JUDGMENT : 1. The present petition is filed by petitioner/accused under section 482 of Cr.P.C. praying to quash the entire proceedings in Crime No. 27/2017 of Nimbarga P.S. 2. Brief facts of the complaint are that a suo moto complaint registered against the accused alleging that on 11.03.2017 at about 03.00 p.m. on receipt of credible information they went near Shuntanoor Baba Fakiruddin Dargah, there they noticed some persons playing cards by betting. They raided the said place along with panch witnesses. Then they arrested four persons, recovered Rs.2,500/-, 52 playing cards. Same were seized by drawing a mahazar. Thereafter case was registered. 3. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned High Court Government Pleader. 4. The main grounds urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners are that complainant has not given written complaint and has not taken prior permission from the Magistrate as contemplated under section 81 of Karnataka Police Act nor complied with the provisions of section 155 of Cr.P.C. before conducting the raid. The said act is serious incurable defect. He would further contend that Section 87 of Karnataka Police Act comes under non-cognizable offence, no permission from the Magistrate was obtained as contemplated under section 155(2) of Cr.P.C. as such the proceedings are void, as such proceedings are not sustainable in law. He would further contend that playing Andhar-Bahar is not a game of chance, but game of skill. It does not constitute any offence. In order to substantiate the said fact he relied on decision of this Court. 5. Per contra, the learned HCGP would contend that a requisition dated 11.03.2017 was given by the concerned police to the JMFC Aland seeking permission to register the case on the information and on the same letter, permission was came to be granted. He by serving the copy of the said letter to the learned counsel for the petitioner produced the same before this Court. As such, the first contention will not sustain in law. He would also further contend that there is a prima facie material as against the accused. At this juncture it cannot be held that there is no material as against the accused-petitioner. Hence he prays for dismissal of the petition. 6. As such, the first contention will not sustain in law. He would also further contend that there is a prima facie material as against the accused. At this juncture it cannot be held that there is no material as against the accused-petitioner. Hence he prays for dismissal of the petition. 6. On perusal of the records, it does not disclose the fact that the Investigating Officer has not obtained any permission from the jurisdictional Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of Cr.P.C. But, during the course of arguments, the learned HCGP brought to my notice that he has given a letter dated 11.3.2017 seeking permission from the jurisdictional Magistrate and there is an endorsement “permitted”. On going through the said document, it indicates that before making a raid by the police officer on 11.3.2017 he has obtained the necessary permission from the jurisdictional Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of Cr.P.C. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner does not hold any water and the same is liable to be rejected. 7. The next contention taken up by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that playing andar baahar is not a game of chance, but it is a game of skill as such it does not constitute any offence. In order to substantiate the said contention, he has relied upon the decisions of co-ordinate bench of this Court. I have carefully and cautiously gone through the said decisions. The said decisions have been rendered at the time of adjudication of the case at the final stage after recording of evidence. Unless the prosecution proves how the game of andar baahar is played and in what manner bettings are recorded, it would not be inferred that it was a pure and simple game of chance and not a game of skill. Admittedly, in the instant case, this petition came to be filed at the stage of registration of the complaint. Still the investigation has to be completed and the charge sheet has to be filed. Under such circumstances, at this juncture, it cannot be inferred that the said andar bahaar is a game of skill and not a game of chance. Admittedly, in the instant case, this petition came to be filed at the stage of registration of the complaint. Still the investigation has to be completed and the charge sheet has to be filed. Under such circumstances, at this juncture, it cannot be inferred that the said andar bahaar is a game of skill and not a game of chance. Be that as it may, it is well established principles of law that while exercising the power conferred with this Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., that too when a case has been filed immediately after the registration of the case, the merits of the case not to be assessed at this stage. This Court can exercise the discretionary power only when from reading of the complaint, it cannot be held that even if the allegations are taken as proved no case is made out, then under such circumstances, the proceedings can be quashed. This proposition of law has been laid down in the case of Taramani Prakash Vs. State of M.P. & others, reported in (2015) 11 SCC 260 , wherein it is observed at paragraph-11 as under:- “11. Referring to earlier decisions, in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, it was observed: (SCC pp. 482-84, para 27) “27.1. Though there are no limits of the powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly, the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases. 27.2. The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere. 27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge. 27.4. 27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge. 27.4. Where the exercise of such power is absolutely essential to prevent patent miscarriage of justice and for correcting some grave error that might be committed by the subordinate courts even in such cases, the High Court should be loath to interfere, at the threshold, to throttle the prosecution in exercise of its inherent powers. 27.5. Where there is an express legal bar enacted in any of the provisions of the Code or any specific law in force to the very initiation or institution and continuance of such criminal proceedings, such a bar is intended to provide specific protection to an accused. 27.6. The Court has a duty to balance the freedom of a person and the right of the complainant or prosecution to investigate and prosecute the offender. 27.7. The process of the court cannot be permitted to be used for an oblique or ultimate/ ulterior purpose. 27.8. Where the allegations made and as they appeared from the record and documents annexed therewith to predominantly give rise and constitute a ‘civil wrong’ with no ‘element of criminality’ and does not satisfy the basic ingredients of a criminal offence, the court may be justified in quashing the charge. Even in such cases, the court would not embark upon the critical analysis of the evidence. 27.9. Another very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction; the court is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice. 27.10. It is neither necessary nor is the court called upon to hold a full-fledged enquiry or to appreciate evidence collected by the investigating agencies to find out whether it is a case of acquittal or conviction. 27.11. Where allegations give rise to a civil claim and also amount to an offence, merely because a civil claim is maintainable, does not mean that a criminal complaint cannot be maintained. 27.12. 27.11. Where allegations give rise to a civil claim and also amount to an offence, merely because a civil claim is maintainable, does not mean that a criminal complaint cannot be maintained. 27.12. In exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 228 and/or under Section 482, the Court cannot take into consideration external materials given by an accused for reaching the conclusion that no offence was disclosed or that there was possibility of his acquittal. The Court has to consider the record and documents annexed therewith by the prosecution. 27.13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to decide admissibility and reliability of the documents or records but is an opinion formed prima facie. 27.14. Where the charge-sheet, report under Section 173(2) of the Code, suffers from fundamental legal defects, the Court may be well within its jurisdiction to frame a charge. 27.15. Coupled with any or all of the above, where the Court finds that it would amount to abuse of process of the Code or that the interest of justice favours, otherwise it may quash the charge. The power is to be exercised ex debito justitiae i.e. to do real and substantial justice for administration of which alone, the court exist. (Ref. State of W.B. v. Swapan Kumar Guha, Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia V. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre, Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary, Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill, G. Sagar Suri v. State of U.P., Ajay Mitra v. State of M.P., Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Judicial Magistrate, State of U.P. v. O.P. Sharma, Ganesh Narayan Hegde. v. S. Bangarappa, Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. v. S. Bangarappa, Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque, Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd. v. Biological E. Ltd., Shakson Belthissor v. State of Kerala, V.V.S. Rama Sharma v. State of U.P., Chunduru Siva Ram Krishna v. Peddi Ravindra Bbu, Sheonandan Paswan V. State of Bihar, State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma, Lalmuni Devi v. State of Bihar, M. Krishnan v. Vijay Singh, Savita v. State of Rajasthan and S.M. Datta v. State of Gujarat.) 27.16 These are the principles which individually and preferably cumulatively (one or more) be taken into consideration as precepts to exercise of extraordinary and wide plenitude and jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code by the High Court. Where the factual foundation for an offence has be laid down, the courts should be reluctant and should not hasten to quash the proceedings even on the premise that one or two ingredients have not been stated or do not appear to be satisfied if there is substantial compliance with the requirements of the offence.’’ Keeping in view the ratio laid down in the above decision and on perusal of the records, now it cannot be held that it is not a simple game of chance and it is a game of skill. The said fact is to be clarified only when the full pledged trial is going to be held. At this preliminary stage, now it is not possible to quash the proceedings on that ground. In view of the above, there is no merit in the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. As such, the petition deserves to be dismissed. Accordingly, the same stands dismissed.