ORDER : HEMANT GUPTA, CJ. The challenge in the present writ petition is to the communication (Annexure-P/31) dated 17-11-2016 whereby Road Sweeping Machine supplied by the petitioner was not accepted to be in terms of the tender conditions, thus the petitioner was not entitled to any amount from the Municipal Corporation on account of failure of the petitioner to perform contract as per contract of acceptance dated 3-12-2015 accepting the bid offered by the petitioner. 2. The brief facts leading to the present petition are that a tender was issued by the Municipal Corporation, Rewa (for short ‘the Corporation’) on 10-9-2015 for supply and delivery of Truck Mounted Johnston Sweepers Ltd., UK make road sweeper Model - VT - 561 E Duel Sweeper Skid Unit or equivalent make (as per specification attached to the tender documents) on Truck Chassis for Municipal Solid Water Management at Rewa City. The bid was to be submitted in two parts, (i) qualification criteria and technical bid; and (ii) financial bid. The petitioner offered the option of 100% advance payment against proforma invoice for supply of chassis whereas for supply of equipment was against 100% advance payment to be made against submission of a valid bank guarantee for six months. 3. The financial bid of the petitioner was opened on 15-10-2015. The same was accepted by the Corporation in its resolution on 2-11-2015. Thereafter, the letter of acceptance was issued whereby the petitioner was asked to submit bank guarantee for a value of Rs. 18,20,000/-, i.e. 10% of the contract value which would be valid for a period of 36 months. The work order was issued on 3-12-2015 with delivery period of four months with contract value of Rs. 1,82,00,000/- (Annexure-P/7). As per the petitioner, the cost of chassis was Rs. 18,04,430/- and the cost of equipment was Rs. 1,63,95,570/-. The latter amount was to be released on payment of bank guarantee which was to be valid for a period of six months. 4. The stand of the petitioner is that it sought shipment of the Road Sweeper Model - VT - 651E on 2-3-2016 and, therefore, it sought 100% payment on furnishing of advance bank guarantee on immediate basis in order to avoid demurrage charges of custom and clear the consignment without any delay. It was on 15-3-2016 partial advance of Rs. 1,00,00,000/- (Rupees One Crore) was released in favour of the petitioner. It was on 15-3-2016 partial advance of Rs. 1,00,00,000/- (Rupees One Crore) was released in favour of the petitioner. The petitioner sought release of balance advance payment of Rs. 63,95,570/- before 31-3-2016. The stand of the petitioner is that it received a message from Shri A.P. Shukla, Assistant Engineer of the Corporation that the balance advance payment of Rs. 63,95,970/- will be released only after delivery of Road Sweeping Machine at Rewa. Such condition was said to be in violation of the terms and conditions of the tender document by the petitioner. The petitioner informed the Corporation on 26-4-2016 that it has initiated the chassis procurement process by placing purchase order on chassis supplier - Eicher. On receipt of the chassis, the petitioner will complete mounting and integration and will send the pre-despatch inspection call to the Corporation. 5. It was on 9-5-2016, the petitioner informed the Corporation that the chassis is reaching the factory of the petitioner by 31-5-2016 and sought information of exact date of visit, name of the visiting officials so as to enable it to make necessary arrangement for inspection of the machine. The petitioner is said to have dispatched the Road Sweeping Machine from Pune on 16-5-2016 which reached Rewa on 20-5-2016. The petitioner also informed the RITES Ltd. that it has supplied KAMSWEEP Model VT-651 special purpose vehicle mounted Johnston Make Machine mounted on 16 Ton Gross Vehicle Weight Chassis to the Corporation. The third party agency RITES Ltd. is said to have carried out inspection of the Road Sweeper Machine on 26th and 27th of May, 2016. 6. As per petitioner, the machine was found to be as per technical specifications mentioned in the tender document by M/s. RITES Ltd. However, the petitioner was informed on 6-6-2016 that during the joint inspection, the machine was found to be leaving some dust on road surface and it escapes a lot of dust through dust collection tank mounted on the machine. The Corporation also found some part/components of the machine without seal and identification of manufacturer to show that these parts were supplied by Johnston Sweepers Ltd., UK and some alteration has been done before delivery. 7. The Corporation also found some part/components of the machine without seal and identification of manufacturer to show that these parts were supplied by Johnston Sweepers Ltd., UK and some alteration has been done before delivery. 7. The stand of the petitioner is that the Machine has been supplied in total compliance to the technical specifications mentioned in the tender document and issue of non-mentioning of the name, seal, serial, identification, make for the components etc. will be forwarded to Johnston Sweepers Ltd. for clarification. Thereafter, the Johnston Sweeper Ltd. is said to have clarified on 9-6-2016 that the Machine in question was supplied to the petitioner fully built and tested from the UK and it does not label every single component. Thereafter, on 22-7-2016, the Corporation found performance of the Road Sweeper Machine unsatisfactory and decided to invoke the advance bank guarantee and performance bank guarantee. 8. The petitioner then filed a civil suit for injunction in the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division, Pune on 28-7-2016, but before any interim order could be communicated, the bank guarantee was encashed. It is thereafter the petitioner filed the present writ petition after it received a letter of cancellation of contract on 17-11-2016. 9. Counsel appearing for the Corporation has raised preliminary objection that the instant writ petition is not maintainable, as the petitioner has filed a suit on the same cause of action claiming similar reliefs from the Civil Court as have been claimed in the present writ petition. For ready reference the prayer made in the civil suit by the petitioner reads thus: (a) The defendant No. 1 Corporation either personally or through its officers, servants, employees or agents etc. be restrained by order of temporary injunction from acting on the basis of the letter dated 22-7-2016 invoking the Advance Bank Guarantee and Performance Bank Guarantee as well as from taking any steps or coercive action for encashment of the said Bank Guarantee. (b) The defendant No. 2 and 3 banks, its agents, assigns or officers be restrained by an order of interim injunction from acting on the basis of the letter dated 22-7-2016 releasing or honouring the Advance Bank Guarantee and Performance Bank Guarantee to the defendant No. 1, Corporation. (b) The defendant No. 2 and 3 banks, its agents, assigns or officers be restrained by an order of interim injunction from acting on the basis of the letter dated 22-7-2016 releasing or honouring the Advance Bank Guarantee and Performance Bank Guarantee to the defendant No. 1, Corporation. (c) The defendant may kindly be restrained by order of stay in the form of interim relief from taking any coercive action and/or from taking any steps on the basis of impugned letter dated 22-7-2016 from invoking, encashing or releasing the payment under the Bank Guarantee. (d) The plaintiff be allowed to amend and or alter the plaint if necessary.” 10. After filing of the suit, the contract was cancelled by letter dated 17-11-2016 which is the subject-matter of challenge in the present writ petition. The petitioner has claimed the following reliefs: “7.1 To issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari, quashing and setting aside the order dated 22-7-2016 and invocation or encashment of Bank Guarantee by the respondent No. 1 hereinabove; 7.2 To direct the respondent No. 1, Corporation to pay an interest at the rate of 18% per annum on Rs. 1,00,00,000/- (One crore only) w.e.f. The date of invocation of the Bank Guarantee up to the actual date of payment; 7.3 To direct the, respondent No. 1, Corporation to pay the legally due and payable amount of Rs. 63,95,570/- (Rupees Sixty three lacs ninety five thousand five hundred seventy only) towards the arrears of consideration for the agreed price of Truck Mounted Johnston Make Road Sweeper Model VT - 65IE Duel Sweeper Skid unit machine; 7.4 To direct the respondent No. 1, Corporation to pay an interest at the rate of 18% per annum on the amount of Rs. 63,95,570/- (Rupees Sixty three lakhs ninety five thousand five hundred seventy only) mentioned hereinabove w.e.f. 25-5-2016 the date of supply of the requisite Truck Mounted Johnston Make Road Sweeper Model VT - 65 IE Duel Sweeper Skid unit Machine up to the actual date of payment aforesaid; 7.5 To quash or set aside the order dated 17-11-2016 passed by respondent No. 1 and cancel the contract/agreement dated 2-12-2015 delivery of Johnston Make Road Sweeper Model VT-651E Duel Sweeper Skid unit Machine.” 11. It is admitted by the petitioner that an advance bank guarantee for a sum of Rs. It is admitted by the petitioner that an advance bank guarantee for a sum of Rs. 1,63,95,570/- towards the supply of Road Sweeper machine valid for a period of six months was submitted to the Corporation. 12. In the return, the stand of the Corporation is that the Corporation paid a sum of Rs. 1,00,00,000/- and that the petitioner has not stated the facts correctly in the petition. The petitioner, as per the agreement, was to supply Truck Mount Johnston Make Road Sweeper Model VT-651E Duel Sweeper Skid unit machine. During course of trial, it was found that the machine was extremely defective and unable to sweep the road; and that the parts of the machine were not manufactured by the Johnston Sweeper Limited, UK. It is asserted that 47 such defects were pointed out to the petitioner vide communication dated 3-6-2016, Annexure-P/23. It is denied in the reply that the bank guarantee was to be returned immediately on delivery of the Machine. It is stated that the petitioner was interested in getting the public money from the Corporation without supplying the machine as per the standard specifications enumerated in the tender document. It is pointed out that the petitioner was informed that the balance payment will be made only after supply of the Machine which is not at all any deviation and infringement of tender document but in the consonance of the tender document. The petitioner was only interested to obtain public money without performing the contract. It is also asserted that the petitioner has not placed any purchase order to Johnston Sweeper Ltd., U.K. It is denied that the petitioner paid any international freight, custom duty and insurance for the Machine in question because the Corporation endeavoured hard to contact M/s. Johnston Sweeper Ltd. through telephone provided by the petitioner but the Corporation did not receive any response in that behalf. The specific reply of the Corporation is as under:— “32. That, the contents of the para 5.27 of the writ petition is vehemently denied. It is denied that the machine was found as per the technical specification mentioned in the tender documents. It is also denied that the petitioner has also conducted any trials commissioning for 13 days, 125 hours sweeping hours 61 and 201 K.M. It is submitted that the answering respondent was not at all satisfied with the machine. It is denied that the machine was found as per the technical specification mentioned in the tender documents. It is also denied that the petitioner has also conducted any trials commissioning for 13 days, 125 hours sweeping hours 61 and 201 K.M. It is submitted that the answering respondent was not at all satisfied with the machine. The answering respondent has stated in the letter dated 3-6-2016 by which it has pointed out as many as 47 defects. It is also mentioned in the letter dated 3-6-2016 that at the time of joint inspection from 26-5-2016 to 28-5-2016 it came into the notice that the delivered machine was leaving dust under surface, also it escapes a lot of dust collection tank mounted with the machine and the parts of the machine do not appear from the Johnston manufacture. The answering respondent has also written to the Manager, RITES Ltd., Western Region, Church Gate, Mumbai in connection with the vague report submitted by Inspector Mr. Puran Singh, Raipur, Chhattisgarh and to issue necessary orders for re-inspection through Senior Officers of your organization. Thus, the answering respondent has never accepted the machine supplied by the petitioner. A copy of the letter dated 3-6-2016 is already filed as Annexure-P/23. All other adverse allegation in the instant para is denied. 33. That, the contents of the para 5.28 of the writ petition is admitted to the extent that by letter dated 3-6-2016 the answering respondent pointed out the defects. All other adverse litigation in the instant para is denied. The answering respondent simultaneously wrote a letter dated 3-5-2016 to M/s. Johnston Sweeper Ltd. U.K., regarding the supply regarding the supply and delivery of the machine in question. The answering respondent also sought various clarifications regarding the status of authorized dealer of the company in India and whether the company has allowed the alternation of machine and its parts. It is submitted that the answering respondent has not received any communication regarding the letter and its queries. It is submitted that the officials of the answering tried to contact the Johnston Company through telephone provided by the petitioner the answering respondent did not receive any response. Hence, the machine supplied by the petitioner is not the machine as per the specification mentioned in the tender. A copy of the letter dated 3-6-2016 is filed herewith as Annexure-R-¼. 34. Hence, the machine supplied by the petitioner is not the machine as per the specification mentioned in the tender. A copy of the letter dated 3-6-2016 is filed herewith as Annexure-R-¼. 34. That, the contents of the para 5.29 of the writ petition is specifically denied. It is vehemently denied that the machine was total compliance of technical specification mentioned in the tender documents. It is submitted that the machine is sub-standard and is not purchased from M/s. Johnston Sweeper Ltd. UK. The machine is unable to sweep the road and in the parts of the machine the seal and serial number and its identification number of M/s. Johnston Sweeper Company do not appear. The petitioner has not taken any action to rectify the mistake of the machine. All other adverse allegation in the instant para is denied. 35. That, the contents of the para 5.30 of the writ petition is vehemently denied. It is denied that the petitioner had made any communication regarding the machine to M/s. Johnston Sweeper Ltd. UK. It is also denied that the M/s. Johnston Sweeper Ltd. UK has confirmed vide letter dated 9-6-2016 that the machine was supplied to the petitioner fully built and tested from the UK. The letter dated 9-6-2016 (Annexure-P/25) appears to be fabricated as the answering respondent is preceding paragraphs has mentioned that it has not made any contact to M/s. Johnston Sweeper Ltd., UK regarding the authenticity of the machine. All other adverse allegations in the instant para are denied.” 13. Counsel for the petitioner vehemently argued that the respondents are bound to make payment of the machine on the principle of promissory estoppel, as the petitioner has supplied the machine as per tender conditions. The petitioner has undertaken to remove the defects as pointed out by the Corporation, but still the Corporation has proceeded to invoke the bank guarantee. Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the judgments rendered in Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P., (1979) 2 SCC 409 : AIR 1979 SC 621 and Gangotri Enterprizes Ltd. v. Union of India, 2016 MPLJ Online (S.C.) 9 : (2016) 11 SCC 720 : AIR 2016 SC 2199 . He submitted that on the basis of doctrine of promissory estoppel, the petitioner is entitled to payment of the price of the Machine in question and invocation of the bank guarantee is illegal. He submitted that on the basis of doctrine of promissory estoppel, the petitioner is entitled to payment of the price of the Machine in question and invocation of the bank guarantee is illegal. The argument of the counsel for the petitioner regarding promissory estoppel is based on the fact that there was limited time limit for supply of the machine of 120 days; therefore, in advance the petitioner imported the machine so that it could comply with the tender conditions. Since the machine was imported in terms of the tender submitted by the petitioner, therefore, the petitioner is entitled to entire payment of the machine in question; and that invocation of the bank guarantee of Rs. 1,00,000,00/- is not justified. 14. Relying on the judgment in Gangotri Enterprizes Ltd. (supra), learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the Corporation is the purchaser of the machine and had to quantify the damages from a competent Court or through arbitration before it could invoke the bank guarantee. 15. Counsel for the petitioner also relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Monnet Ispat and Energy Ltd. v. Union of India., (2012) 11 SCC 1 and also invoked the doctrine of legitimate expectation as discussed in J.P. Bansal v. State of Rajasthan, (2003) 5 SCC 134 : AIR 2003 SC 1405 . 16. Some of the terms and conditions of the contract entered into between the parties, being relevant for the present purpose, are extracted hereunder: “15. If any dispute arises about the contract or any terms of contract, Municipal Corporation Rewa shall be the sole arbitration and his decision would be final and binding to all the parties. 16. Test and inspect prior to dispatch/shipment and field test after delivery the following inspection and test shall be carried at manufacturer's plant by third party (Rites Ltd., Govt, of India Enterprizes) and purchaser's representative. All inspection charge would be scope of bidder. (a) Inspection and checking of details of various component specified in the specification and agreed by the bidder, particularly the details of engine, drive system, brakes, hydraulic system, electrical system, vacuum system, brushing system etc. including their capacity, make, dimension etc. The bidder shall also produce documents of import along with test certificate of manufacturer. (b) Functional test of Mechanical Sweeper to check its specified/guaranteed capacity by operating the machine continuously for four to six hours. including their capacity, make, dimension etc. The bidder shall also produce documents of import along with test certificate of manufacturer. (b) Functional test of Mechanical Sweeper to check its specified/guaranteed capacity by operating the machine continuously for four to six hours. (c) The following test shall be carried out after delivery of the equipment. (d) Field trial for 7 days (8 hours in two shifts running per day) by operating the machine at all major roads to assess functional performance of the machine. Machine shall be inspected/verified by authorized representative/s of MCR and third party (if required) with the specification. All the expenses in field trial shall be bom by bidder. xxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxx 31. Warranty clause (i) The tender would give warranty that the Machines/Equipments would continue to confirm to the description and quality as specified for a period indicated in the table given below from the date of delivery of the Machine/Equipment to be purchased and that notwithstanding the fact that the Corporation may have expected and/or approved the said Machine/Equipments, if during the guarantee/warrantee period the said Machine/equipment be discovered not to confirm to the description and quality aforesaid or have determined (and the decision of the Municipal Commissioner, MCR in that behalf will be final and conclusive) the corporation will be entitled to reject the Machines/Equipment or such portion thereof as may be discovered not to confirm to the said description and quality, on such rejection the Machines/Equipment will be at the seller's risk and all the provision relating to rejection of goods, etc. or such portion thereof as is rejection by the Corporation, otherwise the Tenderer shall pay such damage as may arise by reason of the breach of the condition herein contained. Nothing herein contained shall prejudice any other right of the in that behalf under this contract or otherwise. S. No. Name of Machine/Equipment Warranty/guarantee period 1 Mechanical Power sweeper Machine Truck mounted. Three year from the date of commissioning The Commissioner, MCR and/or his duly authorized representative shall at all reasonable time have access to the suppliers premises and shall have the power at all reasonable time to inspect and examine the materials and workmanship of the equipment/machineries during manufacturing process or afterwards as may be decided. Three year from the date of commissioning The Commissioner, MCR and/or his duly authorized representative shall at all reasonable time have access to the suppliers premises and shall have the power at all reasonable time to inspect and examine the materials and workmanship of the equipment/machineries during manufacturing process or afterwards as may be decided. (i) The tenderer shall furnish completer address of premises of his office, godown and workshop where inspection can be made together with name and address of the person who is to be contacted for the purpose. (ii) The firm is liable to execute any minor change/modification suggested at the time of inspection for which no extra payment shall be paid. 32. Rejection. — Articles not approved during inspection or testing shall be rejected and will have to be replaced by the Tenderer at his own cost with the time. xxxxxx 34. If any dispute arises out of the contract with regard to the interpretation, meaning and breach of the terms of the contract, the matter shall be referred to by the parties to the Municipal Corporation, Rewa (MCR) whose decision shall be final.” 17. We do not find any merit in the argument raised by learned counsel for the respondent that the writ petition is on the same cause of action as is raised by the petitioner before the Civil Court. The challenge in the present writ petition is of an order of cancellation of contract on 17-11-2016 and also of an action of invoking bank guarantee, whereas the challenge in the civil suit is to the decision of invocation of the bank guarantee alone. The challenge in the present writ petition includes the challenge to the bank guarantee, but it cannot be said that the writ petition itself is not maintainable. 18. We have heard counsel for the parties and find that there is no merit in the present petition. The tender conditions were specific to supply the Truck Mounted Johnston make road sweeper. The chassis price of Rs. 18,20,000/- was to be paid in advance whereas a sum of Rs. 1,63,95,570/- was to be paid against 100% amount of bank guarantee towards advance payment of equipment. Apart from such conditions, the petitioner was required to furnish performance bank guarantee of 10% contract value valid for a period of six months. The chassis price of Rs. 18,20,000/- was to be paid in advance whereas a sum of Rs. 1,63,95,570/- was to be paid against 100% amount of bank guarantee towards advance payment of equipment. Apart from such conditions, the petitioner was required to furnish performance bank guarantee of 10% contract value valid for a period of six months. But the machine itself has not been accepted as conforming to the tender conditions. 19. As per letter dated 3-6-2016 (Annexure-P/23) the petitioner was informed as many as 47 defects in the Machine. By letter dated 7-6-2016 (Annexure-P/24) the petitioner was communicated by the Corporation in respect of the defect that the machine is leaving some dust on road surface and also it escapes a lot of dust through dust collection tank mounted on the machine. Response of the petitioner is that there are over 50 Nos. of such machines working in India and majority of them have come in the form of repeat orders from renowned companies. It is pointed out that the Machine is fully imported skid unit complying with tender conditions; however, it was not in a position to answer as to why M/s. Jonhston Sweeper Ltd. was mentioned on the seal; serial number; identification name and components. 20. Admittedly, 47 defects, as pointed out by the Corporation were neither removed by the petitioner nor it was possible to remove the defects. As many as 35 defects were mentioned, as manufacture's name, seal, identification and make were not found. The stand of the Corporation is that the petitioner has given false document as if it is from M/s. Johnston Sweeper Ltd. but the said company could not be contacted to verify the assertions of the petitioner. The Corporation has taken a decision that the Machine in question is not as per the tender conditions, therefore, in exercise of power of judicial review, this Court will not examine the terms and conditions of the contract as a Court of appeal - as to whether the Machine supplied is in terms of the tender documents or not. 21. The scope of judicial review in the matter of termination of services was considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Gridco Limited v. Sadnanda Doloi, reported as (2011) 15 SCC 16 . 21. The scope of judicial review in the matter of termination of services was considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Gridco Limited v. Sadnanda Doloi, reported as (2011) 15 SCC 16 . It was held that the judicial review and resultant interference is permissible where the action of the authority is mala fide, arbitrary, irrational, disproportionate or unreasonable but impermissible if the petitioner's challenge is based only on the ground that the view taken by the authority is less reasonable. The judicial review is not so much concerned with the correctness of the ultimate decision as it is with the decision making process. The relevant extract reads as under:— “25. It is true that judicial review of matters that fall in the realm of contracts is also available before the superior Courts, but the scope of any such review is not all pervasive. It does not extend to the Court substituting its own view for that taken by the decision-making authority. Judicial review and resultant interference is permissible where the action of the authority is mala fide, arbitrary, irrational, disproportionate or unreasonable but impermissible if the petitioner's challenge is based only on the ground that the view taken by the authority may be less reasonable than what is a possible alternative. The legal position is settled that judicial review is not so much concerned with the correctness of the ultimate decision as it is with the decision-making process unless of course the decision itself is so perverse or irrational or in such outrageous defiance of logic that the person taking the decision can be said to have taken leave of his senses. 28. Recognizing the difference between public and private law activities of the State, this Court reasoned that unlike private individuals, the State while exercising its powers and discharging its functions, acts for public good and in public interest. Consequently every State action has an impact on the public interest which would in turn bring in the minimal requirements of public law obligations in the discharge of such functions. The Court declared that to the extent, the challenge to State action is made on the ground of being arbitrary, unfair and unreasonable hence offensive to Article 14 of the Constitution, judicial review is permissible. The Court declared that to the extent, the challenge to State action is made on the ground of being arbitrary, unfair and unreasonable hence offensive to Article 14 of the Constitution, judicial review is permissible. The fact that the dispute fell within the domain of contractual obligations did not, declared this Court, relieve the State of its obligation to comply with the basic requirements of Article 14. 39. A writ Court is entitled to judicially review the action and determine whether there was any illegality, perversity, unreasonableness, unfairness or irrationality that would vitiate the action, no matter the action is in the realm of contract. Having said that we must add that judicial review cannot extend to the Court acting as an appellate authority sitting in judgment over the decision. The Court cannot sit in the arm chair of the Administrator to decide whether a more reasonable decision or course of action could have been taken in the circumstances. So long as the action taken by the authority is not shown to be vitiated by the infirmities referred to above and so long as the action is not demonstrably in outrageous defiance of logic, the writ Court would do well to respect the decision under challenge.” 22. In the judgment in the case of State of Kerala v. M.K. Jose, reported as 2016 (2) M.P.L.J.(S.C.) 327 : (2015) 9 SCC 433 , the Court was examining the action of the State terminating the contract and forfeiture of the security deposit placed by the contractor. The Court has held as under:— “19. In this regard, a reference to Noble Resources Ltd. v. State of Orissa, (2006) 10 SCC 236 , would be seemly. The two- Judge Bench referred to the ABL International Ltd. v. Export Credit Guarantee Corpn. Of India Ltd., (2004) 3 SCC 553 , Dwarkadas Marfatia and Sons v. Port of Bombay, (1989) 3 SCC 293 , Mahabir Auto Stores v. Indian Oil Corpn., (1990) 3 SCC 752 and Jamshed Hormusji Wadia v. Port of Mumbai, (2004) 3 SCC 214 and opined thus: (Noble Resources case, SCC p. 246, para 29) “29. Although the scope of judicial review or the development of law in this field has been noticed hereinbefore particularly in the light of the decision of this Court in ABL International Ltd. v. Export Credit Guarantee Corpn. Although the scope of judicial review or the development of law in this field has been noticed hereinbefore particularly in the light of the decision of this Court in ABL International Ltd. v. Export Credit Guarantee Corpn. of India Ltd., (2004) 3 SCC 553 each case, however, must be decided on its own facts. Public interest as noticed hereinbefore, may be one of the factors to exercise the power of judicial review. In a case where a public law element is involved, judicial review may be permissible. [See Binny Ltd. v. V. Sadasivan, (2005) 6 SCC 657 : 2005 SCC (L&S) 881 and G.B. Mahajan v. Jalgaon Municipal Council, (1991) 3 SCC 91 .]” Thereafter, the Court in Noble Resources Ltd. v. State of Orissa, (2006) 10 SCC 236 , proceeded to analyse the facts and came to hold that certain serious disputed questions of facts have arisen for determination and such disputes ordinarily could not have been entertained by the High Court in exercise of its power of judicial review and ultimately the appeal was dismissed. 20. We have referred to the aforesaid authorities to highlight under what circumstances in respect of contractual claim or challenge to violation of contract can be entertained by a writ Court. It depends upon facts of each case. The issue that had arisen in ABL International Ltd. v. Export Credit Guarantee Corpn. of India Ltd., (2004) 3 SCC 553 was that an instrumentality of a State was placing a different construction on the clauses of the contract of insurance and the insured was interpreting the contract differently. The Court thought it apt merely because something is disputed by the insurer, it should not enter into the realm of disputed questions of fact. In fact, there was no disputed question of fact, but it required interpretation of the terms of the contract of insurance. Similarly, if the materials that come on record from which it is clearly evincible, the writ Court may exercise the power of judicial review but, a pregnant one, in the case at hand, the High Court has appointed a Commission to collect the evidence, accepted the same without calling for objections from the respondent and quashed the order of termination of contract. 21. 21. The procedure adopted by the High Court, if we permit ourselves to say so, is quite unknown to exercise of powers under Article 226 in a contractual matter. We can well appreciate a Committee being appointed in a Public Interest Litigation to assist the Court or to find out certain facts. Such an exercise is meant for public good and in public interest. For example, when an issue arises whether in a particular State there are toilets for school children and there is an assertion by the State that there are good toilets, definitely the Court can appoint a Committee to verify the same. It is because the lis is not adversarial in nature. The same principle cannot be taken recourse to in respect of a contractual controversy. It is also surprising that the High Court has been entertaining series of writ petitions at the instance of the respondent, which is nothing but abuse of the process of extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court. The Appellate Bench should have applied more restraint and proceeded in accordance with law instead of making a roving enquiry. Such a step is impermissible and by no stretch of imagination subserves any public interest.” 23. We have gone through the pleadings and find that the decision-making process adopted by the Corporation does not suffer from any illegality which may warrant interference of this Court exercising writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In fact none was pointed out. 24. The judgments referred by the counsel for the petitioner are not applicable to the facts of the present case. In Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. (supra) the question was for benefit of tax wherein it was laid down that a party who has, acting on a promise made by the Government, altered its position, is entitled to enforce the promise against the Government, even though the promise is not in the form of a formal contract as required by Article 299 and that Article does not militate against the applicability of the doctrine of promissory estoppel against the Government. In the present case, it is contractual obligation of the petitioner to supply the Machine in question as per the specification and standards enumerated in the tender conditions. If the machine is not as per the tender conditions, then the Corporation is within its jurisdiction to reject the machine. In the present case, it is contractual obligation of the petitioner to supply the Machine in question as per the specification and standards enumerated in the tender conditions. If the machine is not as per the tender conditions, then the Corporation is within its jurisdiction to reject the machine. There is no question of promissory estoppel in the present case, as the Corporation has refused to accept the Machine for the reason that it does not conform to the specification standards enumerated in the tender document. 25. In Gangotri Enterprizes Ltd. case (supra) the Court has quoted with approval the judgment of the Bombay High Court rendered in Iron and Hardware (India) Co. v. Firm Shamlal and Bros, AIR 1954 Bom. 423 wherein the Bombay High Court was examining the right of creditors claiming to be displaced persons entitled to damages under Displaced Persons (Debts Adjustment) Act, 1951. The Court was examining the debt as defined under the Act, which was different than the damages on account of breach of contract. The Court has held as under: “6.…………… Now, in order that there should be a debt there must be an existing obligation. The payment may be due immediately or it may be due in future, but the obligation must arise in order that the debt should be due. It may even be that the actual amount due in respect of the debt may require ascertainment by some mechanical process or by the taking of accounts. But even when the actual amount is to be ascertained the obligation must exist. It is well settled that when there is a breach of contract the only right that accrues to the person who complains of the breach is the right to file a suit for recovering damages. The breach of contract does not give rise to any debt and therefore it has been held that a right to recover damages is not assignable because it is not a chose in action. An actionable claim can be assigned, but in order that there should be an actionable claim there must be a debt in the sense of an existing obligation. But inasmuch as a breach of contract does not result in any existing obligation on the part of the person who commits the breach, right to recover damages is not an actionable claim and cannot be assigned.” 26. But inasmuch as a breach of contract does not result in any existing obligation on the part of the person who commits the breach, right to recover damages is not an actionable claim and cannot be assigned.” 26. The judgment in Gangotri Enterprizes Ltd. case (supra) has no applicability to the facts of the present case nor the argument raised by the counsel for the petitioner that the Corporation in order to claim damages have to seek quantification of the damages from the competent Court. The issue raised and decided by the Supreme Court was that the arbitration proceedings in relation to the contract were pending and that the sum claimed by the respondents from the appellant does not relate to the contract for which the bank guarantee had been furnished but it relates to another contract for which no bank guarantee had been furnished. In the present case, the Corporation has cancelled the contract on account of failure of the petitioner to supply sweeping machine as per tender condition. The Corporation has paid a sum of Rs. 1 Crore of public money to the petitioner but the petitioner has failed to perform its part of the contract to supply the sweeping machine as per the tender conditions. Therefore, it is not a question of damages but to seek restitution of the amount paid in advance for the unfulfilled contract. 27. Counsel appearing for the petitioner relied in para 188 of Monnet Ispat and Energy Ltd. (supra), however the said para deals with a contempt petition and not the issue raised in the present writ petition. We do not find any relevancy of the said case as regard the issue raised in the present petition. 28. In J.P. Bansal (supra) the petitioner was removed from the post of Chairman of the Rajasthan Taxation Tribunal which was abolished. The erstwhile Chairman claimed that he has legitimate expectation and such a claim was declined by the Supreme Court. We find that the said judgment is of no any assistance to the petitioner. 29. In respect of law of bank guarantee, a recent judgment reported in the case of Gujarat Maritime Board v. Larsen and Toubro Infrastructure Development Projects Limited, (2016) 10 SCC 46 , the Supreme Court held that a bank guarantee is an independent and separate contract. The relevant extract from the judgment is reproduced hereunder: “12. 29. In respect of law of bank guarantee, a recent judgment reported in the case of Gujarat Maritime Board v. Larsen and Toubro Infrastructure Development Projects Limited, (2016) 10 SCC 46 , the Supreme Court held that a bank guarantee is an independent and separate contract. The relevant extract from the judgment is reproduced hereunder: “12. An injunction against the invocation of an absolute and an unconditional bank guarantee cannot be granted except in situations of egregious fraud or irretrievable injury to one of the parties concerned. This position also is no more res integra. In Himadri Chemicals Industries Limited. v. Coal Tar Refining Company, (2007) 8 SCC 110 : “14. From the discussions made hereinabove relating to the principles for grant or refusal to grant of injunction to restrain enforcement of a bank guarantee or a letter of credit, we find that the following principles should be noted in the matter of injunction to restrain the encashment of a bank guarantee or a letter of credit: (i) While dealing with an application for injunction in the course of commercial dealings, and when an unconditional bank guarantee or letter of credit is given or accepted, the beneficiary is entitled to realise such a bank guarantee or a letter of credit in terms thereof irrespective of any pending disputes relating to the terms of the contract. (ii) The bank giving such guarantee is bound to honour it as per its terms irrespective of any dispute raised by its customer. (iii) The Courts should be slow in granting an order of injunction to restrain the realisation of a bank guarantee or a letter of credit. (iv) Since a bank guarantee or a letter of credit is an independent and a separate contract and is absolute in nature, the existence of any dispute between the parties to the contract is not a ground for issuing an order of injunction to restrain enforcement of bank guarantees or letters of credit. (v) Fraud of an egregious nature which would vitiate the very foundation of such a bank guarantee or letter of credit and the beneficiary seeks to take advantage of the situation. (vi) Allowing encashment of an unconditional bank guarantee or a letter of credit would result in irretrievable harm or injustice to one of the parties concerned.” 13. (v) Fraud of an egregious nature which would vitiate the very foundation of such a bank guarantee or letter of credit and the beneficiary seeks to take advantage of the situation. (vi) Allowing encashment of an unconditional bank guarantee or a letter of credit would result in irretrievable harm or injustice to one of the parties concerned.” 13. The guarantee given by the bank to the appellant contains only the condition that in case of breach by the lead promoter, viz., the first respondent of the conditions of Lol, the appellant is free to invoke the bank guarantee and the bank should honour it… “without any demur, merely on a demand from GMB (appellant) stating that the said lead promoter failed to perform the covenants…” It has also been undertaken by the bank that such written demand from the appellant on the hank shall be… “conclusive, absolute and unequivocal as regards the amount due and payable by the bank under this guarantee”. Between the appellant and the first respondent, in the event of failure to perform the obligations under the Lol dated 6-2-2008, the appellant was entitled to cancel the Lol and invoke the bank guarantee. On being satisfied that the first respondent has failed to perform its obligations as covenanted, the appellant cancelled the Lol and resultantly invoked the bank guarantee. Whether the cancellation is legal and proper, and whether on such cancellation, the bank guarantee could have been invoked on the extreme situation of the first respondent justifying its inability to perform its obligations under the Lol, etc., are not within the purview of an inquiry under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Between the bank and the appellant, the moment there is a written demand for invoking the bank guarantee pursuant to breach of the covenants between the appellant and the first respondent, as satisfied by the appellant, the bank is bound to honour the payment under the guarantee.” 30. The decision to invoke bank guarantee and to cancel the contract is based upon the economic interest of the Corporation so as to not to purchase something which is not likely to serve public purpose. Such decision of the Corporation cannot be said to be arbitrary, unreasonable, invalid which may warrant interference in the writ jurisdiction of this Court. 31. The decision to invoke bank guarantee and to cancel the contract is based upon the economic interest of the Corporation so as to not to purchase something which is not likely to serve public purpose. Such decision of the Corporation cannot be said to be arbitrary, unreasonable, invalid which may warrant interference in the writ jurisdiction of this Court. 31. In view of the above discussion, we find that the present writ petition sans substance and the same is hereby dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.