Research › Search › Judgment

Gauhati High Court · body

2017 DIGILAW 844 (GAU)

Rajesh Kumar Jalan v. State of Assam

2017-06-23

RUMI KUMARI PHUKAN

body2017
ORDER : 1. By the petition under section 482, Cr.P.C. the petitioner prayed for quashing order dated 1.3.2017 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kamrup (M) as well as the order dated 26.4.2017 passed by the learned Special Judge, Assam in GR Case No. 127651/2015 corresponding to CID P.S. Case No. 54/2015 and by the connected interlocutory application the petitioner has prayed for his release from the aforementioned case. Both the petitions are being disposed of by this common order. 2. The brief facts of the case is that on 20.11.2015 the Commissioner of Excise, Assam lodged an FIR alleging, inter alia, that on receipt of certain information through SMS from an unidentified person on 12.5.2015 regarding alleged anomalies in M/s. B.G. Bonded Warehosue, located at Lokhra, Guwahati ordered the Excise Intelligence Bureau (EIB) officials to visit the said licensed premises and to verify the Excise documents and records. The said team seized the excise documents and records for verification as per rules. It was further alleged that subsequently on 26.5.2015 the informant received an unsigned letter from an unidentified reporter on the same matter. The informant directed the Joint Commissioner of Excise (I/C), Assam, EIB to submit report on the Bonded Warehouse at the earliest. It was further alleged that pursuant to the publication of the news in the electronic as well as print media against the said Bonded Warehouse, a Special Investigation Team (SIT) was constituted under the Joint Commissioner of Excise (I/C), Excise Intelligence Bureau, vide order dated 17.7.2015. Further it was alleged that the SIT conducted an enquiry and submitted its report on 19th September, 2015 where in the SIT recommended that the licensee of the said Bonded Warehouse was criminally culpable as the proprietor allegedly forged the signature and seal of the Excise Officials of Kokrajhar Treasury Officer, Kokrajhar and the State Bank of India, Kokrajhar and thereby defalcated an amount of Rs. 19.86 crores as excise revenue apart from sales tax. It was further alleged that the SIT further recommended that the case be handed over to the CID or Assam Police, since the licensee was not co-operating with the investigation and, therefore, her custodial interrogation may be required to find out her criminal culpability and to find out the involvement of any other persons. 3. It was further alleged that the SIT further recommended that the case be handed over to the CID or Assam Police, since the licensee was not co-operating with the investigation and, therefore, her custodial interrogation may be required to find out her criminal culpability and to find out the involvement of any other persons. 3. On receipt of the aforesaid FIR, CID PS Case No. 54/15 under section 120B/409/468/ 471, IPC was registered and the CID PS case No. 4/2016 which was also registered on the basis of a similar complaint lodged by the tax department has been amalgamated with instant case with due permission of the learned CJM. Thereafter the accused petitioner was arrested in connection with the case on 4.12.2016 and produced before the learned CJM, Kamrup (M), on the following grounds: (i) The accused Rajesh Jalan with the help of other co-accused prepared fake document, forge seal of different government offices, inserted forged signature on those papers thereby misappropriated and amount of Rs. 43,73,32,93,410.60 approx which is deemed to the Government as excise duty and VAT. (ii) The accused Mr. Jalan though is not the licensee of BG Bonded Warehouse, however, he operated all functions of the said BG Bonded Warehouse by establishing himself as the licensee of the said bonded house and thereby mislead the administration. (iii) The accused along with other accomplice prepared forged documents relating to purchasing of IMFL (Indian Made Foreign Liquor) documents relating to deposit of Government, revenue, accepted all the facilities provided by different companies under lifting criteria whereas he is having no authority to accept it. (iv) Though the actual licensee of BG Bonded Warehouse, Mrs. Bonti Gogoi Pegu, however, she prepared a management agreement and executed power of attorney with one Mrinal Goswami in 2013 contrary to the excise manual, even then the accused nowhere made the power of attorney-holder, but he prepared all the documents identifying himself the owner of BG Bonded Warehouse with his group. (v) From the documents collected, it reveals that accused wrote letter to the company on behalf of BG Bonded Warehouse which purchased IMFL through forged documents prepared by the accused, who is operating the functions of other five bonded houses. 4. (v) From the documents collected, it reveals that accused wrote letter to the company on behalf of BG Bonded Warehouse which purchased IMFL through forged documents prepared by the accused, who is operating the functions of other five bonded houses. 4. While forwarding the accused it was also submitted though accused has been carrying out the instructions as per notice issued under section 41(A), Cr.P.C. but he neither co-operated with the investigation nor divulged vital information, whereas the entire fraud of government, revenue has been done by using fake seal and signature of the accused and in the circumstances he was arrested. 5. After the arrest he was produced before the learned CJM on 4.12.2016 and thereafter he was remanded to custody and his bail prayer was rejected by the court of GM as well as Hon’ble High Court and the Hon’ble Apex Court on SLP. The police submitted charge sheet on 20.1.2017 before the learned GM, Kamrup (M) Guwahati under section 120B/409/468/471, IPG against the petitioner with a submission that the investigation in respect of other co-accused is pending. While submitting the charge sheet the I.O. has also made a prayer for adding the section 13(1)(c)(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (‘PC Act’) submitting that the Excise Officials who were deputed at BG Bonded Warehouse during the period of 2012-15 were in connivance with the accused-petitioner committed the alleged offence. Accordingly, the learned CJM allowed the prayer for adding the section as prayed for by the IO and sent the case records to the learned Special Judge, Assam by its order dated 1.3.2017. Now the grievances raised by the petitioner is that although he was produced before the learned Special Judge on 31.3.2017 and 12.4.2017 and he was remanded to judicial custody till 26.4.2017 but such a remand by the Special Judge without taking cognizance is bad in law. However, the trial of the accused is not yet commenced and he has been languishing in the judicial custody for his no fault and as such it amounts to illegal detention. However, the trial of the accused is not yet commenced and he has been languishing in the judicial custody for his no fault and as such it amounts to illegal detention. On 19.4.2017 a petition was filed before the learned Special Judge reiterating the sequence of the events as narrated above, but the same was disposed of by the learned Special Judge by observing that as at the time of filing charge sheet the learned GM was pleased to add section 13(2) of the PC Act and the I.O. has also submitted before the said court that he is going to submit charge sheet against some of public servants under PC Act very soon. So under the circumstances it is not permissible for the said court to return the charge sheet at this stage. 6. Challenging the aforesaid two orders of learned GM as well as the Special Judge, present petition has been preferred on the ground that the fundamental rights of the accused under article 21 of the Constitution has been violated as he has been kept under detention in violation of the legal provision of section 309(2), Cr.P.C. It has been contended that as soon as the charge-sheet is filed power of remand of an accused will be governed as per the provisions of section 309(2), Cr.P.C. and not by the section 167(2), Cr.P.C. (which is applicable only during the course of investigation). Accordingly it has been contended that remanding of an accused to the custody without taking cognizance by any of the court below is illegal and, therefore, the order of the learned GM as well as the learned Special Judge as mentioned above are liable to be quashed and set aside. The detention of the petitioner being illegal he is liable to be released forthwith. 7. It has been stated that both the courts below committed gross error of law and passed the order of remanding the petitioner to judicial custody even after filing of charge sheet on 20.1.2017 inasmuch as both the courts below have no power and jurisdiction to authorise the detention of the petitioner after filing of the charge sheet till date including the order dated 26.4.2017. The petitioner till now is not involved to the alleged offence along with any public servant. The petitioner till now is not involved to the alleged offence along with any public servant. However, the IO wanted to investigate against excise officials as they were also alleged to be in connivance with the alleged offence with the petitioner. But the IO has not submitted any charge sheet against the excise officials, therefore, the Special Judge has no jurisdiction to hold the trial against the petitioner inasmuch as the offences against the petitioner is triable by the Magistrate only. Accordingly, challenging the remand of the accused petitioner as illegal. Prayer has been made to quash the aforesaid orders of the learned CJM as well as the Special Judge and by filing the IA No. 361/2017 and prayed for releasing him on bail. 8. Learned senior counsel Mr. A.K. Bhattacharyya in his argument heavily relied upon the decision of this court. Ved Kumar Seth vs. State of Assam, (1975) Crl. L.J. 647 wherein it has been held (in paragraph 29) that from the language of sub-section (2) of section 309 it is quite clear that an accused if in custody may be remanded for custody only after taking cognizance of an offence or after commencement of a trial and if other condition laid down under sub-section (2) are satisfied. Hence, in order to pass an order of remand under sub-section (2) of section 309 the Magistrate must first take cognizance of the offence; no remand order can be passed under sub-section (2). 9. Also by referring to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court Hazari Lal Gupta vs. Rameswar Prasad, (1972) 1 SCC 452 : AIR 1972 SC 484 it has been contended that the High Court in exercise of power under section 482, Cr.P.C. can consider granting of bail to an accused while there is blatant error or illegality in the investigation. 10. On the other hand, learned P.P. Mr. Barua assisted by Mr. N. Kalita, Addl. 10. On the other hand, learned P.P. Mr. Barua assisted by Mr. N. Kalita, Addl. P.P. has resisted the aforesaid contention so raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner submitting that that in the given fact situation and apparent complicity of the accused-petitioner with the alleged offence and the magnitude of the offence which has occasioned tremendous loss to the government, exchequer for the fraudulent affairs conducted by the accused-petitioner, the I.O. is under serious obligation to carry out minute investigation to unearth the complicity of various excise officials (public servant) and others with the present petitioner. The I.O. though has submitted charge-sheet against the accused-petitioner (within time) but has also carried out further investigation after adding the section 13 of PC Act. The reference has been made to the report of the I.O. which has been placed before this court and it has been contended that there is no any illegality either in the order of the learned CJM or in the order of learned Special Judge as mentioned above. 11. Further the learned P.P. has referred to a decision reported in Rahul Parik vs. State of Rajasthan, 2017 Crl. L.J. 721 wherein it has been held that custody after filing of charge sheet is authorised under section 309, Cr.P.C. It is, however, on taking cognizance of offence or commencement of trial. Till cognizance of offences is taken for trying offences of accused, the Magistrate may assume custody of accused for the purpose of remand as governed by section 309, Cr.P.C. The custody of accused cannot be said to be illegal after filing of charge sheet till cognizance of offence is taken. 12. For proper appreciation of the matter some relevant paragraphs from the aforesaid judgment is reproduced below: “21. Section 309 no doubt comes into operation on cognizance of the offence or commencement of the trial. The custody is authorised on cognizance of offence. We are not making reference to section 209, Cr.P.C. as it is not applicable in the case in hand. If sections 167 and 309, Cr.P.C. read together and arranged in seriatim of events it would apply during the course of investigation and till filing of charge sheet, the operation of section 167 is ceased to exist after filing of charge sheet. If sections 167 and 309, Cr.P.C. read together and arranged in seriatim of events it would apply during the course of investigation and till filing of charge sheet, the operation of section 167 is ceased to exist after filing of charge sheet. It is as per section 167, Cr.P.C. the judgment of Constitution Bench of Apex Court in the case of Sanjay Dutta, thus, we can safely concluded that after the charge sheet chalan section 167, Cr.P.C. ceases to apply. 22. The question now remains as to under what provision custody can be authorised after filing of charge-sheet. For it reference of section 209, Cr.P.C. would be relevant. The custody after filing of charge sheet is authorised under section 309, Cr.P.C. It is, however, on taking cognizance of offence or commencement of trial. The provision of section 309, Cr.P.C. was made by the Legislature presuming that immediately on filing of charge sheet cognizance of offence could be taken or may be denied, thus, remand of custody should be allowed on cognizance of offence. The Legislature did not visualise the situation where there may be delay in taking cognizance of the offence as it happened in the present case in absence of sanction for prosecution. 23. In the aforesaid background if we go by strict mandate, then the judgment in the case of Natabar Parida, (1975) 2 SCC 220 : AIR 1975 SC 1465 would apply, wherein it is held that authorisation of custody can be given by Magistrate if the power is conferred for it. In the case of Uday Mohan Acharyjee, (2001) 5 SCC 453 : AIR 2001 SC 1910 the Apex Court given interpretation of and sections 167 and 209. The fact, however, remains that in subsequent judgment of the Apex Court in Suresh Kumar Bhikamchand Jain, AIR 2013 SC (Supp) 281, three Judges of the Apex Court have considered and decided the issue raised therein. The Apex Court held that as per the scheme of the Code of Criminal Procedure, once investigation is complete the court proceed to the next stage, i.e. for taking cognizance of the offence and trial. An accused has to remain on custody in the event of investigating authority fails to file charge sheet within the statutory period the accused is entitled to release on statutory bail. An accused has to remain on custody in the event of investigating authority fails to file charge sheet within the statutory period the accused is entitled to release on statutory bail. It is, however, to be noted that in other judgment such a bail is made admissible, if it is filed before submission of charge sheet not otherwise. It is further held that till the Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence for trying the offence, the court assumes charge of the custody of the accused for the purpose of remand to be governed in terms of section 309. The judgment was summed up with the aforesaid.” 24. As per the judgment aforesaid, the court assumes custody of the accused till cognizance of offence is taken. The judgment aforesaid has been given to continue the custody of accused after noticing two stages given in the court or criminal procedure and will fill up the gap in between two stages. 25. The third question gave the answer with the aforesaid and accordingly custody of accused cannot be said to be illegal after filing of the charge till cognizance of offence is taken. It is more so when it cannot be said that intervening period after filing of charge sheet till cognizance is taken due to lapse of court or the police, the cognizance of offence could not be taken in absence of sanction for prosecution mandated by section 90 of the Act. 26. It is a peculiar circumstances not visualised by Legislature and, thus, not dealt with by the Apex Court. In the light of the aforesaid, custody of accused cannot be said to be illegal.” 13. The decision of Suresh Kumar Bhikamchand Jain (supra) (2013) 3 SCC 77 also been pressed into by the learned P.P. in the course of their argument which has a reference in the Rahul Parik's case (supra). The learned Apex Court has also made observation that the accused enjoyed an indefeasible right to grant bail, if such application was made before filing of charge sheet but once the charge sheet is filed, such right come to an end and the accused would be entitled to regular bail on merit. Accordingly, it is the contention of the learned PP that the accused-petitioner cannot claim indefeasible right for grant of bail or release after filing of charge sheet within the stipulated time. Accordingly, it is the contention of the learned PP that the accused-petitioner cannot claim indefeasible right for grant of bail or release after filing of charge sheet within the stipulated time. The court can decide such bail prayer only on merit after filing of charge sheet. As in the present case it is an admitted position that the bail prayer of the accused-petitioner has already been decided and rejected on merit by the court of the learned CM, learned Special Judge, Hon’ble High Court as well as Hon’ble Apex Court, and as such in terms of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Kalyan Chandra Sarkar vs. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528 at this stage consideration of bail will be violative of decision of the Apex Court which is binding in nature. The necessary observation is reproduced below: “20........In the impugned order we do not see any such fresh ground recorded by the High Court by granting bail. It also failed to take into consideration that at least four occasions order refusing bail has been affirmed by this court and when subsequently the High Court grant bail, this court by its order dated 26.7.2000 cancelled the bail by a reasoned order. From the impugned order we do not notice any indication of the facts that the High Court took note of the grounds which persuaded this court to cancel the bail. Such approach by the High Court in our opinion is violative of principle of binding nature of judgment of superior court rendered in a lis between the same parties and in effect tends to ignore and thereby rendered ineffective the principle enunciated therein which have a binding character.” 14. On the next it has been contended by the learned counsel for the State that in view of the matters on record the stage of investigation and magnitude of the offence having serious impact the State machinery and complicity of the accused, the remand of accused is a necessity to the peculiar circumstances of the case and the same cannot be held as illegal and the learned courts below are within its jurisdiction while granting the remand and there cannot be any indefeasible right on the part of accused to claim bail on the pretext of such inconvenience that has been occurred within such transitory period. Countering to the submission that this court can dealt with release of bail of an accused under section 482, Cr.P.C. the learned P.P. has referred to the decision reported in 2009 (2) GLT SC 50, Wherein it has been held that “the jurisdiction under section 482 cannot be extended to grant bail in the manner done. There was not even consideration of merit of the case. The High Court was clearly in error by holding that there was no material to show that respondent Nos. 1 to 9 were absconders and issued direction to grant bail in a petition under section 482 of the Cr.P.C. 15. The relevant portion of the status report, furnished by the I.O. (in detail), is reproduced below: “During investigations, the I/O visited the PO and examined available witnesses and recorded their statements and also seized relevant documents in connection of the case. Investigation carried out so far, it is found that Mrs. Bonti Gogoi Pegu was licensee of the B.G. Bonded Warehouse located at Lopkhara, Guwahati. During 2012 she had entered into a Management Agreement with one Mrinal Goswami violating the primary licence condition and also executed a Power of Attorney in his favour to run her business of the bond. However, during scrutiny of seized records and statement of witnesses, it is found that accused-Rajesh Kr. Jalan was the mastermind of the entire alleged business of the B.G. Bonded Warehouse during 2012-15 who operated the entire business of the said bond through fake and forged transport permits and challans with the help of other accomplices and thereby misappropriated an huge amount of Rs. 19.86 crores Excise Revenue and Rs. 21,896,42,082 VAT in connivance with excise officials both Headquarter and field level officers deputed to the B.G. Bonded Warehouse. As a result, Government, has lost around Rs. 40 crores revenue during the period 2012-15. All the related documents including 2 Nos. of CPU and 2 Nos. of Cell Phones have been seized from the office of Shri Rajesh Kr. Jalan which are sent to CFSL, Kolkata for expert opinion relating to the B.G. Bonded Warehouse. The I/O has visited the retailer shops of the Kokrajhar district since accused of the case prepared forged transport permit and challans, etc., in the name of different retailers of Kokrajhar district. The seal and signature of Supdt. Jalan which are sent to CFSL, Kolkata for expert opinion relating to the B.G. Bonded Warehouse. The I/O has visited the retailer shops of the Kokrajhar district since accused of the case prepared forged transport permit and challans, etc., in the name of different retailers of Kokrajhar district. The seal and signature of Supdt. Of Excise of Kokrajhar, SBI, Kokrajhar and Treasury Officer, Kokrajhar were also found forged. There is found no record of SBI, Kokrajhar Branch office, Supdt. of Excise Officer, Kokrajhar and Treasury Office, Kokrajhar regarding depositing of Excise duty and VAT, etc. against the issue of transport permits and challans in the name of retailers of Kokrajhar to purchase liquor of B.G. Bonded Warehouse, Guwahati. On scrutiny of seized documents including some letters written and signed by accused Rajesh Kr. Jalan to the company named United Spirit Ltd. regarding purchased of liquor as he operated the B.G. Bonded Warehouse and 5 other bonded houses. Hence, the specimen signature of Rajesh Kr. Jalan were obtained and sent for FSL examinations which the signature found available in letter written to the company. The expert of FSL tallied each specimen signature and opined that both the signatures are similar. Hence, Shri Rajesh Kr. Jalan was arrested in the case and forwarded to the judicial custody and charge sheet also submitted against Shri Rajesh Kr. Jalan under section 120B/468/471, IPC under section 173(8), Cr.P.C. In a next step, Smt. Bonti Gogoi Pegu who is owner (Licensee) of the B.G. Bonded Warehouse issued three times notices under section 41 A, Cr.P.C. to appear before the I/O but she did not responded to I/O. Her house was searched so many times. Her passport was impound by the RPO Guwahati, one vehicle which was purchased by her from the B.G. Bonded Warehouse bank account was also seized in the case and finally she was arrested and forwarded to Judicial Custody. Now she is in Jail Custody and another achievement is that 3 times, the I/O issued notices under section 41A, Cr.P.C. to Shri Amarendra Nath, I/C Supdt. of Excise, Hailakandi, Shri Ajay Kr. Bayan, Supdt. Excise, Dibrugarh, and Inspr. Excise, Jorhat, Shri Bijoy Kr. Das. In this regard, Shri Ajay Kr. Bayan and Shri Bijoy Kr. Das were present who responded the notice and appeared before the I/O with medical report. of Excise, Hailakandi, Shri Ajay Kr. Bayan, Supdt. Excise, Dibrugarh, and Inspr. Excise, Jorhat, Shri Bijoy Kr. Das. In this regard, Shri Ajay Kr. Bayan and Shri Bijoy Kr. Das were present who responded the notice and appeared before the I/O with medical report. But Shri Amarendra Nath did not responded and sent a reply to the I/O for his absence due to sick and who finally took medical leave from the D.C. Hailakandi and had gone on medical leave for a period of one month as information received from the D.C. Hailakandi.” 16. The above report of the I.O. itself reflects that the extent of investigation to be earned out after scrutiny of all relevant materials, documents, to arrive at a proper finding as regards the complicity of the present accused-petitioner in connivance of higher excise officials. Though the I.O. has submitted charge sheet against the present petitioner prior to statutory period, still yet the IO is justified for further investigation in the given circumstances. Both the learned courts below, taking note of all the above, has allowed the IO for further investigation and also allowing for addition of the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Eventually, due to non-appearance of the excise officials even after service of notice under section 41A of the Cr.P.C. and till comparison of documents with the signature of accused in all seized documents, etc. the IO is not in a position to conclude the further investigation, which has been apprised to the learned Special Judge. That being the position there appears to be no illegality in the impugned order of the learned CJM, as well as the Special Judge, as alleged. It can be consciously held that it is a very transitory period from the filing of the charge-sheet against the accused-petitioner till the filing of the additional charge-sheet under section 173(8) of the Cr.P.C. the accused has to be remanded to custody by the court. As regards the merit of the case it is suffice to hold that the bail prayer has been rejected by all the forums already on merit and the same cannot be reconsidered herein in a petition under section 482 of the Cr.P.C. 17. As regards the merit of the case it is suffice to hold that the bail prayer has been rejected by all the forums already on merit and the same cannot be reconsidered herein in a petition under section 482 of the Cr.P.C. 17. It may be mentioned here that the decision in Ved Kumar (supra) was rendered in a different context while the trial court refused to grant bail after expiry of mandatory period while even the charge-sheet was not filed and the learned trial court observed that remand order has been passed under section 309(2) of the Cr.P.C. In para 35 of the aforesaid judgment it is held that “the remand orders under section 309(2) cannot be passed before submission of police report under section 173(2) on the basis of which alone the Magistrate can take cognizance under section 190(1)(b). Therefore, the learned CJM, in the instant case is not correct when he says that he has jurisdiction to take cognizance before submission of police report under section 173.” But the fact situation in the present case is totally different as has been discussed above and it is difficult to hold illegality of the order passed by the learned courts below. 18. The scope of invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction under section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is well settled. The High Court is justified for exercising such jurisdiction if any palpable illegality appears to be made out by the order of the court which calls for interference. The inherent power under section 482, Cr.P.C. envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of the court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. While exercising powers under the section, the court does not function as a court of appeal or revision, inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised “ex debito justitiae” to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts exist. 19. The power under section 482 must be exercised sparingly with circumspection and in rarest of rare cases. It is to be exercised “ex debito justitiae” to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts exist. 19. The power under section 482 must be exercised sparingly with circumspection and in rarest of rare cases. Exercise of inherent power under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not the rule but an exception. The exception is applied only when it is brought to the notice of the court that grave miscarriage of justice would be committed if the trial is allowed to proceed without considering lawful prayer of accused. In other words, the inherent power of the court under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure can be invoked by the High Court either to prevent abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Som Mittal vs. Government of Karnataka, 2008 Crl. L.J. 1610 (SC) : (2008) 3 SCC 753 : AIR 2008 SC 1126 : (2008) 3 SCC 753 . 20. The powers possessed by the High Court under section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. The court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. 21. Such provision under section 482, Cr.P.C. has to be exercised very sparingly to render real and substantial justice to the parties. It is not fair on the part of the High Court to interfere with judicial exercise of the discretion vested in the lower courts on the mere allegations of the accused - Pratap Singh vs. State of H.P. (2003) Crl. L.J. 2874 : (2003) 4 Rec Cr. R 294 (HP). 22. If we go by the word of “purposive legislation” in the given circumstances, it will be evident that while passing the order by the GM, he was not in a position to take cognizance as the offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act was added. Similarly the learned Special Judge was not in a position to take cognizance as the I.O. continued further investigation of the case and additional charge-sheet was not submitted as regards the co-accused. Similarly the learned Special Judge was not in a position to take cognizance as the I.O. continued further investigation of the case and additional charge-sheet was not submitted as regards the co-accused. Having regard to the offence which is of serious nature and secure of lots of documents and other facts related to discovery of certain facts from the e-documents, etc., and the magnitude of offence, it is incumbent on the part of the I.O. to go in for detail investigation. It cannot be lost sight of that the matter herein relates to economic offence and thereby causing loss of huge government, exchequer, one can assume that investigation is to be carried out to unearth the real miscreants involved at the helm of affairs. It includes high level officials of the excise department and having regard to all above the learned court has to allow adequate time to unearth such huge scam to book the real culprits involved in the case. 23. Having regard to the entire facts and circumstances depicted from the matters on record this court is of the opinion that it is not a fit case to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to interfere in the impugned orders and to release the accused on the ground assigned. 24. Resultantly both the petitions stand rejected.