ORDER : 1. Aggrieved by the order dated 04.02.2017, passed by the Additional District and Sessions Judge, Chamaraja Nagar, sitting at Kollegala, whereby the learned Judge has allowed the appeal filed by the respondent No.3, Smt. Shanthi, and another appeal filed by the respondent No.4, Smt. Chandra, and has directed the trial court to return the election petition to the respondent Nos.3 and 4, so as to enable them to present the same before the proper forum, the petitioner has approached this Court. Since the dispute is strictly between respondent No.3, Smt. Shanthi and the petitioner, Smt. Ishrath Banu, the respondent No. 3, Smt. Shanthi shall be referred to as "the plaintiff" in this order. 2. In a nutshell the facts of the case are that on 20.02.2016, the petitioner and the plaintiff contested the election for the Chamaraja Nagar Zilla Panchayat from Martalli Constituency. The result of the said election was declared on 23.02.2016; the petitioner was declared as having been elected. However, the said constituency of Martalli was reserved for women belonging to Category II-A. Since allegedly the petitioner was born as Chaya, D/o Devi Charan Gupta and Smt. Prabha Devi, and belonged to the Bania Caste, she could not contest the election in a constituency reserved for Category II-A (Woman). Moreover, since the petitioner had subsequently married Mr. Irshad Pasha, a Muslim, she could not claim herself as a woman belonging to category II-A. Since, Smt. Shanthi, the plaintiff was aggrieved by the fact that the petitioner had won the election, she filed an election petition, namely Election Petition No.2/2016 before the Civil Judge & JMFC., Kollegala. 3. The petitioner appeared before the Election Tribunal and filed an interim application, namely I. A. No. 2, under Sections 17 (1) read with 16 of the Karnataka Panchayath Raj Act, 1993 ("the Act", for short). In the application, she claimed that since the plaintiff had not complied with the mandatory provisions of Sections 15, 16, 19, and 20 of the Act, the election petition was not maintainable. 4. After hearing both the parties, by order dated 23.07.2016, the learned Trial Court dismissed the election petition inter-alia on the ground that the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition. But simultaneously, it allowed the I.A.No.2 filed by the petitioner. Since the plaintiff was aggrieved by the said order, she filed an appeal before the learned Judge. 5. 4. After hearing both the parties, by order dated 23.07.2016, the learned Trial Court dismissed the election petition inter-alia on the ground that the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition. But simultaneously, it allowed the I.A.No.2 filed by the petitioner. Since the plaintiff was aggrieved by the said order, she filed an appeal before the learned Judge. 5. The learned Judge framed three issues including the issue of relief. The first issue was "whether the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the said election petition?" The second issue was "Whether the trial court should have returned the petition under Or. 7, Rule 10 CPC ?" By order dated 04.02.2017, the learned Judge answered both the issues in the affirmative. Hence, this petition before this Court. 6. Prof. Ravi Verma Kumar, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, has raised the following contentions before this Court: firstly, the germane issue before the learned Judge was whether the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code were applicable to an election petition pending before the trial court or not ? For, if the provisions of CPC were applicable, only then the learned Judge would be justified in directing the learned trial court to return the plaint to the plaintiff for its presentation before the proper forum, otherwise not. Secondly, relying on the case of S. Shekar v. Commissioner and Returning Officer, Bangalore City Corporation, Bangalore and Others [ 1999 (1) KAR. L.J. 98 (DB) ] the learned Senior Counsel has pleaded that where the statute dealing with election is a complete code in itself, the provisions of Civil Procedure Code cannot be read into the statute. Since certain provisions of the Act specifically deals with the filing of the election petition, and with the procedure for dealing with the election petition, the Act is a complete code in itself. Therefore, the learned Judge has erred in reading the provisions of Order 7, Rule 10 CPC, into the Act. Thirdly, the provisions of Section 86 of the Representation of Peoples Act, 1951 are similar to Section 17 of the Act. Relying on the case of G.V. Sreerama Reddy and Another v. Returning Officer and Others [ (2009) 8 SCC 736 ], the learned Senior counsel has pleaded that when the special law ousts the provisions of the general law, the special law has to be interpreted strictly. Relying on the case of G.V. Sreerama Reddy and Another v. Returning Officer and Others [ (2009) 8 SCC 736 ], the learned Senior counsel has pleaded that when the special law ousts the provisions of the general law, the special law has to be interpreted strictly. Since Section 17 of the Act, dealing with the election trial, ousts the provisions of CPC, Section 17 of the Act would have to be strictly interpreted. Hence, the learned Judge was not justified in concluding that the provisions of CPC would be applicable to an election petition filed under the Act. Fourthly, since the provisions of CPC are inapplicable to the election petition, the learned trial court was justified in dismissing the petition. Therefore, the learned Judge has committed an illegality in directing the trial court to return the petition so that the same could be presented before the proper forum. Lastly, relying on Rule 10 of the High Court Rules, which requires the High Court to consider the maintainability of the election petition prior to issuing notice, the learned Senior Counsel has pleaded that the same rule should be applied to the learned trial court. Therefore, as the election petition was not maintainable, the learned trial court was justified in dismissing the same. Thus, the impugned order, passed by the learned Judge, deserves to be set aside by this Court. 7. Heard the learned Senior Counsel, perused the impugned order, and considered the case law cited at the Bar. 8. Section 17 of the Act, is as under:- 17. Trial of election petition - (1) The [Civil Judge (Junior Division)] shall dismiss an election petition which does not comply with the provisions of Section 15. Explanation - An order of the [Civil Judge (Junior Division)] dismissing an election petition under this sub-section shall be deemed to be an order made under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 18. (2) Where more election petitions than one are presented to the [Civil Judge (Junior Division)] in respect of the same election, the [Civil Judge (Junior Division)] may, try them separately or in one or more groups. (2) Where more election petitions than one are presented to the [Civil Judge (Junior Division)] in respect of the same election, the [Civil Judge (Junior Division)] may, try them separately or in one or more groups. (3) Any candidate not already a respondent shall, upon application made by him to the [Civil Judge (Junior Division)] within fourteen days from the date of commencement of the trial and subject to any order as to security for costs which may be made by the [Civil Judge (Junior Division)], be entitled to be joined as a respondent. Explanation - For the purpose of this section, a trial of petition shall be deemed to commence on the date fixed for the respondents to appear before [Civil Judge (Junior Division)] and answer the claim or claims made in the petition. (4) the [Civil Judge (Junior Division)], may upon such terms as to costs and otherwise as he may deem fit, allow the particulars of any costs and otherwise as he may deem fit, allow the particulars of any corrupt practice alleged in the petition to be amended or amplified in such manner as may in his opinion be necessary for ensuring a fair and effective trial of the petition, but shall not allow any amendment of the petition, which will have the effect of introducing particulars of a corrupt practice not previously alleged in the petition. (5) The trial of an election petition shall, so far as is practicable consistently with the interest of justice in respect of the trial, be continued from day-to-day until its conclusion, unless the [Civil Judge (Junior Division)] finds the adjournment of trial beyond the following day to be necessary for reasons to be recorded. (6) Every election petition shall be tried as expeditiously as possible and endeavour shall be made to conclude the trial within six months from the date on which the election petition is presented to the [Civil Judge (Junior Division)] for trial. (6) Every election petition shall be tried as expeditiously as possible and endeavour shall be made to conclude the trial within six months from the date on which the election petition is presented to the [Civil Judge (Junior Division)] for trial. (7) Subject to the provisions of this Act every election petition shall be tried by the [Civil Judge (Junior Division)], as nearly as may be in accordance with the procedure applicable under the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (Central Act 5 of 1908), to the trial of suits: Provided that the [Civil Judge (Junior Division)] shall have discretion to refuse for reasons to be recorded in writing, to examine any witness or witnesses if he is of the opinion that their evidence is not material for the decision of petition or that the party tendering such witness or witnesses is doing so on frivolous grounds or with a view to delay the proceedings. (8) The provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, shall subject to the provisions of this Act be deemed to apply in all respects to the trial of an election petition. (9) Notwithstanding anything in any enactment to the contrary, no document shall be inadmissible in evidence at the trial of the election petition on the ground that it is not duly stamped or registered. A bare perusal of the said provision clearly reveals that explanation attached to sub-section 3 defines the moment when "the trial" is deemed to commence. According to the said explanation, a trial is deemed to commence on the day fixed for the respondents to appear before the designated Court and answer the claim, or claims made in the petition. Thus, the moment the respondent appears before the designated Court, the trial is deemed to have started. Moreover, according to sub-section 7, "subject to the provision of this Act, every election petition shall be tried by the designated court as nearly as may be in accordance with the procedure applicable under the CPC to the trials of suit." Therefore, once the trial has commenced, the trial shall be conducted, as nearly as may be, in accordance with the provisions of CPC. Furthermore, since sub-section begins with the words "subject to the provisions of this Act", this phrase merely indicates that in case the Act contains provisions different from the provisions contained in CPC, then the provisions of this Special Act shall prevail over the provisions of CPC. 9. However, undoubtedly, the Act does not deal with the course to be adopted by a trial court if it comes to the conclusion that it does not have the jurisdiction to hear the election petition. In such a circumstance, should the trial court dismiss the election petition or should it return the petition under Or. 7, Rule 10 CPC ? Since the Act is silent on this particular point, obviously, the provisions of the CPC would apply. Therefore, once the trial has commenced, and an objection is taken with regard to maintainability of the petition on the ground that the learned trial court does not have the jurisdiction to try the election petition, then under Or. 7, Rule 10 CPC, the learned trial court should return the plaint to the plaintiff. 10. Admittedly, in the present case, the petitioner had appeared before the learned trial court, and had filed an interim application questioning the maintainability of the election petition. Since the petitioner had appeared before the trial court, as the respondent, naturally the trial had begun according to the explanation contained in Section 17 (3) of the Act. As the trial had begun, according to Section 17 (7) of the Act, the provisions of CPC would be applicable to the trial. Hence, the learned judge is justified in concluding that the provisions of CPC would be applicable to a trial of an election petition as long as there is no contradiction between the provisions of the Act and of CPC. Thus, the learned Judge is legally justified in directing the learned trial court to return the plaint instead of dismissing the same. 11. Prof. Ravi Kumar Verma, the learned Senior Counsel, has relied upon the cases of S. Shekhar (supra) and G. V. Sreerama Reddy and Another (supra). However, neither of the two cases buttress his submissions. The case of S. Shekhar (supra) dealt with an election petition filed by a lawyer whose vakalath was not signed by the plaintiff therein. The vakalath was signed later on. Therefore, the issue arose whether the election petition had been filed properly or not? However, neither of the two cases buttress his submissions. The case of S. Shekhar (supra) dealt with an election petition filed by a lawyer whose vakalath was not signed by the plaintiff therein. The vakalath was signed later on. Therefore, the issue arose whether the election petition had been filed properly or not? It is in this context that this Court opined that although the provisions of CPC would permit a lawyer to sign the vakalath even later on, but the provisions of the Municipal Act dealing with the filing of an election petition are a code in themselves. Therefore, the general provisions of the CPC cannot be read into the provisions of the Karnataka Municipal Act. 12. Similarly, in the case of G. V. Sreerama Reddy and Another (supra), the election petition was not presented "by" the plaintiff, but was presented by his advocate. Since the requirement of Sections 81 (1) and (3), read with 86(1) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 was that the election petition has to be submitted "by" the plaintiff, the Apex Court was of the opinion that the election petition has not been submitted properly. Although it was argued that under the provisions of CPC, the plaint could be submitted by the advocate, but this argument was rejected inter-alia on the ground that the provisions of CPC are not applicable to the Representation of People Act, 1951. It is in this context that the Apex Court observed as under: Inspite of existence of adequate provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure relating to institution of a suit, the present Act contains elaborate provisions as to disputes regarding elections. It not only prescribes how election petitions are to be presented but it also mandates what are the materials to be accompanied with the election petition, details regarding parties, contents of the same, relief that may be claimed in the petition. How trials of election petitions are to be conducted has been specifically provided in Chapter III of Part VI. In such circumstances, we are of the view that the provisions have to be interpreted as mentioned by the legislature. 13. Both these cases deal with the filing of the election petition. Thus, they deal with pre-trial situation. How trials of election petitions are to be conducted has been specifically provided in Chapter III of Part VI. In such circumstances, we are of the view that the provisions have to be interpreted as mentioned by the legislature. 13. Both these cases deal with the filing of the election petition. Thus, they deal with pre-trial situation. Interestingly, both the Karnataka Municipal Act and the Representation of Peoples Act, 1951, do contain provisions which warrant that once the trial has begun, then the provisions of CPC would have to be followed as closely as possible. However, as both the cases mentioned above, deal with pre-trial period, therefore, the observations made by this court in the case of S. Shekhar (supra), and made by the Apex Court in the case of G. V. Sreerama Reddy and Another (supra) cannot be doubted. However, in the present case, the trial had begun with the appearance of the petitioner before the learned trial court. Most importantly, a co-joint reading of Section 17 (3) and (7) of the Act makes it amply clear that once the trial has commenced, the provisions of CPC would be applicable as long as they are not in derogation of the provisions of the Act. Hence, both the cases are distinguishable on the basis of the factual matrix of the case. Therefore, neither of the two cases, referred by the learned Senior Counsel, cover the issue involved in the present case. The issue involved in the present case, naturally, has to be answered in terms of Section 17 (3) and (7) of the Act. 14. Therefore, for the reasons stated above, this court does not find any illegality or perversity in the impugned order dated 04.02.2017. Thus, this petition is devoid of any merit. It is, hereby, dismissed.