JUDGMENT : K.R. Mohapatra, J. This intra Court appeal has been filed by the Workman-Appellant, namely, Sri Prafulla Kumar Panda assailing the order dated 23.04.2001 (Annexure-1) passed by learned Single Judge in OJC No.2833 of 1994, whereby the Writ Court, while upholding the award of reinstatement of the Workman-Appellant passed by learned Industrial Tribunal in ID Case No.37 of 1991, reduced the award of full back wages by 50%. 2. Shorn of unnecessary details, relevant fact for adjudication of this appeal are that the Workman-Appellant was working as a Dozer Operator under the Management-Respondent No.1. On 24.10.1985, while on duty, he had entered into the official chambers of Sri P.K. Sahoo, erstwhile Accounts Officer of the Respondent No.1 at about 10.30 A.M. and abused him in filthy languages in loud voice and had also threatened him with dire consequences by showing his ‘Chappal’. Consequently, the Appellant had to face disciplinary enquiry. On being found guilty, he was inflicted with punishment of dismissal from service. Assailing the imposition of punishment of dismissal the Appellant instead of approaching the labour machinery, had filed O.J.C. No. 2041 of 1987 before this Court. The writ petition was disposed of, vide judgment dated 14.12.1989 with the following direction: “7. In view of our conclusion that there has been no procedural illegality or infirmity in the order of dismissal being passed and since this Court cannot exercise the jurisdiction and power conferred on the Labour Court to substitute its measures of punishment in place of the managerial wisdom even if it is satisfied that the order of discharge of dismissal was not justified in the facts and circumstances of the case, while exercising jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution directly against an order of dismissal, the only recourse open for us is to direct the petitioner to approach the Industrial Court if he is so advised, which, in other words, would mean an enquiry by way of a conciliatory proceeding and in the event there is a failure report, then to approach the State Govt. for making a reference to the Industrial Tribunal as to whether the punishment inflicted upon the petitioner is illegal and/or unjustified and the relief, if any, which the petitioner is entitled to, particularly when the petitioner has already lost quite a few years in approaching this Court and the matter being pending. 8. for making a reference to the Industrial Tribunal as to whether the punishment inflicted upon the petitioner is illegal and/or unjustified and the relief, if any, which the petitioner is entitled to, particularly when the petitioner has already lost quite a few years in approaching this Court and the matter being pending. 8. In view of the aforesaid submission of the learned counsel for the Opposite parties while we are not inclined to interfere with the order of dismissal passed, we direct that the appropriate authority of the State Govt. should make a reference to the Industrial Tribunal bearing in mind the observations made by us in this judgment and such a reference be made within a period of three months from the date of receipt of our orders.” 3. Pursuant to the judgment dated 14.12.1989, the Appellant had approached the labour machinery. Consequently, the matter was referred to learned Industrial Tribunal, Bhubaneswar and was registered as I.D. Case No.37 of 1991. Both the parties to the reference had declined to adduce any evidence for adjudication and had prayed that learned Tribunal to confine his finding only to the quantum of punishment imposed on the Workman (Appellant). Accordingly, learned Tribunal heard the parties at length and passed an award on 15.09.1993 holding as under: “9. In view of my discussions made above and on a scrutiny of the facts, circumstances and the gravity of the charge, I am of the considered opinion that the punishment imposed on the workman by dismissing him from service is shockingly disproportionate to the charge. This being my finding he should be reinstated in service with full back wages. This payment be made within three months from the date of publication of the Award.” Assailing the same, Respondent No.1 preferred O.J.C. No. 2833 of 1994, which was disposed of on 23.04.2001 reducing the award of full back wages to the Appellant by 50%. Assailing the same, the writ appeal has been filed. 4. Learned counsel for the Appellant strenuously argued that Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short, ‘the I.D. Act’) confers power on the Tribunal to pass an award reinstating the Workman on such terms and conditions as it thinks fit, when the order dismissal is held to be unjustified. 4. Learned counsel for the Appellant strenuously argued that Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short, ‘the I.D. Act’) confers power on the Tribunal to pass an award reinstating the Workman on such terms and conditions as it thinks fit, when the order dismissal is held to be unjustified. In the case at hand, learned Tribunal finding that punishment of the dismissal imposed on the Appellant being shockingly disproportionate to the charges, directed for reinstatement of the Appellant with full back wages. The award of reinstatement with full back wages is a discretionary relief granted by learned Tribunal, which should not have been interfered with in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is the normal rule that when the dismissal of the Workman is found to be unjustified or in contravention of law, he is entitled to reinstatement with full back wages, which the learned Tribunal had directed. There is no pleading or evidence whatsoever available on record to the effect that the Workman (the Appellant) was gainfully employed elsewhere after the order of dismissal was passed by the Management (the Respondent No.1). As such, learned Single Judge has committed error of law in reducing the award of back wages by 50%, which is not sustainable in the eyes of law. In support of his case, he relied upon a decision in the case of Surendra Kumar Verma Vs. Central Government Industrial Tribunal-Cum-Labour Court, New Delhi, reported in (1980) 4 SCC 443 . He therefore, prayed for setting aside the order passed in O.J.C. No. 2833 of 1994. 5. Learned counsel for the Management-Respondent No.1 refuted the contention raised by learned counsel for the Appellant. It was his submission that assailing the order of punishment of dismissal, the Appellant had approached this Court in O.J.C. No. 2041 of 1987. This Court disposed of the writ petition holding that there was no procedural illegality or infirmity in the order of dismissal passed by RespondentNo.1-Management. Thus, the question of quantum of punishment inflicted upon the workman had remained to be adjudicated by the Industrial Tribunal. Both the parties had declined to adduce evidence before the learned Industrial Tribunal. Thus, the fact that the Appellant was guilty of misconduct had reached its finality. Thus, the question of quantum of punishment inflicted upon the workman had remained to be adjudicated by the Industrial Tribunal. Both the parties had declined to adduce evidence before the learned Industrial Tribunal. Thus, the fact that the Appellant was guilty of misconduct had reached its finality. While adjudicating the question of quantum of punishment, learned Tribunal had directed for reinstatement of the workman with full back wages, which was assailed in O.J.C. No.2833 of 1994. During pendency of the writ petition, the Appellant-Workman was reinstated in service. Thus, the only question that remained to be adjudicated by learned Single Judge was with regard to quantum of back wages the Appellant was entitled to. Admittedly, the Appellant has been found guilty in a domestic enquiry, which warranted imposition of proportionate punishment. The direction of learned Tribunal for reinstatement of the Workman with full back wages can, by no stretch of imagination, be treated to be a punishment, much less ‘proportionate punishment’. Learned Single Judge taking into consideration the fact that the Workman had already been reinstated in service and nine years had already elapsed by the time the impugned order was passed, reduced the quantum of award of back wages by 50%. As such, no illegality can be found with the impugned order. In support of his contention, he relied upon a decision in the case of Employers, MGMT., M. Colliery, BCCL Ltd. Vs. Bihar Colliery Kamgar Union through Workmen, reported in AIR 2005 SC 2006 and prayed for dismissal of the writ appeal. 6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. On consent of learned counsel for the parties, the appeal is taken up for final disposal at the admission stage. 7. The only question that arises for consideration in this appeal is, whether the writ Court was justified in reducing the award of full back wages to the Workman by 50%. 8. This Court, while disposing of O.J.C. No. 2041 of 1987, holding that no procedural illegality or infirmity was found in conducting domestic enquiry, directed the Workman-Appellant (petitioner therein) to approach the labour machinery for consideration of quantum of punishment imposed on him. Accordingly, on being approached by the Appellant, the matter was referred to learned Industrial Tribunal before whom parties had declined to adduce evidence in support of their respective case. Accordingly, on being approached by the Appellant, the matter was referred to learned Industrial Tribunal before whom parties had declined to adduce evidence in support of their respective case. While holding that the punishment imposed on the Appellant by dismissing him from service was shockingly disproportionate to the charges levelled against him, learned Tribunal directed for reinstatement of the Appellant in service with full back wages. It is not disputed that the Appellant has already been reinstated in service pursuant to the award of learned Tribunal. Ordinarily, when a termination, discharge or dismissal is found to be unjustified, the Workman would be entitled to reinstatement with full back wages. But the discretion conferred upon learned Tribunal, while exercising power under Section 11-A of the I.D. Act to pass an award, should be exercised judicially commensurating to the facts and circumstances of each case. In the case at hand, the misconduct of the Workman-Appellant has been proved and reached its finality and he has already been reinstated in the mean time. Thus, awarding full back wages would amount to rewarding the Workman for his misconduct, which can never be the intent of the Legislature conferring power on the Industrial Adjudicator under Section 11-A of the ID Act. The case of Surendra Kumar Verma (supra) relied upon by learned counsel for the Appellant has no application to the present case, as in the said case, the Workman was retrenched from service without complying with the mandatory provisions of Section 25-F of the ID Act. Hence, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the Workman should be reinstated in service with full back wages. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Employers, MGMT., M. Colliery, BCCL Ltd. (supra), while dealing with the scope of Section 11-A of the ID Act, held as follows: “13. It is well established principle in law that in a given circumstance it is open to the Industrial Tribunal acting under Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 has the jurisdiction to interfere with the punishment awarded in the domestic inquiry for good and valid reasons. If the Tribunal decides to interfere with such punishment it should bear in mind the principle of proportionality between the gravity of the offence and the stringency of the punishment. If the Tribunal decides to interfere with such punishment it should bear in mind the principle of proportionality between the gravity of the offence and the stringency of the punishment. In the instant case it is the finding of the Tribunal which is not disturbed by the writ courts that the two workmen involved in this appeal along with the others formed themselves into an unlawful assembly, armed with deadly weapons, went to the office of General Manager and assaulted him and his colleagues causing them injuries. The injuries suffered by the General Manager were caused by lathi on the head. The fact that the victim did not die is not a mitigating circumstance to reduce the sentence of dismissal.” (emphasis supplied) It is thus clear from the above case law that if the learned Tribunal decides to interfere with the quantum of punishment it should keep in mind principle of proportionality between the gravity of the offence and the stringency of the punishment. 9. From a close scrutiny of the award passed under Annexure-2, it is clear that learned Tribunal has not assigned any reason, while directing reinstatement of the Workman with full back wages except holding the punishment of dismissal of the Appellant to be shockingly disproportionate to the charges. Learned Tribunal in the case at hand has miserably failed to realize that the guilt of the accused has already been proved and reached its finality. In the case of Hindustan Tin Works Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Employees of Hindustan Tin Works Pvt. Ltd., reported in AIR 1979 SC 75 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows: “...the very nature of things there cannot to a straight jacket formula for awarding relief of back wages. All relevant considerations will enter the verdict. More or less, it would be a motion addressed to the discretion of the Tribunal. Full back wages would be the normal rule and the party objecting to it must establish the circumstances necessitating departure. At that stage, the Tribunal has to exercise its discretion keeping in view all the relevant circumstances. But the discretion must be exercised in a judicial and judicious manner. The reason for exercising discretion must be cogent and convincing and must appear on of the face of the record. At that stage, the Tribunal has to exercise its discretion keeping in view all the relevant circumstances. But the discretion must be exercised in a judicial and judicious manner. The reason for exercising discretion must be cogent and convincing and must appear on of the face of the record. When it is said that something is to be done within the discretion of the authority, that something is to be done according to the rules of reason and justice, according to law and not humor. It is not to be arbitrary, vague and fanciful but legal and regular.” (emphasis supplied) Hence, the award of full back wages to the Workman without assigning any reason thereto is cryptic and non-speaking. Thus, the same is not sustainable in the eyes of law. True it is that, the party claiming reduction in award of back wages, has to plead and prove that he is not entitled to the same. If the Management claims that the Workman is not entitled to the full back wages, it has to plead and prove the same. Admittedly, in the case at hand, although the Management (Respondent No.1) had taken a plea that the Workman (Appellant) is not entitled to be reinstated, neither pleaded nor led any evidence to the effect that the Workman was gainfully employed, but that has got no relevance in the facts and circumstances of this case. The issue before the learned Tribunal was with regard to adequacy of the punishment. Adequacy of the punishment does not mean that the same should be waived in toto, when misconduct of the Workman had already been proved. In the case at hand, by awarding reinstatement with full back wages, Appellant has been virtually rewarded for his misconduct. Thus, the award of reinstatement with full back wages to the Appellant is not sustainable at all in the eyes of law. The writ Court considering the fact that the Workman has already been reinstated and nine years had already lapsed by the time the impugned order was passed, reduced the award of full back wages by 50%. Learned counsel for the Appellant has also not made out any case to interfere or to vary the order passed by the Writ Court. The writ Court considering the fact that the Workman has already been reinstated and nine years had already lapsed by the time the impugned order was passed, reduced the award of full back wages by 50%. Learned counsel for the Appellant has also not made out any case to interfere or to vary the order passed by the Writ Court. Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances, particularly the gravity of offence committed by the Workman, we do not find any justification to interfere with the order of the Writ court. 10. In view of the discussions made above, we find no infirmity in the impugned order under Annexure-1 passed by the writ Court. As such, the appeal merits no consideration and is accordingly dismissed.