JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Mr. B. Deka, learned counsel for the petitioners as well as Mr. S.C. Keayal, learned counsel for the respondent-opposite parties. 2. The present three petitioners along with other accused-persons are facing trial before the learned Special Judge, CBI, Assam in connection with Special Case No. 3/2013. By preferring this application under section 401 read with section 482 of the Cr.PC they have prayed for quashing and setting aside the order dated 23.5.2017 passed by the Special Judge, CBI, Assam in Special Case No. 3/2013. 3. Briefly stated the prosecution case is that the accused-petitioners were the members of Credit Department of Punjab and National Bank (‘PNB’) Circle Office, Guwahati. At that time on 10.2.2009 one of the accused Jitu Goswami a dealer filed a loan application requesting sanction of CC limit of Rs. 600 lakhs and the extension of bank guarantee limit is Rs. 1,000 lakhs. The accused-petitioner along with other co-accused overlooking various inherent deficiencies has recommended the said credit proposal to the Credit Committee compromising of various other co-accused (senior officials of the bank) who in turn recommended it to the DGM, PNB and accordingly said CC limit of 6 crores along with BG limit of 10 crores was sanctioned on 31.3.2009 in favour of said loan applicant, Mr. Goswami. It was the allegation that said applicant Mr. Goswami inflated the value of collateral security with active connivance with the valuer. After the investigation by the CBI the charge sheet was filed against the three accused-petitioners and nine other accused-persons (present three accused-petitioners were arrayed as A-8, A-9, A-10) under sections 120B read with section 420, IPC and section 13(2) read with section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act. The allegation in the charge sheet as regards the present three petitioners is that they are responsible for recommending the loan proposal of the said applicant which contained inherent deficiencies and without any meaningful appraisal they recommended the loan in spite of the fact that the said credit information report was not reflecting the up-to-date status of the account of the DDCPL (which was stated to be purchased by the said loan applicant) and IOB Dispur Branch (Indian Oversees Bank), in order to illegally facilitate the loan to the said applicant. 4. 4. During the course of the trial seeking to be an approver with an undertaking to make full and true disclosures of and circumstances to which they are acquainted with after consultation with I.O. and other officers of the CBI associated with the investigation, present three petitioners filed an application before the trial court of learned Special Judge. On receipt of the said application a miscellaneous case, was registered as Misc. Case No. 1/2013. Although several opportunities had been given to prosecuting agency which is CBI and other co-accused but none of them had raised any objection at the relevant time and tender of pardon was granted to the petitioners by the Court by its order dated 9.9.2013. However, the successor of the said court cancelled the tender of pardon granted to the accused-petitioners on 9.9.2013 by its order dated 12.9.2014 without even giving an opportunity of hearing to the petitioners. 5. Petitioners being highly aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the aforesaid order preferred a criminal revision petition before this court and the same was registered as Criminal Revision Petition No. 415/2014. However, in the meantime, in order to take advantage of such situation other accused-persons involved in the case also preferred criminal petition challenging the order dated 9.9.2013 whereby pardon was tendered to the present petitioners. In the said case CBI also filed affidavit. Thereafter, after hearing the respective submissions made by the parties in connection with the cases filed the present petitioners as well as other persons as aforesaid, i.e., Criminal Revision Petition No. 415/2014, Criminal Petition Nos.826/2014, 813/2014 and Criminal Petition No. 760/2014, this Hon’ble Court by a common judgment and order dated 3.2.2017 disposed of the matters by quashing and setting aside the orders dated 9.9.2013 to 12.9.2014 in connection with the aforesaid cases and directed all the petitioners to appear before the trial court on or before 23.2.2017 with direction to the learned trial court to hear the matter of pardon afresh by giving full opportunity to the prosecution to submit its opinion as regards pardon in Petition No. 346/2013 under section 306, Cr.PC for the pardon filed by the instant three petitioners as per law. Pursuant to the aforesaid order the present petitioners preferred a fresh petition under section 306, Cr.PC for tender of pardon to which CBI/opposite parties on 4.4.2017 raised objection in writing. Pursuant to the aforesaid order the present petitioners preferred a fresh petition under section 306, Cr.PC for tender of pardon to which CBI/opposite parties on 4.4.2017 raised objection in writing. Thereafter the learned trial court by its order dated 23.5.2017 dismissed the petition filed by the present petitioners praying for tender of pardon in Special Case No. 3/2013. 6. Being highly aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the impugned order dated 23.5.2017, passed by the learned Special Judge, CBI, Assam, Addl. Court No. 3, Chandmari in Spl. Case No. 3/2013 the petitioners preferred the present petition. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioners submit that the learned court below by mechanical and casual manner grossly undermining the related statutory provisions under the Cr.PC dealing with the tender of pardon dismissed the same without correct appreciation of provisions of law by its order dated 23.5.2017. Further it is submitted that petitioners are able to make full and true disclosure of the whole circumstances within their knowledge related to the offence and every other person concerned whether as principal or abettor in the commission of the said offence but the learned trial court did not record the statement of the accused-petitioners after granting tender of pardon. But the same cannot be attributed to the present petitioners as there was specific direction by the court below that they need not be appeared in the proceeding before the trial court unless called upon. Learned counsel for the petitioner also argued that sub-section (1) of section 308, Cr.PC clearly states that once the status of approver being granted to the accused tendering pardon the same can be cancelled only by a certificate by public prosecutor stating his opinion in that regard but in the instant case said objection has been filed by one Sailesh Kumar, Inspector of H/O, CBI, ACB, Guwahati. Further submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that once tender of pardon granted under section 306 read with section 5(2) of the PC Act, 1988 the same cannot be withdrawn unless there is any cogent material to show that such persons have either wilfully concealed anything essential or have given false evidence complying with the condition on which tender of pardon was granted. Contention of the petitioners is that vide judgment of the Hon’ble High Court dated 3.2.2017 specific direction was given to the public prosecutor CBI to form an opinion as to whether the prayer of the accused-petitioners to remain as an approver should be sustained or not. It is also contended that once police report has been submitted under section 173(2) of Cr.PC on completion of the investigation, the trial court has no role to play thereafter and it is only the duty of the public prosecutor to form an opinion as to whether the evidence of the approvers would be of any help to prove a case against other co-accused. 8. Thus, the learned counsel for the petitioners has basically submitted that once an accused preferred the petition for pardon the same is to be decided by the court as per the provision of section 306(1), Cr.PC on the declaration of the petitioners that they will make full and true disclosure of the circumstances as per their knowledge. The same court on earlier occasion has granted the pardon as per order dated 9.9.2013 the same cannot be cancelled by the court unless the public prosecutor issued a certificate in terms of section 308, Cr.PC. Roving around the earlier status of the case it has been contended that the position of the petitioners already turned to be a approver and they have acquired status of witness and as such the court cannot alter their status. But such a submission by the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be appreciated as the earlier order of approval and the cancellation thereafter has already been adjudicated by this court while dealing the application filed by the petitioners in Criminal Revision Petition No. 415/14 vide order dated 3.2.2017, whereby this court has already held that the order of granting pardon as well as cancellation thereof by the same court are irregular and accordingly the order of granting pardon dated 9.9.2013 and all subsequent orders upto 12.9.2014 so far as it relates to the matter of pardon was quashed and set aside with a direction to the learned trial court to hear the matter of pardon afresh by giving full opportunity to the prosecution to submit its opinion as regards the necessity of pardon and thereafter pass an appropriate order on the petition filed by the accused-petitioners under section 306, Cr.PC as per law. 9. 9. In view of above any submission as regards the granting of pardon on earlier occasion cannot be re-appreciated as because the same is non est. Let us consider the other piece of argument by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the prosecution cannot deviate from their document as has been furnished to them at the time of furnishing copy. As we found by the aforesaid submission the petitioners have indicated the last page of the charge sheet wherein the IO has recommended for making approver to the aforesaid three petitioners subject to their giving self-incriminating confessional statement before the Magistrate to strengthen the evidence as against the main accused Sri S.K. Kalra (A-1). After going through the aforesaid documents it is evident that the same is nothing but a recommendation by the IO at the time of filing charge sheet which, however, did not adhere to by the IO and obviously this cannot confer a right upon the accused-petitioners to get the status of approver. 10. On the next, the objection that the present holding IO cannot raise any objection for having no any knowledge of the investigation that has been conducted by the earlier IO also appears to be not sustainable, in view of the fact that the earlier IO got transferred and, hence, the present IO his holding the charge of the case. 11. Now the crucial point that has been raised in the present petition that the learned trial court has not decided the petition for pardon under section 306, Cr.PC properly in terms of the provision incorporated therein. In this context a lot of submissions has been made by the learned counsel for the petitioners in support of the contention that has been raised in the petition and the learned standing counsel for the CBI has refuted the all such contentions with a submission that the matter of granting pardon entirely vested to the learned trial court having regard to the entire facts and circumstances of the case as well as the opinion of the prosecution as regards the necessity of granting pardon thereof. 12. I have given due consideration to the respective submission of both the parties as well as the impugned orders of the trial court and the relevant provisions of law as well as the legal pronouncement in this context. 13. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Lt. 12. I have given due consideration to the respective submission of both the parties as well as the impugned orders of the trial court and the relevant provisions of law as well as the legal pronouncement in this context. 13. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Lt. Commander Pascal Fernendas v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1968 594 SC (the decision was passed prior to amendment of Cr.PC) it has been held as follows: “In our criminal jurisdiction is a tender of pardon on a condition of true disclosure section 6(2) in the Criminal Law Amendment Act (repealed presently section 5(2) of the PC Act) enabling. Without recourse to it an accused person cannot be examined as a witness in the same case against another accused. To determine whether the accused testimony as approver is likely to advance the interest of justice, the Special Judge must have materials before him to show that the nature of the testimony will be. Ordinarily it is for prosecution to ask that a particular accused out of several may be tendered pardon. But even where the accused directly applies to the special judge, he must refer the request to the prosecuting agency. It is not for the special judge to enter the ring as veritable direction of prosecution. The power which the special judge exercised is not on his own behalf but on behalf of the prosecuting agency, must, therefore, he exercised only when the prosecution joins tender pardon because it does not need approver testimony. It may also not like tender of pardon to the crime or worst offender.” 14. Further, in another decision CBI v. Ashok Kumar Agarwal, (2013) 15 SCC 222 while dealing with the granting of pardon under section 306, Cr.PC and the right of co-accused to challenge such order some reference has been made to the aforesaid decision of Lt. Commander Pascal and has held as below: “25. The observations made in Lt. Commander Pascal Fernandes were sought to be construed by the learned ASG as requiring the court to indubitably agree to the tendering of pardon if the prosecution thinks that the tender of pardon will be in the interests of successful prosecution of the other offenders whose conviction is not easy without the approver's testimony. The observations made in Lt. Commander Pascal Fernandes were sought to be construed by the learned ASG as requiring the court to indubitably agree to the tendering of pardon if the prosecution thinks that the tender of pardon will be in the interests of successful prosecution of the other offenders whose conviction is not easy without the approver's testimony. We do not agree since this court was contemplating a situation where the proper course for the judge was to ask for a statement from the prosecution and as the prosecution emphasised that it indubitably agreed to the tendering of pardon as it will be in the interest of a successful prosecution of the other offenders. 26. It was contended by Mr. K.V. Viswanathan, learned SG, that the court must invariably agree to tendering a pardon if the proposal to pardon originates from the prosecution or if the prosecution supports it. Since the prosecution, as in this case, supported the plea of respondent 2 for grant of pardon and for becoming an approver, the High Court committed an error in reversing the order of the Special Judge. If this contention is accepted, it would completely marginalise the role of the court and take away the discretion of a Judge in ensuring a fair trial and doing justice in a criminal case. We, therefore, reject the contention. 28. Section 306, Cr.PC is verbatim to section 337 of the old Code. There is no change at all with respect to the power to grant pardon. More so, exercise of judicial power in relation to grant of pardon is required so as to remove any suspicion of political consideration or to ensure that the pardon is in the interest of justice (Law Commission of India, Forty-eight Report, July 1972). The Constitution Bench in Sarvanabhavan considered the issue of veracity/reliability of the evidence of an approver and not who can be made an approver or what is the role of the court while considering the application for grant of pardon. 30. The concept of public policy was explained by Lord Mansfield in Holman v. Johnson observing that the principle of public policy is : ex dolo malo non oritur action. No court will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause of action upon an immoral or an illegal act. 30. The concept of public policy was explained by Lord Mansfield in Holman v. Johnson observing that the principle of public policy is : ex dolo malo non oritur action. No court will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause of action upon an immoral or an illegal act. If, from the plaintiff's own stating or otherwise, the cause of action appears to arise ex turpi caus, or the transgression of a positive law of this country, there the court says he has no right to be assisted (See also Kedar Nath Motani v. Prahlad Rai) Public policy, through based on morality and its notions are intermittently subjective, has apparently been referred to as synonymous with the policy of law or the policy of the statute. However, in modem times it has become quite distinct from that of policy of law as it has rightly been said that a just thing may not be legally right as morality and law are not co-existensive. 33. In view of the above and considering the judgment of the Privy Council in Bawa Faqir Singh, we are of the view that the grant of pardon by a court under section 306, Cr.PC on being asked by the accused and duly supported by the State is a judicial act and white performing the said act, the Magistrate is bound to consider the consequences of grant of pardon taking into consideration the policy of the State and to certain extent compare the culpability of the person seeking pardon qua the other co-accused.” 15. It is clear from the above legal proposition set forth by the Highest Authority that the power of granting pardon is a judicial act and the court alone cannot exercise such discretion for granting pardon unless the prosecution joins such tender of pardon. The sole discretion is of prosecution who may desire for granting such pardon in the interest of such successful prosecution or it may deny tender of pardon even to the crime or worst offender. The sole discretion is of prosecution who may desire for granting such pardon in the interest of such successful prosecution or it may deny tender of pardon even to the crime or worst offender. Turning to the matter in hand it is to be noted that this court on earlier occasion while disposing the matter of Criminal Revision Petition No. 415/14 vide order dated 3.2.2017 directed the learned trial court to decide the matter of pardon afresh by taking the opinion of the prosecution and accordingly the learned trial court has obtained the report as such wherein the prosecution has filed objection as against the granting of pardon with the contention that all three accused-petitioners were members of Credit Department and Credit Committee for the crime and they abuse the official position and dishonestly did not ensure exchange of information about the account of M/s. DDCPL with IOB under multiple bank arrangement. Further they entered into a criminal conspiracy with Sri S.K. Kalra (A-1) and other accused and in pursuant thereof recommendation of sanction of CC limit of Rs. 6 crores and BG limit of Rs. 10 crores in favour of M/s. DDCPL by ignoring the NPA status of loan accounts was made. Accordingly, it was objected that the prosecution can establish its case by the available witnesses and the court should allow the pardon in the interest of justice. Such an objection was filed by prosecution through the IO and the learned trial court in view of such serious objection so filed by the prosecution has refused to tender pardon as has been sought for by the accused-petitioners. Such a finding of the learned trial court is in tune with the legal pronouncement as indicated above. Only because such an objection has been filed by the subsequent IO, the same cannot be discarded by the court because it was the version of the prosecution and the court cannot suo motu take another decision bypassing the objection raised by the prosecution. Because it is the prerogative of the prosecution as to how to conduct a successful prosecution on the basis of which set of evidence. 16. Because it is the prerogative of the prosecution as to how to conduct a successful prosecution on the basis of which set of evidence. 16. It may also be noted that on earlier occasion at the time of passing order on 9.9.2013 the learned trial court did not obtain specific opinion of the prosecution nor any written objection was filed and the trial court passed the order granting pardon simply relying on the submission of the accused-petitioner and by referring to the relevant provision of section 306 of the Cr.PC. Although section 306 of the Cr.PC is an enabling provision for granting pardon, the learned court was oblivious of the aspect that such a prayer has been made by the accused person and not by the prosecution itself. The precaution required to be taken by the court as indicated in the above decision discussed above, was not taken by the court and because of such irregularity this court set aside the aforesaid order of pardon on earlier occasion. By the subsequent stage when the matter of pardon was again taken up by the learned trial court, the prosecution came up with written objection against the granting of pardon and the learned court acting upon such objection and other parameters refused to tender pardon to the accused-petitioners. Now the accused-petitioners as a matter of right cannot claim that the court is bound to grant pardon as prayed. 17. In Ashok Kumar Agarwal (supra) the aforesaid aspect has been discussed as below: “Grant of pardon on being sought by the accused and duly supported by the State, viz., judicial act. While performing this act the court has to apply its mind and is bound to consider consequences of grant of pardon taking into consideration the policy of the State and to certain extent compare culpability of the person seeking pardon qua other co-accused. If such person seeking pardon is facing prosecution in a large number of criminal cases, the court should be aware of such fact situation. However, meticulous examination of each and every point not required as the court may consider all relevant facts and take prima facie view on basis of same. Plea that the court must invariably agree to the tendering pardon if proposal to pardon originates from prosecution or if prosecution supports it cannot be accepted. However, meticulous examination of each and every point not required as the court may consider all relevant facts and take prima facie view on basis of same. Plea that the court must invariably agree to the tendering pardon if proposal to pardon originates from prosecution or if prosecution supports it cannot be accepted. Accepting such contention would completely marginalise the role of the court and take away the discretion of a judge in ensuring a fair trial and doing justice in a criminal case.” 18. In Sontush Kumar Satish Bhusan Bariyar v. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 6 SCC 498 it is held that order of pardon cannot be passed mechanically and the court has to apply its mind while exercising such power. Further, in Bawa Faqir Singh v. King of Emperor, AIR 1938 PC 266 while dealing with grant of pardon it is held that tendering pardon is a judicial act under special precautions, rules and consequences which statutes set out. 19. The High Court while sitting in revisional jurisdiction under section 397 of the Cr.PC can examine the records or order of an inferior court for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of the proceeding and is entitled to reverse the finding only when it reaches the conclusion that finding of the trial court is perverse and the jurisdiction d cannot be invoked lightly. It is to be mentioned herein that the revisional jurisdiction is basically supervisory in nature. As a broad proposition revisional interference may be justified where (i) the decision is grossly erroneous, (ii) there is no compliance with the provision of law, (iii) the finding of fact affecting the decision is not based on evidence, (iv) material evidence of the parties is not considered, (v) judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. 20. In the impugned order the learned trial court after due appreciation of all the matters on record, legal proposition and faking note of the objection filed by the prosecution refused to tender pardon to the accused-petitioners. It is also noted that the accused-petitioners have been charged with serious allegation as mentioned earlier. There appears to be no illegality in the impugned order passed by the learned Special Judge. 21. In view of all above I do not find any cogent reason to interfere in the impugned order. Accordingly the revision petition is dismissed.