JUDGMENT : Sanjay Karol, J. In the present appeal, filed by the defendants, under the provisions of Section 10 of the Letters Patent, we are called upon to decide the correctness of findings returned by the learned Single Judge, in disposing of two applications, being OMPs No.237 of 2008 & 290 of 2008 (in Civil Suit No.48 of 2008), so decided by a common judgment dated 12.8.2009, passed in the case tiled as Vinod Kumar Goel v. Ravinder Kumar Kansal & another. 2. Insofar as dismissal of application for grant of interim injunction (OMP No.237 of 2008) is concerned, there is no challenge laid by the defendant. Also, plaintiff has not filed any appeal. As such, we are not deciding correctness of dismissal thereof. 3. Insofar as OMP No.290 of 2008 is concerned, it is an application, filed by defendant No.1, seeking dismissal of the suit, for being barred under the provisions of sub-rule (3) of Rule 2 of Order 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as CPC. Holding that even though property and some of the parties to the lis are same, but since causes of action disclosed in the plaints are not identical, keeping in view the principle of law that not only abandonment of a right, but also relinquishment with the knowledge of existence of such a right, was necessary, learned Single Judge rejected the application. 4. While contending that the cause of action, in both the suits, being same and similar, and the plaintiff having omitted to claim the relief sought for in the subsequent suit, the same being barred under the provisions of Order 2 Rule 2 CPC, learned counsel for the defendants (appellants herein), seeks reliance upon the following decisions: 1. Virgo Industries (Eng.) Private Limited v. Venturetech Solutions Private Limited, (2013) 1 SCC 625 ; 2. Coffee Board v. Ramesh Exports Private Limited, (2014) 6 SCC 424 ; 3. Kamal Kishore Saboo v. Nawabzada Humanyun Kamal Hasan Khan, AIR 2001 Delhi 220; and 4. Amar Singh v. Shiv Dutt & others, 2014 (3) Him.L.R. 1560. 5. On the other hand, in support of the judgment, learned counsel for the plaintiff (respondent herein), seeks reliance upon the following decisions: 1. Rathnavathi & another v. Kavita Ganashamdas, (2015) 5 SCC 223 ; and 2. Inbasagaran & another v. S. Natarajan (Dead) through LRs, (2015) 11 SCC 12 . 6. 5. On the other hand, in support of the judgment, learned counsel for the plaintiff (respondent herein), seeks reliance upon the following decisions: 1. Rathnavathi & another v. Kavita Ganashamdas, (2015) 5 SCC 223 ; and 2. Inbasagaran & another v. S. Natarajan (Dead) through LRs, (2015) 11 SCC 12 . 6. Let us first examine the facts. 7. Ravinder Kumar Kansal (defendant No.1) is the owner of the suit property. Vide agreement dated 19.4.2008, he agreed to sell the same to plaintiff Vinod Goel. As per the agreement, sale was to be executed on or before 19.7.2008. 8. On 12.5.2008, plaintiff presented a plaint, praying for a decree of permanent prohibitory injunction, restraining the defendant from alienating the suit property. In the said plaint, it stood specifically recorded that since cause of action to file the suit for specific performance of the agreement, subject matter of the suit, has not arisen, for the sale deed was to be executed upto 19.7.2008, the suit is being filed with a limited prayer. 9. Now significantly, in the very same plaint, on which much emphasis is laid by the defendants, reference is also made of the fact that on 14.5.2008, defendant No.1 had refused to receive the sale consideration and threatened to alienate and encumber the suit property. 10. It is a matter of record that notice in the suit came to be issued and order passed in the plaintiff’s application for grant of interim injunction. 11. It cannot be disputed that on 12.5.2008, Ravinder Kumar Kansal (defendant No.1) executed Release Deed. By virtue of the said Release Deed, all rights stood transferred in favour of Bharat Bhushan. 12. Resultantly, on 31.5.2008, plaintiff filed the subsequent (instant) suit, seeking specific performance of agreement dated 19.4.2008 against Ravinder Kumar Kansal (defendant No.1), impleading Bharat Bhushan as defendant No.2 (he is not a party in the earlier suit). It is a matter of record that factum of filing of earlier suit is not disclosed in the subsequent suit. But however, the cause of action, so disclosed in the subsequent plaint, is the execution of (a) agreement dated 19.4.2008, (b) deed of relinquishment dated 12.5.2008, (c) and issuance of notice dated 10.5.2008 by the defendant. 13. It is also a matter of record that in view of subsequent suit, on 27.6.2008, plaintiff withdrew the earlier suit pending in the Court of Civil Judge (Senior Division). 13. It is also a matter of record that in view of subsequent suit, on 27.6.2008, plaintiff withdrew the earlier suit pending in the Court of Civil Judge (Senior Division). It is in the subsequent suit, pending before this Court, that defendant No.1 has filed the instant application. 14. It is a matter of record that earlier suit came to be withdrawn, for the plaintiff being dominus litis, has all rights to pursue the matter, in the manner best advised. 15. Sub-rule (3) of Rule 2 of Order 2 CPC prescribes that a person entitled to more than one relief in respect of the same cause of action, may seek for all or any of such reliefs, but if he so omits, to do so, except with the leave of the Court, to sue for all such reliefs, he shall not afterwards sue for any relief so omitted. 16. Whether the claim in the new suit is founded on the same or distinct cause of action is for the Court to adjudge, on the following principles, summarized by the Hon’ble Judges of the Privy Council, in Mohammad Khalil Khan & others v. Mahbub Ali Mian & others, AIR (36) 1949 Privy Council 78, in the following terms: “61. The principles laid down in the cases thus far discussed may be thus summarized: (1) The correct test in cases falling under O.2, R.2, is “whether the claim in the new suit is in fact founded upon a cause of action distinct from that which was the foundation for the former suit”. Moonshee Buzloor Ruheem v. Shumsunnissa Begum, (19=867.11 M.I.A. 551 : 2 Sar. 259 P.C.) (supra). (2) The cause of action means every fact which will be necessary for the plaintiff to prove if traversed in order to support his right to the judgment. Read v. Brown, (1889-22 Q.B.D. 128: 58 L.J.Q.B. 120) (supra). (3) If the evidence to support the two claims is different, then the causes of action are also different. Brunsden v. Humphrey, (1889-14 Q.B.D.141 : 53 L.J.Q.B. 476 (supra). (4) The causes of action in the two suits may be considered to be the same if in substance they are identical. Brunsden v. Humphrey, (1889-14 Q.B.D.141 : 53 L.J.Q.B. 476 (supra). Brunsden v. Humphrey, (1889-14 Q.B.D.141 : 53 L.J.Q.B. 476 (supra). (4) The causes of action in the two suits may be considered to be the same if in substance they are identical. Brunsden v. Humphrey, (1889-14 Q.B.D.141 : 53 L.J.Q.B. 476 (supra). (5) The cause of action has no relation whatever to the defence that may be set up by the defendant nor does it depend upon the character of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff. It refers … to the media upon which the plaintiff asks the Court to arrive at a conclusion in his favour. Muss. Chandkour v. Partap Singh, (15 I.A. 156 : 16 Cal. 98 P.C.) (supra). This observation was made by Lort Watson in a case under S. 43 of the Act of 1882 (corresponding to O.2, R.2), where plaintiff made various claims in the same suit.” 17. It is also a settled principle of law that before the subsequent suit of the plaintiff can be held to be barred, it must be shown by the applicant that the said suit is based on the same cause of action, on which the earlier suit was based and if the cause of action is same in both the suits and if in the earlier suit plaintiff had not sued for any one of the reliefs so available, on the basis of that cause of action, the reliefs which it had failed to press into service in that suit, cannot be subsequently prayed for, except with the leave of the court. What is significant is that the suits must be based on the same cause of action. This is a settled position of law, as emerging from the decisions rendered by the Apex Court in Gurbux Singh v. Bhooralal, AIR 1964 SC 1810 , Constitution Bench (Five Judges); Deva Ram & another v. Ishwar Chand & another, (1995) 6 SCC 733 ; Bengal Waterproof Limited v. Bombay Waterproof Manufacturing Company & another, (1997) 1 SCC 99 ; and Kunjan Nair Sivaraman Nair v. Narayanan Nair & others, (2004) 3 SCC 277 . 18. In the instant case, in our considered view, cause of action, so pleaded by the plaintiff in both the suits, is distinct and separate. No doubt in the first suit, plaintiff does mention refusal on the part of Ravinder Kumar Kansal (defendant No.1) to accept the money. 18. In the instant case, in our considered view, cause of action, so pleaded by the plaintiff in both the suits, is distinct and separate. No doubt in the first suit, plaintiff does mention refusal on the part of Ravinder Kumar Kansal (defendant No.1) to accept the money. But then, it is also averred, rather categorically, that time for getting the sale deed executed, has not expired and only on reasonable apprehension, emanating out of the alleged threats of the property being alienated, the suit stands filed. It is not the case of the defendant that as on the date of filing of the subsequent suit, plaintiff was aware of defendant No.1 having transferred interest in the property in favour of defendant No.2. Cause of action, thus, in our considered view, for filing the subsequent suit, arose with defendant No.1 transferring the property in favour of defendant No.2, as also not executing the sale deed on the date so stipulated in the agreement for sale, which undisputedly was subsequent to the date of filing of the earlier suit. Thus, cause of action being distinct and separate, it cannot be said that plaintiff omitted to seek the relief which he was entitled to, at the time of presentation of the first plaint. 19. We find, on almost similar facts, the Apex Court, in Rathnavathi (supra), to have decided the issue as under: “25.1. So far as the suit for permanent injunction is concerned, it was based on a threat given to the plaintiff by the defendants to dispossess her from the suit house on 2.1.2000 and 9.1.2000. This would be clear from reading Para 17 of the plaint. So far as cause of action to file suit for specific performance of agreement is concerned, the same was based on non performance of agreement dated 15.2.1989 by defendant No.2 in plaintiff’s favour despite giving legal notice dated 6.3.2000 to defendant no.2 to perform her part. 25.2. In our considered opinion, both the suits were, therefore, founded on different causes of action and hence could be filed simultaneously. Indeed even the ingredients to file the suit for permanent injunction re different than that of the suit for specific performance of agreement.” 20. On similar facts is the decision rendered by the Apex Court in Inbasagaran (supra). 21. In our considered opinion, both the suits were, therefore, founded on different causes of action and hence could be filed simultaneously. Indeed even the ingredients to file the suit for permanent injunction re different than that of the suit for specific performance of agreement.” 20. On similar facts is the decision rendered by the Apex Court in Inbasagaran (supra). 21. Reliance by the defendants on Virgo Industries (supra), as also Coffee Board (supra), is misplaced, for the facts being totally different. As already observed, in the instant case, in the first plaint, it came to be averred that the cause of action for claiming relief for specific performance had not arisen, in view of the time stipulated in the agreement and the suit for injunction was filed only on the basis of threats extended and there being reasonable apprehension of the property being alienated. Noticeably, such apprehension turned out to be true with the execution of Release Deed, which led to the filing of the subsequent suit. Thus, the essential ingredient pointed out in Coffee Board (supra) of the foundation of the subsequent suit, being on same and similar cause of action, is missing in the instant case. In the earlier suit, it was not mentioned that defendant No.1 had threatened to alienate the property in favour of defendant No.2 or that any such steps were taken in that direction. Plaintiff was not even aware of such fact. Also, for the very same reason, we do not find the decisions rendered in Kamal Kishore Saboo (supra) and Amar Singh (supra) to be applicable. 22. With vehemence, Mr. Arjun Lall, learned counsel for the defendants, invites our attention to the decision rendered in CWP No.364 of 2016, titled as Pratap Singh Verma v. State of H.P. & others, wherein this court deprecated the practice adopted by dishonest litigant, in instituting lis on false claims and defences, by abusing the process of law, more so by suppressing material facts. 23. Issue of suppression, in our considered view, stands considered by the learned Single Judge, while dismissing the application for grant of interim injunction. We notice the learned Single Judge to have clarified, not to have expressed any opinion on merits, leaving all facts to be considered and decided, while deciding the settled issues. 24. 23. Issue of suppression, in our considered view, stands considered by the learned Single Judge, while dismissing the application for grant of interim injunction. We notice the learned Single Judge to have clarified, not to have expressed any opinion on merits, leaving all facts to be considered and decided, while deciding the settled issues. 24. As such, we find no reason to interfere with the order passed by the learned Single Judge in OMPs No.237 of 2008 & 290 of 2008 (in Civil Suit No.48 of 2008), so decided by a common judgment dated 12.8.2009, passed in the case tiled as Vinod Kumar Goel v. Ravinder Kumar Kansal & another. Hence, the appeal is dismissed. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of and interim order vacated.