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Gujarat High Court · body

2017 DIGILAW 831 (GUJ)

Chaital Rashmikant Bhatt v. State of Gujarat

2017-04-19

ABHILASHA KUMARI

body2017
JUDGMENT : Abhilasha Kumari, J. 1. Rule. Ms. Amita Shah, learned Assistant Government Pleader waives service of notices of Rule for respondents Nos. 1 to 3. Mr. Devang J. Joshi, learned advocate waives service of notices of Rule for respondents Nos. 4 to 8. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and with the consent of learned counsel for the respective parties, the petition is being heard and decided finally. 2. The challenge in this petition under Articles-226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is to the order dated 31.07.2015, passed by the first respondent-Secretary (Appeals), Revenue Department in Revision Application No. 121/2013, as well as to the order dated 28.10.2013, passed by the second respondent-Collector, District Anand, in RTS suo motu No. 247/2011, whereby revenue entry No. 2396 in respect of the registered Sale Deed executed by respondents Nos. 4 to 8 in favour of the petitioners has been cancelled on the ground that the petitioners do not hold the status of agriculturists. 3. Briefly stated, the relevant facts of the case are as follows : 3.1 Petitioner No. 2 is the father of petitioner No. 1. The deceased father of petitioner No. 2, namely, Shri Jayashankar Raghavji Bhatt, had acquired agricultural land bearing Block No. 130 in Village Vemali, Taluka and District Vadodara, by a Will dated 24.12.1984, executed by the owner of the land. Pursuant thereto, the said land was mutated in the name of the father of petitioner No. 2 vide revenue entry No. 792 dated 16.08.1988. This entry was certified on 22.11.1988. 3.2 Petitioner No. 2 had also acquired land bearing Revenue Survey Nos. 352 and 355 by way of a Will dated 14.02.1988 executed by the owners of the land. The said land was mutated in the name of petitioner No. 2 by revenue entry No. 868 dated 15.10.1990, which was certified on 22.12.1990. Probate was obtained for the Will from the competent Civil Court and this fact was recorded by revenue entry No. 915 dated 10.09.1991. 3.3 The father of petitioner No. 2 during his lifetime, as well as petitioner No. 2, purchased new tenure agricultural lands by obtaining prior permission from the Collector, as required under Section-43 of the Gujarat Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (the Tenancy Act). Consequently, different Sale Deeds were executed in the year 1997 in respect of lands situate d in village Sayajipura. Consequently, different Sale Deeds were executed in the year 1997 in respect of lands situate d in village Sayajipura. In respect of the said Sale Deeds, revenue entries Nos. 2241, 2242 and 2243 were mutated in the record on 18.10.1997. 3.4 The father of petitioner No. 2 passed away on 08.06.1998. Consequently, heirship entry No. 2405 dated 03.04.2000 was mutated in the revenue record, showing the names of the present petitioners and other family members. 3.5 It is the case of the petitioners that petitioner No. 2 became an agriculturist by way of a Will in the year 1988, and the status of agriculturist was further conferred on him by the entry of inheritance from hi s deceased father in the year 1998. The petitioners, therefore, have acquired the status of agriculturist s in the year 1988 and 1998. 3.6 Thus, being agriculturists and holders of different parcels of agricultural lands, the petitioners purchased the land in question, being land bearing Revenue Survey No. 58/1 and 59/1 from respondents Nos. 4 to 8 herein, by a registered Sale Deed dated 13.08.2008, after paying full consideration as agreed upon between the parties. In respect of the above-mentioned registered Sale Deed executed by respondents Nos. 4 to 8 in favour of the petitioners, revenue entry No. 2396 dated 08.07.2009 came to be mutated in the revenue record. The Mamlatdar certified this entry on 26.08.2009. 3.7 After four years from the execution of the registered Sale Deed and three years from the mutation and certification of the entry in respect of the said Sale Deed, the second respondent-Collector issued a Show Cause Notice dated 25.10.2012 to the petitioners, in exercise of suo motu powers, calling upon them to explain why revenue entry No. 2396 dated 08.07.2009 should not be cancelled on the ground that the document is not in consonance with the record and that the petitioners are not "original" agriculturists. In the proceedings that followed the second respondent held that the Mamlatdar had wrongly certified the said entry as the petitioners were not agriculturists and the name of one Fatehsinh Mohanbhai appeared in the second rights column as a tenant of the land in question. Being aggrieved by the above order of the second respondent, the petitioners preferred a Revision Application before the first respondent who, by his order dated 31.07.2015, confirmed the order passed by the second respondent. Being aggrieved by the above order of the second respondent, the petitioners preferred a Revision Application before the first respondent who, by his order dated 31.07.2015, confirmed the order passed by the second respondent. Aggrieved by the above-mentioned orders passed by the second and first respondents, the petitioners have approached this Court. 4. Mr. Tattvam K. Patel, learned counsel for the petitioners, has submitted that the initiation of suo motu proceedings by the second respondent after a period of four years from the execution of the registered Sale Deed in favour of the petitioners and three years from the mutation and certification of the revenue entry regarding it, is bad in law, as the period of four and three years cannot be considered to be a reasonable period of time. As held by the Supreme Court and this Court in a catena of judgments, proceedings initiated after an unreasonable delay and the resultant orders cannot be sustained and hence, the impugned orders deserve to be quashed and set aside on this ground alone. 4.1 Learned counsel for the petitioners further submits that the Mamlatdar has certified that the petitioners are agriculturists on 23.06.2009, after scrutinizing the record. This order has never been challenged by any person till date. In proceedings under Rule-108(6) of the Gujarat Land Revenue Rules, 1972 ("the Rules", for short), it is not open for the Collector to adjudicate upon the status of the petitioners as agriculturists. This is a cross-utilization of power by which the Collector has sought to decide an issue that does not arise under the jurisdiction vested in him by the said Rule. Hence, the impugned order that is a result of an exercise of power under a different statute, being without jurisdiction and contrary to several judicial precedents, deserves to be quashed and set aside. 4.2 It is further submitted on behalf of the petitioners that there is ample evidence on record to show that the petitioners are agriculturists, which could not have been ignored by the Collector. The father of petitioner No. 2 had acquired the status of agriculturist way back in the year 1984 by way of a Will. Similarly, petitioner No. 2 had also acquired such status in the year 1988. Thereafter, the father of petitioner No. 2 and the said petitioners had purchased agricultural lands with the prior permission of the Collector. The father of petitioner No. 2 had acquired the status of agriculturist way back in the year 1984 by way of a Will. Similarly, petitioner No. 2 had also acquired such status in the year 1988. Thereafter, the father of petitioner No. 2 and the said petitioners had purchased agricultural lands with the prior permission of the Collector. The permission granted by the Collector is legal and valid and cannot be questioned by respondent No. 2 herein, who is exercising different jurisdiction though holding the same rank. There is overwhelming evidence to show that the petitioners are agriculturists, hence the entry in question could not have been cancelled on this ground. 4.3 It is contended by learned counsel for the petitioners that the ground raised by the second respondent-Collector in the impugned order regarding the so-called tenant is factually incorrect, as it has been held vide entry No. 1503 dated 22.11.1978 that the said Fatehsinh Mohanbhai was not a tenant of the land in question. This entry has been certified on 13.04.1979. The findings in this regarding by the Collector, as confirmed by the Secretary are, therefore, incorrect and erroneous. 4.4 Referring to the definition of "agriculturist" in Section-2(2) of the Tenancy Act, it is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioners that there is no concept of "original" agriculturist within the meaning of this definition. The ground raised by the respondent-Collector and reiterated by the first respondent to the effect that the petitioners are not "original" agriculturists is contrary to the provisions of the Tenancy Act, even assuming that the Collector could record a finding on this issue. 4.5 It is next urged on behalf of the petitioners that the present respondents Nos. 4 to 8, who are the original vendors, have no locus standi to state that the petitioners are not agriculturists and the entry in respect of the registered Sale Deed executed by them in favour of the petitioners, be cancelled. Respondents Nos. 4 to 8 have pocketed the full consideration and were willing parties to the Sale Deed, which they have not challenged in the Civil Court. Hence, any objection taken by them deserves to be rejected. 4.6 It is contended that the petitioners have purchased the land in the year 2008. By now, huge equities have arisen in their favour. 4 to 8 have pocketed the full consideration and were willing parties to the Sale Deed, which they have not challenged in the Civil Court. Hence, any objection taken by them deserves to be rejected. 4.6 It is contended that the petitioners have purchased the land in the year 2008. By now, huge equities have arisen in their favour. As there is nothing to dislodge the status of the petitioners as agriculturists and as the Sale Deed in their favour is legal, valid and unchallenged, both the impugned orders of the second and first respondent may be quashed and set aside. 4.7 In support of the above submissions, Mr. Tattvam K. Patel, learned counsel for the petitioners has relied upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Janardan D. Patel v. State of Gujarat, reported in 1997 (1) GLR 50 , on the point of delay as well as the proposition that revenue authorities have no jurisdiction to decide whether or not a transaction is in contravention of any provision of another statute. The relevant extracts of the judgment are reproduced below : "8. It cannot be gainsaid that revisional powers under the relevant provisions contained in Rule 108(6) of the Rules are akin to those contained in Section 211 of the Code. What applies to Section 211 of the Code would apply with equal force to Rule 108(6) of the Rules. 9. In each petition the revisional powers have been exercised by the Deputy Collector beyond one year after the concerned mutation entry was made and certified by the concerned Mamlatdar. This he could not have done in view of the aforesaid binding ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Patel Raghav Natha (supra) and the aforesaid Division Bench ruling of this Court in the case of Bhagwanji Bawanji Patel (supra). In that view of the matter, the impugned order at Annexure D to each petition cannot be sustained in law. An order affirming an illegal and invalid order is of no consequence. In that view of the matter, the impugned orders at Annexures E and F to each petition affirming impugned order at Annexure D to each petition cannot be sustained in law. 10. An order affirming an illegal and invalid order is of no consequence. In that view of the matter, the impugned orders at Annexures E and F to each petition affirming impugned order at Annexure D to each petition cannot be sustained in law. 10. That brings me to the submission to the effect that the revenue authorities have no jurisdiction to decide whether or not a transaction is in contravention of any statutory provision contained in any other enactment. It may be noted that revenue authorities with respect to mutation proceedings in the revenue records popularly known as RTS proceedings are invested with limited powers regarding maintenance of revenue records for fiscal purposes and making mutation entries therein on certain contingencies. Relevant provisions are found in Chapter 10A of the Code. It is not necessary to refer to the entire scheme of that Chapter. The relevant provisions contained therein are Sections 135C, 135D, 135E, 135J and 135L. Section 135C thereof requires reporting of acquisition of rights in properties in revenue record. Section 135D requires maintenance of the register of mutations and the register of disputed cases. In Sub-section (3) thereof it has been provided that, if any objection to any mutation entry is made in writing to village accountant, it has to be entered in the register of disputed cases with necessary particulars. Sub-section (4) thereof requires recording of orders disposing of such objections in the register of mutations. Section 135E casts obligation on persons to furnish the requisite information with respect to properties reflected in revenue records. Section 135J raises presumption of correctness of entries in revenue records. Section 135L(2) is relevant. It reads: "The correctness of the entries in the record of rights and register of mutations shall be inquired into and the particulars thereof revised, by such revenue officers and in such manner and to such extent and subject to such appeal as the State Government may from time to time by Rules prescribe in this behalf." Its bare perusal clearly goes to show that what is to be inquired is the correctness of the entries in the record of rights and the register of mutations in accordance with the Rules framed in that regard. It thus becomes clear that revenue authorities exercising powers with respect to RTS proceedings are invested with limited powers. They cannot assume to themselves certain powers not conferred on them by law. It thus becomes clear that revenue authorities exercising powers with respect to RTS proceedings are invested with limited powers. They cannot assume to themselves certain powers not conferred on them by law. An authority having a limited jurisdiction cannot obviously expand its jurisdiction nor can assume jurisdiction not conferred on it by law. In that view of the mailer, it has no power to decide the validity of a transaction on the touchstone of a statutory provision occurring in some other enactment." (emphasis supplied) 4.8 In Gandabhai Dalpatbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat and others, reported in 2005 (2) GLR 1370 , this Court has held as below : "9. It is the consistent view taken by this Court in catena of judgments that the revenue authorities while dealing with RTS proceedings had no jurisdiction and/or authority to decide the question of title and if there is any dispute with regard to title the parties are to be relegated to the Civil Court. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghav Natha - AIR 1969 SC Page 1297 : 1969 GLR 992 (SC) and judgment of this Court in the case of Ratilal Chunilal Solanki & Ors. v. Shantilal Chunilal Solanki - 1996(2) GLR 525 and Siddharth B. Shah v. State of Gujarat, reported in 1999(3) GLR Page 2527, the revenue authorities cannot decide the disputed question of title to the property and they have to merely go by the documents produced before them. Even this Court has held in the case of Nathabhai Meraman Darji (Supra) that when a document of registered sale deed is produced before the authority, the revenue authorities are bound to give effect to the same and are not required to decide the question of title. 10. Even this Court in a recent judgment in the case of L.R.s of Popat Khima Ramani and Ors. v. Collector, Rajkot and Ors., reported in 2003(1) GLH 30 : 2002 (3) GLR 2256 , has considered the scope of revenue authorities while deciding the question with regard to mutation entry and the powers under Section 135 and Rule 108, has held that revenue authorities are not to decide the question about title and the revenue authorities are to make necessary entries on the basis of decision of Civil Court. It is further held in the said judgment that the revenue authorities are invested with limited powers under Section 135 and they cannot assume to themselves certain powers conferred on them by law and they cannot assume jurisdiction of Civil Court. The revenue authorities cannot decide validity of transaction on touchstone of statutory provision occurring in some enactment and that they cannot decide disputed question of title. *****" 4.9 Another judgment relied upon on behalf of the petitioners is in the case of Karsanbhai Mohanbhai v. State of Gujarat and others, reported in 2013 (5) GLR 4340, on the same proposition of law. This Court, after noticing the judicial precedents on the issues involved, has held as below : "5.2 It is well settled by catena of decisions starting from the Apex Courts decision in State of Gujarat v. Patil Raghav Natha, 1969 (2) SCC 187 : [1969 GLR 992 (SC)], that the revisional powers are required to be exercised within reasonable time, notwithstanding that the legislature has not fixed any period for exercise of these powers. This principle requiring the authority to act within reasonable time, has been propounded not only with reference to Section 211 of the Code, but it stands true in respect of authority exercising the revisional powers under other enactments where the Section conferring such powers is silent on the period of limitation. The rationale is that it would be harsh and inequitable to upset the state of affairs after lapse of unreasonable time when a person has changed his position with regard to the subject matter and equities have arisen. A statutory authority is estopped from disturbing the position and cannot be permitted to exercise power to revise the order passed after long time. What constitute reasonable period for exercise of revisional power depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. It is also held that the original order could be termed as nullity, the authority may exercise revisional powers at any time. *** *** *** 7. It is also well settled that the powers available under different enactments are not to be intermixed. Powers under one statute cannot be exercised for dealing the matter covered or falling under another statute. It is also held that the original order could be termed as nullity, the authority may exercise revisional powers at any time. *** *** *** 7. It is also well settled that the powers available under different enactments are not to be intermixed. Powers under one statute cannot be exercised for dealing the matter covered or falling under another statute. It has been laid down by this Court in Evergreen Apartment Cooperative Housing Society Limited v. Special Secretary (Appeals), Revenue Department, 1991(1) GLH 155 that an officer of the revenue department occupying different capacity under different statute, but it would not empower him to exercise powers under one enactment while proceeding under another enactment. It was so held in the context of powers to be exercisable under Rule 108 of the Bombay Land Revenue Rules. An officer cannot pass the orders, in the RTS proceedings, to cancel the mutation entry on an assumption that the transaction recorded in entry is against or contrary to a provision in another statute. This proposition of law laid down though slightly in a different context, it applies analogically. It has got to be held that it is not open to the Collector to take under revision an order which is not passed by a subordinate revenue officer but it is an order of another authority acting under another statute, in the instant case the Taluka Development Officer, exercising powers under the relevant provisions of the Gujarat Panchayats Act. He cannot be categorised as "any subordinate revenue officer" for the purpose of Section 211 of the Code." (emphasis supplied) 4.10 On the basis of the above submissions, learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the petition may be allowed and the impugned orders be quashed and set aside. 5. The petition has been opposed by respondents Nos. 4 to 8, the vendors of the land in question, who have emerged as the main contesting respondents. Mr. Devang J. Joshi, learned counsel for respondents Nos. 4 to 8 has submitted that though it is true that the said respondents have executed a Sale Deed in favour of the petitioners and received consideration from them, however, when the Sale Deed was executed the vendor s believed that the petitioners were agriculturists. It is submitted that the revenue authority, on its own, questioned the sale transaction. Respondents Nos. It is submitted that the revenue authority, on its own, questioned the sale transaction. Respondents Nos. 4 to 8 did not initiate proceedings but were served with notices by the Collector, therefore, they participate d in the proceedings. 5.1 It is contended that the revenue authorities have arrived at a finding that the petitioners are not agriculturists and the petitioners have not proved anything to the contrary, therefore, the said findings may not be disturbed. 5.2 It is next submitted that there are concurrent findings by the revenue authorities against the petitioners, therefore, the Court may not interfere. 5.3 Learned counsel for respondents Nos. 4 to 8 further contends that the issue involved is whether the petitioners are agriculturists or not. They were put to notice on this aspect and the onus lay on them to prove that they are agriculturists. The petitioners have placed on record two documents to prove that they are agriculturists which have been found to be insufficient by the authorities. 5.4 That, the period of limitation should be counted from the certification of the entry and not from the registration of the Sale Deeds. In that view of the matter, the period of two years and two months is a reasonable period of time and there is no inordinate delay. 5.5 It is further contended that the permission granted to the petitioners by the Collector was to purchase new tenure lands. No detailed inquiry has been held while granting the said permission. Though the Mamlatdar has certified that the petitioners are agriculturists, his superior authority is not bound by such certificate. 5.6 It is submitted that only the entry of the registered Sale Deed has been cancelled and the petitioners have not been stripped of their status as agriculturists. 5.7 On the basis of the above submissions, learned counsel for respondents Nos. 4 to 8 has urged that the petition be rejected. 6. Ms.Amita Shah, learned Assistant Government Pleader appearing for respondents Nos. 1 to 3 has supported the orders of the revenue authorities and submitted that the petitioners have failed to prove that they are agriculturists, therefore, the revenue entry of their Sale Deed has been correctly cancelled. She has further submitted that the proceedings have been initiated within a reasonable period of time. 1 to 3 has supported the orders of the revenue authorities and submitted that the petitioners have failed to prove that they are agriculturists, therefore, the revenue entry of their Sale Deed has been correctly cancelled. She has further submitted that the proceedings have been initiated within a reasonable period of time. 6.1 Learned Assistant Government Pleader has relied upon a judgment mentioned in the impugned order passed by the first respondent, being Special Civil Application No. 2552/2008, which has neither been elaborated nor discussed by the Special Secretary (Appeals), Revenue Department. Even the date of decision has not been stated. The Court has, of its own accord, called for the judgment which shall be dealt with at the proper stage. 7. In the above background, this Court has heard learned counsel for the respective parties, perused the averments made in the petition and other documents on record and accorded thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions. 8. It is not in dispute that the registered Sale Deed regarding the land in question has been executed on 13.08.2008. Mutation entry No. 2396 in this regard was posted in the revenue record on 08.07.2009 and certified on 26.08.2009. The second respondent issued the Show Cause Notice on 25.10.2012, in exercise of suo motu powers, regarding the cancellation of this entry. There is a delay of about four years in the issuance of the said notice from the date of the execution of the Sale Deed and about three years from its certification. The notice has been issued under Rule-108(6) of the Gujarat Land Revenue Rules, 1972. There is a delay of about four years in the issuance of the said notice from the date of the execution of the Sale Deed and about three years from its certification. The notice has been issued under Rule-108(6) of the Gujarat Land Revenue Rules, 1972. For the purpose of deciding whether the delay is unreasonable or not, it would be pertinent to notice Rules-108(5) and 108(6) of the Rules, which read as below: "108(5) An appeal against an order under this rule shall, if the order has been made by the Mamlatdar's First Karkun, the Mamlatdar, the District Inspector or Revenue Officer of lower rank than that of a Deputy Collector lie to the Sub-Divisional Officer, or to an officer appointed by the State Government in his behalf, and if the order has been made by the Sub-Divisional Officer, the Superintendent of Land Records Office of a rank not lower than that of a Deputy Collector, to the Collector: such appeal shall be presented within sixty days from the date on which the copy of the order was served on the appellant or was otherwise intimated to him: Provided that the appellate authority may after recording its reasons in writing admit an appeal after the aforesaid period of sixty days if it is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not presenting the appeal within such period. Subject to the provisions of [sub-rules (6) and (6A)] the decision of the appellate authority shall be final. There shall be no appeal against the order of the Collector. No second appeal shall lie in any case. (6) The [Collector] may call for and examine the record of any enquiry or the proceedings of any subordinate revenue officer held under rules 106, 107 and sub-rules (1) to (5) of this rule for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the regularity of such proceedings and as to the legality or propriety of any decision or order passed in such proceedings. If, in any case, it shall appear to the [Collector] that any proceedings so called for or any decision or order made in such proceeding should be modified, annulled or reverse, he may pass such order thereon as he deems fit." 9. It is clear from the above Rules that the limitation period of sixty days is mentioned in Rule-108(5). If, in any case, it shall appear to the [Collector] that any proceedings so called for or any decision or order made in such proceeding should be modified, annulled or reverse, he may pass such order thereon as he deems fit." 9. It is clear from the above Rules that the limitation period of sixty days is mentioned in Rule-108(5). The proviso provides for reasons to be given by the appellate authority in writing if an appeal is to be admitted after the period of limitation, provided that sufficient cause has been shown for not presenting an appeal within the period of limitation. Rule-108(6), which is the provision under which the Show Cause Notice has been issued, confers the power of revision upon the Collector, for which no specific period of limitation has been provided for. This is where the concept of a reasonable period of time comes in. 10. In the case of Bhagwanji Bawanji Patel v. State of Gujarat and another, reported in 1971 GLR 156 , the Division Bench of this Court has held that the powers of revision under Section-211 of the Code have to be exercised within a reasonable period of time, which is, one year from the date of the order or action complained of. Rule-108(6) of the Rules provides for the power of revision which is akin to the power conferred by Section-211 of the Code where no specific period of limitation is provided for, therefore, the same analogy would apply and what applies to Section-211 of the Code would apply to Rule-108(6), as well. Considered from this angle the delay of about four years from the execution of the Sale Deed and about three years from the mutation of the revenue entry, being much beyond one year, is an unreasonable one. The submissions advanced by learned counsel for respondents Nos. 4 to 8 and the learned Assistant Government Pleader that the delay is not unreasonable cannot be accepted in view of the settled legal position. 11. Though it is true that the proceedings were no t initiated by respondents Nos. 4 to 8 (the vendors) who participated when notices were issued to them by the second respondent, however, once they were in the fray they actively and strongly opposed the case of the petitioners and have done so before this Court as well. 11. Though it is true that the proceedings were no t initiated by respondents Nos. 4 to 8 (the vendors) who participated when notices were issued to them by the second respondent, however, once they were in the fray they actively and strongly opposed the case of the petitioners and have done so before this Court as well. The locus standi of the vendors to question the very sale transaction that they have willingly entered into, is questionable. Learned counsel for respondents Nos. 4 to 8 has not denied that the vendors have received full consideration for the land in question but has state d that they were under the belief that the petitioner s were agriculturists. Once the vendors have parted with the land voluntarily and pocketed the consideration, they cannot be heard to say that the sale is defective in any manner. The vendors would have verified ever y relevant aspect including the status of the petitioner s as agriculturists at the relevant period of time an d the ground that they "believed" the petitioners to be agriculturists which they are not, appears to be a n afterthought. 12. In Rinki Shashikant Gandhi v. Mamlatdar, Vadodara Taluka and others, reported in 2012 (2) GLR 1275 , this Court has held as below : "25.(2) Respondent No. 4, being the vendor of the land in question has no locus standi to challenge the entry of sale, in respect of a transaction to which he was a willing party, after pocketing the sale consideration. Under these circumstances, respondent No. 4 is not an aggrieved person and cannot be permitted to take undue advantage of his own wrong." 13. In light of the above, the vendors cannot be heard to question the entry regarding the sale transaction executed by them after warming their pockets with the sale consideration. 14. This brings us to the impugned orders passed by the second and first respondents and the reasons why they have been passed. The moot question is whether the said respondents could have entered into the issue whether the petitioners are agriculturists or not. This question will be answered later. The impugned orders and the grounds on which they have been passed may be examined at this stage. 15. In his impugned order, the second respondent has stated that the petitioners are not "original" agriculturists. This question will be answered later. The impugned orders and the grounds on which they have been passed may be examined at this stage. 15. In his impugned order, the second respondent has stated that the petitioners are not "original" agriculturists. This is one of the reasons why the entry of their Sale Deed is cancelled. Learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that there is no concept of "original" agriculturist in the Tenancy Act. 16. To evaluate this contention certain provisions of the Tenancy Act may be referred to. Section-2(2) of the Tenancy Act defines "agriculturist" to mean "a person who cultivates land personally". As per Section-2(6) "to cultivate personally" means to cultivate land on one's own account (i) by one's own labour, or (ii) by the labour of any member of one's family, or (iii) under the personal supervision of oneself or any member of one's family, by hired labour or by servants on wages payable in cash or kind but not in crop share. From the above, it does appears that there is no concept of "original" agriculturist in the Tenancy Act. The second respondent appears to have introduced this novel concept on his own, without any legal basis or foundation, and that too under Rule-108(6) of the Rules, where he did not have any jurisdiction to adjudicate on this issue. An agriculturist would be one who fits the definition under the Tenancy Act and for the second respondent to hold that the petitioners are not "original" agriculturists is contrary to law. 17. The Mamlatdar has certified on 23.06.2009, that the petitioners are agriculturists. This certification has been done on the basis of the revenue record. It is only after satisfying himself regarding this aspect that the certificate has been given, which was further verified at the time of the certification of revenue entry No. 2396, on 26.08.2009. 18. The petitioners have produced on record the Sale Deeds executed by them in respect of agricultural land, after prior permission from the Collector, as the lands were of new tenure. The definition of "agriculturist" in the Tenancy Act does not depend on the tenure of the land but upon the personal cultivation of the land, in the manner prescribed. The petitioners were holders of several parcels of agricultural lands by way of purchase. The definition of "agriculturist" in the Tenancy Act does not depend on the tenure of the land but upon the personal cultivation of the land, in the manner prescribed. The petitioners were holders of several parcels of agricultural lands by way of purchase. The permission granted by the Collector in this regard has never been questioned by any person or authority and the second respondent, though of equivalent rank but acting under a different jurisdiction, cannot question it at this stage. Once the petitioners have been permitted to purchase agricultural lands and have entered into several transactions, they are agriculturists for all intents and purposes. Being agriculturists, the petitioners have purchased the land in question from respondents Nos. 4 to 8. Besides, the status as agriculturist of the father of petitioner No. 2 has never been questioned. The petitioners have inherited agricultural lands and being the heirs of an agriculturist have gained that status in their own right. The status of the petitioners as agriculturists has not been questioned by any person or authority in competent proceedings, therefore, this status of the petitioners remains intact and cannot be sought to be nullified in RTS proceedings as is sought to be done by the revenue authorities. That the petitioners are agriculturists is borne out from the record and the certification of the Mamlatdar and the issue could not have been raised in RTS proceedings. 19. Learned counsel for the vendors has submitted that it is only the entry regarding the sale transaction that would be cancelled but the status of the petitioners as agriculturists would remain. This is a strange and contradictory argument. If the status of the petitioners as agriculturists remains, the entry in question cannot be cancelled on the ground that they are not agriculturists. The possibility cannot be ruled out that the vendors would seek to derive undue advantage from the cancellation of the entry as, once it is cancelled, their names would be entered in the revenue record and they could seek to enter into another transaction. Such a state of affairs is impermissible as the vendors, having divested themselves of the title to the land, cannot seek to assert it in an oblique and indirect manner. 20. The other ground stated in the order of the second respondent is that the name of one Fatehsinh Mohanbhai appears in the revenue record as a tenant. Such a state of affairs is impermissible as the vendors, having divested themselves of the title to the land, cannot seek to assert it in an oblique and indirect manner. 20. The other ground stated in the order of the second respondent is that the name of one Fatehsinh Mohanbhai appears in the revenue record as a tenant. It appears that while recording this finding and holding that the Mamlatdar has not properly inquired into this aspect, the second respondent has completely overlooked revenue entry No. 1503 dated 22.11.1978, wherein it is recorded that the said Fatehsinh Mohanbhai is not a tenant. Neither is there any material on record to show that this person has ever asserted his tenancy rights in the present proceedings. In any case, the Collector, exercising power and performing functions in RTS proceedings, is not competent to look into this aspect or indirectly set aside the certification of the Mamlatdar that the petitioners are agriculturists, without having the competence and jurisdiction to do so. 21. As has been held by this Court in several judicial pronouncements, including the judgments relied upon on behalf of the petitioners that have been reproduced above, there can be no cross-utilization of powers by the revenue authorities and powers under a different enactment cannot be used while dealing with another enactment. 22. In Rinki Shashikant Gandhi v. Mamlatdar, Vadodara Taluka and others (supra), this Court has held as below : "25(4) The Collector, in exercise of power under Rule 108(6) in RTS proceedings cannot exercise power under the Fragmentation Act, merely by virtue of his position or designation or the fact that he may be acting in different capacities under different enactments. Being a quasi judicial authority, the Collector is bound to exercise power within the limits prescribed by the particular enactment under which he is called upon to adjudicate, and cannot transgress the limits of such statutory power, in a manner that overlaps a different enactment. By passing the impugned order, the Collector has transgressed the scope and ambit of the power conferred by sub-rule (6) of Rule 108 of the Gujarat Land Revenue Rules, 1972, and has erroneously exercised power under the Fragmentation Act, which is not permissible." 23. Though in the present case the enactment is different, however, the principle of law would not vary and would apply squarely in the present case as well. Though in the present case the enactment is different, however, the principle of law would not vary and would apply squarely in the present case as well. Seen from all angles it is evident that the second respondent-Collector could not have cancelled the revenue entry in favour of the petitioners on the ground that they are not agriculturists, as he has absolutely no jurisdiction to do so in RTS proceedings. 24. The first respondent has more or less followed the same pattern of reasoning as the second respondent while confirming the order of the latter. In his order, the first respondent has casually mentioned a judgment of this Court in Special Civil Application No. 2552/2008, without even giving the date of the decision or stating the point involved in the matter. This judgment has been equally casually relied upon by the learned Assistant Government Pleader, without producing a copy thereof or making submissions regarding the point on which it is applicable. Since it has been mentioned by the learned Assistant Government Pleader, this Court has procured a copy on its own and perused it. This judgment is dated 17.07.2008 and has been rendered by this Court in a case under the Tenancy Act. The order of the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal was in question before the Court, whereby the order of the Deputy Collector dated 22.06.1992 had been confirmed which, in turn, upheld the order of the Mamlatdar dated 13.03.1990. By the said orders it was held that the petitioner was not an agriculturist. This decision has been rendered in respect of the provisions of the Tenancy Act, where the authorities were competent to decide the question whether the petitioner therein was an agriculturist or not. The present is not a case under the Tenancy Act, but arises from RTS proceedings under Rule-108(6) wherein, as per settled law, the authorities cannot determine issues falling under a different enactment. This judgment, therefore, is not at all applicable to the facts of the present case. It follows that the order of the first respondent is also unsustainable in law. 25. There is another aspect to the matter. As per Section-135(C) of the Gujarat Land Revenue Code, 1879, the revenue authorities are bound to make and certify the entry regarding a registered sale transaction. On this ground as well, the entry in question could not have been cancelled. 25. There is another aspect to the matter. As per Section-135(C) of the Gujarat Land Revenue Code, 1879, the revenue authorities are bound to make and certify the entry regarding a registered sale transaction. On this ground as well, the entry in question could not have been cancelled. As four years have elapsed since the execution of the Sale Deed, equities have arisen in favour of the petitioners as they would obviously have incurred expenditure to maintain and develop the land and perform agricultural activities thereupon. The petitioners are owners of the land in question and the Sale Deed has not been questioned by any person in the competent Civil Court. As the Sale Deed is intact, the entry regarding it cannot be cancelled from the revenue record. 26. It has been submitted on behalf of the vendors that there are concurrent findings of the authorities below against the petitioners, therefore, this Court may not interfere. In this regard it can be stated that as per the settled principles of law, perverse findings, whether concurrent or not, can always be set aside by this Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article-226 of the Constitution of India. In the present case the concurrent findings of the second and first respondents are based upon an assumption of jurisdiction not vested in them. The impugned orders are not only without jurisdiction but are also perverse and contrary to the record. Hence, the orders of both authorities deserve to be quashed and set aside. 27. For the aforestated reasons, the order dated 31.07.2015, passed by the first respondent and the order dated 28.10.2013, passed by the second respondent are hereby quashed and set aside. 28. The petition is allowed. Rule is made absolute. There shall be no orders as to costs. Petition Allowed