as to compel the State Government to modify or not to modify the existing scheme. It is completely within the domain of the State Government to exercise its power under Section 102 in the interest of travelling public. Thus, it cannot be gain said by the private operators that a right is vested to them so as to compel the State Government to modify or not to modify the existing scheme. It is completely within the domain of the State Government to exercise its power under Section 102 in the interest of travelling public. Thus, any permit which came to be granted by the authority competent to do so and which is in accordance with the provisions of the Act, can only be treated as valid permit and concession given by the State Government or the interim orders granted by the Courts cannot be treated as a grant of permit or validation of the permit so granted. Thus, what was required to be examined and considered by the Tribunal was as to “whether the permits granted to the operators was saved under the relevant schemes which they are so claiming or not? Or “whether the permits issued to the petitioners (in second set of writ petitions) were saved under the relevant schemes or not? And, if so saved, would they be entitled for renewal of such permits by keeping in mind the principles enunciated in GAJARAJ SINGH’s case by the Apex Court reported in AIR 1987 SC 412 at paragraph 62. These fundamental questions cannot be gone into by this Court and as such, it would suffice if the matter is remitted to the Tribunal for adjudication afresh in the light of the observations made herein above. It is needless to state that the STUs would also be at liberty to lodge their objections and contest the claim of operators and in such an event, the Tribunal shall consider all the contentions in accordance with law. 57. In the light of the above discussion, I proceed to pass the following: ORDER (i) Order No.SARE 140 SAEPA 2011, Bengaluru dated 05.08.2015 passed by first respondent is hereby quashed and “first set of writ petitions” referred to in the judgment are remitted back to the first respondent for being heard afresh. 57. In the light of the above discussion, I proceed to pass the following: ORDER (i) Order No.SARE 140 SAEPA 2011, Bengaluru dated 05.08.2015 passed by first respondent is hereby quashed and “first set of writ petitions” referred to in the judgment are remitted back to the first respondent for being heard afresh. First respondent is directed to dispose of the same in accordance with law and in the light of observations made herein above within a period of three months from the date of receipt of copy of this order or production of certified copy of this order by affording opportunity of hearing to all the concerned as has been directed by Hon’ble Apex Court in B.A. LINGAREDDY ETC. vs KSTA reported in AIR 2015 SC 767 . (ii) Insofar as petitioners in “first set of writ petitions” are concerned, they would be entitled to operate their vehicles only in the event of they are holding or having permits which are valid as on date and if they are authorised to run the vehicles otherwise for a period of three months from today. (iii) The orders passed by the Karnataka State Transport Appellate Tribunal in “second set of writ petitions” rejecting the appeals/revision petitions are hereby set aside and matters are remitted back to the Tribunal for adjudication afresh in the light of observations made herein above. Tribunal is directed to dispose of the same afresh within a period of three months from the date receipt of copy of this order or production of certified copy of this order by affording opportunity of hearing to petitioners / appellants, rival claimants if any and concerned State Transport Undertakings. (iv) Writ petitioners in “second set of writ petitions” would be at liberty to seek for grant of temporary permits by filing appropriate applications before jurisdictional State Transport Authority and in the event of such applications being filed, the jurisdictional State Transport Authority would be at liberty to consider the same on merits and in accordance with law and also keeping in mind observation made hereinabove and pass orders thereon within 10 days from the date of filing of such applications. In the event of authorities granting such permits, they shall ensure that it shall be valid during the pendency of revision petitions or appeals pending before Karnataka State Transport Appellate Tribunal or for a period of four (4) months whichever is earlier. (v) No order as to costs. This Court places on record its appreciation for the able assistance rendered by all the learned Advocates appearing for the parties.