JUDGMENT : SANJIB BANERJEE, J. The primary question raised in this appeal is whether merely because the body of the victim was discovered on the basis of the information furnished by the accused while he was in police custody, his involvement with the commission of the offence may be inferred. 2. In the afternoon on September 18, 2006, a seven-year old girl was playing with two of her village friends and a sibling at a place close to her family’s humble dwellings. The evidence of the two friends is that at or about 3.30 pm the appellant approached the victim and called her away with the promise of offering her a guava fruit. The friends also claimed that when they started to join the victim in the hope of getting guavas for themselves, the victim, at the prompting of the appellant, asked the friends not to follow her since there would be no guava for anyone but her. Another villager claimed in his evidence that he was at Pirtala when he saw the appellant drive away with the victim on a red motorcycle at about 5 pm. One of the girls who was playing with the victim earlier that afternoon testified to have found the appellant alone near where they were originally playing shortly before dusk. It his her evidence that when she approached the appellant or went close to him, she was slapped on the head and asked to go elsewhere. This girl had gone out to the fields to collect the family goats after the day’s grazing was done. 3. A missing person’s complaint was filed by the father of the victim at about noon of the following day, September 19, 2006. Such complaint claimed that the child did not return home and the family could not locate her despite searching the nearby places. The complainant father was away on work on the previous day and he returned on the morning of September 19, 2006. The complaint went on to add that shortly after the complainant’s arrival at home he received a call on his mobile telephone informing him that the child was with the caller and the caller would contact him again. The complaint also spoke of a second call at about 9 am on September 19, 2006 when the caller demanded a ransom of Rs.20 lakh in exchange for the child. The complaint also spoke of a second call at about 9 am on September 19, 2006 when the caller demanded a ransom of Rs.20 lakh in exchange for the child. The complainant asserted in the complaint that someone had kidnapped his daughter. The telephone numbers from which he got the two calls were indicated in the complaint. The complaint concluded with a reference to a statement of one Sanatan Murmu that at 5 o’ clock on the previous evening the child was “taken away on the red colour motor cycle having two persons i.e. one driving motor cycle and other is pillion rider towards Bhagabantapur.” 4. The appellant was arrested on or about September 24, 2006. The dead body of the victim was recovered from a ditch at the corner of a paddy field next to the graveyard of village Chhatraganj. As to the discovery of the body from the ditch, it is the common evidence of several villagers that in the afternoon of September 27, 2006 two police vehicles from the Chandrakona P.S. arrived in front of the house of the complainant and 15 to 20 villagers assembled thereat. The appellant was in one of the vehicles. The police brought the appellant down from one of the vehicles, whereupon the appellant informed the police that the dead body of the victim was in the ditch in the paddy field to the east of the land of Fiaz Ali. It is the further common evidence of several witnesses that a number of persons accompanied the police who were led by the appellant to the ditch. At the request of the police three of the villagers climbed down to the water in the ditch, but did not immediately discover any corpse therefrom. It has been further revealed and corroborated in the evidence that one or more fork-like instruments were thereafter used to try and hook and excavate anything that may have been at the bottom of the ditch. A polythene sack with something heavy in it was fished out from the ditch and opened. The polythene sack, one used to carry fertilisers, had a jute sack within it and such jute sack contained the partly decomposed body of the victim. 5. A polythene sack with something heavy in it was fished out from the ditch and opened. The polythene sack, one used to carry fertilisers, had a jute sack within it and such jute sack contained the partly decomposed body of the victim. 5. The appellant points to several perceived anomalies in the case made out by the prosecution, not the least of them being that despite the appellant having apparently lured the victim by offering her a guava, such aspect was not reflected in the complaint; nor did the complaint refer to the appellant being seen to have driven away with the victim on a motorcycle, though Sanatan Murmu insisted in his deposition that he had brought such fact to the notice of the family members of the victim, including the complainant a short while before the complaint was lodged. The appellant refers to the evidence of the mother and grandmother of the victim who claimed to have witnessed the victim walking away with the appellant in the afternoon of September 18, 2006, but the attention of the police not being drawn, either in the complaint or otherwise, to such matter. The appellant suggests that it is inconceivable that the mother and the grandmother of the victim would see the victim walk away with a much older man and yet not think much of such matter despite the girl child not being seen thereafter. 6. The appellant submits that since it is apparent from the evidence that the appellant’s house was a short distance from the victim’s and there was nothing to suggest that the appellant was missing for the next few days, it is inexplicable that the incident pertaining to the appellant allegedly luring the girl child with the promise of a guava was reported to the police much later for the appellant to be arrested six days after the alleged incident. The appellant insinuates that the evidence in course of the trial was arranged and premeditated to foist the blame on the appellant when the contemporaneous conduct of the victim’s family was inconsistent with any suspicion towards the appellant or the possible guilt on his part. 7. The post-mortem examination was conducted on September 28, 2006. External injuries were discovered and the opinion was that the death was due to the effect of the injuries which were ante-mortem and homicidal in nature. 7. The post-mortem examination was conducted on September 28, 2006. External injuries were discovered and the opinion was that the death was due to the effect of the injuries which were ante-mortem and homicidal in nature. Only a pair of underpants was found on the body, which was identified as the victim’s by her mother. The probable time of death was indicated to be between seven and ten days prior to the autopsy. The injuries were all over, particularly on the head, the arms and the thighs. 8. The phone calls that the complaint referred to were traced to two phone booths, some distance away from Chhatraganj village. The owners of such telephone booths were cited as prosecution witnesses and they testified to the telephone calls being made on September 19, 2006 to the phone of the complainant. The appellant says that if the appellant was the author of the phone calls, as was the underlying suggestion of the prosecution in calling such witnesses, a test identification parade ought to have been conducted for the caller to be identified by such witnesses. The appellant claims that neither call has been linked to the appellant and the appellant has been made a scapegoat merely because some children alleged that the appellant had lured the victim with the offer of a guava fruit. 9. The appellant exhorts that suspicion cannot take the place of proof for a person to be convicted on the basis of the allegations of two or more children. The appellant maintains that when a prosecution case is built on circumstantial evidence and based on the last-seen doctrine, firmer stuff had to be brought against the appellant to establish his guilt rather than the doubtful testimony of sympathisers of the victim’s family. 10. As to the appellant being the person last seen with the victim, the appellant points to the anomaly in the prosecution version that Santanu Murmu saw the appellant on his motorcycle with the victim at 5 pm, though one of the friends of the victim who played with the victim earlier that afternoon found the appellant alone shortly before dusk at a place near the graveyard. 11. 11. Finally, on facts, the appellant questions the testimony of Murmu of seeing the appellant with the victim as pillion on the appellant’s motorcycle by asking the same to be read in the context of the deposition of the investigating officer that “Murmu (P.W. 6) stated to me that he could not recognise the man of motor cycle … (and he further) stated to me that he saw a little girl like Papi, daughter of Sk. Nazir Hossain of their village behind the man of motor cycle.” It may be profitable, in the context, to notice the exact words of Murmu and the evidence of the complainant dealing with the same aspect: Sanatan Murmu (P.W. 6)(in chief): “At about 5 p.m. I was standing near Pirtala at Chhatraganj and I saw accused Bhombal was going towards Chhatraganj market by a motor cycle with Papi. That motor cycle was red coloured coming from the side of the house of Bhombal.” (In cross-examination): “Accused Bombal is younger than me and I know him since his birth. I did not state before the police that I could not recognise the man of motor cycle. I did not state before the police that behind the man of motor cycle I saw a little girl like Papi daughter of Sk. Nazir Hossain … On 2nd Ashwin (September 19, 2006) in the morning I met Sk. Nazir Hossain. What I deposed today before the court about missing of Papi, I stated the same to Sk. Nazir Hossain on 2nd Ashwin ...” Sk. Nazir Hossain (P.W. 1)(in chief): “There is an area of tribal men near our village. Sanatan Murmu of that area informed me on the next morning (September 19, 2006) that a girl like my daughter Sabnam was taken away by a motor cycle in the last evening towards Bhagabantapur.” 12. Several judgments have been carried on behalf of the appellant, particularly on how to appreciate circumstantial evidence and the effect of the improvement of the evidence or the embellishment thereof by the complainant. 13. Several judgments have been carried on behalf of the appellant, particularly on how to appreciate circumstantial evidence and the effect of the improvement of the evidence or the embellishment thereof by the complainant. 13. A judgment reported at (1993) supp (2) SCC 267 (Anant Bhujangrao Kulkarni v. State of Maharashtra) has been placed on behalf of the appellant where the only two circumstances found to be established were that the victim was last seen alive in the company of the accused and, two days later, the dead body of the victim was recovered near the residence of the accused. However, it is evident from paragraph 2 of the report that the accused in that case had volunteered information to a son of the victim that the victim had been murdered by some other and his dead body had been thrown into a hollow raised platform by the murderer. Paragraph 3 of the report records the statement made by the accused under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The accused had described how he was a witness to the murder of the victim and saw the dead body been thrown into the hollow of the platform. 14. On circumstantial evidence and the last-seen theory, the appellant refers to a judgment reported at (2008) 16 SCC 714 (State of Goa v. Pandurang Mohite). The report quotes a previous judgment to postulate that the last-seen theory comes into play where the time gap between the point of time when the accused and the deceased were last seen alive and when the deceased is found dead is so small that the possibility of any person other than the accused being the author of the crime becomes impossible. The report also quotes from a previous judgment on the four features that the evidence must satisfy when a prosecution case rests upon circumstantial evidence: “(1) the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn, must be cogently and firmly established; (2) those circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards guilt of the accused; (3) the circumstances, taken cumulatively, should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and none else; and (4) the circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction must be complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused and such evidence should not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent with his innocence.” 15. The judgment next placed by the appellant is reported at (2011) 11 SCC 754 (Sk. Yusuf v. State of West Bengal). The judgment deals with the same rules noticed earlier pertaining to circumstantial evidence. Further, an adverse inference was drawn by the trial court against the accused simply because he was found absconding after the commission of the offence. The Supreme Court held that if there were no other circumstances linking the accused to the commission of the offence, merely because the accused was absconding may not be enough to establish his guilt, as it was possible that he had absconded merely on being suspected and out of fear of arrest and harassment. Most importantly, the court disbelieved, on the appreciation of the evidence, that the accused had been seen alone with the victim “near the place of occurrence in close proximity of time.” 16. A judgment reported at (2011) 12 SCC 408 (Gurdeep Singh v. State of Punjab) has been referred to on behalf of the appellant for the proposition that if the subsequent testimony in court is at variance with the statement recorded under Section 161 of the Code, it would have to be seen with a lot of suspicion. A judgment reported at (2011) 12 SCC 408 (Gurdeep Singh v. State of Punjab) has been referred to on behalf of the appellant for the proposition that if the subsequent testimony in court is at variance with the statement recorded under Section 161 of the Code, it would have to be seen with a lot of suspicion. This judgment is cited in the context of Murmu’s testimony that he had seen the appellant take the victim on his motorcycle at 5 pm on the day the victim went missing, though the investigating officer maintained that Murmu had neither identified the appellant on the motorcycle nor was he absolutely certain that it was the victim who was with the appellant on such motorcycle. 17. Another decision reported at (2014) 13 SCC 105 (Chetram v. State of Uttarakhand) has been cited on behalf of the appellant for the proposition that if the complainant improves on his complaint by subsequently claiming to be an eye-witness to the commission of the offence, the later testimony would have to be disregarded. In that case, it was alleged in the complaint that two persons had come to the place of occurrence and stabbed the brother of the complainant with knives before fleeing. During the trial, the complainant testified that he and his brother were selling guavas on the roadside and he saw one of the accused catching hold of his brother and the other accused stabbing him with a knife before both of them fled upon the complainant running towards them. Apart from the guava connection in the reported judgment, the purpose for placing reliance on this judgment cannot be appreciated. The complainant in this case did not seek to make any remarkable improvement on his complaint in course of his testimony in court. He also maintained what he had initially said, that Murmu had mentioned to him that a girl like his daughter was seen by Murmu to have been taken away on a motorcycle at about 5 pm on the day when the child went missing. 18. The last judgment brought by the appellant is reported at (2013) 5 SCC 722 (Raj Kumar Singh v. State of Rajasthan). In that case the statement by the accused under Section 313 of the Code was made the basis for the conviction. 18. The last judgment brought by the appellant is reported at (2013) 5 SCC 722 (Raj Kumar Singh v. State of Rajasthan). In that case the statement by the accused under Section 313 of the Code was made the basis for the conviction. The court held that in cases of circumstantial evidence, answers of the accused to the questions put to him under Section 313 of the Code cannot be used to fill up the gaps left by the prosecution witnesses in their depositions. Again, particularly considering that the appellant herein said nothing in course of his statement under Section 313 of the Code, it cannot be immediately gauged why such decision has been referred to. 19. The State emphasises on the versions of the several witnesses varying to some extent. The State submits that if the appellant had been framed, care would have been taken to iron out the differences. The State, however, maintains that there is no significant anomaly in the evidence, if seen as a whole and it is only natural that lay villagers would have imperfect recollection, somewhat varying in their details. 20. The State maintains that in the state of the evidence as it presented itself, it was incumbent on the appellant to set up an alibi or discredit the common testimonies of several persons on the several aspects of the matter. The State says that the fact that the appellant lured the victim with the promise of a guava stands virtually admitted in the state of the evidence. The State also points to the evidence of the several witnesses as to what transpired on September 27, 2006 when the appellant was brought to the village and he pointed out to the ditch from where the body was subsequently recovered. The State submits that though the appellant has made some murmurs about the ditch being accessible to all, it cannot be the appellant’s case that the dead body was obviously there and could have been seen to be there without the appellant pointing it out. 21. The State says that nothing was suggested in course of the cross-examination that the family of the victim or most of the prosecution witnesses bore any grudge against the appellant or they had been driven by any common feeling of animosity towards the appellant or political rivalry in framing the appellant. 21. The State says that nothing was suggested in course of the cross-examination that the family of the victim or most of the prosecution witnesses bore any grudge against the appellant or they had been driven by any common feeling of animosity towards the appellant or political rivalry in framing the appellant. According to the State, the appellant, like several of the prosecution witnesses, was a resident of the same village and they knew each other very well. The State insists that since the evidence had brought out that the victim was last seen with the appellant, it was for the appellant to explain what happened to the victim, particularly in the light of the victim’s body being discovered only upon information in such regard being furnished by the appellant. 22. The State has relied on several judgments, particularly on the perceived confession of the appellant upon the dead body being discovered on the basis of the information furnished by him while in custody. Several of these judgments have been brought in response to the appellant’s contention that since the ditch where the body of the victim was discovered was accessible to others, the recovery of the body pursuant to the information that may have been supplied by the appellant while in custody may not be held against him. In the judgment reported at (1999) 4 SCC 370 (State of Himachal Pradesh v. Jeet Singh), the court observed that it was a fallacious notion that when recovery of any incriminating article was made from a place which was open or accessible to others, it would vitiate the evidence under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. Referring to the oft-quoted judgment of the Privy Council in Pulukuri Kottaya v. Emperor ( AIR 1947 PC 67 ), the court reiterated that “the discovery of fact referred to in Section 27 of the Evidence Act is not the object recovered but the fact embraces the place from which the object is recovered and the knowledge of the accused as to it …” 23. A judgment reported at (2002) Cr LJ 218 (State of Maharashtra v. Bharat Fakira Dhiwar) has been brought by the State. A judgment reported at (2002) Cr LJ 218 (State of Maharashtra v. Bharat Fakira Dhiwar) has been brought by the State. In that case a grinding-stone used as the weapon for the offence was recovered on the information of the accused from an area covered by tall grass and his trousers and underwear were discovered buried in a sugarcane field also at his behest. The argument made was that such seemingly inculpatory evidence would not be covered by Section 27 of the Act since they were found from an open place. The court repelled such argument by quoting paragraphs 26 and 27 of the judgment in Jeet Singh (supra), since the grinding-stone was concealed in tall grass and not open to public view and the trousers and underwear were found exactly at the place pointed out by the accused. 24. The State has relied on another judgment reported at (2003) 9 SCC 277 (Golakonda Venkateswara Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh) where the wearing apparel of the victim was discovered from a well. The court observed that since the incriminating material was not found to be open to public view and had to be dug out pursuant to the information received from the accused when in custody, the principle embodied in Section 27 of the Act was attracted to the discovery of such material. Another decision reported at (1999) 3 SCC 507 (State of Rajasthan v. Teja Ram) has also been placed by the State, but its relevance in the present context cannot be appreciated. 25. It is necessary to appreciate the facts that have been established in course of the evidence to form the chain of events that led to the conviction of the appellant. That the appellant approached the victim at or about 3.30 pm on the relevant date when she was playing along with others and lured her away with the promise of giving her a guava, is virtually admitted. If Murmu’s version of seeing the victim in the company of the appellant at 5 pm is disregarded for argument’s sake, that would still mean that the victim was last seen with the appellant. If Murmu’s statement is accepted, it does not alter the position: it merely pushes the time when the victim was last seen with the appellant by about an hour or so. But in either case, the victim was last seen with the appellant. If Murmu’s statement is accepted, it does not alter the position: it merely pushes the time when the victim was last seen with the appellant by about an hour or so. But in either case, the victim was last seen with the appellant. Given that the victim was a seven-year old girl and the appellant was an adult male, it was incumbent on the appellant, in the state of the evidence, to bring out what happened to the victim after the victim was last seen with him, whenever that may have been. The appellant was also found near the graveyard sometime before dusk on the same day and close to where the body of the victim was subsequently recovered from. The family of the victim realised that she was missing around the same time. The victim could not be found anywhere in the village and was never seen thereafter till her decomposed body was recovered from the ditch that the appellant led the police to when the appellant was in custody. The body of the victim was not visible in the ditch or in the water contained therein and considerable effort was needed to dig the sack out as it was partly embedded at the bottom of the ditch. The body was recovered only upon information in such regard being provided by the appellant while he was in police custody. The fact that the appellant knew exactly where the body could be found, permits an inference to be drawn therefrom which the appellant made no attempt to rebut. In the light of the initial direct evidence and the subsequent chain of circumstantial evidence leading to the inculpatory evidence as a consequence of the recovery of the body from a place hidden from public view, there is no room for reasonably harbouring any doubt as to the guilt of the appellant or his commission of the offence that he was charged with. 26. The sheet-anchor of the appellant’s argument is that the complainant did not refer to the appellant in the complaint despite Murmu having informed him that Murmu saw the appellant carrying the victim on the appellant’s motorcycle at 5 pm on the day preceding the lodging of the complaint when the child went missing. There are two ways of looking at such apparent anomaly. There are two ways of looking at such apparent anomaly. First, both the complainant and the investigating officer maintained in their testimony in court that Murmu had not specifically identified the appellant on the motorcycle and he had merely stated that he saw a girl like the victim on the motorcycle. Either Murmu embellished his version in course of his evidence at the trial or the complainant and the investigating officer had missed Murmu’s point or had deliberately concealed it. There was no reason for, at least, the complainant to have deliberately concealed such fact in the complaint. Further, that the investigating officer’s evidence corroborated the complainant’s testimony at the trial may imply that Murmu may have been firmer in his belief as to the identity of the two persons on the motorcycle when he came to court than when he had initially made the statement. It is not unlikely for an ordinary villager to feel emboldened to identify the person once he was aware that there was other evidence against the appellant for which formal charges had been brought against him. 27. The consequence of such reading of the evidence would be to somewhat dilute Murmu’s evidence that the victim was seen in the company of the appellant at about 5 o’ clock on the day she went missing. But that would not detract from the prosecution case, as the victim would still have been last seen with the appellant at or about 3.30 pm when he lured her away with the promise of a guava. 28. Secondly, it must not be lost sight of that the complainant father received two phone calls – the second for ransom – shortly before the complaint was lodged. Indeed, the complaint expressed an apprehension that the victim was kidnapped for ransom. The complaint also referred to Murmu’s assertion that the victim was seen to have been taken away on a motorcycle at 5 pm on the day she went missing. The appellant was known to the complainant. If the complainant believed that the appellant had kidnapped his daughter, he would have gathered the villagers to immediately confront the appellant before even lodging a complaint. 29. The appellant was known to the complainant. If the complainant believed that the appellant had kidnapped his daughter, he would have gathered the villagers to immediately confront the appellant before even lodging a complaint. 29. By the time complaint was lodged, the complainant must have heard the versions of his wife and mother who later testified that they had seen the victim following the appellant at or about 3.30 pm the previous day. It appears that the phone calls received by the complainant shortly before he filed the complaint overwhelmed the complainant into believing that his daughter was kidnapped for ransom. It is also significant that the fact that the two phone calls were received by the complainant has been established in course of the evidence. 30. The minor anomaly, though the appellant has not emphasised much on such aspect, is in Murmu having seen the appellant riding with the victim on the appellant’s motorcycle at about 5 pm while a friend of the victim found the appellant alone close to the graveyard shortly before dusk. If Murmu’s evidence is discarded, there may not be any anomaly. Even if it is accepted that Murmu saw the appellant and the victim on the motorcycle at about 5 pm on the same day, in the light of what has otherwise been established, it would be injudicious to regard 5 pm and the time shortly before dusk to be in such close proximity that it would have been impossible for the appellant to be near the graveyard shortly before dusk and riding his motorcycle with the victim at or about 5 pm. Evidence cannot be assessed with mathematical precision. The time of shortly before dusk described by the minor witness may have been anytime in the late afternoon or early evening; just as the 5 pm referred to by Murmu could have been at least a half an hour this side or that. 31. An apparent drawback of the prosecution case is the absence of proof of motive. But it must be remembered that motive alone does not determine the culpability of an accused; it has to be taken into account with the other incriminating facts established in evidence. 31. An apparent drawback of the prosecution case is the absence of proof of motive. But it must be remembered that motive alone does not determine the culpability of an accused; it has to be taken into account with the other incriminating facts established in evidence. The aspect of motive needs attention, however, since the conviction is based, to an extent, on circumstantial evidence and the absence of proof of motive in such a situation would put the court on guard to scrutinise the evidence to eliminate the possibility of suspicion or conjecture taking the place of proof. There is direct evidence to the fact that the victim was last seen with the appellant and not seen alive thereafter. There is no direct evidence as to what happened to the victim after she was last seen with the appellant till the time of the recovery of her corpse. There is no doubt that the appellant had special knowledge of where the dead body of the victim would be found and the body was recovered from the exact spot indicated by the appellant. To repeat, the dead body was hidden from public view. 32. Motive may have been established if the autopsy had not been hindered by the severe decomposition of the body. Motive may also have been established if, despite the pronounced stage of rotting of the body, more advanced medico-legal tests had been conducted thereon. But here the ubiquity of the inadequacy in criminal investigation has to be noticed and it must also be appreciated that adequate facilities and resources may not had been available to the investigating agency in this case. There were, after all, injuries found on the thighs of the victim, apart from the fatal injuries to her head. But just as it may not be permissible to allow the imagination to run wild in search of the motive on the basis of some injuries to the thighs of the victim, it may not be prudent to discard the evidence and the chain of events apparent therefrom in the absence of proof of motive. 33. It is true that the inculpatory evidence in this case, along with the direct evidence of the victim being last seen alive in the company of the appellant, have impelled the conclusion that the appellant must have committed the crime. 33. It is true that the inculpatory evidence in this case, along with the direct evidence of the victim being last seen alive in the company of the appellant, have impelled the conclusion that the appellant must have committed the crime. The post-mortem examination confirmed that the date of death may have been the very day that the child went missing. The body of the victim was recovered from the village and it would be unreasonable to expect that the victim was alive several hours or days after she went missing, but she was not seen again in the village. The sequence of events and the evidence on record unmistakably points at the appellant having committed the offence. 34. The order of conviction and the sentence imposed do not call for any interference. CRA No. 653 of 2007 is dismissed. 35. A copy of this judgment be made over as expeditiously as possible to the convict and a further copy thereof be sent to the correctional home where he is lodged. The lower court records and a copy of this judgment be sent down to the trial court for immediate appropriate steps in accordance with law. Sanjib Banerjee & Siddhartha Chattopadhyay, JJ. I agree.