ORDER Yadav, J. -- 1. This intra-Court appeal under section 2(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nyayalaya (Khand Nyaypeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005, is directed against the order dated 15.11.2016 passed in Writ Petition No.4559/2014. 2. Petition, at the instance of the appellant, was for quashment of award dated 8.6.1993 passed by the Collector/Land Acquisition Officer, District Gwalior (M.P.) under the provisions of Land Acquisition Act, 1894; whereby, in lieu of acquisition of land bearing Survey No.684 admeasuring 0.240 hectare (unirrigated) compensation of Rs.3,92,000/- was awarded along with interest at the rate of 12% per annum under section 23(1A) of the Act, 1894 and solatium 30% under section 23(2) thereof. The challenge was primarily on the ground that the impugned award has lapsed as per sub-section (2) of section 24 of Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 and the purchaser being the owner of land, therefore, having the interest therein sought for the quashment of such award. It was also a ground that the impugned award passed in direct contravention of the provisions of section 54 of the M.P. Town and Country Planning Act 1973. It was also the ground that the land in question having not vested in the Government and no compensation has been paid till the date of filing of the petition. In nutshell, the petitioner though invoked sub-section 2 of section 24 of the Act, 2012 while challenging the award dated 8.6.1993. However, no specific relief was sought by the petitioner for a declaration of lapse of acquisition proceedings under section 24(2) of the Act, 2013. Be that as it may. 3. The facts on which the petitioner rested his challenge briefly are that, the petitioner is a society registered under the provisions of Madhya Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 and being in liquidation its authorized representative Attar Singh s/o Shri Mannu Singh on the strength of delegation by the liquidator under section 70 of 1960 Act had preferred the petition on the contentions that in the year 1989 an agreement to sell in respect of the property in question was entered into between Shri Sughar Singh s/o Shri Devi Singh and Shri Mannu Singh s/o Shri Pejram with the petitioner society for sale of said land. The agreement was signed on 28.4.1990 and possession was also taken by the petitioner society by paying the entire sale consideration. The agreement was signed on 28.4.1990 and possession was also taken by the petitioner society by paying the entire sale consideration. On 16.8.1985, a notification was issued under sub-section 4 read with sub-section (7) of section 50 of the Act, 1973 by Gwalior Development Authority (“for brevity “the Authority”) declaring its intention to prepare town development scheme for acquiring 271 survey numbers for undertaking development project. The notification included within its fold, besides other villages, village Mahalgaon where the land in question is situated. The authority further intended to acquire 111 survey numbers admeasuring 373.07 bigha-biswa. Whereafter the State Government on the requisition by the Authority issued a notification under section 4 read with section 17(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 on 28.2.1992 to acquire about 32 survey numbers of village Thatipur and Mahalgaon including the land in question. Notification dated 28.2.1992 issued under section 4 read with section 17(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 land admeasuring 0.240 hectare of Survey No.684 situated in village was proposed to be acquired. As the urgency clause was invoked, a notice under section 9(2) of Land Acquisition Act was issued on 10.7.1992 on the holders of the land, namely, Sughar Singh, Daulat Singh, Devi Singh, Paacho Bai w/o Devi Singh, Rajo Bai d/o Devi Singh, Mannu Singh s/o Pejram, Mst. Sarmaniya w/o Randheer Singh received by Attar Singh on 23.7.1992 (Annexure P-10). The notification and the proceeding culminated into passing of an award on 8.6.1993. Contending, inter alia, that after passing of final award the property in question continued to remain in possession of Shri Sughar Singh and Shri Mannu Singh from whom the society purchased the land. Society through Attar Singh preferred the said writ petition. The relief sought was not a declaration of lapse of acquisition proceedings under section 24(2) of 2013 Act but the quashment of the Award dated 8.6.1993. 4. Respondent authority denied the claim. Besides countering the claim on merits, the authority raised objection as to maintainability of the petition on the grounds that the land in question having been acquired to implement the town development scheme, since being implemented after the acquisition in 1993, it is too late for the society to question such award as the original owners through whom society lay the claim have not come forward to challenge the Award for over 21 years. It was also the contention on behalf of the authority that respondent No.4 being one of the original owners did not come forward to accept the compensation in the year 1993. 5. It was contended that after completion of acquisition proceedings Tahsildar, Gwalior handed over the possession of the land in question to the authority on 31.9.1994 vide possession letter/receipt brought on record as Annexure R-1(7). It is urged that the possession of the land in question having been taken over much before its transfer vide sale deed dated 11.2.1997 in favour of the society, no cause survived either in favour of the original owners or the society to have lay any claim against the said acquisition. It was further contended that as the sale deed was executed on 11.2.1997 i.e. much after the land was acquired and the same having vested in the authority no right over the land remained with the original owner to have transferred the same in favour of the society. The transfer of land vide sale deed dated 11.2.1997 was sham in the eyes of law and thus void ab initio. It was further contended that the respondent/authority had published Town Development Scheme under section 50 of the Adhiniyam, 1973 after inviting objections from the owners of the land which was to be acquired for implementation of commercial and residential scheme. It was urged that as the land in question could not be settled through private negotiations contemplated under section 56 of the Adhiniyam, the authority requested the Collector to initiate the acquisition proceeding of the land in question whereon notification under section 4 read sections 17(1) and 17(4) was issued and after following the procedure laid down under section 9 the award was passed on 8.6.1993 determining the compensation to the tune of Rs.3,92,000/-. It was alleged that the amount determined by the Land Acquisition Officer was deposited by the authority with the Land Acquisition Officer which is still lying with him as despite repeated notices sent to the owner of the land and despite receiving the notice no-one has come forward to collect it. It is further contended that after the award, the land which vested in the State Government with the notification under sections 17(1) and 17(4) was transferred to the authority on 31.5.1994. It is further contended that after the award, the land which vested in the State Government with the notification under sections 17(1) and 17(4) was transferred to the authority on 31.5.1994. It is urged that it was to circumvent the society in collusion with respondent No.4 got the sale deed executed in his favour on 28.4.1997 whereas the fact was that no title rested with respondent No.4 to transfer the same. It was urged that since there was no valid title for transfer in favour of the society it had no locus to question the award passed on 8.6.1993. 6. It was further contended that the subsequent sale entered into by the society is also of no consequence as there was no right, title or interest of society in the land in question qua the authority. On these submissions, the respondent/authority sought dismissal of the petition. 7. Learned Single Judge dwelling upon the merits of the matter dismissed the petition by the impugned order dated 15.11.2016. 8. Learned Single Judge observed that the original owners at no point of time either objected to the acquisition proceedings nor challenged the award. It observed that the original owners of the land in question have been noticed under section 9(2) and 9(3) of the Act, 1894 which was served upon them and despite repeated notices issued by the Land Acquisition Officer offering the payment of compensation, the original owners did not turn up to collect the same. Learned Single Judge also found that the possession was taken over by the Government and was handed over to the authority. It also observed that respondent No.4, the original owner of the land, did not deny the facts regarding the possession as well as compensation having been offered as he did not come forward to file counter affidavit. 9. Pausing for a moment at this stage. 10. An application (I.A.No.834/2017) is filed in the present appeal for transposition as petitioner on behalf of respondent No.4, however, after addressing for sometime, learned counsel for applicant does not wish to press the said application. Accordingly, I.A.No.834/2017 stands dismissed. 11. Reverting to the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge, it is observed that a finding is recorded in paragraphs 14 and 15 as regards possession and the vesting of the title in the authority. The learned Single Judge while distinguishing the judgments viz. Accordingly, I.A.No.834/2017 stands dismissed. 11. Reverting to the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge, it is observed that a finding is recorded in paragraphs 14 and 15 as regards possession and the vesting of the title in the authority. The learned Single Judge while distinguishing the judgments viz. U.P. Jal Nigam, Lucknow through its Chairman and another v. Kalra Properties (P) Ltd., Lucknow and others [ (1996)3 SCC 124 ], Meera Sahni v. Lieutenant Governor of Delhi and others [ (2008) 9 SCC 177 ], Saraswati Devi (dead) by LRs v. Delhi Development Authority [ (2013)3 SCC 571 ], and Budhuwa Chamar v. Board of Revenue and others [(2002) RN 95], relied upon by the petitioner in writ petition, dismissed the writ petition. 12. Considered the rival submissions. Perused the pleadings on record and the judgments, reliance whereof has been place. 13. At the outset, we make it clear that the petitioner has chosen not to seek a declaration of lapse of acquisition proceedings under section 24(2) of the Act, 2013 as is evident from the reliefs sought by the petitioner in writ petition which are in following terms : “7. Relief prayed for: 1. The petitioner humbly prays that the petition may kindly be allowed. 2. The impugned award Annexure P-1 passed by respondent No.2 may kindly be set aside. 3. Cost of the writ petition may kindly be awarded. 4. Any other relief which this Hon'ble Court deem fit and proper in the circumstances may kindly be granted.” The only relief that the petitioner sought was the quashment of the award dated 8.6.1993. 14. Section 50 of Adhiniyam, 1973 provides for preparation of town development schemes and empowers the Town and Country Development Authority to declare its intention to prepare a town development scheme. 14. Section 50 of Adhiniyam, 1973 provides for preparation of town development schemes and empowers the Town and Country Development Authority to declare its intention to prepare a town development scheme. Sub-sections 4 and 5 of section 50 provides for : “(4) The Town and Country Development Authority shall consider all the objections and suggestions as may be received within the period specified in the notice under sub-section (3) and shall, after giving a reasonable opportunity to such persons affected thereby as are desirous of being heard, and after considering the report of the committee constituted under sub-section (5) approve the draft scheme as published and make such modifications therein as it may deem fit : Provided that the final publication of such draft scheme shall be notified after the layout proposed therein has been approved by the Director. Such final publication shall be notified not later than one year from the date of publication of the draft scheme failing which the draft scheme shall be deemed to have lapsed. (5) XX XX XX (6) XX XX XX (7) Immediately after the town development scheme is approved under sub-section (4) with or without modifications the Town and Country Development Authority shall publish in the Gazette and in such other manner as may be prescribed a final town development scheme and specify the date on which it shall come into operation.” 15. Section 53 envisages that as from the date of publication of the declaration to prepare a town development scheme, no person shall, within the area included in the scheme, institute or change the use of any land or building or carry out any development, save in accordance with the development authorised by the Director in accordance with the provisions of Adhiniyam 1973 prior to the publication of such declaration. 16. Section 54 of Adhiniyam, 1973 mandates that if the Town and Country Development Authority fails to commence implementation of the Town Development Scheme within a period of two years or complete its implementation within a period of five years from the date of notification of the final scheme under section 50, it shall, on expiration of the said period of two years or five years, as the case may be, lapse. 17. 17. In the case at hand, though a stand is taken by the petitioner that the entire acquisition proceeding taken recourse to by the authority is contrary to the stipulations contained under section 54 of the Adhiniyam, 1973, however, there is no foundation laid either in the petition or in the submissions made before the learned Single Judge or before us to establish that after 16.8.1985, the development scheme was not implemented or completed within a period of five years. On the contrary, it appears from the pleadings and the cogent material available on record that the entire scheme was implemented but for the land in question which was later on subjected to acquisition under the provisions of the Act, 1894 that the contention on behalf of the appellant that the acquisition was bad and contrary to the provisions contained under section 54 of the Adhiniyam, 1973 has no legs to stand. 18. Furthermore, section 55 of the Adhiniyam, 1973 which is a deeming provision mandates that the land needed for the purpose of town development scheme shall be deemed to be a land needed for a public purpose within the meaning of Land Acquisition Act, 1894. 19. Section 56 provides for acquisition of land for Town and Country Development Authority which reads thus : “The Town and Country Development Authority may at any time after the date of publication of the final town development scheme under section 50 but not later than three years therefrom, proceed to acquire by agreement the land required for the implementation of the scheme and, on its failure so to acquire, the State Government may, at the request of the Town and Country Development Authority, proceed to acquire such land under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (No.1 of 1894) and on the payment of compensation awarded under that Act and any other charges incurred by the State Government in connection with the acquisition, the land shall vest in the Town and Country Development Authority subject to such terms and conditions as may be prescribed : Provided that the said agreement may contain such conditions and executed in such manner as may be prescribed.” Thus, there are two modes through which the authority can acquire land to meet out the requirement of development of scheme notified under section 50. The acquisition of land can be through private settlement with the owners of the land. The other mode is through acquisition under the Land Acquisition through State Government. 20. In the case at hand, as is evident from the notification under sections 50(4) and 50(7) Annexure PP-5 dated 16.8.1985, the authority expressed its intention for development scheme for that it intended to acquire 373.07 bigha-biswa of villages Thathipur and Mahalgaon including the land in question situated in village Mahalgaon. The record further reveals that subsequently, the State Government issued notification under section 4 read with sections 17(1) and 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to acquire the land in question. The notification was issued on 26.8.1988. As the urgency clause was invoked, the Land Acquisition Officer took recourse to the proceedings under section 9 of the Act of 1894 which was duly received by Attar Singh, the petitioner. This will be evident from Annexure R1-3 which bears the signature of Attar Singh which is not denied by the petitioner. Thereafter, the Award was passed on 8.6.1993. The owners of the land viz. Sughar Singh, Daulat Singh, Devi Singh, Paacho Bai w/o Devi Singh, Rajo Bai d/o Devi Singh, Mannu Singh s/o Pejram, Mst. Sarmaniya w/o Randheer Singh were noticed to receive the compensation which is evident from Annexure R1-5. Earlier the notices were refused (See Annexure R1-4). Thereafter, the petitioner Attar Singh received the notice. however, the owners did not come forward to receive the compensation. 21. Stand is taken by the petitioner that there was an agreement of sale on 4.7.1989 and the physical possession was taken on 28.4.1990. And that the prospective purchaser, the society, was not aware of these developments, though they were the interested party. These submissions are taken note of and rejected at the outset of having any consequential effect over the proceedings culminating in the acquisition of land in question. An agreement of sale does not create any title in the person in whose favour the agreement is executed. The limited right which accrues in favour of such person is a right to sue for specific performance. Thus, any legal right which accrued in favour of the petitioner, was against the sellers. An agreement of sale does not create any title in the person in whose favour the agreement is executed. The limited right which accrues in favour of such person is a right to sue for specific performance. Thus, any legal right which accrued in favour of the petitioner, was against the sellers. And since on the date when the alleged agreement was entered the land in question stood notified under section 50 of the Adhiniyam, 1973, the right of the owners to transfer the land stood abrogated. In other words, with notification under section 50, statutory clog on the right of transfer came into operation. 22. There is another aspect of the matter. Evidently, vide notification dated 16.8.1985, 373.07 bigha of land was notified for development Scheme. Thereafter, vide another notification dated 26.8.1988, 5.863 bigha of land of Village Mahalgaon was notified. That by subsequent notification dated 28.2.1992 subject land was notified vide notification under section 4 read with section 17(1) and (4) of Adhiniyam, 1973. 23. As it is not the case of the petitioner that the development scheme has not been undertaken. On the contrary, it is informed by learned counsel for the respondent/the Authority that the entire scheme has been given effect to and the City Centre with commercial and residential blocks are already in existence. This fact has not been controverted by the petitioner. Evidently, various bighas of land notified on 16.8.1985 and on 26.8.1988 have been utilized for said purpose. It appears that majority of land owners of the land notified took recourse to settlement through negotiation and the land owners of the land in question since did not come forward to settle it through negotiations led the Authority to requisition it through the State Government for its acquisition under the Act of 1894, which led the State Government to issue the notification on 28.2.1992. If the society as it claims that it acquired the interest in land through agreement of sale said to have been executed on 4.7.1989 it was at liberty to have raised an objection. Nor did it respond to the notice under section 9. Evidently it was the petitioner Attar Singh who represented not only the owner but also the society. If the society as it claims that it acquired the interest in land through agreement of sale said to have been executed on 4.7.1989 it was at liberty to have raised an objection. Nor did it respond to the notice under section 9. Evidently it was the petitioner Attar Singh who represented not only the owner but also the society. Furthermore, since society had no actionable claim against the Authority as the land being not transferred in the name of society and the owners of the land, viz., Shri Sughar Singh and Shri Mannu Singh despite repeated notices issued did not come forward to receive the compensation awarded. Pertinent it is to note that there was no reference under section 18 of the Act, 1894 either at the instance of the land owners as would have led the Land Acquisition Officer deposit the amount with the Court. It is stated that the amount is still with the Land Acquisition Officer. These facts go to establish that the acquisition of land in question with the issuance of notification under section 4 read with sections 17(1) and 17(4) of 1894 Act and passing of Award on 8.6.1993 was allowed to attain finality. The petitioner claims that by virtue of sale deed dated 11.2.1997 it acquired the right over the land in question. However, since the land in question already vested in the Authority with the Award dated 8.6.1993 and with challenge thereof, no title existed in favour of Sughar Singh and Mannu Singh as could have been transferred. Thus, there was no transfer in the eyes of law. The challenge to Award dated 8.6.1993 by the Society in the year 2014 was totally misconceived as there existed no right, title and interest in the society qua the Authority. 24. Furthermore, arguments have been tendered in the context of sub-section (2) of section 24 of the Act of 2013. Though the petitioner under the garb of challenge to award dated 8.6.1993 seeks a declaration of lapse of acquisition proceedings under section 24(2) of the Act 2013, however, no such relief has been sought by the petitioner in the petition and therefore, no declaration in terms of sub-section (2) of section 24 of the Act, 2013 can be granted. 25. Though the petitioner under the garb of challenge to award dated 8.6.1993 seeks a declaration of lapse of acquisition proceedings under section 24(2) of the Act 2013, however, no such relief has been sought by the petitioner in the petition and therefore, no declaration in terms of sub-section (2) of section 24 of the Act, 2013 can be granted. 25. Even otherwise, there must exist a cause of action for invoking the provision contained under sub-section (2) of section 24 of the Act, 2013 which envisages : “24(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), in case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, where an award under the said section 11 has been made five years or more prior to the commence-ment of this Act but the physical possession of the land has not been taken or the compensation has not been paid the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed and the appropriate Government, if it so chooses, shall initiate the proceedings of such land acquisition afresh in accordance with the provisions of this Act : Provided that where an award has been made and compensation in respect of a majority of land holdings has not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries specified in the notification for acquisition under section 4 of the said Land Acquisition Act, shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Act.” In the case at hand as noted supra with the finalization of award, as the same was never challenged by the owners, the transfer of land after its having vested in the Authority did not create a fresh cause of action in favour of society as there is no valid accrual of right, title and interest in the land which stood vested in authority. 26. In view whereof contentions regarding non-payment of compensation and non-acquisition are of no avail to the society. 27. There is one more reason why Attar Singh through society cannot lay the claim over the land in question. 28. Section 70 of the M.P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 envisages that : “70. Appointment of Liquidator. 26. In view whereof contentions regarding non-payment of compensation and non-acquisition are of no avail to the society. 27. There is one more reason why Attar Singh through society cannot lay the claim over the land in question. 28. Section 70 of the M.P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 envisages that : “70. Appointment of Liquidator. - (1) Where the Registrar has made an order under section 69 for the winding up of a society, he may appoint a liquidator for the purpose and fix his remuneration and may also remove at any time any person appointed as liquidator and appoint another instead : Provided that in respect of a co-operative bank, an order, for the winding up of the bank and appointment of liquidator thereof made by Registrar with the previous sanction in writing or on the requisition of the Reserve Bank, shall not be called in question in any co-operative Court. (2) A liquidator shall, on appointment, take into his custody or under his control all the property, effects and actionable claims to which the society is or appears to be entitled and shall take such steps as he may deem necessary or expedient, to prevent loss deterioration of, or damage to such, property, effects and claims. (3) [it is omitted by M.P. 10 of 2005, we.f. 13.6.2005] (4) Where an order of winding up of a society is set aside in appeal, the property, effects and actionable claims of the society shall revert in the society.” 29. In the present case, as evident from paragraph 5.1 of the petition that Attar Singh has been delegated with the authority to file petition meaning thereby the society in question is in liquidation and when the competent authority himself is a delegatee, he cannot further sub-delegate the power. In that event, in the eyes of law Attar Singh had no valid authority to file the petition. The petition, therefore, must fail on this count also. 30. In view of finding that there is no accrual of cause of action in favour of the appellant as would attract invocation of sub-section (2) of section 24 of the Act, 2013 coupled with the fact there is no relief sought by the appellant/petitioner seeking declaration of lapse of acquisition proceedings thereunder, we are not inclined to cause any indulgence. In view of finding that there is no accrual of cause of action in favour of the appellant as would attract invocation of sub-section (2) of section 24 of the Act, 2013 coupled with the fact there is no relief sought by the appellant/petitioner seeking declaration of lapse of acquisition proceedings thereunder, we are not inclined to cause any indulgence. Consequently, the present appeal fails and is hereby dismissed, however, there shall be no order as to costs.