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2017 DIGILAW 842 (MP)

Anil Alias Bhura v. State Of M. P.

2017-07-19

G.S.AHLUWALIA

body2017
JUDGMENT : Today, the case is listed for hearing on IA No. 3425/2017, an application under section 389 of Criminal Procedure Code for suspension of sentence and grant of bail. It is submitted by the counsel for the appellant that he is ready to argue finally and, therefore, instead of deciding the application for suspension of sentence, the case may be heard finally. The State Counsel has expressed his willingness to argue the case finally. Therefore, with the consent of the parties, the appeal is heard finally. 2. This Criminal Appeal under section 374 of Criminal Procedure Code has been filed against the judgment and sentence dated 23-2-2017, passed by Special Judge (MPDVPK Act, 1981) Gwalior in Special Sessions Trial No. 31/2014, by which the appellant has been convicted under section 307 of Indian Penal Code read with section 11/13 of MPDVPK Act as well as under section 25(1-B)(A) and section 27 of the Arms Act and has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment of five years and fine of Rs. 2,000/-; rigorous imprisonment of three years and fine of Rs. 1,000/-, and rigorous imprisonment of four years and fine of Rs. 2,000/- with default imprisonment respectively. All the sentences have been directed to run concurrently. 3. The necessary facts for the disposal of this appeal in short are that the SHO, Police Station Utila, District Gwalior received an information from Senior Superintendent of Police, Gwalior on 16-9-2014 to the effect that the appellant on whom a reward has been declared and is a hardcore criminal, is reported to have been seen near Gijora Road, Bhogipura Triangle and he may commit any serious offence. After recording such information in Rojnamcha the police force available in the police station was divided into two parties. The entire police force was informed about the information received by the SHO, Police Station Utila. The police party No. 1 was being led by SHO himself whereas the police party No. 2 was constituted under the leadership of in-charge Sub-Inspector Jitendra Singh Tomar. The police party along with the arms and ammunition went to Gijora Road and they noticed that two persons on motorcycle came there and they were asked to stop who disclosed their names as Kalyan Singh and Pan Singh. Both the persons were asked to accompany the police party. The police party along with the arms and ammunition went to Gijora Road and they noticed that two persons on motorcycle came there and they were asked to stop who disclosed their names as Kalyan Singh and Pan Singh. Both the persons were asked to accompany the police party. Thereafter, the police party noticed that one motorcycle is coming from the direction of Gijora and it was asked to stop. After noticing the police party, the miscreant after throwing the motorcycle, fired at the police party but fortunately, none got injured. In retaliation, the SHO, Police Station Utila and Constable Sunil also fired in their self-defence. The miscreant again fired at police party No. 2, who also in retaliation, fired at the miscreant. The miscreant tried to run away from the spot and was screaming. At that time, the police party caught hold the miscreant. The miscreant was injured and was having one 315 bore country made pistol in his hand. One fired cartridge was found stuck in the chamber of country made pistol. Two live cartridges were also found in the pocket of pant of the miscreant. On the interrogation, the miscreant disclosed his name as Anil alias Bhura on whom the DGP had declared a reward of Rs. 25,000/-. A Dehati Nalishi was recorded and the FIR was registered. The police after investigating the matter and recording the statements of the witnesses, filed the charge-sheet for offence under section 307 of Indian Penal Code, under section 25/27 of the Arms Act and under section 11/13 of MPDVPK Act. The trial Court by order dated 26-12-2014 framed charges under section 307 of Indian Penal Code read with section 11/13 of MPDVPK Act and sections 25(1-B)(A) and 27 of the Arms Act. 4. The appellant abjured his guilt and pleaded not guilty. 5. The prosecution, in order to prove its case, examined Mohan Singh (PW1), Ashok Singh Bhadoriya (PW2), Kalyan Singh (PW3), Rajesh Singh Gurjar (PW4), Anil Singh Rajawat (PW5), Ramvaran Singh Sharma (PW6), V.S.Yadav (PW7), Gopal Agrawal (PW8) and V. S. Kaurav (PW9). The appellant did not examine any witness in his defence. 6. The trial Court after considering the evidence which has been led by the prosecution convicted the appellant for the above-mentioned offence. 7. The appellant did not examine any witness in his defence. 6. The trial Court after considering the evidence which has been led by the prosecution convicted the appellant for the above-mentioned offence. 7. Challenging the correctness and proprietary of the judgment and sentence dated 23-2-2017, it is submitted by the counsel for the appellant that the investigation was faulty because the Dehati Nalishi was lodged by V. S. Kaurav (PW9). V. S. Kaurav (PW9) is also the Arresting Officer and since the entire investigation was also done by V. S. Kaurav (PW9), therefore, the appellant is entitled to be acquitted only on the said ground. It is further submitted that the independent witness Kalyan Singh (PW3) has not supported the prosecution case and was declared hostile whereas another independent witness Pan Singh was not examined by the prosecution. No other argument was advanced by the counsel for the appellant. 8. Per contra, it is submitted by the counsel for the State that there is no provision in the Criminal Procedure Code which prohibits the complainant from conducting the investigation. Unless and until it is proved by the appellant that the investigation was tainted and biased because the Investigating Officer himself was the complainant in the case, therefore, merely because the investigation was also done by the complainant cannot be a ground by itself to discard the evidence of the Investigating Officer. It is further submitted that neither in the cross-examination of V. S. Kaurav (PW9) nor during the argument, any circumstance has been pointed out by the counsel for the appellant, which may indicate biased attitude of V. S. Kaurav (PW9) in conducting the investigation. Unless and until any prejudice is caused to the appellant, he can not be acquitted merely on the technical ground that the investigation was done by the complainant himself. It is further submitted that it is well-settled principle of law that if the evidence of the police officer is trustworthy and reliable, then the same cannot be discarded merely on the ground that the independent witnesses have not supported the prosecution case. 9. Heard the counsel for the parties. 10. It is further submitted that it is well-settled principle of law that if the evidence of the police officer is trustworthy and reliable, then the same cannot be discarded merely on the ground that the independent witnesses have not supported the prosecution case. 9. Heard the counsel for the parties. 10. In the present case, Gopal Agrawal (PW8) has stated that he was working on the post of Arms Clerk in the office of ADM, Gwalior and the case diary as well as one 315 bore country made pistol, two live cartridges, three empty cartridges were produced before the ADM for grant of sanction for prosecution and the ADM after going through the case diary and inspecting the seized weapons granted sanction (Ex.P8) and the signature of ADM is at “A to A”. This witness was cross-examined. He denied the suggestion that the case diary or weapons were not produced before the ADM. He further denied that ADM had not dictated the order Ex.P8 and he further denied that this witness had prepared the sanction order as per fixed proforma. As nothing could be elicited from the cross-examination of this witness, which may indicate non-application of mind, therefore, it is held that the prosecution has succeeded in proving that the ADM, Gwalior had granted sanction for prosecution (Ex.P8) after inspecting the seized weapons as well as after going through the case diary. 11. Ramvaran Sharma (PW6) is the Armourer, who had examined the seized country-made pistol, live cartridges as well as empty cartridges. This witness has given his enquiry report Ex.P7. This witness has specifically stated that he had received the weapons as well as live and empty cartridges in a sealed condition and were returned after resealing the same and in cross-examination, he admitted that he has taken a departmental training to examine the weapons and he further denied that with an intention to help the prosecution, a false report Ex.P7 has been prepared by him. 12. Kalyan Singh (PW3) is the independent witness. He has not supported the prosecution case and he was declared hostile. However, in the examination-in-chief itself, this witness admitted his signatures on spot map Ex.P1, seizure memo Ex.P2, another seizure memo Ex.P3, arrest memo Ex.P4 as well as sketch of country-made pistol Ex.P5. 12. Kalyan Singh (PW3) is the independent witness. He has not supported the prosecution case and he was declared hostile. However, in the examination-in-chief itself, this witness admitted his signatures on spot map Ex.P1, seizure memo Ex.P2, another seizure memo Ex.P3, arrest memo Ex.P4 as well as sketch of country-made pistol Ex.P5. This witness has further tried to explain that he had signed these documents on the instructions of V. S. Kaurav (PW9) but expressed his ignorance about contents of the documents. This witness was cross-examined by the Public Prosecutor. This witness accepted his signatures on the documents, but denied the remaining prosecution story. However, this witness except saying that he had signed the documents on the instructions of V. S. Kaurav (PW9), no explanation has been given by this witness as to why he signed the documents. This is not the case of the defence that this witness was a pocket witness of the police. On the contrary, it is a case of the prosecution that when the police party went to the spot, two persons were coming on the motorcycle, who were stopped and both two persons were asked to accompany the police party. Thus, undisputedly, Kalyan Singh (PW3) was the independent witness and he has admitted his signatures on Ex.P1 to Ex.P5 and he has not given any plausible explanation as to why he signed those documents at the instance of V. S. Kaurav (PW9) and how he came in contact with V. S. Kaurav (PW9). This witness has also not stated that for one reason or another he went to the police station where he was forced to sign these documents. Once the prosecution has come up with the specific case that the independent witnesses were found on the spot itself and the documents Ex.P1 to Ex. P5 were prepared on the spot itself, therefore, signing of the documents by Kalyan Singh (PW3) is proved. For the reasons best known to this witness, he is not willing to support the prosecution case but in view of his admitted signatures on Ex.P1 to Ex.P5 which were prepared on the spot, it is clear that this witness cannot be said to be the witness who has not supported the prosecution case in toto. 13. For the reasons best known to this witness, he is not willing to support the prosecution case but in view of his admitted signatures on Ex.P1 to Ex.P5 which were prepared on the spot, it is clear that this witness cannot be said to be the witness who has not supported the prosecution case in toto. 13. Mohan Singh (PW1), Ashok Singh Bhadoriya (PW2), Rajesh Singh Gurjar (PW4), Anil Singh Rajawat (PW5) and V. S. Yadav (PW7) are the persons, who were the Members of the police party. According to these witnesses, they proceeded from the police station at about 08:00 pm and reached at the spot at about 10:30 pm and they have stated that the SHO, Police Station Utila had informed the police party that a hardcore criminal on whom a reward of Rs. 25,000/- has been declared, was seen moving in the locality. Two persons were coming on motorcycle who were stopped and they were Kalyan Singh and Pan Singh. They were asked to stay there. Thereafter, another motorcycle came which was asked to stop. One person after stopping the motorcycle tried to run away and when he was challenged, he fired at the police party. The police party also returned fire in personal defence. Thereafter, the miscreant was arrested by the police who disclosed his name Anil alias Bhura and on search, one 315 bore countrymade pistol was found from him and one fired cartridge was found stuck in the said country-made pistol. Three empty cartridges were also found on the spot and two live cartridges were also found in the possession of the appellant. Five currency notes of Rs. 100/- were also found. As the appellant was injured, therefore, he was taken to J. A. Hospital, Gwalior. These witnesses were examined and except minor omissions and contradictions in their evidence, nothing could be elicited which may make their evidence unreliable. In case of truthful witnesses, minor omissions may occur in their evidence and it is well-settled principle of law that unless and until the omission results in contradiction, it would not be fatal to the prosecution case. 14. V. S. Kaurav (PW9) has also stated the entire incident. This witness has further stated that Dehati Nalishi (Ex.P9) was written by him, which was sent to the Police Station through Constable Sunil and a FIR was registered which is Ex.P10. A spot map Ex. 14. V. S. Kaurav (PW9) has also stated the entire incident. This witness has further stated that Dehati Nalishi (Ex.P9) was written by him, which was sent to the Police Station through Constable Sunil and a FIR was registered which is Ex.P10. A spot map Ex. P1 was prepared. The appellant was arrested vide arrest memo Ex.P4 and from the possession of the appellant one 315 bore country-made pistol, two live cartridges, one mobile, five currency notes of Rs. 100/- and three empty cartridges were found and were seized by seizure memo Ex.P2. A motorcycle, plain earth and bloodstained earth were seized by seizure memo Ex.P3 and sketch of the countrymade pistol was prepared which is Ex.P5. The seized weapons were sent to the Armourer. Sanction for prosecution was obtained and this witness recorded the statements of the witnesses and after completing the investigation, he had filed the charge-sheet. This witness was cross-examined in detail. He denied that he had not received any information from the Senior Superintendent of Police regarding the movement of appellant in the locality. Although this witness admitted that Rojnamcha in which such information was recorded, has not been produced but he denied that no such information has ever recorded in the Rojnamcha. This witness has also admitted that the logbook of official vehicle has not been produced but he specifically stated that he had left the Police Station at about 08:00 in the evening and reached on the spot at 10:00 in the evening and had not put any barricades. This witness has further stated that at about 09:30 pm he had stopped the independent witnesses and at about half an hour thereafter the appellant came there. This witness has further stated that it is true that the police party did not receive any injury and also admitted that the bullets or empty cartridges fired by the police party, were not seized from the spot but this witness has specifically stated that in the night itself an attempt was made to recover the empty cartridges or bullets fired by the police party. As it was night, therefore, the same could not be seized. He further denied that the statements of the witnesses were recorded on his own. 15. In the statement under section 313 of Criminal Procedure Code the appellant has stated that he was called in the police station where he was arrested. As it was night, therefore, the same could not be seized. He further denied that the statements of the witnesses were recorded on his own. 15. In the statement under section 313 of Criminal Procedure Code the appellant has stated that he was called in the police station where he was arrested. A question was put to the appellant that he got injured in the incident and the appellant expressed his ignorance of the same. Although it is the case of the prosecution that in exchange of gunshot fires, the appellant had sustained an injury on his hand and he was sent to J. A. Hospital, Gwalior for treatment but the documents have not been proved by the prosecution although the same were filed along with the charge-sheet. Once the prosecution has not proved any document then the same cannot be read in favour of the prosecution. However, as the appellant has given an evasive reply expressing his ignorance to the injury sustained and in view of the specific evidence given by the prosecution witnesses that the appellant had sustained injury in exchange of gunshot fires, it is clear that the appellant was arrested at the spot. The explanation given by the appellant that he was called in the police station where he was arrested, does not appear to be correct because a reward of Rs. 25,000/- was declared by DGP and, therefore, it is beyond imagination that any person on whom a reward of Rs. 25,000/- has been declared, would go to the police station and would surrender himself. As the appellant was required in various criminal cases and if the appellant had gone to the police station and had voluntarily surrendered himself, then there was no reason for the police to frame another false criminal case against him. They could have simply arrested the appellant in those cases in which he was wanted. Thus, from the evidence which has been led by the prosecution, it is clear that V. S. Kaurav (PW9) the SHO, Police Station Utila, District Gwalior received an information from the Senior Superintendent of Police about the movement of the appellant in the locality and he fired at the police when he was asked to stop and in exchange of fire, he sustained gunshot injury. 16. 16. Now, the moot question for consideration is that whether the appellant can be convicted on the basis of investigation done by the Investigating Officer. In the present case, the ambush was led by V. S. Kaurav (PW9). Dehati Nalishi was recorded by V. S. Kaurav (PW9) and the arrest and other proceedings on the spot were done by V. S. Kaurav (PW9) and thereafter, the statements of the witnesses were also recorded by V. S. Kaurav (PW9). 17. In support of his contention that the Arresting Officer and the Investigating Officer should not be the same person, the counsel for the appellant has relied upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Raju Dubey vs. State of M.P., reported in 1998 (1) JLJ 236 which read as under :? “5. xxxxxxxxxx In a recent decision the Apex Court has held that the arresting officer should not be Investigating Officer himself xxxxxxxxx.” The Supreme Court in the case of Meghna Singh vs. State of Haryana, reported in AIR 1995 SC 2339 has held as under :— “4. After considering the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears to us that there is discrepancy in the depositions of the P.Ws. 2 and 3 and in the absence of any independent corroboration such discrepancy does not inspire confidence about the reliability of the prosecution case. We have also noted another disturbing feature in this case. PW-3, Siri Chand, head Constable arrested the accused and on search being conducted by him a pistol and the cartridges were recovered from the accused. It was on his complaint a formal first information report was lodged and the case was initiated. He being complainant should not have proceeded with the investigation of the case. But it appears to us that he was not only the complainant in the case but he carried on with the investigation and examined witnesses under section 161, Criminal Procedure Code. Such practice, to say the least, should not be resorted to so that there may not be any occasion to suspect fair and impartial investigation.” However, this judgment was considered by the Supreme Court in the case of State represented by Inspector of Police, Vigilance and Anti Corruption, Tirchirapalli, Tamil Nadu vs. V. Jayapaul, reported in AIR 2004 SC 2684 and it was held as under :— “9. Now, we may turn our attention to the case of Megha Singh vs. State of Haryana on which reliance was placed by the High Court. 10. In Megha Singh’s case, PW3, the Head Constable, found a country-made pistol and live cartridges on search of the person of the accused. Then, he seized the articles, prepared a recovery memo and a ‘rukka’ on the basis of which FIR was recorded by the S.I. of police. However, P.W.3-the Head Constable himself, for reasons unexplained, proceeded to investigate and record the statements of witnesses under section 161, Criminal Procedure Code. The substratum of the prosecution case was sought to be proved by the Head Constable. In the appeal against conviction under section 25 of the Arms Act and section 6(1) of the TADA Act, this Court found that the evidence of PWs 2 and 3 was discrepant and unreliable and in the absence of independent corroboration, the prosecution case cannot be believed. Towards the end, the Court noted “another disturbing feature in the case”. The Court then observed : “PW 3, Siri Chand, Head Constable arrested the accused and on search being conducted by him a pistol and the cartridges were recovered from the accused. It was on his complaint a formal first information report was lodged and the case was initiated. He being complainant should not have proceeded with the investigation of the case. But it appears to us that he was not only the complainant in the case but he carried on with the investigation and examined witnesses under section 161, Criminal Procedure Code. Such practice, to say the least, should not be resorted to so that there may not be any occasion to suspect fair and impartial investigation”. 11. The conviction was set aside by this Court for the above reasons. 12. At first blush, the observations quoted above might convey the impression that the Court laid down a proposition that a Police Officer who in the course of discharge of his duties finds certain incriminating material to connect a person to the crime, shall not undertake further Investigation if the FIR was recorded on the basis of the information furnished by him. On closer analysis of the decision, we do not think that any such broad proposition was laid down in that case. On closer analysis of the decision, we do not think that any such broad proposition was laid down in that case. While appreciating the evidence of the main witness, i.e., the Head Constable (PW3), this Court referred to this additional factor--namely, the Head Constable turning out to be the investigator. In fact, there was no apparent reason why the Head Constable proceeded to investigate the case bypassing the Sub-Inspector who recorded the FIR. The fact situation in the present case is entirely different. The appellant-Inspector of Police, after receiving information from some sources, proceeded to investigate and unearth the crime. Before he did so, he did not have personal knowledge of the suspected offences nor did he participate in any operations connected with the offences. His role was that of investigator — pure and simple. That is the obvious distinction in this case. That apart, the question of testing the veracity of the evidence of any witness, as was done in Megha Singh’s case, does not arise in the instant case as the trial is yet to take place. The High Court has quashed the proceedings even before the trial commenced.” Thus, it is clear that in absence of any bar under Criminal Procedure Code it cannot be said that merely because the first informant/ complainant and the investigating officer was the same person. Therefore, the investigation was (sic : not) bad unless and until it is shown that the investigation was biased or tainted. The Supreme Court in the case of H. N. Rishbud and another vs. State of Delhi, reported in AIR 1955 SC 196 has held that incompetence of the Investigating Officer cannot be argued after the charge-sheet is filed. It is further held that invalidation of investigation would not always nullify the cognizance or trial based thereon when the charge-sheet is filed. A defect or illegality in investigation, however, serious, has no direct bearing on the competence or the procedure relating to a cognizance or trial because a valid and legal police report cannot be said to be a foundation of jurisdiction of the Court to take cognizance. The Supreme Court in the case of Union of India vs. Prakash P. Hinduja and another, reported in AIR 2003 SC 2612 has held as under :— “20. The Supreme Court in the case of Union of India vs. Prakash P. Hinduja and another, reported in AIR 2003 SC 2612 has held as under :— “20. An incidental question as to what will be the result of any error or illegality in investigation on the trial of the accused before the Court may also be examined. Section 5-A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 provided that no police officer below rank of a Deputy Superintendent of Police shall investigate any offence punishable under section 161, section 165 and section 165-A Indian Penal Code or under section 5 of the said Act without the order of a Magistrate of the First Class. In H. N. Rishbud (supra) the investigation was entirely completed by an officer of the rank lower than the Deputy Superintendent of Police and after permission was accorded a little or no further investigation was made. The Special Judge quashed the proceedings on the ground that the investigation on the basis of which the accused were being prosecuted was in contravention of the provisions of the Act, but the said order was set aside by the High Court. The appeal preferred by the accused to this Court assailing the judgment of the High Court was dismissed and the following principle was laid down :— “The question then requires to be considered whether and to what extent the trial which follows such investigation is vitiated. Now, trial follows cognizance and cognizance is preceded by investigation. This is undoubtedly the basic scheme of the Code in respect of cognizable cases. But it does not necessarily follow that an invalid investigation nullifies the cognizance or trial based thereon. Here we are not concerned with the effect of the breach of a mandatory provision regulating the competence or procedure of the Court as regards cognizance or trial. It is only with reference to such a breach that the question as to whether it constitutes an illegality vitiating the proceedings or a mere irregularity arises. A defect or illegality in investigation, however serious, has no direct bearing on the competence or the procedure relating to cognizance or trial. No doubt a police report which results from an investigation is provided in section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as the material on which cognizance is taken. A defect or illegality in investigation, however serious, has no direct bearing on the competence or the procedure relating to cognizance or trial. No doubt a police report which results from an investigation is provided in section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as the material on which cognizance is taken. But it cannot be maintained that a valid and legal police report is the foundation of the jurisdiction of the Court to take cognizance. Section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is one out of a group of sections under the heading “Conditions requisite for initiation of proceedings.” The language of this section is in marked contrast with that of the other sections of the group under the same heading, i.e. sections 193 and 195 to 199. These latter sections regulate the competence of the Court and bar its jurisdiction in certain cases excepting in compliance therewith. But section 190 does not. While no doubt, in one sense, clauses (a), (b) and (c) of section 190(1) are conditions requisite for taking of cognizance, it is not possible to say that cognizance on an invalid police report is prohibited and is therefore a nullity. Such an invalid report may still fall either under clause (a) or (b) of section 190(1) (whether it is one or the other we need not pause to consider) and in any case cognizance so taken is only in the nature of error in a proceeding antecedent to the trial.” The Court after referring to Prabhu vs. Emperor AIR 1944 SC 73 and Lumbhardar Zutshi vs. The King, AIR 1950 PC 26 held that if cognizance is in fact taken on a police report initiated by the breach of a mandatory provision relating to investigation, there can be no doubt that the result of the trial, which follows it cannot be set aside unless the illegality in the investigation can be shown to have brought about a miscarriage of justice and that an illegality committed in the course of investigation does not affect the competence and the jurisdiction of the Court for trial. This being the legal position, even assuming for the sake of argument that the CBI committed an error or irregularity in submitting the charge-sheet without the approval of CVC, the cognizance taken by the learned Special Judge on the basis of such a charge-sheet could not be set aside nor further proceedings in pursuance thereof could be quashed. The High Court has clearly erred in setting aside the order of the learned Special Judge taking cognizance of the offence and in quashing further proceedings of the case.” Thus, it is clear that unless and until the defence points out any bias on the part of the Investigating Officer, the prosecution case cannot be thrown merely on the ground that the complainant as well as the Investigating Officer was the same. Furthermore, in the present case, documents spot map Ex.P1, seizure memos Ex.P2 and P/3, arrest memo Ex.P4 and sketch of weapon Ex.P5 were also prepared on the spot itself. Dehati Nalishi (Ex.P9) was also written on the spot itself. Arrest memo, Ex.P4 was prepared and FIR Ex.P10 was lodged by another witness and the remaining investigation was done by V. S. Kaurav (PW9) by recording case diary statements of the witnesses and sending the weapons to the Armourer and sending the diary along with weapons to ADM for grant of sanction. So far as the report of Armourer and grant of sanction is concerned, undisputedly, it was granted by the persons other than the Investigating Officer. Therefore, this part of the investigation by no stretch of imagination can cause prejudice to the appellant. So far as the recording of the case diary statements of the witnesses are concerned, suffice to say that the substantive evidence is the evidence led in the Court and not the case diary statements of the witnesses. Even in the cross-examination of V. S. Kaurav (PW9) no such suggestion was given by the appellant that the entire investigation was biased. 18. Under these circumstances, this Court is of the view that merely because V. S. Kaurav (PW9) had made the ambush and was the complainant in the case and, therefore, by investigating the matter, did not cause any prejudice to the appellant and nothing could be pointed out to prima facie establish that the investigation done by V. S. Karuav was tainted or biased. So far as non-support of prosecution case by the independent witness Kalyan Singh is concerned, suffice to say that where the case is based on the evidence of the prosecution witnesses who were the police personnel and if the independent witness has turned hostile, then the prosecution case cannot be thrown over lightly merely because the independent witness did not support the prosecution case. 19. The Supreme Court in the case of Anil @ Andya Sadashiv Nandoskar vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in (1996)2 SCC 589 has held as under :— “5. Indeed all the 5 prosecution witnesses who have been examined in support of search and seizure were members of the raiding party. They are all police officials. There is, however, no rule of law that the evidence of police officials has to be discarded or that it suffers from some inherent infirmity. Prudence, however, requires that the evidence of the police officials, who are interested in the outcome of the result of the case, needs to be carefully scrutinized and independently appreciated. The police officials do not suffer from any disability to give evidence and the mere fact that they are police officials does not by itself give rise to any doubt about their credit worthiness. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx” 20. Considering the totality of the facts and circumstances of this case, this Court is of the considered opinion that the prosecution has succeeded in proving its case beyond reasonable doubt. The appellant on whom a reward of Rs. 25,000/- was declared by DGP, was asked to stop and after noticing the police party, he tried to run away and also fired at the police party and sustained gunshot injury during exchange of fire. It is also held that one 315 bore country-made pistol was seized from the appellant along with two live cartridges and three empty cartridges. The sanction for prosecution under section 39 of the Arms Act was granted after due application of mind and 315 bore country made pistol was found in working condition and the cartridges which were found in the possession of the appellant were live and were sufficient to cause human loss. The trial Court after appreciating the evidence, has convicted the appellant for offence under section 307 of Indian Penal Code read with section 11/13 of MPDVPK Act and under section 25(1-A)(A) and 27 of the Arms Act. The trial Court after appreciating the evidence, has convicted the appellant for offence under section 307 of Indian Penal Code read with section 11/13 of MPDVPK Act and under section 25(1-A)(A) and 27 of the Arms Act. The conviction of the appellant recorded by the trial Court by the judgment dated 23-2-2017 is upheld. 21. So far as the question of sentence is concerned, it is submitted by the counsel for the State that it has come on record that the appellant is a hardcore criminal on whom a reward of Rs. 25,000/- was also declared, therefore, the sentence awarded by the trial Court appears to be justified and do not require any interference. The sentence of five years, three years and four years for offence under section 307 of Indian Penal Code read with section 11/13 of MPDVPK Act, sections 25(1-B)(A) and 27 of the Arms Act respectively is justified and do not require any interference. 22. Accordingly, the judgment and sentence dated 23-2-2017 passed by the Special Judge (MPDVPK Act), Gwalior in Special Sessions Trial No. 31/2014 is hereby affirmed. The appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.