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2017 DIGILAW 831 (ORI)

Bhagaban Behera v. Kishore Chandra Dash

2017-08-04

A.K.RATH

body2017
JUDGMENT : Dr. A.K. Rath, J. This is a defendant’s appeal against confirming judgment. 2. The respondent as plaintiff instituted O.S. No.187 of 1985-I in the court of the learned Sub-ordinate Judge, Puri for specific performance of contract impleading the appellant as defendant. The case of the plaintiff is that he was the owner of the suit schedule property. He was in need of money. He approached the defendant for loan. Since the defendant had no money lending licence, he proposed the plaintiff to execute a sale deed in his favour in respect of the suit property and after repayment of money, he would reconvey the property in favour of the plaintiff. On 6.4.1984, the plaintiff executed the sale deed in favour of the defendant for a consideration of Rs.6000/-. On the same day, the defendant executed an agreement to reconvey the property on refund of consideration amount within a year from the date of agreement. In the month of April, 1985 the plaintiff asked the defendant to execute the sale deed after receipt of the amount, but the defendant did not perform his part of contract. The plaintiff is ready to perform his part of contract. All the persuasions made by the plaintiff ended in a fiasco. With this factual scenario, he instituted the suit. 3. The defendant filed written statement pleading inter alia that the transaction between them was out and out a sale. The plaintiff sold the land for a valid consideration and thereafter delivered possession. It was further pleaded that he had executed a deed of reconveyance of the suit land in favour of the plaintiff with a condition that the consideration amount of Rs.6000/-shall be paid to him within one year. Since the plaintiff did not pay the consideration amount within the stipulated time, the said deed become null and void and became unforceable. Plaintiff had never asked him to take back the loan and to reconvey the suit land in his favour as per the agreement. He was not ready and willing to perform his part of contract. 4. On the interse pleadings of the parties, learned trial court struck six issues. Both the parties led evidence, oral and documentary, in support of their cases. Learned trial court came to hold that the sale deed, Ext.A executed by the plaintiff was a security for loan. He was not ready and willing to perform his part of contract. 4. On the interse pleadings of the parties, learned trial court struck six issues. Both the parties led evidence, oral and documentary, in support of their cases. Learned trial court came to hold that the sale deed, Ext.A executed by the plaintiff was a security for loan. The plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of contract. It further held that the plaintiff is entitled to the specific performance of contract of sale. Held so, it decreed the suit. Assailing the judgment and decree of the learned trial court, the defendant filed an appeal before the learned District Judge, Puri, which was subsequently transferred to the court of the learned 2nd Additional District Judge, Puri and renumbered as T.A. No.13/84 of 1989/1988. The appeal was eventually dismissed. 5. The second appeal was admitted on the following substantial question of law. “Whether time is essence in a contract in view of the clause made in the agreement for sale vide Ext.1 ?” 6. Heard Mr. Nirod Kumar Sahu, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. Ayushman Mahanta, learned counsel for the respondent. 7. Mr. Sahu, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that Ext.A is a sale deed. The recitals of the sale deed are clear and unambiguous. The courts below committed a manifest illegality and impropriety in holding that Ext.A is a deed of mortgage. He further contended that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of contract. The plaint does not confirm to the requirements prescribed in Form-47 and 48 of the first schedule of the C.P.C. with regard to the suit for specific performance of contract. In a suit for specific performance, it is incumbent on the plaintiff not only to set out agreement on the basis of which he sues in all its details, he must go further and plead that he has approached the defendant to perform the agreement, but the defendant has not done so. He must further plead and prove that he is ready and willing to perform the part of contract. It is the duty of the plaintiff to propose a proper draft of sale deed and submit the same to the defendant as contended under Sec.55(1) of the Transfer of Property Act. He must further plead and prove that he is ready and willing to perform the part of contract. It is the duty of the plaintiff to propose a proper draft of sale deed and submit the same to the defendant as contended under Sec.55(1) of the Transfer of Property Act. There is absolutely no foundational fact with regard to readiness and willingness of the plaintiff to perform his part of contract. He further submitted that there is a condition in the agreement to sale that in the event plaintiff’s failure to pay the amount within the stipulated time, the document in question shall be deemed to be treated as null and void. The plaintiff had failed to perform his part of contract within the stipulated time. The deed became null and void. He relied on the decision of the apex Court in the case of Hero Vinoth (minor) vs. Seshammal, AIR 2006 SC 2234 and this Court in the case of Baruna Giri and others vs. Rajakishore Giri and others, AIR 1983 Ori. 107 . 8. Per contra, Mr. Mahanta, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that Ext.A is a sale deed. It was specifically pleaded that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of contract. The specific provision of Sec.16(c) of the Specific Relief Act does not insist upon a particular set of words to be used. The averment must in substance indicate the continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the person suing. He further pleaded that time was not for the essence of contract for agreement of sale. He submitted that the decision of this Court in the case of Baruna Giri and others vs. Rajakishore Giri and others had been set aside by the apex Court. To buttress his submission, he relied on the decisions of the apex Court in the case of V. Pechimuthu vs. Gowrammal, (2001) 7 SCC 617 and Smt. Indira Kaur and others vs. Shri Sheo Lal Kapoor, AIR 1988 SC 1074 and the decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Anwarul Haq (deceased by L.Rs.) vs. Nizam Uddin (deceased by L.Rs.) and another, AIR 1984 Allahabad 136. 9. Learned counsel for both parties are in unison that Ext.A is a sale deed executed by the plaintiff in favour of the defendant. 9. Learned counsel for both parties are in unison that Ext.A is a sale deed executed by the plaintiff in favour of the defendant. The next question crops up as to whether the time is essence for contract in the case of sale of immovable property ? 10. In Chand Rani (Smt.) (Dead) by LRs. vs. Kamal Rani (Smt.)(Dead) By LRs., (1993) 1 SCC 519 , the Constitution Bench of the apex Court in no certain terms held thus: “It is a well-accepted principle that in the case of sale of immovable property, time is never regarded as the essence of the contract. In fact, there is presumption against time being the essence of the contract. This principle is not in any way different from that obtainable in England. Under the law of equity which governs the rights of the parties in the case of specific performance of contract to sell real estate, law looks not at the letter but at the substance of the agreement. It has to be ascertained whether under the terms of the contract the parties named a specific time within which completion was to take place, really and in substance it was intended that it should be completed within a reasonable time. An intention to make time the essence of the contract must be expressed in unequivocal language” 11. In V. Pechimuthu vs. Gowrammal (supra), the apex Court held thus: “12.…………A privilege has been defined as a particular and peculiar benefit or advantage enjoyed by a person, and a concession as a form of privilege. An option to purchase or repurchase has been held to be such a privilege or concession. (See: Shanmugam Pillai v. Annalakshmi, K. Simrathmull v. Nanjalingiah Gowder). This is because an option by its very nature is dependent entirely on the volition of the person granted the option. He may or may not exercise it. Its exercise cannot be compelled by the person granting the option. It is because of this one sidedness or “unilaterality”, as it were, that the right is strictly construed and “an option for the renewal of a lease, or for the purchase or repurchase of property, must in all cases be exercised strictly within the time limited for the purpose, otherwise it will lapse” (Halsbury’s Laws of England, 3rd Edn. Vol.3 Art.281, p. 165). 13. Vol.3 Art.281, p. 165). 13. An agreement for sale and purchase simpliciter, on the other hand, is a reciprocal arrangement imposing obligations and benefits on both parties and is enforceable at the instance of either. The interpretation of such a contract would be governed by the laws of contract relating to the performance of reciprocal promises. 14. Whether an agreement is an option to purchase or an “ordinary” agreement would depend on the interpretation of its provisions. Sometimes the option is expressly and in terms granted. In others, the right may be implicit. Thus when an agreement provides that the right to obtain a sale is subject to the fulfilment of certain conditions by the purchaser, the agreement would in effect be an option to purchase, as the right to purchase would only accrue upon the voluntary performance of the conditions specified by the owner. The vendor cannot compel the performance of the conditions by the purchaser and then ask for the contract to be specifically performed. 15. Thus in Shanmugam Pillai V. Annalakshmi, the terms of the agreement provided that the mortgagee/vendor would re-sell the land to the owners subject to the conditions (i) that the owner would pay Rs.31,500/-as the sale price as well as all expenses in connection with the re-sale, (ii) that the agreement could be enforced upto 30.04.1943 and that time was of the essence of the agreement, and (iii) that the owner should pay the instalments under the lease punctually failing which the agreement for re-conveyance would stand cancelled. These provisions were construed and the Court came to the conclusion that the original vendor had in fact been granted an option of re-purchase and it was not an ordinary contract for transfer of land. The Court came to this conclusion on two grounds (i) the right to purchase was subject to payment of instalments under a lease, and was a conditional right, and (ii) the fixation of an outer time limit for exercise of the right gave the original owner the option to re-purchase upon payment of the sale consideration within the specified time. It was not in dispute that not only the purchaser had failed to pay the instalments under the lease but had also allowed the time limit to lapse. It was in this context that the Court said: (AIR p.41, para 12) “12. It was not in dispute that not only the purchaser had failed to pay the instalments under the lease but had also allowed the time limit to lapse. It was in this context that the Court said: (AIR p.41, para 12) “12. It is well settled that, when a person stipulates for a right in the nature of a concession or privilege on fulfilment of certain conditions, with a proviso that in case of default the stipulation should be void, the right cannot be enforced if the conditions are not fulfilled according to the terms of the contract.” 16. Similarly, this Court in K. Simrathmull V. Nanjalingiah Gowder construed and followed Shanmugam Pillai and the majority view that: (AIR p.11184, para 5) “Where under an agreement an option to a vendor is reserved for repurchasing the property sold by him the option is in the nature of a concession or privilege and may be exercised on strict fulfilment of the conditions on the fulfilment of which it is made exercisable.” (emphasis supplied)” On an interpretation of the deed in question, the apex Court held that the clause does not provide that if the sale consideration was not paid by a particular date, the plaintiff has right to buy the property. Time was not stated to be of the essence of the contract. The agreement in question was an “ordinary” agreement for sale. It further held that no logical distinction can be drawn between an agreement to repurchase and an ordinary agreement of purchase just because the vendor happens to be the original purchaser and the purchaser happens to be the original vendor. The agreement remains an agreement for sale of immovable property and must be governed by the same provisions of law. It further held that: “Thirdly, it is well settled: ……..in construing a plea in any pleading, courts must keep in mind that a plea is not an expression of art and science but an expression through words to place fact and law of ones case for a relief. Such an expression may be pointed, precise, sometimes vague but still it could be gathered what he wants to convey through only by reading the whole pleading, depending on the person drafting a plea. In India most of the pleas are drafted by counsel hence the aforesaid difference of pleas which inevitably differ from one to the other. Such an expression may be pointed, precise, sometimes vague but still it could be gathered what he wants to convey through only by reading the whole pleading, depending on the person drafting a plea. In India most of the pleas are drafted by counsel hence the aforesaid difference of pleas which inevitably differ from one to the other. Thus, to gather the true spirit behind a plea it should be read as a whole. This does not distract one from performing his obligations as required under a statute. But to test whether he has performed his obligations, one has to see the pith and substance of a plea. (Syed Dastagir vs. T.R. Gopalakrishna Setty, (1999) 6 SCC 337 at 341). (See also Motilal Jain V. Ramdasi Devi)” The ratio in the cases of Chand Rani (Smt.) (Dead) by LRs. (supra) and V. Pechimuthu vs. Gowrammal (supra) proprio vigore apply with full force to the facts of the case. 12. Reliance placed on Baruna Giri and others (supra) is totally misplaced. The decision in the case of Baruna Giri and others (supra) has been set aside by the apex Court in the case of Rajkishore Giri and others vs. Purendra Giri and others, 1997(I) OLR (SC)-1. Thus Baruna Giri is no longer good law. 13. With regard to Form Nos.47 and 48 of Appendix-A CPC, this Court in the case of Kumar Barik (since dead) through L.Rs. and others vs. Banshidhar Lenka (disposed of on 28.07.2017 in S.A. No.45 of 1999) held thus: “10. Much reliance has been placed upon Form Nos.47 and 48 of Appendix-A CPC that the plaint did not contain the requisite allegation that the plaintiff is ready and willing to perform his part of contract in terms of Form 47 and 48 which was necessary to obtain a decree for specific performance of contract. In the instant case, the plaint contains material facts of readiness and willingness of the plaintiff to perform his part of contract. The plaintiff also led evidence that he was although ready and willing to perform part of his contract. 11. In Ramesh Chandra v. Chuni Lal AIR 1971 SC 1238 , the apex Court held that readiness and willingness cannot be treated as a strait-jacket formula. Those have to be determined from the entirety of facts and circumstances relevant to the intention and conduct of the party concerned. 11. In Ramesh Chandra v. Chuni Lal AIR 1971 SC 1238 , the apex Court held that readiness and willingness cannot be treated as a strait-jacket formula. Those have to be determined from the entirety of facts and circumstances relevant to the intention and conduct of the party concerned. Taking a cue from the same, the Kerala High Court in the case of Krishnan Kesavan (supra) held that Forms 47 and 48 in Appendix-A to the Code prescribe the forms in specific performance suits. Those forms provide for specific pleadings of readiness and willingness and demand for performance and its refusal. But Order 6 Rule 3 says that compliance of forms as nearly as may be will be sufficient. The forms could only be read along with Order 6 Rule 3 and not word by word. Compliance of the forms is not what is absolutely necessary in the pleadings though it is always desirable in order to enable the courts to arrive at the truth and do justice. This Court is in complete agreement with the view taken by the Kerala High Court in the case of Krishnan Kesavan (supra). In Abdul Khader Rowther (supra), the plaintiff brought a suit for specific performance of covenant for reconveyance. His plaint did not contain the requisite allegation that he is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract in terms of Forms 47 and 48, which was necessary to obtain a decree for specific performance. The apex Court held that the equitable remedy recognized by the Specific Relief Act could not be had on the basis of such pleadings and evidence. But then in the present case there is pleading as well as evidence with regard to readiness and willingness of the plaintiff to perform his part of contract.” 14. The plaint contains material facts of readiness and willingness of the plaintiff to perform his part of contract. Evidence on record shows that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of contract. Thus the plaint is in conformity with requirements prescribed in Forms 47 and 48 of the first schedule of C.P.C. The substantial questions of law are answered in negative. 15. In the wake of the aforesaid, the appeal, sans merit, is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.