ORDER 4.8.2017. PER : I. Mahanty, J. The present appeal has been filed mainly for setting aside the judgment and decree dated 9.1.2017 and 21.1.2017 respectively passed by the learned Family Court, Berhampur, Ganjam. In this appeal, the Stamp Reporter has pointed out a delay of 51 days in filling the appeal taking into account 30 days as period of limitation. A perusal of records shows that the appellant had filed C.P. No.348 of 2012 under Section 11 read with Section 5 and Sections 25 and 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (for short “the 1955 Act”) with a prayer for annulling the marriage of the appellant with respondent No.1 and directing the respondent No.1 to return all the dowry articles or its value with further prayer for directing respondent No.1 to make payment of permanent alimony, damages and cost of litigation. Finally on contest, the petition of the appellant was decreed on part without cost declaring the marriage of the appellant and respondent No.1 as null and void. Further, the learned Family Court directed the respondent No.1 to pay permanent alimony of Rs.3,00,000/- (Rupees three lakhs) to the appellant within a period of four months in two equal installments. Besides that, the respondent No.1 has also been directed to pay litigation expenses of Rs.2,000/- (Rupees two thousand) to the appellant failing which the appellant was granted liberty to levy execution in accordance with law. Taking the date of judgment to be 9.1.2017 as indicated earlier, the Stamp Reporter has shown that the present appeal has been filed with a delay of 51 days taking 30 days as limitation period for presenting the appeal. The delay has been calculated with reference to the date of judgment, which obviously is not correct. It should have been calculated from the date of decree. Even if limitation period of 30 days is calculated from the date of decree, which is 21.1.2017 (as signed on that date) still then, the present appeal would be time barred though with a lesser period of delay. Mr. B.P.B. Bahali learned Counsel for the appellant started his argument drawing attention of this Court to Section 28 of “the 1955 Act” and Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, (for short “the 1984 Act”), which are quoted hereunder : “The 1955 Act” “28. Mr. B.P.B. Bahali learned Counsel for the appellant started his argument drawing attention of this Court to Section 28 of “the 1955 Act” and Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, (for short “the 1984 Act”), which are quoted hereunder : “The 1955 Act” “28. Appeals from decrees and orders – (1) All decrees made by the Court in any proceeding under this Act shall, subject to the provisions of Sub-section (3), be appealable as decrees of the Court made in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction, and every such appeal shall lie to the Court to which appeals ordinarily lie from the decisions of the Court given in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction. “(2) Orders made by the Court in any proceeding under this Act under Sec. 25 or Sec. 26 shall subject to the provisions of Sub-section (3), be appealable if they are not interim orders and every such appeal shall lie to the Court to which appeals ordinarily lie from the decisions of the Court given in exercise of its original civil jurisdiction. (3) There shall be no appeal under this section on the subject of costs only. (4) Every appeal under this section shall be preferred within a [period of ninety days] from the date of the decree of order” (emphasis supplied). “The 1984 Act” “ 19. Appeal – (1) Save as provided in Sub-section (2) and notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) or in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or in any other law, an appeal shall lie from every judgment or order, not being an interlocutory order, of a Family Court to the High Court both on facts and law. (2) No appeal shall lie from a decree or order passed by the Family Court with the consent of the parties or from an order passed under Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974). Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to any appeal pending before a High Court or any order passed under Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1972 (2 of 1974) before the commencement of the Family Courts (Amendment Act, 1991). (3) Every appeal under this section shall be preferred within a period of thirty days from the date of the judgment or order of a Family Court. (3) Every appeal under this section shall be preferred within a period of thirty days from the date of the judgment or order of a Family Court. (emphasis supplied.) (4) The High Court may, of its own motion or otherwise, call for and examine the record of any proceeding in which the Family Court situate within its jurisdiction passed an order under Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of the order, not being an interlocutory order, and as to the regularity of such proceeding. (5) Except as aforesaid, no appeal or revision shall lie to any Court from any judgment, order or decree of a Family Court. (6) An appeal preferred under sub-section (1) shall be heard by a Bench consisting of two or more Judges”. According to Mr. Biplab P.B. Bahali, learned Counsel for the appellant in the present appeal limitation period as provided under Sub-section 4 of Section 24 of “the 1955 Act” is applicable not the limitation period provided under “the 1984 Act”. Accordingly he submitted that there has been no delay in filing the appeal and therefore, the Stamp Reporter has gone wrong in pointing out the delay. In this context, he pointed out that the limitation period of 30 days as indicated in Sub-section 3 of Section 19 of “the 1984 Act” with regard to presentation of the appeal cannot override the special provision made under Sub-section 4 of the Section 28 of “the 1955 Act”, providing 90 days limitation period for presenting appeal against all decrees/order passed under the said Act. Further, he submitted that Section 28 of “the 1955 Act” constitutes a substantive law while Section 19 of “the 1984 Act” constitute only a part of procedural law. Thus in the matter of appeal arising out of the proceeding under “the 1955 Act”, the period of limitation would be 90 days and the period of limitation for filing the appeal as provided under “the 1984 Act” cannot steal a march over the period of limitation as indicated in Section 28 of” the 1955 Act”. In this context, he has relied on the decision of the Kerala High Court in Viswanathan vrs. In this context, he has relied on the decision of the Kerala High Court in Viswanathan vrs. Sindhu as reported in 1 (2010) DMC 72 (DB) and a Full Bench decision of the Bombay High Court rendered on 1.12.2016 in Family Court Appeal No.161 of 2013 pertaining to Shri Shivram Dodanna Shetty vrs. Sou Sharmila Shivram Shetty.We have gone through the judgments of the Kerala High Court in Viswanathan (supra) and Bombay High Court in Shri Shivram Dodanna Shetty (supra). Both the High Courts by detailed process of the reasoning have come to a conclusion that the limitation period prescribed under Sub-section 4 of Section 28 of “the 1955 Act” i.e. 90 days would be the period of limitation for filing the appeal in matters arising out of the proceeding under “the 1955 Act”. Thus for filing an appeal under Section 19 of “the 1984 Act” pertaining to the proceeding under “the 1955 Act”, the period of limitation would be 90 days. For arriving at such a conclusion mainly the following things have been taken into account. 1. It is well established in law that procedural law is always subservient to the substantive law. While provisions of “the 1955 Act” are substantive in nature, the provisions under “the 1984 Act” are mainly procedural. Therefore, the period of limitation, as provided under the substantive law for filling the appeal would prevail over the limitation period prescribed in the procedural law. 2. While Sub-section 3 of Section 19 of “the 1984 Act” deals with a general provision; Sub-section 4 of the Section 28 of “the 1955 Act” providing 90 days period of limitation as incorporated by way of an amendment on 22.12.2003 substituting earlier period of 30 days of limitation is a special provision in the background of the observations of the Supreme Court in Savitri Pandey vrs. Prem Chandra Pandey reported in AIR 2002 SC 591 . 3. The purpose of amending Sub-section 4 of Section 28 of “the 1955 Act” was to overcome the inconvenience and hardship faced by the litigant public as pointed out by the Supreme Court in Savitri Pandey’s case (supra). Keeping in mind the purpose of amendment of Sub-section 4 of Section 28 of “the 1955 Act” w.e.f. on 23.12.2003, the period of limitation as provided therein must be given prominence and predominance. 4. Keeping in mind the purpose of amendment of Sub-section 4 of Section 28 of “the 1955 Act” w.e.f. on 23.12.2003, the period of limitation as provided therein must be given prominence and predominance. 4. Where two interpretations are possible with regard to the limitation period, the one stipulating the larger period of limitation is to be preferred. 5. 90 days limitation period as provided pursuant to the amendment of Sub-section 4 of Section 28 of “the 1955 Act” which was brought in by the Act 50 of 2003 substituting earlier period of 30 days being a product of later enactment has to prevail over Sub-section 3 of Section 19 of “the 1984 Act”, which is an earlier enactment. We respectfully agree with the views taken by the Kerala High Court and Bombay High Court keeping in mind the above noted principles. In view of this, limitation for filing of appeal against the decree/order passed in any proceeding under “the 1955 Act” would be 90 days as provided under Sub-section 4 of Section 28 of “the 1955 Act” and not 30 days as provided under Sub-section 3 of Section 19 of “the 1984 Act”. In such view of the matter, we hold that the present appeal has been filed within the period of limitation of 90 days and is in time. Since the appeal is in time, we ignore the defect pointed out by the Stamp Reporter with regard to limitation and direct listing of the matter under the heading “Fresh Admission” after removal of other defects. Ordered accordingly.