JUDGMENT : I.P. Mukerji, J. There are 139 petitioners. All of them are qualified doctors. Each of them has the degree of Bachelor of Medicine and Bachelor of Surgery (MBBS) granted by a State University. The respective State Medical Councils have registered them and issued to each of them a certificate of registration. 2. In each of the states except Jammu and Kashmir and Andhra Pradesh the Government Medical Teaching Institutes conducting the MD, MS degree and PG diploma courses had to keep 50% seats for students who qualified in an All India Entrance Examination for these courses. These All India Entrance Examinations are known as the All India Post Graduate Medical Entrance Examination (AIPGMEE) and the All India Post Graduate Dental Entrance Examination (AIPGDEE). 3. The National Board of Examinations (NBE) was established, as an autonomous body by the Government of India in 1975. The Union Ministry of Health and Family Welfare entrusted this Board with the responsibility to conduct the All India post graduate medical entrance examination (AIPGMEE) an entrance examination. 4. The balance 50% seats in these courses can be filled up by the State, conducting its own examination or on the basis of results of AIPGMEE or AIPGDEE. 5. Our State Government conducts a separate examination for filling up 50% of the Post Graduate Medical and Dental seats. 6. On 24th October, 2013 the Board published an advertisement for the State Entrance Examination for 2014 (AIPGMEE-2014). It was said therein that between 24th October, 2013 and 13th November, 2013 the information bulletin cum examination fee voucher would be available at the designated branches of AXIS Bank. Between 26th October and 13th November 2013 online registration would take place. Between 25th November and 6th December, 2013 the entrance examination would be held. On 31st January, 2014 the results would be declared. 7. The petitioners qualified in the entrance examination. 8. The Medical Counselling Committee (MCC) under the Director General of Health Services, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Government of India had conducted the counselling process for each of the writ petitioners. Several rounds took place. Thereafter, each of the writ petitioners was allotted a medical teaching institute as specified in paragraph-14 of the petition. Accordingly, the petitioners took admission into these institutions. 9. The state government made a notification on 31st July, 2013. It was issued by the Joint Secretary Department of Health and Family Welfare. Several rounds took place. Thereafter, each of the writ petitioners was allotted a medical teaching institute as specified in paragraph-14 of the petition. Accordingly, the petitioners took admission into these institutions. 9. The state government made a notification on 31st July, 2013. It was issued by the Joint Secretary Department of Health and Family Welfare. It said that, to serve the rural areas doctors after completing their Post Graduate and Post Doctoral Education in State Medical Teaching Institutions in West Bengal were to work in multi speciality/super speciality hospitals secondary and tertiary level hospitals in this state for a period of one year. A bond had to be executed that in breach of this condition a candidate would have to pay a penalty of Rs. 10 lakhs to the government. It would be applicable for all post doctoral courses in State Medical Teaching Institutions from the academic session 2013-2014 and post graduate courses in State Medical Teaching Institutions from the succeeding academic session 2014-2015 onwards. 10. By the notification dated 10th June, 2014 the mandatory service period was increased to three years after completion of the post doctoral course and two years after completion of the PG Diploma course. In default penalty of Rs. 10 lakhs per year was payable aggregating to Rs. 30 lakhs. 11. Two subsequent notifications dated 26th July, 2016 and 10th august, 2016 were made by the state government basically to implement its earlier notifications. 12. The petitioners say that this stipulation was attached to the information booklet meant for the State quota candidates. 13. As a result the petitioner nos. 1 and 94 to 139 are required to serve the government for one year, whereas the petitioner nos. 2 to 10 and 49 to 53 have been asked to serve the government for two years. The petitioner nos. 11 to 48 and 54 to 93 have to work three years with the government. In default each of them has to pay a penalty of Rs. 10 lakhs or Rs. 10 lakhs per year to the government. 14. 2 to 10 and 49 to 53 have been asked to serve the government for two years. The petitioner nos. 11 to 48 and 54 to 93 have to work three years with the government. In default each of them has to pay a penalty of Rs. 10 lakhs or Rs. 10 lakhs per year to the government. 14. The petitioners say that after the counselling process was over, each of them was coerced by the respondents (referring to concerned respondents only in this judgment) to sign a bond that they would serve in the rural areas of the state under the Department of Health and Family Welfare, Government of West Bengal for a specified period after obtaining the qualification. In case they were unable to do so each would pay the State Government compensation as stipulated. 15. The petitioners complain that their original documents like mark sheets, certificates etc. have been retained by the heads of the State Medical Teaching Institutions. The petitioner nos. 1, 94 to 111 and 121 have completed their PG Diploma course in July, 2016. On withholding of these original documents the petitioners cannot even apply anywhere for a suitable position. 16. The requirement of furnishing this bond was for a students selected from the State quota, only, they contend. 17. The petitioners submit that each of them was coerced by the respondents to execute the bond. They were not in an equal bargaining position. The respondents being in a superior bargaining position had fully exerted coercion on the petitioners. 18. These respondents had also exerted undue influence on the petitioners. It was also pointed out to me that the State in their affidavit-in-opposition had admitted that the bond was taken only from State quota candidates and was required to be given by those candidates only. Later in their supplementary affidavit they stated that this averment was wrong and that this bond had to be furnished by all the candidates. 19. Mr. Pratik Dhar, learned senior Advocate appearing for the petitioners has attacked the action of the respondents on several grounds. 20. Later in their supplementary affidavit they stated that this averment was wrong and that this bond had to be furnished by all the candidates. 19. Mr. Pratik Dhar, learned senior Advocate appearing for the petitioners has attacked the action of the respondents on several grounds. 20. First and foremost, he said that a Joint Secretary of the State Government by an administrative order could not impose restrictions on the fundamental right to practise any profession granted by Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution and the fundamental right to move freely throughout the territory of India granted by Article 19 (1) (d). Such restrictions could only be imposed by law. He referred to the definition of law in Article 13 (3) (a) and submitted that in order to be law there must be Parliamentary or legislative sanction. 21. He also said that as administrative orders, the impugned notifications are defective as they were not stated to be made in the name of the Governor. 22. A mere administrative order without the sanction of law was nonest in the eye of law. Therefore, the notifications issued by the Joint Secretary restricting the right of practice of the writ petitioners failing which the petitioners would have to pay penalty was nonest in the eye of law. 23. Secondly, he argued that the right to practice a profession was a fundamental right under Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution of India. The right to free movement throughout the country was conferred by Article 19 (1) (d) of the Constitution. If both these rights were taken together a doctor had the right to practice medicine in any place in India. The restrictions that might be imposed on this right are referred to in sub-Section 4 and 6 of the Article. But such restrictions had to be reasonable in the interest of the general public. The restriction which the respondents were trying to impose on the right to practice of the petitioners were not at all reasonable. 24. Learned counsel also argued that the respondents did not have the right to impose any additional condition contrary to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Harsh Pratap Sisodia v. Union of India and others reported in (1999) 2 SCC 575 and Anand S. Biji v. State of Kerala and others reported in 2001 (6) Scale page 665. 25. According to Mr. 25. According to Mr. Dhar, at the time of issuance of the bulletin by the National Board of Examination there was no mention of any restriction on the right to practice that might be put upon the writ petitioners, after qualifying in the post graduate course. Therefore, the writ petitioners wrote the selection test and took part in the counselling process without any idea of this restriction. Clamping this kind of restriction after the admission process was a most arbitrary and an unreasonable act on the part of the respondents. The restriction put on the right to practice was an invasion on the right to carry on any trade or profession. This kind of a contractual provision in restraint of trade was forbidden by Section 27 of the Contract Act, 1872. 26. In any event according to learned Counsel the bond was made to be signed by the petitioners was a product of coercion and undue influence practised by the respondents. 27. I will discuss the cases cited by the petitioners, later on in this judgment. 28. Mr. Abhratosh Majumder, Ld. Additional Advocate General made submissions for the respondent. 29. First of all, he has referred to a policy of the government. It is this. The government is committed to rendering medical services in rural areas. It is providing PG Medical Education at a sub-sidised rate. In exchange of that it is extracting an undertaking from the students that they will serve the rural areas for a specific period of time as provided in the bond. He said that the students were paid stipend during the academic course and remuneration during the bond period. He argued that the impugned notifications were executive action under Article 166 of the Constitution of India. Article 166 (3) says that the Governor usually makes rules for the more convenient transaction of business of the government of the states. Although, the impugned notifications were not stated to be made in the name of the Governor, the rules of business were scrupulously followed before issuing the notification. The impugned decision had been approved by the Chief Minister of the State who is also the Ministry-in-charge Health Department Government of West Bengal, as would be evident from the note sheets in the file. He said that there was substantial compliance with the requirements of Article 166 of the Constitution of India. 30. The impugned decision had been approved by the Chief Minister of the State who is also the Ministry-in-charge Health Department Government of West Bengal, as would be evident from the note sheets in the file. He said that there was substantial compliance with the requirements of Article 166 of the Constitution of India. 30. He said that there was valid exercise of executive power. Hence, the notifications dated 31st July, 2013 and 10th June, 2014 were valid and law within the meaning of Article 13 of the Constitution. The notifications dated 26th July, 2016 and 10th August, 2016 had been issued in the name of the Governor and were also valid. 31. Each of the petitioners according to the learned Advocate General was paid a monthly stipend. It was Rs. 31566/- for the one year post graduate training, Rs. 33994/- for the second year students and Rs. 36422/- for those in the third year. Fees paid by the students were highly subsidised for the post graduate trainees and diploma trainees. The admission and tuition fees were Rs. 2000/- and Rs. 1000 p.m. respectively. For the post graduate trainees and the post graduate diploma, examination fee was Rs. 10,000/- registration fee was Rs. 2,000/- whereas post graduate diploma students the examination fee was Rs. 6,000/- registration fee was Rs. 2,000/-. He also said that in the implementation of its health policy public interest should override the private interest. 32. Mr. Majumder stated that the case sought to be made out by the petitioners that they were totally in the dark about, the stipulation of the state that after undergoing the training or course they would have to render medical service in the rural areas of the state, was absolutely untenable. Each one of them was aware of the requirements of the State Government. In fact the National Board of Examinations issued an information bulletin with which was appended same frequently asked question. Question 30 pertained to this issue. The answer of the National Board of Examinations specifically stated that the "bond amount" varies from state to state. Candidates were advised to visit web site of the institutions to get the exact information. 33. In fact the National Board of Examinations issued an information bulletin with which was appended same frequently asked question. Question 30 pertained to this issue. The answer of the National Board of Examinations specifically stated that the "bond amount" varies from state to state. Candidates were advised to visit web site of the institutions to get the exact information. 33. Learned counsel argued that Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 had no application in this case because the admission to the post graduate diploma or degree course and the execution of the bond by a student to render rural service was part of the same contract and did not entail any obligation outside a contractual period. Therefore, during this period when a student was bound by the bond, the state could validly impose restriction on his or her carrying out private practice. If this restriction was made when he was outside this relationship then only could the petitioners say that the contract was void for being in restraint of trade. 34. The learned Additional Advocate General also argued that the above stipulation was not in violation the judgment of the Supreme Court in Harsh Pratap Sisodia v. Union of India and others reported in (1999) 2 SCC 575 in as much as by the stipulation the eligibility criteria for admission was not being interfered with but undertakings were obtained from the petitioners by way of execution of bonds that they would render rural medical services for a particular period of time. The decision in Anand S. Biji v. State of Kerala and others reported in 2001 (6) Scale 665 merely endorsed the decision in Harsh Pratap Sisodia. Learned counsel added that when such substantial remuneration was being paid to the students as stipends for undergoing the course and the admission fee monthly tuition fee, examination fee, registration fee etc. maintained at such a low level by the state, the government was entitled to impose the stipulation and to enforce the bond by compelling each student to render rural service. In view of the above financial data the decision of the government cannot be said to be arbitrary or unfair or unjust. I will discuss the cases cited by the learned Additional Advocate General later on in this judgment. Discussion 35. In view of the above financial data the decision of the government cannot be said to be arbitrary or unfair or unjust. I will discuss the cases cited by the learned Additional Advocate General later on in this judgment. Discussion 35. It is quite necessary, first, to have a look at Articles 154 and 162 of the Constitution of India. The first article provides that the executive power of the state is vested in the Governor. The second article lays down that this executive power extends to the matters "with respect to which the legislature of the state has power to make laws". Now, the 7th Schedule List II of the Constitution contains matters with regard to which the state legislature can make laws. Health is one of such matters. There is no law by the state legislature in the area of controversy, that is to say with regard to admission in the 50% medical seats or any condition or conditions that may be attached by the State Government to such admission. If the state legislature has the power to make law in a particular field and there is no law then under Article 162 of the Constitution the state can exercise its executive or administrative power. It has tried to do so by making these notifications. This exercise of power appears to be backed by constitutional sanction. 36. Now, let us come to Article 166 of the Constitution to assess the procedural validity of the notifications. Article 166 (1) provides that all executive actions of a state shall be expressed to be taken in the name of the Governor. Article 166 (3) says that the Governor shall make rules for the more convenient transaction of business of the government of the state. The notifications dated 31st July, 2013 and 10th June, 2014 were issued by the Joint Secretary and the Special Secretary respectively. Now could it be said that those notifications were validly issued? 37. Mr. Majumder said relying on file notings that the decision had been ultimately approved by the Hon'ble Chief Minister who is also Minister in Charge Health Department, Government of West Bengal. The notifications issued by the Joint and Special Secretary do not say that the notifications were made by the Governor. Mr. 37. Mr. Majumder said relying on file notings that the decision had been ultimately approved by the Hon'ble Chief Minister who is also Minister in Charge Health Department, Government of West Bengal. The notifications issued by the Joint and Special Secretary do not say that the notifications were made by the Governor. Mr. Majumder submitted that since all the formalities of the rules of business of the State under Article 166 (3), specially rule 47, had been followed the notifications were valid, although not expressed to be made in the name of the Governor. 38. Mr. Majumder's view seems to be endorsed by the Supreme Court in Lalaram and others v. Jaipur Development Authority and another reported in (2016) 11 SCC 31 . 39. The Supreme Court expressed the following view in paragraph-105 of this judgment: "It is no longer res integra that the enjoinment of clauses (1) and (2) of Article 166, is not mandatory so much so, that any non-compliance therewith, ipso facto would render the executive action/decision, if otherwise validly taken in terms of the Rules of Business framed under Article 166 (3), invalid. Any decision however, to be construed as an executive decision as contemplated under Article 166, would essentially have to be in accordance with the Rules of Business. The Rules depending upon the scheme thereof, may or may not, accord an inbuilt flexibility in its provisions in the matter of compliance. It is possible that the provisions of the Rules en bloc may not be relentlessly rigid, obligatory or peremptory proscribing even a minimal departure ensuing incurable vitiations. Contingent on the varying imperatives, some provisions may warrant compulsory exaction of compliance therewith e.g. negative/prohibitive expression/clauses, matters involving revenue or finance, prior approval/concurrence of the Finance Department, consultative/approval/concurrence of the Finance and Revenue Departments in connection therewith and issues not admitting of any laxity so as to upset, dislodge or mutilate the prescribed essentiality of collective participation, involvement and contribution of the Council of Ministers, headed by the Chief Minister in aid of the Governor in transacting the affairs of the State to effectuate the imperatives of federal democratic governance as contemplated by the Constitution." 40. Hence, mere omission to state that the notification was being issued by the Governor is not fatal. 41. Hence, mere omission to state that the notification was being issued by the Governor is not fatal. 41. If not anything else the candidates, on perusal of the information bulletin published by the National Board of Examinations in 2014, 2015 and 2016 were aware that some states if not all might enforce compulsory service for a certain period of time in the government health service in rural areas, after obtaining a degree or diploma. 42. In my opinion, all the candidates were aware of this stipulation of the respondents. They wrote the entrance examination knowing it and with their eyes wide open. I do not believe the statement made by the petitioners that they were coerced to sign bonds undertaking service with the government and in default a promise to pay the agreed penalty. Being aware of the above condition of the government, candidates signed the bond voluntarily without any duress, in my judgment. 43. Now, what was the effect of the notification dated 31st July, 2013 for the students who sought admission in 2014 and of the notification dated 10th June, 2014, which were applicable to the students who obtained admission in the subsequent academic years? 44. I have held that the notifications were issued as administrative orders observing due procedure. The question which now arises for consideration is whether these notifications could be considered as valid and binding on the candidates or were they violative of the Constitution and the laws? 45. If each of these notifications is viewed as a condition attached by the State Government while entering into an agreement with each of the candidates to admit him into the post graduate degree or diploma courses, could the condition embodied in the notifications be considered as void for being violative of Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872? 46. The legal relationship entered into by each of the petitioners with the teaching institutions and the government was this: (a). Candidates residing outside West Bengal would be granted admission into 50% seats in the subject post graduate courses. (b). Each of the candidates would be paid a stipend of over Rs. 30,000 per month for the first year and over Rs. 35,000 per month in the third year. (c). The admission fee, tuition fee, examination and registration fee for each student was to be kept comparatively low. 47. (b). Each of the candidates would be paid a stipend of over Rs. 30,000 per month for the first year and over Rs. 35,000 per month in the third year. (c). The admission fee, tuition fee, examination and registration fee for each student was to be kept comparatively low. 47. At the time of seeking admission each of the candidates was to execute a bond promising to serve the government for a certain number of years or pay them compensation as provided therein. For those students who took admission in 2014 the bond period was one year, for those who took admission in 2015 and 2016 it was three years. The candidates of the 2014 batch who did not wish to serve this period would have to pay the government Rs. 10 lakhs. Those of 2016 would have to pay Rs. 10 lakhs every year for three years. 48. I would like to discuss the Section 27 issue first. 49. I quote from Percept D' Mark (India) (P) Ltd. v. Zaheer Khan and Another reported in (2006) 4 SCC 227 : "62. If the negative covenant or obligation under clause 31 (b) is sought to be enforced beyond the term i.e. if it is enforced as against a contract entered into on 20.11.2003 which came into effect on 1.12.2003, then it constitutes an unlawful restriction on Respondent 1's freedom to enter into fiduciary relationships with persons of his choice, and a compulsion on him to forcibly enter into a fresh contract with the appellant even though he has fully performed the previous contract, and is, therefore, a restraint of trade which is void under Section 27 of the Contract Act. 63. Under Section 27 of the Contract Act: (a) a restrictive covenant extending beyond the term of the contract is void and not enforceable, (b) the doctrine of restraint of trade does not apply during the continuance of the contract for employment and it applies only when the contract comes to an end, (c) as held by this court in Gujarat Bottling v. Coca-Cola this doctrine is not confined only to contracts of employment, but is also applicable to all other contracts." 50. In Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. and others v. Coca Cola and others reported in (1995) 5 SCC 545 paras 22, 24 and 34 the same court said: "22. In Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. and others v. Coca Cola and others reported in (1995) 5 SCC 545 paras 22, 24 and 34 the same court said: "22. In India agreements in restraint of trade are governed by Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act which provides as follows. "27. Every agreement by which any one is restrained from exercising a lawful profession, trade or business of any kind, is to that extent void. Exception 1-One who sells the goodwill of a business may agree with the buyer to refrain from carrying on a similar business, within specified local limits, so long as the buyer, or any person deriving title to the goodwill from him, carries on a like business therein; Provided that such limits appear to the Court reasonable, regard being had to the nature of the business.' 24. We do not propose to go into the question whether reasonableness of restraint is outside the purview of Section 27 of the Contract Act and for the purpose of the present case we will proceed on the basis that an enquiry into reasonableness of the restraint is not envisaged by Section 27. On that view instead of being required to consider two questions as in England, the court in India have only to consider the question whether the contract is or is not in restraint of trade. It is, therefore, necessary to examine whether the negative stipulation contained in paragraph 14 of the 1993 Agreement can be regarded as in restraint of trade. This involves the question, what is meant by a contract in restraint of trade? 34. Since the negative stipulation in paragraph 14 of the 1993 Agreement is confined in its application to the period of subsistence of the agreement and the restriction imposed therein is operative only during the period the 1993 Agreement is subsisting, the said stipulation cannot be held to be in restraint of trade so as to attract the bar of Section 27 of the Contract Act. We are, therefore, unable to uphold the contention of Shri Shanti Bhushan that the negative stipulation contained in paragraph 14 of the 1993 Agreement, being in restraint of trade, is void under Section 27 of the Contract Act." [ See also Electro steel Castings Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd. and others reported in (2005) 1 CHN 612 ]. 51. We are, therefore, unable to uphold the contention of Shri Shanti Bhushan that the negative stipulation contained in paragraph 14 of the 1993 Agreement, being in restraint of trade, is void under Section 27 of the Contract Act." [ See also Electro steel Castings Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd. and others reported in (2005) 1 CHN 612 ]. 51. From the above decisions of the Supreme Court and our High Court it is absolutely clear that an agreement in restraint of trade during the contractual period can be enforced. It cannot be enforced beyond the contractual period. 52. It is absolutely plain that the covenants which the petitioners signed with the respondents related to one composite contract of study and service. This contract cannot be broken up into two parts. The restraint was during the contract period. Hence, following that the above Supreme Court decisions, I do not think that the condition mentioned in the agreement or bond was in restraint of trade or void for violation of Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. 53. Now, the question is whether the stipulation of the respondents is against the decisions of the Supreme Court in Harsh Pratap Sisodia v. Union of India and others reported in (1999) 2 SCC 575 or Anand S. Biji v. State of Kerala and others reported in 2001 (6) Scale page 665. 54. The dictum of the Supreme Court in the first case can be found in paragraph 6 which is as follows: Paragraph-6 "It is not disputed that the criteria of eligibility for allotment of a seat to MBBS against the 15% all-India quota has been fixed by the CBSE in consultation with the Medical Council of India under a modified scheme approved by this Court. Under that scheme, the States and colleges cannot insist upon satisfaction of the "State requirements" as a condition to grant admission to the allottees against the 15% all-India quota. It is, therefore, not open to any State to fix any additional eligibility criteria in cases of candidates who fall under the 15% all-India quota. The eligibility criteria having been approved by this Court, it could not be ignored by the Dean, medical College, Solapur. The denial of admission to the petitioner was thus wholly illegal and unjustified. Consequently, this writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The eligibility criteria having been approved by this Court, it could not be ignored by the Dean, medical College, Solapur. The denial of admission to the petitioner was thus wholly illegal and unjustified. Consequently, this writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The Dean, V.M. Medical College, Solapur is hereby directed to grant admission to the petitioner in the first year of MBBS course under the 15% all-India quota forthwith." 55. In paragraphs 2 & 3 of Anan S. Biji the same court said: Paragraphs 2 and 3 The learned Solicitor General asked us to make clear certain aspects for smooth implementation of the scheme of admission into medical colleges and in particular those pertain to the 155 All India quota. It is submitted that the States and colleges should not insist upon satisfaction of the "State requirements" as a condition to grant admission to the allottees against the 15% all-India quota. He elaborated that the States are imposing conditions for the candidates admitted to post graduate courses in the colleges, for example, the Government of Gujarat requires the post graduate students to execute a bond of Rs. 75,000/- for rendering 3 years rural service in the State as prescribed by the State Government. Similarly, Government of Maharashtra has imposed as condition that candidate would have to serve the Government of Maharashtra for a period of one year as medical officer in any of the PHC/RHC in the State prior to admission to the post graduate course. Thus the result is that different States have imposed different conditions. Candidates admitted under the All India quota under different State medical colleges are not uniformly placed. While some of the candidates have to fulfil those requirements, others are not requires to do so. 3. Indeed in this regard a Three Judge Bench of this Court in Harsh Pratap Sisodia v. Union of India others 1999 (2) SCC 575 , has stated as follows:- "It is not disputed that the criteria of eligibility of the allotment of seal to MBBS against the 15% all-India quota has been fixed by the CBSE in consultation with the Medical Council of India under a modified scheme approved by this court. Under that scheme, the States and colleges cannot insist upon satisfaction of the "State requirements" as a condition to grant admission to the allottees against the 15% all-India quota. Under that scheme, the States and colleges cannot insist upon satisfaction of the "State requirements" as a condition to grant admission to the allottees against the 15% all-India quota. It is, therefore, not open to any state to fix any additional eligibility criteria in cases of candidates who fall under the 15% all-India quota. The eligibility criteria having been approved by this Court, it could not be ignored by the Dean, Medical College, Solapur" [pp 576, 577]. In view of this direction, no fresh direction in this regard is required." 56. The dictum in Harsh Pratap Sisodia is that the state could not impose any fresh eligibility criterion. This means that if the eligibility requirement to get admission to the post graduate degree course is 50% marks in MBBS the state cannot say that they will admit candidates with an additional qualification or that candidates should posses 60%. Eligibility criterion to my understanding, relates to, qualifications and other conditions at the time of admission. The ruling in this case was on this issue only. The state by their impugned stipulation prescribed as mandatory state health service for a limited period of time after a candidate obtained his or her post graduate qualification. It is true that the issue of compulsory health service was before the court in Anand S. Biji but it did not make any pronouncement on the issue and restricted its ruling to the ratio in Harsh Pratap Sisodia case. It was silent on the impugned stipulation issue. With the deepest respect there is no ruling of the court on whether this the stipulation about compulsory state service and payment of liquidated damages in breach thereof is good or bad. 57. The subsequent judgments of the various High Courts in Poojaben Rajeshkumar Patel v. State of Gujarat reported in (2014) SCC OnLine Gujarat 7988 and Romil Saini v. State of Uttarkhand reported in 2015 SCC OnLine Utt 1296 and W.P. (C) No. 586 of 2012 Dr. Amit Bishamlal Vallabhani and others v. The State of Chattisgarh and others, have proceeded on an erroneous interpretation of the said two Supreme Court judgments, in my humble view. 58. Now, the next question which arises for consideration is whether the impugned notifications were validly issued? 59. Amit Bishamlal Vallabhani and others v. The State of Chattisgarh and others, have proceeded on an erroneous interpretation of the said two Supreme Court judgments, in my humble view. 58. Now, the next question which arises for consideration is whether the impugned notifications were validly issued? 59. A very serious objection has been made by the petitioners that those notifications were administrative orders trying to take away the fundamental rights of the petitioners to carry on any trade or profession, under Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution. 60. Article 19 (2) deals with the power of the State to restrict these rights by imposing reasonable restrictions. "19(2) Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation of any existing law, or prevent the State from making any law, in so far as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause in the interests of (the sovereignty and integrity of India) the security of the State, friendly relations with Foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of Court, defamation or incitement to an offence." 61. It is also very relevant to take a look at Article 13 (3). "13(3). In this article, unless the context otherwise require,--- (a) "law" includes any Ordinance, order, bye-law, rule, regulation, notification, custom or usage having in the territory of India the force of law; (b) "laws in force" includes laws passed or made by a Legislature or other competent authority in the territory of India before the commencement of this Constitution and not previously repealed, notwithstanding that any such law or any part thereof may not be then in operation either at all or in particular area. 62. Would the administrative notifications fit into the description of law under this sub-Article and under Article 19 (2)? 63. Since the early days of independence, the Supreme Court has been deliberating on this subject. Whether any decision of the government restraining or restricting freedom had to have legislative sanction was the real issue before the court. Added to it was the test whether the restriction was reasonable. 64. In Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur and others. v. The State of Punjab reported in AIR 1955 SC 549 Mr. Justice B.K. Mukherjea opined with regard to the executive power under Articles 73 and 162 as follows: "They do not mean, as Mr. Added to it was the test whether the restriction was reasonable. 64. In Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur and others. v. The State of Punjab reported in AIR 1955 SC 549 Mr. Justice B.K. Mukherjea opined with regard to the executive power under Articles 73 and 162 as follows: "They do not mean, as Mr. Pathak seems to suggest, that it is only when the Parliament or the State Legislature has legislated on certain items appertaining to their respective lists, that the Union or the State executive, as the case may be, can proceed to function in respect to them. On the other hand, the language of article 162 clearly indicates that the powers of the State executive do extend to matters upon which the state Legislature is competent to legislate and are not confined to matters over which legislation has been passed already. The same principle underlies article 73 of the Constitution. These provisions of the Constitution therefore do not lend any support to Mr. Pathak's contention." 65. In Kharak singh v. The State of U.P. and others reported in AIR 1963 SC 1295 Mr. Justice Ayyangar was the same view. 66. Again in State of Madhya Pradesh and another v. Thakur Bharat Singh reported in AIR 1967 SC 1170 the same court said we have adopted under our Constitution not the continental system but the British system under which the rule of law prevails. Every Act done by the government or by its officers must, if it is to operate to the prejudice of any person must be supported by some legislative authority. 67. In Bishambhar Dayal Chandra Mohan and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in AIR 1982 SC 33 Mr. Justice A.P. Sen remarked as follows; "20. The executive power of a modern State is not capable of any precise definition. In Rain Jawaya Kapur v. State of Punjab : [1955] 2 SCR 225, Mukherjee, CJ., dealt with the scope of Articles 73 and 162 of the contains any definition as to what the executive function is or gives an exhaustive enumeration of the activities which would legitimately come within its scope. In Rain Jawaya Kapur v. State of Punjab : [1955] 2 SCR 225, Mukherjee, CJ., dealt with the scope of Articles 73 and 162 of the contains any definition as to what the executive function is or gives an exhaustive enumeration of the activities which would legitimately come within its scope. It was observed:" Ordinarily the executive power connotes the residue of governmental functions that remain after legislative and judicial functions are taken away." It is neither necessary nor possible to give an exhaustive enumeration of the kinds and categories of executive functions which may comprise both the formulation of the policy as well as its execution. In other words, the State in exercise of its executive power is charged with the duty and the responsibility of carrying on the general administration of the State. So long as the State government does not go against the provisions of the constitution or any law, the width and amplitude of its executive power cannot be circumscribed. If there is no enactment covering a particular aspect, certainly the Government can carry on the administration by issuing administrative directions or instructions, until the legislature makes a law in that behalf. Otherwise, the administrations would come to a standstill." 68. An administrative circular or notification is not law (see Punit Rai v. Dinesh Chaudhary reported in (2003) 8 SCC 204 paragraphs 42 and 45). 69. The ratio pronounced by Chief Justice V.N. Khare in Union of India (UOI) v. Naveen Jindal and another reported in AIR 2004 SC 1559 is very interesting. In that case the right of the government to enforce the Flag Code was challenged. It was a set of administrative instructions. Since the right to fly the national flag was a constitutional right under Article 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution, that right could not be curtailed by the Flag Code. The Supreme Court held that the rights under Article 19 of the Constitution could only be regulated by a law which has legislative sanction. The Flag Code was however upheld as it sought to preserve the respect and dignity of the national flag. 70. The Supreme Court held that the rights under Article 19 of the Constitution could only be regulated by a law which has legislative sanction. The Flag Code was however upheld as it sought to preserve the respect and dignity of the national flag. 70. The combined effect of the admission bulletin and the notifications of the state government is that the teaching institutions of this state could only grant a candidate a right to practise all over India if the qualified students served the State government for a particular period of time. You will have to look at the whole bargain in this way. A candidate would get admission, would take the applicable course and practise in the rural areas for a particular period of time. Then the degree awarded by the respondents could be handed over to the candidate to practise wherever he or she likes throughout India. Added to this condition was the default clause. If the qualified candidates wanted an immediate right to practise throughout the country, he or she would have to pay the stipulated amount of damages or penalty. Today, an engineering institution may insist that practical experience for a certain period of time is necessary before grant of the degree. I do not think that those stipulations could be termed as bad. A law university may insist that pupillage or internship for a certain period of time would be compulsory. The service conditions or the requirement to take practical training or undergo pupillage or internship are to be taken as part of the qualification or obligation attached to the course. 71. Hence, the stipulation by the respondents about the length of government service to be rendered or payment of compensation in lieu thereof cannot be said to be law under Article 13 (3) or 19 (2) of the Constitution. It is similar to the Flag Code in Union of India (UOI) v. Naveen Jindal and another reported in AIR 2004 SC 1559 , regulating post graduate medical education in the state so that the doctors acquiring the qualification can aid in implementing the health policy of the government in rural areas, for a limited time. 72. Therefore, I hold that the impugned notification for this broad purpose was justified. 73. There can be no doubt in anybody's mind that this post graduate education is imparted at a very reasonable rate by the State Government. 72. Therefore, I hold that the impugned notification for this broad purpose was justified. 73. There can be no doubt in anybody's mind that this post graduate education is imparted at a very reasonable rate by the State Government. The tuition fee and other charges of any private university is several times more than that taken from each petitioner by the respondents. Even State aided institutions often charge a much higher scale of graduate and post graduate education. Furthermore, as pointed out by the learned Additional Advocate General the State Government is made conscious of the medical infrastructure that they have to maintain in rural areas by the World Health Organisation. This organisation has also indicated that compulsory service in the rural and remote areas must be introduced to render proper medical treatment and assistance to people in remote, backward and far flung areas. 74. If, in order to recoup-these expenses, the State Government insisted that a candidate on qualifying, would have to render service in a health department to serve the rural areas, it cannot be said that such a condition was arbitrary, unfair, unjust or unreasonable. Neither can it be said that this stipulation was violative of the Constitution or of any law. The provision appears to be reasonable particularly if you consider that there is an exit route by which upon payment of a liquidated sum as penalty a qualified candidate can escape the requirement of rendering this service. 75. But in my opinion and this is the most crucial part of the case the computation of the liquidated damages by the state and the subsequent increase in the length of service to three years do not stand the test of reasonableness, fairness and equality. Take for example the candidates of 2014. 76. By the notification dated 31st July, 2013 all candidates would have to execute a bond to serve the State Government for a period of one year failing which he or she would have to pay a penalty Rs. 10 lakhs. By the notification dated 10th June, 2014 post graduate trainees would have to work for a period of three years and post graduate diploma holders for a period of two years failing which a candidate had to pay Rs. 10 lakhs " for each defaulting year to the government". 77. 10 lakhs. By the notification dated 10th June, 2014 post graduate trainees would have to work for a period of three years and post graduate diploma holders for a period of two years failing which a candidate had to pay Rs. 10 lakhs " for each defaulting year to the government". 77. It is one thing to insert a condition that in breach of the contract a contracting party would have to pay Rs. 10 lakhs as compensation when the period of contract is one year. It is another thing to increase the contractual period from one year to three years and to say that the defaulting party had to pay compensation of Rs. 10 lakhs per year. It is true that the subsequent notification was applicable to those who took admission in the subsequent year and did not apply to the 2014 candidates. But it is plain that the respondents had discriminated between the 2014 and 2015 candidates by putting more onerous conditions on the 2015 candidates. This condition is not fair or reasonable and is violative of Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution of India. Furthermore, execution of a bond does not mean bondage. The candidate must be given a reasonable opportunity of exiting from the bond. To expect fresh post graduates to seek employment elsewhere and earn at such a rate so as to pay the government Rs. 10 lakhs per year as penalty is more or less an impossible condition in our country. A condition which is more or less impossible to fulfil cannot be reasonable. It would result in bondage with the government. Therefore, in my opinion the length of compulsory service and penalty stipulated is unreasonable. 78. The notification dated 10th June, 2014 is quashed and set aside. The notification dated 31st July, 2013 will apply to all the petitioners. Each of the petitioners purposing to exit will have an option to pay Rs. 10 lakhs over a period of five years in five equal instalments. In default of payment of any instalment the respondents shall be entitled to take a decision to suspend the degree or diploma granted to the candidates with a clause that in the event the defaulted amount is paid together with such interest as may be specified by the State Government within a particular point of time the degree or diploma may be restored. 79. 79. The petitioners or such of them to whom the notifications apply will have an option whether to avail of the notifications dated 26th July, 2016 and 10th August, 2016. In case they opt out of the purview of the notifications or choose not to accept them, they will be allowed the benefit of the notification dated 31st July, 2013, read with this judgment and order, by the respondents. 80. The respondents will release all the documents of the petitioners, e.g. mark sheet, degree/diploma certificate held by them, within two weeks of receipt of the penalty or the first instalment of it as determined by them on the basis of this judgment and order. 81. Summary Of My Findings 1. The impugned notifications dated 31st July, 2013 and 10th June, 2014 are products of executive action of the state under Article 162 of the Constitution of India. They are administrative orders. They are not law within the meaning of Article 19 (2) of the Constitution of India read with Article 13 (3) thereof. Such exercise of executive power had the sanction of the Constitution. 2. The aforesaid administrative orders were made after due observance of the conduct of government business rules in Article 166 of the Constitution. In that respect the notifications are valid. 3. The legal relationship between the petitioners and the state was that the latter would provide post graduate degree or diploma in medicine, on the condition that the qualified doctors would serve the rural areas of the state for a specified period of time, failing which they would have to pay liquidated damages. This is to be taken as a composite bargain between the state and students. The restriction in practice does not extend to any period outside the contractual period. Hence, the contract is not hit by Section 27 of the said Act. 4. No coercion or duress was exercised by the respondents to compel the petitioners to sign the bond promising to offer their service to the state for a limited time and to pay compensation to the state in case of breach. The candidates were aware of the condition and wrote the entrance examination and took admission subject to those conditions with their eyes wide open. 5. The condition to render three year's government service or make payment of penalty @ Rs. 10 lakhs per year per student is unreasonable and arbitrary. 6. The candidates were aware of the condition and wrote the entrance examination and took admission subject to those conditions with their eyes wide open. 5. The condition to render three year's government service or make payment of penalty @ Rs. 10 lakhs per year per student is unreasonable and arbitrary. 6. Only the notification dated 31st July, 2013 can be enforced but on the condition that in case a candidate wants to exit from government service, he or she can pay Rs. 10 lakhs in five equal instalments over a period of five years as may be specified by the State Government within four weeks of this order. 7. If there is default in the payment of instalments the degree or diploma already granted to a candidate may be suspended on the condition that upon payment of the balance dues together with such interest as may be specified by the state government within a particular period of time the degree or diploma may be restored. 8. The notification dated 10th June, 2014 is unconstitutional, arbitrary, unreasonable and is set aside. The notification dated 31st July, 2013 subject to clauses 6 and 7 above will also apply to petitioners covered by the 10th June, 2014 notification. 9. The petitioners or such of them to whom the notifications apply will have an option whether to avail of the notifications dated 26th July, 2016 and 10th August, 2016. In case they opt out of the purview of the notifications or choose not to accept them, they will be allowed the benefit of the notification dated 31st July, 2013, read with this judgment and order, by the respondents. 10. The respondents will release all the documents of the petitioners, e.g. mark sheet, degree/diploma certificate held by them, within two weeks of receipt of the penalty or the first instalment of it as determined by them on the basis of this judgment and order. 82. This writ application is allowed as above. The connected application (CAN 10395 of 2016) is also accordingly disposed of, if not disposed of earlier. Certified photocopy of this Judgment and order, if applied for, be supplied to the parties upon compliance with all requisite formalities. Later Mr. Jishnu Chowdhury, learned Additional Government Pleader prays for stay of operation of the above judgment and order. Such prayer is considered and refused.