Dharam Chand Chaudhary, J. : Order under challenge in this petition is dated 24.09.2016, whereby learned Additional District Judge-I, Kangra at Dharamshala has dismissed the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act filed by the petitioners (hereinafter referred to as the ‘defendants’) for seeking condonation of delay as occurred in filing appeal against the judgment and decree dated 29.03.2012 passed by learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Indora, District Kangra, H.P. in Civil Suit No. 117/2010 and as a result thereof the appeal so preferred was also dismissed being time barred. 2. The original plaintiff is Jayabanti. She died during the pendency of this case before learned lower appellate Court and substituted by the present respondents (hereinafter referred to as the ‘plaintiffs’). The predecessor-in-interest of plaintiffs is Desh Raj, who was working as Teacher in a privately managed school, which was taken over by the State Government on 21.4.1971. His services were not taken over. He approached the respondents for his appointment as JBT Teacher on the basis of his meritorious record in the school. He, as such, was appointed as JBT Teacher. After attaining the age of superannuation i.e. 58 years, he stood retired on and w.e.f. 10.07.1975, however, without payment of retiral benefits such as pension, gratuity and PF etc. The matter remained under consideration with the defendants. Consequently, he was appointed as JBT/SV Teacher vide letter No. 269 dated 18.09.1981 and his services were taken over on and w.e.f. 21.04.1971, on getting new post of SV Teacher created in the school from that date. The retiral benefits, however, not released at the pretext that deceased Desh Raj had rendered less than five years of service; therefore, as per Rules, he was not entitled to pensionary benefits or other retiral benefits. In this backdrop, deceased plaintiff had filed the suit for declaration to the effect that her husband Desh Raj was entitled to all pensionary benefits on his superannuation and the defendants were sought to be directed to release GPF subscription and other pensionary benefits in her favour being his widow. 3. The suit was tried and decreed vide judgment and decree dated 29.03.2012, Annexure P-6 to this petition. 4. Learned District Attorney has forwarded the copy of judgment and decree to the defendant-State with the opinion that for appeal, it was a weak case. 3. The suit was tried and decreed vide judgment and decree dated 29.03.2012, Annexure P-6 to this petition. 4. Learned District Attorney has forwarded the copy of judgment and decree to the defendant-State with the opinion that for appeal, it was a weak case. The matter was also examined by the administrative department i.e. Education and Law Department, however, Law Department also opined in its opinion dated 8.2.2013 that the judgment and decree passed by learned trial Court being just and reasonable was not required to be assailed further by way of filing an appeal. 5. The defendants in order to show sufficient cause has come forward with the version that after obtaining such opinion, the functionaries of the respondent-State at different levels had dealt with the matter to implement the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. The defendants even were about to release the monetary benefits in terms of judgment, however, it is in December, 2014, the office of Accountant General (A&E), Himachal Pradesh returned the pension case of deceased Desh Raj with the remarks that he had less than five years of service, hence family pension cannot be authorized as directed by the trial Court for want of qualifying service i.e. 10 years. The pension papers were sought to be resubmitted after seeking prior approval of the sanctioning authority qua the amendment of Rule 49 of CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972. The matter thereafter remained under consideration in the Education Department at various levels. The opinion of the Law Department was again sought. The Law Department in its opinion conveyed to the Administrative Department somewhere in April, 2015 found the present a fit case for agitating the judgment and decree passed by learned trial Court further by way of filing an appeal. The appeal, as such, came to be filed in the District Courts, Kangra at Dharamshala on 28.04.2015 along with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, dismissed vide order under challenge in these proceedings. 6. Learned lower appellate Court has dismissed the application vide order under challenge in this petition with the following observations: “9. Be it stated that from the evidence on record, it is transpired that the suit filed by the respondent in the year 2010 was decreed on 29.3.2012 by the ld. Civil Judge (Junior Division), Indora. After obtaining the copy of judgment and decree the ld. Be it stated that from the evidence on record, it is transpired that the suit filed by the respondent in the year 2010 was decreed on 29.3.2012 by the ld. Civil Judge (Junior Division), Indora. After obtaining the copy of judgment and decree the ld. Assistant District Attorney submitted the complete case file to ld. District Attorney on 7.4.2012 with his opinion that the case is weak for appeal and thereafter the ld. District Attorney further submitted the matter to Deputy Director of Elementary Education with the direction to consult the Law Department. The case file went through various channels and finally on 16.8.2013 the Secretary Education conveyed the opinion of the law Department that the case is not fit for appeal. When the benefits were about to be released to the respondent, the case took U-turn and on 16.4.2015 the Additional Chief Secretary (Education) to the Govt. of H.P. conveyed the Director of Elementary Education to file appeal along with the instant application for condonation of delay and accordingly applicants filed the appeal along with the instant application on 28.4.2015 after about three years. The day to day delay has not been at all explained in the application though PW1 Deepak Kanayat, Deputy Director Elementary Education, Kangra at Dharamshala has tried to explain such delay by leading evidence but it is well settled principle of law that evidence beyond pleadings cannot be looked into. The application is absolutely silent about the delay in filing the appeal. No explanation has been afforded for the delay in the application. 10. Further it has been alleged that the matter was delayed in official routine and in this behalf various abstracts of official files have been brought on record by the applicants vide which matter regarding filing of appeal was processed in the office of the applicants. It is transpired from the Clause (xvi) of Para 3 of the affidavit of PW1 that on 16.8.2013 the Secretary Education conveyed that case is not fit for appeal. Thus, it is transpired that at the first instance the applicants were not at all keen to file appeal as per the opinion of the Law Department. As discussed above when the benefits were about to be released to the respondent, the case took U-turn and the applicants were asked to file appeal along with the instant application for condonation of delay. As discussed above when the benefits were about to be released to the respondent, the case took U-turn and the applicants were asked to file appeal along with the instant application for condonation of delay. Thus, it is not a case where there is delay on account of official routine. Firstly the applicants decided not to file appeal in the year 2013 and thereafter changed their mind to file the appeal in the year 2015 and this shows how the government machinery functions at various levels. It is not in dispute that the persons concerned were not well aware or conversant with the issues involved including prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing appeal. There is utter inaction on the part of the applicants despite knowledge. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government. Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act envisages explanation of delay to the satisfaction of the court and in matters of limitation makes no distinction between the State and citizen. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case P.K. Ramchandran-Vs-Sate of Kerala and another, AIR 1998 SC 2276 wherein the State sought condonation of delay in filing the appeal has held as follows: “6. Law of Limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigor when the statute so prescribe and the Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The discretion exercised by the High Court was, thus, neither proper nor judicious. The order condoning the delay cannot be sustained….” 11. The transaction of the business of the government was being done leisurely by the officers who had no or evince no personal interest at different levels. No one takes personal responsibility in processing the matters expeditiously. As a fact at several stages, they take their own time to reach a decision. Even in spite of pointing at the delay, they do not take expeditious action for ultimate decision in filing the appeal. This case is one of such instances. 12. No one takes personal responsibility in processing the matters expeditiously. As a fact at several stages, they take their own time to reach a decision. Even in spite of pointing at the delay, they do not take expeditious action for ultimate decision in filing the appeal. This case is one of such instances. 12. Though the court is conscious of the fact that in matter of condonation of delay when there is no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bonafide, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice but in the facts and circumstances the applicants cannot take advantage of rulings cited in rejoinder especially when the application is absolutely silent about the satisfactory explanation of day to day delay. 13. Hon’ble apex Court in Office of the Chief Post master General-Vs-Living Media India Ltd., AIR 2012, Supreme Court 1506 has held that in our view, it is the right time to inform all the Government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process. The Government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as anticipated benefit for Government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit for a few. Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation offered by the Department for the delay except mentioning of various dates, according to us, the Department has miserably failed to given any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a huge delay. Accordingly, the appeals are liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay.” 7. The defendants-State has assailed the legality and validity of the impugned order on the grounds interalia that the documentary evidence produced in evidence by way of affidavit Ext. PW-1/X by PW-1 Deepak Kinayat, Deputy Director of Elementary Education, Kangra at Dharamshala has been misconstrued, misunderstood and misinterpreted. This has resulted in recording wrong findings. The defendants-State has assailed the legality and validity of the impugned order on the grounds interalia that the documentary evidence produced in evidence by way of affidavit Ext. PW-1/X by PW-1 Deepak Kinayat, Deputy Director of Elementary Education, Kangra at Dharamshala has been misconstrued, misunderstood and misinterpreted. This has resulted in recording wrong findings. The judgment and decree was absolutely wrong and illegal as deceased Desh Raj had rendered less than five years of service as Teacher in the school under rule 49 of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972. He was not entitled to the payment of retiral benefits i.e. pension and gratuity etc. The service gratuity due and admissible to deceased Desh Raj was withdrawn by the Principal of the school on 16.07.2015 and paid together with interest. The settled legal principles that “decisive factor in condonation of delay is not the length of the delay, but sufficiency of a satisfactory explanation” has been ignored. The impugned order has, therefore, been sought to be quashed and set aside. 8. Mr. Shrawan Dogra, learned Advocate General assisted by Mr. Pramod Thakur and Mr. Varun Chandel, Additional Advocates General has drawn the attention of this Court to the given facts and circumstances and also the evidence available on record and urged that in view of opinion of Law Department obtained initially, the department has bonafidely started dealing with the matter to implement the impugned judgment and decree. It was at a stage when the matter was submitted for sanction of pensionary benefits to the Accountant General (A&E) Himachal Pradesh, transpired that for want of qualifying service, he was not entitled to pensionary benefits. The matter, as such, was re-examined and as the Law Department in its opinion obtained by the administrative Department subsequently recommended filing of an appeal against the judgment and decree passed by learned trial Court, the memorandum of appeal was presented along with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act without any further delay. 9. On the other hand, Mr. R.K. Gautam, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. 9. On the other hand, Mr. R.K. Gautam, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Gaurav Gautam, Advocate while pointing out various acts of omission and commission attributed to the defendants and also that during the execution proceedings a statement was made in the trial Court that the monetary benefits accrued to the plaintiffs will be released now cannot be permitted to turn around and to claim that the judgment and decree is illegal. 10. Before coming to the merits of the case, it is desirable to take note of the legal principles settled by the Apex Court and also various High Courts, applicable in a case of this nature:- “Hon’ble the Apex Court in P.K. Ramchandran Vs.State of Karela and others. AIR. 1998 Supreme Court, 2276, has held that law of limitation may harshly effect a particular party, but it has to be applied with all rigor when the statute so prescribe and the Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. Hon’ble the High Court of Rajasthan has also held in Union of India Vs.Brij Lal Prabhu Dayal and others A.I.R. 1999 Rajasthan, 216, that a party seeking condonation of delay must place before court facts constituting “sufficient cause’, failing which the delay cannot be condoned. The reference can also be made to the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another Vs.Mst. Katiji and Others, A.I.R. 1987 S.C.1353 in which it has been held that the expression “sufficient cause’ employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the court to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice”. 11. The Apex Court in State (NCT of Delhi) V. Ahmed Jaan, (2008) 14 SCC 582 , after taking note of the law laid down by way of various judicial pronouncements including in Collector, Land Acquisition V. Mst. Katiji, cited supra has held as under: “7. The proof by sufficient cause is a condition precedent for exercise of the extraordinary discretion vested in the court. What counts is not the length of the delay but the sufficiency of the cause and shortness of the delay is one of the circumstances to be taken into account in using the discretion. The proof by sufficient cause is a condition precedent for exercise of the extraordinary discretion vested in the court. What counts is not the length of the delay but the sufficiency of the cause and shortness of the delay is one of the circumstances to be taken into account in using the discretion. In N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy ( AIR 1998 SC 3222 ) it was held by this Court that Section 5 is to be construed liberally so as to do substantial justice to the parties. The provision contemplates that the Court has to go in the position of the person concerned and to find out if the delay can be said to have been resulted from the cause which he had adduced and whether the cause can be recorded in the peculiar circumstances of the case is sufficient. Although no special indulgence can be shown to the Government which, in similar circumstances, is not shown to an individual suitor, one cannot but take a practical view of the working of the Government without being unduly indulgent to the slow motion of its wheels. 8. What constitutes sufficient cause cannot be laid down by hard and fast rules. In New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shanti Misra ( 1975 (2) SCC 840 ) this Court held that discretion given by Section 5 should not be defined or crystallised so as to convert a discretionary matter into a rigid rule of law. The expression "sufficient cause" should receive a liberal construction. In Brij Indar Singh v. Kanshi Ram (ILR (1918) 45 Cal 94 (PC) it was observed that true guide for a court to exercise the discretion under Section 5 is whether the appellant acted with reasonable diligence in prosecuting the appeal. In Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari ( AIR 1969 SC 575 ) a Bench of three Judges had held that unless want of bona fides of such inaction or negligence as would deprive a party of the protection of Section 5 is proved, the application must not be thrown out or any delay cannot be refused to be condoned. 9. In Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nirmala Devi ( 1979 (4) SCC 365 ) which is a case of negligence of the counsel which misled a litigant into delayed pursuit of his remedy, the default in delay was condoned. 9. In Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nirmala Devi ( 1979 (4) SCC 365 ) which is a case of negligence of the counsel which misled a litigant into delayed pursuit of his remedy, the default in delay was condoned. In Lala Mata Din v. A. Narayanan ( 1969 (2) SCC 770 ), this Court had held that there is no general proposition that mistake of counsel by itself is always sufficient cause for condonation of delay. It is always a question whether the mistake was bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. In that case it was held that the mistake committed by the counsel was bona fide and it was not tainted by any mala fide motive. 10. In State of Kerala v. E. K. Kuriyipe (1981 Supp SCC 72), it was held that whether or not there is sufficient cause for condonation of delay is a question of fact dependant upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case. In Milavi Devi v. Dina Nath ( 1982 (3) SCC 366 ), it was held that the appellant had sufficient cause for not filing the appeal within the period of limitation. This Court under Article 136 can reassess the ground and in appropriate case set aside the order made by the High Court or the Tribunal and remit the matter for hearing on merits. It was accordingly allowed, delay was condoned and the case was remitted for decision on merits. 11. In O.P. Kathpalia v. Lakhmir Singh ( 1984 (4) SCC 66 ), a Bench of three Judges had held that if the refusal to condone the delay results in grave miscarriage of justice, it would be a ground to condone the delay. Delay was accordingly condoned. In Collector Land Acquisition v. Katiji ( 1987 (2) SCC 107 ), a Bench of two Judges considered the question of the limitation in an appeal filed by the State and held that Section 5 was enacted in order to enable the court to do substantial justice to the parties by disposing of matters on merits. The expression "sufficient cause" is adequately elastic to enable the court to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice - that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of courts. The expression "sufficient cause" is adequately elastic to enable the court to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice - that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy. This Court reiterated that the expression "every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. Judiciary is not respected on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the State which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. There is no warrant for according a step-motherly treatment when the State is the applicant. The delay was accordingly condoned. 12. Experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file-pushing, and passing on- the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. The State which represents collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The State which represents collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The courts, therefore, have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression of sufficient cause. Merit is preferred to scuttle a decision on merits in turning down the case on technicalities of delay in presenting the appeal. Delay as accordingly condoned, the order was set aside and the matter was remitted to the High Court for disposal on merits after affording opportunity of hearing to the parties. In Prabha v. Ram Parkash Kalra (1987 Supp SCC 339), this Court had held that the court should not adopt an injustice- oriented approach in rejecting the application for condonation of delay. The appeal was allowed, the delay was condoned and the matter was remitted for expeditious disposal in accordance with law. 13. In G. Ramegowda, Major v. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer ( 1988 (2) SCC 142 ), it was held that no general principle saving the party from all mistakes of its counsel could be laid. The expression "sufficient cause" must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally delays in preferring the appeals are required to be condoned in the interest of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides is imputable to the party seeking condonation of delay. In litigations to which Government is a party, there is yet another aspect which, perhaps, cannot be ignored. If appeals brought by Government are lost for such defaults, no person is individually affected, but what, in the ultimate analysis, suffers is public interest. The decisions of Government are collective and institutional decisions and do not share the characteristics of decisions of private individuals. The law of limitation is, no doubt, the same for a private citizen as for governmental authorities. Government, like any other litigant must take responsibility for the acts, omissions of its officers. But a somewhat different complexion is imparted to the matter where Government makes out a case where public interest was shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of its officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross-purposes with it. But a somewhat different complexion is imparted to the matter where Government makes out a case where public interest was shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of its officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross-purposes with it. It was, therefore, held that in assessing what constitutes sufficient cause for purposes of Section 5, it might, perhaps, be somewhat unrealistic to exclude from the consideration that go into the judicial verdict, these factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the Government. Government decisions are proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by a considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process of their making. A certain amount of latitude is, therefore, not impermissible. It is rightly said that those who bear responsibility of Government must have "a little play at the joints". Due recognition of these limitations on governmental functioning - of course, within reasonable limits - is necessary if the judicial approach is not to be rendered unrealistic. It would, perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to put Government and private parties on the same footing in all respects in such matters. Implicit in the very nature of Governmental functioning is procedural delay incidental to the decision-making process. The delay of over one year was accordingly condoned. 14. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officers/agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on table for considerable time causing delay-intentional or otherwise - is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red-tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression "sufficient cause" should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day's delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-a-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The Government at appropriate level should constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles are involved for decision by the courts or whether cases require adjustment and should authorise the officers to take a decision or give appropriate permission for settlement. In the event of decision to file appeal needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants.” 12. As per the ratio of the judgment cited supra, the delay may howsoever long, the same can be condoned, however, in a case where the party seeking condonation of delay is able to show sufficient cause. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ in terms of above legal position needs liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and not to thwart it. In a case of this nature where one of the party is State Government, the Apex Court has held that if appeals prefer by the Government are lost on technical grounds or any other default, no person will be affected thereby individually but ultimately sufferers in such cases is the larger public interest. 13. Now adverting to the present case, true it is that learned trial Court has decreed the suit on 29.03.2012. Learned District Attorney after obtaining certified copy of the judgment and decree forwarded the same to Deputy Director of Elementary Education, Kangra at Dharamshala vide letter dated April 16, 2012, Ext. RW-1/A-1 with the opinion that for agitating the same further by way of filing an appeal, it was a weak case. Learned District Attorney after obtaining certified copy of the judgment and decree forwarded the same to Deputy Director of Elementary Education, Kangra at Dharamshala vide letter dated April 16, 2012, Ext. RW-1/A-1 with the opinion that for agitating the same further by way of filing an appeal, it was a weak case. Any how, the defendants examined the matter at various levels, as is evidence from the perusal of official correspondence Ext. AW-1/A-2, dated 20.04.2012, AW-1/A-3 dated 25.04.2012, AW-1/A-4 dated 26.04.2012, AW-1/A-5 dated 8.8.2012, AW-1/A-6 dated 16.8.2012, AW-1/A-7 dated 18.8.2012, AW-1/A-9 dated 8.08.2012, AW-1/A-10 dated 1.9.2012, AW-1/A-11 dated 28.9.2012, AW-1/A-12 dated 7.6.2013, AW-1/A-13 dated 24.6.2013, AW-1/A-14 dated 31.7.2013, AW-1/A-15 dated 16.8.2013 and AW-1/A-16 dated 22.8.2013. It was on AW-1/A-16, a decision was taken not to file an appeal against the judgment and decree in question after obtaining the opinion of the Law Department. The remaining correspondence Ext. AW-1/A-17 onwards to Ext. AW-1/A-29 reveals that same pertains to the correspondence between the defendants to release the monetary benefits payable to the plaintiffs under the judgment in question. Even her pension papers were also sent to the office of Accountant General (A&E), Himachal Pradesh. It is, however, the office of Accountant General (A&E), which has returned the pension papers vide letter dated 23rd December, 2014, Ext. AW-1-A-30, with a query that for want of qualifying service i.e. 10 years, pensionary benefits cannot be released in favour of the plaintiffs unless the provisions contained under Rule 49 of CCS (Pension), Rules, 1972 are relaxed/amended by the competent authority. The pension papers were, therefore, sought to be re-submitted after doing the needful. It is this letter which has compelled the defendants to re-examine the matter. The subsequent correspondence Ext. AW-1/A-31 dated 9.1.2015, AW-1/A-32 dated 21.1.2015, AW-1/A-33 dated 13.2.2015, AW-1/A-34 dated 16.2.2015, AW-1/A-35 dated 20.1.2015, AW-1/A-36 dated 11.3.2015, AW-1/A-37 dated 8.4.2015, AW-1/A-38 dated 16.4.2015, AW-1/A-39 dated 17.4.2015, AW-1/A-40 dated 16.4.2015 and AW-1/A- 41 dated nil, fresh legal opinion obtained from the Law Department. Ext. AW-1/A-42 dated 18.04.2015 and again Ext. AW-1/A-42 dated 18.04.2015 lead to the only conclusion that after obtaining the legal opinion afresh i.e. Ext. AW-1/A-41 supra, a decision was taken to file an appeal against the impugned judgment and decree. Consequently, vide letter Ext. AW-1/A-42 dated 18.04.2015, the District Attorney was directed to draft the appeal and also an application for condonation of delay at the earliest. AW-1/A-42 dated 18.04.2015 lead to the only conclusion that after obtaining the legal opinion afresh i.e. Ext. AW-1/A-41 supra, a decision was taken to file an appeal against the impugned judgment and decree. Consequently, vide letter Ext. AW-1/A-42 dated 18.04.2015, the District Attorney was directed to draft the appeal and also an application for condonation of delay at the earliest. Consequently, along with the appeal, an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was drafted and filed in the Court on 28.04.2015. 14. It is worth while to mention here that initially a bonafide decision was taken not to agitate the judgment and decree further by way of filing an appeal and the defendants rather proceeded to implement the same by releasing the monetary benefits due and admissible to the plaintiffs thereunder. Though during this period, it transpired that for want of qualifying service, the plaintiffs are not entitled to the pensionary benefits, however, taking into consideration the long service carrier of deceased Desh Raj in privately managed school, which ultimately was taken over on 21.04.1971 by the defendants-State coupled with the factum that less than five years services he rendered after taking over the school by the defendants till his superannuation on 10.07.1975, the defendants seems to have taken a lenient view of the matter and to implement the impugned judgment. However, in view of the specific objection raised by the office of Accountant General, Himachal Pradesh, as is apparent from the perusal of Ext. AW-1/A-30 dated 23.12.2014 that for want of qualifying service i.e. 10 years under Rule 49 of CCS (Pension), Rules, 1972, the pensionary benefits cannot be released in favour of the plaintiffs unless such provisions in the Rules are relaxed or amended by the competent authority, the defendant-State was compelled to give second thought to the entire matter and a conscious decision was taken expeditiously and without any further loss of time in between 31.12.2014 and 16.04.2015. After two days i.e. on 18.04.2015, the District Attorney was also directed to draft the appeal along with application for condonation of delay under Section 5 and file the same in the Court. The appeal and application both were drafted and instituted in learned lower appellate Court on 28.04.2015 after getting the grounds of appeal approved and signed by the competent authority. The appeal and application both were drafted and instituted in learned lower appellate Court on 28.04.2015 after getting the grounds of appeal approved and signed by the competent authority. The appeal, as such, was filed within 10-12 days from the date when a decision was taken to prefer an appeal against the impugned judgment and decree. 15. The facts and circumstances of this case and overwhelming documentary evidence produced by the defendants leads to the only conclusion that they have succeeded in showing sufficient cause to condone the delay. As pointed out hereinabove till 23.12.2015, there was no intention of the defendants to challenge the impugned judgment and decree further by way of filing an appeal. Since in view of the query raised by the office of Accountant General, Himachal Pradesh, it become difficult for them to implement the impugned judgment and decree, therefore, a decision was taken thereafter to re-examine the matter afresh for filing an appeal, which ultimately was filed expeditiously in a period less than four months after obtaining the opinion of Law Department on compliance of other codal formalities. It would, therefore, not be improper to conclude that learned lower appellate Court has failed to appreciate the facts of the case and the evidence available on record in its right perspective. The impugned order, as such, is not legally and factually sustainable. 16. This petition, as such, is allowed and the impugned order dated 24.09.2016 passed by learned Additional District Judge-I, Kangra at Dharamshala in CMA No. 48 of 2015 is quashed and set aside. The parties through learned counsel representing them are directed to appear before learned lower appellate Court on 21st August, 2017. The record of Court below be sent back forthwith so as to reach there well before the date fixed.