JUDGMENT : Dr. A.K. Rath, J. 1. Defendant is the appellant against the reversing judgment. 2. Respondent as plaintiff instituted Title Suit No.76 of 1997 in the court of the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), 1st Court, Cuttack for eviction, delivery of possession and recovery of arrear rent impleading the appellant no.1 as defendant. The case of the plaintiff is that his mother had purchased the suit land from the legal heirs of Gobardhan Sharaf by means of a registered sale deed dated 16.3.1994. Possession of the land was delivered to the vendee. In the year 1995, the plaintiff inducted defendant as a tenant at Rs.60/- per month in the suit house. The defendant wilfully defaulted in paying the rent since July, 1996. With this factual scenario, he filed the suit seeking the reliefs mentioned supra. 3. Defendant filed a written statement denying the assertions made in the plaint. The case of the defendant is that the land was lying fallow. In the year 1944, the forefathers of the defendant cleared the bushes, constructed a house and stayed therein along with the family members. After death of his father, the defendant continued to possess the suit house openly, peacefully and uninterruptedly for more than the statutory period and as such, perfected title by way of adverse possession. The mother of the plaintiff had purchased some land from the above plots from Sharaf Family. The suit house is not situated over the land of the plaintiff’s mother. She had never inducted the defendant as a tenant. The mother of the plaintiff had not taken delivery of possession of the land. 4. On the inter se pleadings of the parties, learned trial court has framed ten issues. Both the parties led evidence, oral and documentary, in support of their cases. Learned trial court came to hold that the plaintiff is not the owner in possession of the suit land. There is no landlord and tenant relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant. Further, notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act (hereinafter referred to as “the T.P Act”) had not been duly served on the defendant. Held so, it dismissed the suit. The plaintiff filed Title Appeal No.16 of 1999 before the learned District Judge, Cuttack, which was subsequently transferred to the learned 1st Addl. Civil Judge (Senior Division), Cuttack. Further, notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act (hereinafter referred to as “the T.P Act”) had not been duly served on the defendant. Held so, it dismissed the suit. The plaintiff filed Title Appeal No.16 of 1999 before the learned District Judge, Cuttack, which was subsequently transferred to the learned 1st Addl. Civil Judge (Senior Division), Cuttack. Learned lower appellate court came to hold that the mother of the plaintiff is the owner in possession of the suit schedule house. The defendant failed to establish that he is in possession over the suit house since 1944. It negatived the plea of adverse possession of the defendant. It further held that the defendant is not the owner of the suit house. He is the tenant under the mother of the plaintiff. He had defaulted in payment of rent. The plaintiff was in need of the house for his own use. The plaintiff had sent notice under Section 106 of the T.P Act through registered post to the defendant on 3.9.1996. The notice was duly served on the defendant. The tenancy was terminated. Held so it allowed the appeal. It is apt to state here that during pendency of the second appeal, appellant no.1 died, where after his legal representatives have been brought on record. 5. The second appeal was admitted on 7.8.2003 on the following substantial question of law. “1. Whether a Civil Court can pass a valid and enforceable decree for eviction of a monthly tenant from a House in his occupation in capacity of a monthly tenant without service of notice on him for clear fifteen days preceding the date of termination of his monthly tenancy? 2. Whether it is permissible on the part of the learned lower appellate court to hear the appeal on merit when the application for withdrawal of the suit has been filed by the appellant?” 6. Heard Mr. R.K. Mohanty, learned Senior Advocate along with Mr. D.R. Mohapatra, learned counsel for the appellants and Mr. B.H. Mohanty, learned Senior Advocate along with Mrs. M.Pal, learned counsel for the respondents. 7. The sheet anchor of Mr. R.K. Mohanty’s submission is the application filed under Order 23 Rule 1(3) CPC for withdrawal of the suit. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the plaintiff has stated that notice under Section 106 of the T.P Act has not been validly served on the defendant. M.Pal, learned counsel for the respondents. 7. The sheet anchor of Mr. R.K. Mohanty’s submission is the application filed under Order 23 Rule 1(3) CPC for withdrawal of the suit. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the plaintiff has stated that notice under Section 106 of the T.P Act has not been validly served on the defendant. In view of the same, the suit is liable to be dismissed. But then, learned lower appellate court has travelled beyond its jurisdiction and allowed the appeal. 8. Mr. B.H. Mohanty, learned Senior Advocate for the respondents, submitted that notice under Section 106 of the T.P Act was sent by the plaintiff to the defendant by registered post on 3.9.1996 terminating tenancy. The suit was dismissed. Since the plaintiff had suffered a decree, the application for withdrawal of the suit filed by the plaintiff was thoroughly misconceived. He further submitted that the learned lower appellate court held that the notice under Section 106 of the T.P Act had been duly served on the defendant. He relied on the decision of the apex Court in the case of R. Rathivavel Chettiar and another v. V. Sivaraman and others, 1999 (4) SCC 89 . 9. From the plaint, it is patent that the plaintiff has specifically pleaded that he had sent notice under Section 106 of the T.P Act to the defendant by registered post terminating the tenancy. Notice as well as postal receipts had been marked as exhibits. Learned lower appellate court, on a vivid analysis of the materials on record, came to hold that the plaintiff had sent notice in writing by registered post to the defendant under Section 106 of the T.P Act and the same was served on the defendant. The tenancy was terminated by end of September, 1996. It negatived the plea of the defendant that they have perfected the title by way of adverse possession. 10. In R. Rathivavel Chettiar (supra), the question arose before the apex Court that if the suit has already been decreed or, for that matter, dismissed and a decree has been passed determining the rights of the parties to the suit, which is under challenge in an appeal, can the decree be destroyed by making an application for dismissing the suit as not pressed or unconditionally withdrawing the suit at the appellate stage. The apex Court held that once the matter in controversy has received judicial determination, the suit results in a decree either in favour of the plaintiff or in favour of the defendant. What is essential is that the matter must have been finally decided so that it becomes conclusive as between the parties to the suit in respect of the subject-matter of the suit with reference to which relief is sought. It is at this stage that the rights of the parties are crystallised and unless the decree is reversed, recalled, modified or set aside, the parties cannot be divested of their rights under the decree. Now, the decree can be recalled, reversed or set aside either by the Court which had passed it as in review, or by the Appellate or Revisional Court. Since withdrawal of suit at the appellate stage, if allowed, would have the effect of destroying or nullifying the decree affecting thereby rights of the parties which came to be vested under the decree, it cannot be allowed as a matter of course but has to be allowed rarely only when a strong case is made out. It is for this reason that the proceedings either in appeal or in revision have to be allowed to have a full trial on merits. The apex Court further held that where a decree passed by the trial court is challenged in appeal, it would not be open to the plaintiff, at that stage, to withdraw the suit so as to destroy that decree. The rights which have come to be vested in parties to the suit under the decree cannot be taken away by withdrawal of suit at that stage unless very strong reasons are shown that the withdrawal would not affect or prejudice any body's vested rights. 11. In Paragraph-2 of the petition filed under Order 23 Rule 1(3) CPC, the plaintiff stated: “2. That the suit for eviction filed by the present appellant having been held to be without compliance of mandatory requirement under Section 106 T.P Act, unless the suit is permitted to be withdrawn, the technical difficulty can not be waived…” 12. Does it mean that the plaintiff has admitted that no notice under Section 106 of the T.P Act was issued? By no stretch of imagination it can be held that the plaintiff has stated that he has not sent notice. Does it mean that the plaintiff has admitted that no notice under Section 106 of the T.P Act was issued? By no stretch of imagination it can be held that the plaintiff has stated that he has not sent notice. The application for withdrawal has been filed, since the learned trial court held that no notice has been served on the defendant. The plaintiff did not press the same. No order has been passed. Furthermore, the plaintiff has suffered a decree. Thus the application for withdrawal of the suit is thoroughly misconceived. There is pleading as well as evidence with regard to issuance of notice under Section 106 of the T.P Act by registered post with A.D. The notice and postal receipts have been marked as exhibits. Learned lower appellate court, on an analysis of the evidence on record, both oral as well as documentary and pleadings, came to hold that the notice has been issued by the plaintiff under Section 106 of the T.P Act by registered post with A.D and served on the defendant. There is no perversity or illegality in the finding of the learned lower appellate court. The substantial questions of law are accordingly answered. 13. In the wake of the aforesaid, the appeal, sans merit, deserves dismissal. Accordingly, the same is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.